JUDGMENT : Jobin Sebastian, J. An order of detention dated 04.06.2025, passed against one Siraj K., S/o. Abdul Khader (herein after referred to as ‘detenu’), under Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (‘PITNDPS Act’ for brevity), is under challenge in this writ petition. The petitioner herein is the mother of the detenu. The said detention order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 22.08.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention. 2. As evident from the records, it was on the basis of a proposal dated 18.03.2025, forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode City, the jurisdictional authority, the 1st respondent, initiated proceedings against the detenu under Section 3 (1) of the PITNDPS Act. The case considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the order of detention is Crime No.147/2025 of Kozhikode Town Police Station, registered alleging commission of an offence punishable under Section 22 (c) of the NDPS Act. The allegation in the said case is that on 16.02.2025, the petitioner was found in possession of 778 gms of MDMA near Neelagiri lodge at Annie Hall road at Kozhikode, in contravention of the provisions of the NDPS Act. 3. We heard Sri. P.K.Varghese, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A.Anas, the learned Government Pleader. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Ext.P1 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and without proper application of mind. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another , [ 1991 (1) SCC 128 ] , the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is under judicial custody, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the case registered against him, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, though in the Ext.P1 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody, it is nowhere mentioned that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail in the case registered against him. The learned counsel submitted that for the above-mentioned sole reason, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 4. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext.P1 order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after complying with all the procedural formalities and after arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the Government Pleader, the impugned order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that a detention order under Section 3 (1) of the PITNDPS Act is the only way to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. It was further contended that the jurisdictional authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody, and it was on being satisfied that there is every chance that the detenu be released on bail, and if so released, he would in all probability indulge in criminal activities further, the order of detention was passed. According to him, therefore, the order of detention will legally sustain irrespective of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody while the impugned order was passed. 5. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3 (1) of the PINDPS Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody. 5. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3 (1) of the PINDPS Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Apex Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody. However, an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody cannot be passed in a mechanical manner. Undisputedly, an order of detention under the PITNDPS Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts his personal as well as his fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible. When a detenu is in jail, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy itself that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail, and further, if released on bail, the material on record reveals that he will indulge in prejudicial activity if not detained. The circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself. 6. In Kamarunnissa’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid. 7. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid. 7. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [ 1994 (2) SCC 337 ] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [ 2003 (8) SCC 342 ] . 8. In view of the said decisions, in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decisions by the Supreme Court. 9. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu and considered by the authority to pass the impugned order of detention is crime No.147/2025 of Kozhikode Town Police Station, alleging the commission of an offence punishable under Section 22 (c) of the NDPS Act. In the said case, the detenu was arrested on 16.02.2025, and since then, he has been under judicial custody. It was on 18.03.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that the proposal for proceedings under the PITNDPS Act was initiated. Later, it was on 04.06.2025, the impugned order was passed. 10. In Ext.P1 impugned order, the fact that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under custody is specifically adverted to. Similarly, it is mentioned that no bail application has been filed by the detenu so far. Likewise, in the impugned order, it is stated that, if the detenu is released, he, along with other associates, will traffic synthetic contraband from other states. Similarly, it is noted that the detenu is a person indulging in trafficking a huge quantity of MDMA from other states. In the impugned order, it is further stated that it is objectively and subjectively satisfied that the detention of the respondent under the PITNDPS Act is imperative to prevent him from indulging in further illegal activities. We do agree that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “detenu is likely to be released on bail”. 11. In the impugned order, it is further stated that it is objectively and subjectively satisfied that the detention of the respondent under the PITNDPS Act is imperative to prevent him from indulging in further illegal activities. We do agree that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “detenu is likely to be released on bail”. 11. Dealing with a similar situation, the Supreme Court in Union of India and another vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad ( 2019 KHC 6662) , after considering the dictum laid down in Kamarunissa (cited supra) in paragraph 35 of the judgment, observed as follows; “In the light of the well settled principles, we have to see, in the present case, whether there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that detenu is in custody and he had reason to believe that detenu is likely to be released on bail and if so released, he would continue to indulge in prejudicial activities. In the present case, the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 record the awareness of the detaining authority that (i) the detenu is in custody, (ii) that the bail application filed by the detenus have been rejected by the court. Of course, in the detention order, the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that the “detenu is likely to be released. It cannot be said that the detaining authority has not applied its mind merely on the ground that in the detention orders, it is not expressly stated as to the “detenu’s likelihood of being released on bail” and if so released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities. But the detaining authority has clearly recorded the antecedents of the detenu and its satisfaction that the detenus, Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar, have the high propensity to commit such offences in the future.” 12. Keeping in mind the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that, in the impugned order, it is not specifically recorded that the detenu is likely to be released on bail. However, in the order, it is stated that if the detenu is released on bail, there is a high propensity that the detenu will indulge in drug peddling activities in the future. However, in the order, it is stated that if the detenu is released on bail, there is a high propensity that the detenu will indulge in drug peddling activities in the future. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is already in custody and he is likely to be released on bail, and on being so released, he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity, is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and normally, the subjective satisfaction is not to be interfered with. The impugned order reflects that there is a proper application of mind and, based on the materials available on record, the detaining authority subjectively satisfied that there is a reason to believe that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, on so released, the detenu will in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities. Therefore, merely because of the reason that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “the detenu is likely to be released on bail”, it cannot be said that the impugned order lacks satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the chance of the detenu being released on bail. 13. Therefore, it is clear that the order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, on being so released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities. A perusal of the records further reveals that all the procedural formalities before and after passing an order of detention have been fully complied with in this case. Similarly, from the records as well as from the impugned order, it is discernible that the said order has been passed by the jurisdictional authority after arriving at the requisite subjective as well as objective satisfaction. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.