JUDGMENT : GOPINATH P., J. The appellants are accused Nos. 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, and 17 in S.C.No.811/2005 on the file of the Sessions Court, Thalassery. S.C.No.811/2005 arises from Crime No.171/2001 of Mattannur Police Station, Kannur district, which was registered alleging commission of offences under Sections 143 , 147, 148, 323, 324, 326, and 307 r/w Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ IPC ’), and under Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 1908 Act'). The trial of the case against accused No.1 was split up, as he was/is absconding. The prosecution examined 17 witnesses (PWs 1 to 17) and marked 13 exhibits (Exts P1 to P13). The defence examined 5 witnesses (DWs 1 to 5), and 6 exhibits were marked (Exts D1 to D6). Two material objects were produced as MO1 and MO2. Following the trial, the Sessions Court acquitted accused Nos. 2, 5, 7, 8, 14, 15, and 18. Accused No.11 in the case had died pending trial. The appellants herein were found not guilty under Section 3 07 r/w Section 149 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 5 of the 1908 Act. The appellants were found guilty under Sections 143 , 147, 323, 324, and 326 r/w Section 149 of the IPC . The appellants (except appellant No.8/accused No.16) were also found guilty under Section 148 of the IPC . The appellants/accused were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. The maximum term of imprisonment was for the offence under Section 3 26 r/w Section 149 of the IPC , for which the appellants were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years and to a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. The appellants were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month each under Section 143 r/w Section 149 of the IPC , rigorous imprisonment for three months each under Section 147 r/w Section 149 of the IPC , rigorous imprisonment for three months each under Section 3 23 r/w Section 149 of the IPC , rigorous imprisonment for one year each under Section 3 24 r/w Section 149 of the IPC . Accused Nos. 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 17 were also sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months each under Section 148 of the IPC . All substantive sentences were to run concurrently. Accused Nos. 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 17 were also sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months each under Section 148 of the IPC . All substantive sentences were to run concurrently. The amount of fine, if recovered, was directed to be paid as compensation to PW9 under Section 3 57(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . 2. Sri. K.S. Madhusoodanan, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, has invited the attention of the Court to the First Information Statement (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FIS’) (Ext. P9) given by PW8. He has also taken the Court to the depositions of PW8, PW9, PW10, and PW11. He also referred to the depositions of PW4 (the doctor who examined PW10 and PW11 at the Indira Gandhi Co-operative Hospital, Thalassery, and issued Exts. P4 and P5 wound certificates) and PW12 (who examined PW9 and issued Ext. P10 wound certificate). The learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to Ext. P12, the discharge summary from the Kasturba Medical College Hospital, Mangalore, in respect of PW9. It is pointed out that even according to the prosecution, PW8, PW9, PW10, and PW11, and the accused, belong to rival political fronts. It is submitted that even according to the prosecution, the injured persons, namely PW9, PW10, and PW11, along with some others, had been called to the Mattannur Police Station in connection with a complaint given by the accused No.14 (Balakrishnan), and they were attacked when they were returning from the Police Station. It is submitted that the attack admittedly took place in front of the shop of one Dineshan. It is submitted that, according to the prosecution, the accused persons had the intention to murder PW9, and this was prevented on account of the fact that certain people of the locality came running on seeing PW9 and the other injured persons being attacked by the accused in this case. It is submitted that, surprisingly, the prosecution did not deem it necessary to examine Dineshan, despite all the witnesses having a consistent case that the attack took place right in front of the shop of Dineshan. It is submitted that the prosecution did not examine any person from among the group of persons who allegedly came running on seeing the attack. It is submitted that the prosecution did not examine any person from among the group of persons who allegedly came running on seeing the attack. In other words, it is submitted that, apart from the interested testimony of PW8, PW9, PW10, and PW11, there was no other independent prosecution witness (other than the official witnesses and the doctors) to establish the case against the appellants/accused. It is pointed out from the First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FIR’) that though it is stated that the FIR was registered at 2:00 p.m. on 27.05.2001, the FIS indicates that PW9 had already been admitted at the Kasturba Medical College Hospital, Mangalore, at that time, whereas Ext.P10, the discharge summary from the Kasturba Medical College Hospital, Mangalore, indicates that PW9 was admitted only at 6:24 p.m. on 27.05.2001. It is submitted that Exts.P4 and P5, wound certificates issued by PW4, give contradictory reasons for the injuries allegedly suffered by PWs 10 and 11. It is submitted that Exts.P4 and P5 are also silent regarding the identity of all the persons who allegedly attacked PWs 10 and 11. It is submitted that even in Ext.P12 discharge summary, the names of the persons who attacked PW9 have not been mentioned. It is submitted that this coupled with the fact that Ext.P9-FIS and Ext.P11-FIR appear to be antedated or ante- timed, indicates that, owing to political rivalry, the names of the present appellants were necessarily included in the array of accused. It is submitted that the depositions of PW8, PW9, PW10, and PW11 indicate that the injured persons and the accused were all persons of the same locality, and they were all well known to each other. It is submitted that in such circumstances, the failure to indicate the identity of the assailants assumes significance. It is submitted that the prosecution also failed to explain the reasons for the injuries suffered by the accused No.7 (Achuthan), and this is also fatal to the prosecution case. 3. The learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra , 1982 (1) SCC 700 , to contend that the statement of the injured to the doctor, being first in point of time, must be preferred to any subsequent statement made by the injured. 3. The learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra , 1982 (1) SCC 700 , to contend that the statement of the injured to the doctor, being first in point of time, must be preferred to any subsequent statement made by the injured. It is submitted that if this principle is applied to the facts of this case, the failure to mention the names of the present appellants is fatal to the prosecution case. The learned counsel also referred to Rehmat v. State of Haryana , 1996 KHC 1280 , to contend that while attending to persons who are allegedly injured owing to an attack by some others, doctors treating the injured persons are supposed to record the names of the assailants. It is submitted that the failure to record the names of the present appellants is also fatal to the prosecution case. The learned counsel then placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Babu Ram and Others v. State of Punjab , (2008) 3 SCC 709 , to contend that the failure to mention the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of occurrence in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance from which the Court may draw an inference that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version. It is also submitted that the same judgment is authority for the proposition that the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes greater significance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution. The learned counsel has also placed for the consideration of this Court the decision of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Singh and Others v. State of Bihar , AIR 1976 SC 2263, which was relied upon and followed by the Supreme Court in Babu Ram (supra). It is submitted that all the above circumstances put together indicate that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants/accused beyond all reasonable doubt, and therefore the appellants/accused are to be acquitted, giving them the benefit of doubt. 4. It is submitted that all the above circumstances put together indicate that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants/accused beyond all reasonable doubt, and therefore the appellants/accused are to be acquitted, giving them the benefit of doubt. 4. Smt. Seena C, the learned Public Prosecutor, has taken this Court again to the depositions of PWs 8, 9, 10, and 11. She also referred to Exhibit P1 scene mahazar to contend that there is clear evidence of the commission of the alleged offence by the appellants. It is submitted that, though PW3, the owner of the jeep in which the accused had travelled, had turned hostile to the prosecution, it must be noticed that he admitted that the jeep was being driven by his brother named Santhosh, who was also one of the accused in the case. It is submitted that, where the medical evidence corroborates the evidence of injured witnesses, the evidence of the injured witnesses carries great weight. In support of this contention, the learned Public Prosecutor has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State through the Inspector of Police V. Laly @ Manikandan and Another , 2022 KHC 7089, and to the judgment in Balu Sudam Khalde and Another V. State of Maharashtra , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355, which was subsequently followed by the Supreme Court in Baljinder Singh @ Ladoo and Other V. State of Punjab (judgment dated 25.09.2024 in Crl. Appeal No.1389 of 2012). She further submits that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the FIS was antedated or ante-timed cannot be accepted. It is submitted that a reading of the FIS will indicate that the first informant had gone to the police station to lodge the FIR after the person who suffered the major injury was taken in a jeep to a hospital in Mangalore. It is submitted that, even according to the FIS, it is clear that the seriously injured witnesses were taken to Mangalore by one Dayanandan and others. It is submitted that non-examination of Dineshan is not fatal to the prosecution's case, as the person who gave the FIS was also an eyewitness to the incident, and he was running a ration shop directly in front of the place where the incident occurred. It is submitted that non-examination of Dineshan is not fatal to the prosecution's case, as the person who gave the FIS was also an eyewitness to the incident, and he was running a ration shop directly in front of the place where the incident occurred. It is submitted that the entire genesis of the incident was clearly explained by the first informant, who was examined as PW8. It is submitted that, in such circumstances, there is no merit in any of the contentions taken by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit, in reply, that even the preparation of the scene mahazar, which was allegedly prepared at about 04:30 PM on 27.05.2001, is doubtful as the first informant has clearly stated about the admission of the main injured at a hospital at Mangalore, which happened only at 06:24 PM on the same day. It is submitted that, in such circumstances, the appellants ought to have been acquitted on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt. It is submitted that, since the standard of proof required in such cases is high, all lacunae in the prosecution's case should come to the benefit of the appellants/accused. 6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned Public Prosecutor, I am of the opinion that the appellants are entitled to succeed. The prosecution case in brief is that the appellants, who belong to a political party in rivalry with the political party to which the injured and others belong, had attacked the injured persons owing to such political rivalry. It is in such circumstances that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants and the injured persons and others were well known to each other, and yet the injured persons did not deem it necessary to mention the name of all the accused persons as being responsible for causing injuries at the time when they were examined by the doctor assumes significance. In Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani (supra), the Supreme Court held as follows:- “Thus, the reason given by the High Court for distrusting the evidence of Dr Heena is wholly unsustainable. In Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani (supra), the Supreme Court held as follows:- “Thus, the reason given by the High Court for distrusting the evidence of Dr Heena is wholly unsustainable. Moreover, the statement of the injured to Dr Heena being the first statement in point of time must be preferred to any subsequent statement that Shetty may have made. In fact, the admitted position is that Shetty did not know the appellant before the occurrence nor did he know his name which was disclosed to him by one Salim. Therefore, Salim who is now dead, being the source of information of Shetty would be of doubtful admissibility as it is not covered by Section 32 of the Evidence Act. And, once we believe the evidence of PW 11, as we must, then the entire bottom out of the prosecution case is knocked out.” (Emphasis is supplied) It is also relevant in this context to note that Exts.P4, P5, and P10 do not spell out the names of the assailants. While no names are mentioned in Exts.P4 and P5, the names mentioned in Ext.P10 are those of the 1st accused (O. Govindan) and N. Pavithran (accused No.18). Paragraph 10 of Rehmat (supra) reads thus: “10. There is also another aspect which goes in favour of the appellant. Admittedly Padam Singh (PW 4) along with Vijay Singh had first gone to the Primary Health Centre for medical help but he did not disclose the name of the assailant to the doctor. Ordinarily, in a medico-legal case, the doctor is supposed to write down the history of the injured but admittedly in this case, medical papers of Padam Singh (PW 4) do not indicate the name of the assailant. The names were disclosed only at the time when the complaint was recorded by SI Narain Singh at about 9.00 p.m. which was treated as a formal FIR. The learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, rightly urged that the appellant was later on implicated in the present crime at the instance of the complainant and his friends. The names were disclosed only at the time when the complaint was recorded by SI Narain Singh at about 9.00 p.m. which was treated as a formal FIR. The learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, rightly urged that the appellant was later on implicated in the present crime at the instance of the complainant and his friends. It may also be stated that the prosecution case even otherwise appears to us improbable because Padam Singh (PW 4) claims to have got up early in the morning and seen the appellant running from the side of his room at about 3.30 a.m. In these circumstances, it is not possible to sustain the conviction of the appellant under Sections 3 07 /393 of the Penal Code, 1860.” 7. Ext.D5 shows that one of the accused (Achuthan, S/o. Narayanan) had suffered a lacerated wound on his scalp (occipital region). The aforementioned Achuthan was the 7th accused in the case. The prosecution has clearly failed to explain the reasons for the injuries suffered by accused No.7. In Babu Ram (supra), it was held as follows: “18. It is a well-settled law that in a murder case, the non- explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance from which the court can draw the following inferences: “1. that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version; 2. that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying on a most material point and therefore their evidence is unreliable; 3. that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case.” (See Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar [ (1976) 4 SCC 394 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 671 : AIR 1976 SC 2263 ] , SCC p. 401, para 12.) 19. Further, it is important to point out that the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one.” Even if this Court were to ignore the failure to mention the name of the present appellants in Exts. P4, P5, and P10 and the failure of the prosecution to explain the injuries on accused No.7 (not an appellant) were not fatal to the prosecution case, it is clear that the FIR in this case shows that it was registered at 2:00 p.m. on 27.05.2001. The FIS leading to registration of the FIR indicates that it must have been given only after PW9 was admitted to the Kasturba Medical College Hospital, Mangalore, which is at 6:24 p.m. on 27.01.2001 (see Ext. P10). Further, though it is the prosecution case that the assault took place in the front of the shop of one Dineshan, the prosecution did not deem it necessary to examine Dineshan. In the FIS, it is stated as follows: Thus, failure to examine Dineshan, who would have been a prime witness for the prosecution, is significant. 8. The principles that can be culled out from the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to by the learned Public Prosecutor, that the statements by the injured witnesses carry great weight, are unimpeachable. However, the shortcomings in the prosecution case discussed above lead me to conclude that the prosecution has not established its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the appellants are entitled to be acquitted, giving them the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the conviction and the sentence imposed on the appellants in S.C.No.811/2005 on the file of the Sessions Court, Thalassery will stand set aside. The bonds executed by the appellants will stand discharged.