JUDGMENT : SYAM KUMAR V.M., J. 1. This appeal is filed challenging the judgment dated 03.03.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.24282 of 2021. The appellant was the petitioner in the said W.P.(C) and the respondent was the respondent therein. 2. The respondent, who was a Nursing Assistant, was terminated from service on 05.04.2018 after due enquiry. She raised Industrial Dispute (ID) No.49 of 2018 before the Labour Court, Kollam, and the case proceeded as envisaged. After the enquiry officer was examined before the court, the respondent filed an I.A. seeking permission to file an additional claim statement. An objection was filed by the appellant to the said I.A., pointing out that the Kerala Industrial Disputes Rules , 1957, do not envisage the filing of an additional claim statement. The said objection was not accepted by the Labour Court and vide Ext.P5 order dated 12.11.2020, the additional claim statement was accepted. Since in Ext.P5 order, it had been erroneously stated that the appellant had failed to point out the absence of pleadings regarding the validity of the enquiry, an IA was filed by the appellant to expunge the observation. Thereafter, the ID was posted on various dates for hearing the said IA, but there was no appearance for the respondent consecutively. Finally, on 11.02.2021, the case was posted to 08.04.2021 for rendering the Award. On that date, the Award was rendered and the case was posted for pronouncement to 28.04.2021. In the meantime, the respondent on 28.04.2021 applied to review the order dated 11.02.2021, by which the case was reserved for rendering the Award. No application for setting aside the Award was filed. The Award, which had already been rendered, remained, and it was sent to the Government for publication. Appellant filed objections to the I.A. seeking review, pointing out that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to review its orders and that the award, having already been passed on 08.04.2021, the earlier order dated 11.02.2021 cannot now be reviewed. However, the application for reviewing the Order was allowed by the Labour Court by Ext.P10 order on 12.08.2021, and the award already rendered was set aside. However, the application for reviewing the Order was allowed by the Labour Court by Ext.P10 order on 12.08.2021, and the award already rendered was set aside. Aggrieved by the same, the Writ Petition was filed by the appellant seeking to quash the Exts.P5 and P10 orders rendered by the Labour Court, Kollam, allowing the respondent to file the additional claim statement and reviewing its own earlier order dated 11.02.2021. The following prayers were sought in the W.P. (C): “a) A writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order quashing and setting aside Exts.P5 and P10 orders; b) Hold that the Award passed by the Labour Court, Kollam on 08.04.2021 in I.D.No.49/2018 is final and is liable to be published as provided in Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act ; c) Issue such other writ, order or direction as are deemed just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, dismissed the W.P.(C) inter alia holding that the Labour Court proceedings were conducted during a period when the State and the Country were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, and considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, there was no illegality in the orders rendered by the Labour Court, Kollam. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the W.P. (C), this Writ Appeal has been filed by the appellant. 4. Heard Sri.P.Ramakrishnan, Advocate appearing for the appellant and Sri.Liju V.Stephen, Advocate appearing for the respondent. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is erroneous and unsustainable in law. The learned Single Judge has overlooked the legal position that Rule 10B of the Kerala Industrial Disputes Rules , 1957, which relates to proceedings before the Labour Court, does not envisage even the filing of a claim statement, let alone adding or amending a statement already filed. The learned Single Judge also failed to note that the Labour Court had acted beyond its jurisdiction. The Labour Court had no power to permit parties to file additional pleadings or to adduce additional evidence after rendering of the Award. The Labour Court should have recognised that the validity of the enquiry was being challenged only after the enquiry officer's examination and submission of the enquiry file, without stating any valid reason for not raising the issue earlier. The Labour Court should have recognised that the validity of the enquiry was being challenged only after the enquiry officer's examination and submission of the enquiry file, without stating any valid reason for not raising the issue earlier. The fact that an enquiry had been conducted was deliberately suppressed, despite being mentioned in the written statement. Ext.P5 order allowing the respondent to file an additional statement is therefore arbitrary and illegal. Further, the Industrial Disputes Act does not empower the Labour Court to review its own orders and hence, the Labour Court ought to have dismissed the application filed by the respondent seeking to review the earlier order. Since the Labour Court acknowledged that the award had been made and that it had been sent to the Government for publication, that meant that the respondent’s application to review an earlier order that reserved the dispute for an award could not be considered or entertained. Since the award had already been forwarded to the Government under Section 17 of the Act, no further adjudication was necessary or permissible. The Labour Court’s view that the enquiry’s validity needed to be decided and that parties should be heard before passing a preliminary award is legally unsustainable. The final award, having already been issued and sent for publication, the Labour Court’s order (Ext.P10) reviewing the earlier order of 11.02.2021, it is contended by the learned counsel, is unjustifiable and unsustainable, and the learned Single Judge erred in failing to take note of the same. It is further submitted that Rule 23 of the Kerala Industrial Dispute Rules empowers the Labour Court to set aside an ex parte order on an application made within 15 days of the decision. The Rule also provides for a condonation of delay, in case sufficient cause is shown. The application filed by the respondent was not for setting aside the ex parte order, and the relief sought therein was for reviewing an order dated 11.02.2021, as per which the dispute was taken for award. It is contended that even assuming that it is an application for setting aside the order dated 11.02.2021, the same has not been filed within 15 days of the order, and there has been no application for condonation of delay as well. It is contended that even assuming that it is an application for setting aside the order dated 11.02.2021, the same has not been filed within 15 days of the order, and there has been no application for condonation of delay as well. In view of the same, it is contended that Ext.P10 order passed by the Labour Court is arbitrary, illegal, and the learned Single Judge erred in overlooking the same. The learned counsel thus sought to set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent contended that the judgment of the learned Single Judge was validly rendered and the same does not call for interference. It is contended that by an inadvertent mistake on the part of the respondent, the ground of violation of principles of natural justice was not raised in the claim statement, and hence an application had to be filed for permission to file an additional claim statement. The Labour Court had accepted the additional claim statement, insofar as the same did not alter the nature of the dispute raised by the respondent. It is further contended that the application that was preferred by the respondent was not properly worded, and thus it happened to be filed seeking to review the order dated 11.02.2021. The said error, as properly noted by the Labour Court, cannot disentitle a workman from the benefits of a welfare legislation like the Industrial Dispute Act. It is contended that, being a beneficial legislation, the Industrial Dispute Act should be constituted in favour of the workmen and that the respondent is the mother of two children, and the elder child is suffering from cerebral palsy. Reliance is also placed on the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, 1980 KHC 490 wherein it had been held that the Tribunal has power to pass orders that it thinks fit in the interest of justice and that even though there is no express prohibition in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving Tribunal jurisdiction to do so, such orders could be issued by the Tribunal. It has been held by the Supreme Court further that by the settled rules of statutory construction, a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Tribunals should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is an indication in the statute to the contrary. No such statutory prohibition has been noted, and on the other hand, there are indications which would show that the object has been to confer wide powers to mitigate the rigour of the technicalities of law. As regards an exparte award, it has been held by the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank (supra) that, where a party is prevented from appearing at the hearing due to a sufficient cause, and is faced with an exparte award, it is as if the party is visited with an award without notice of the proceedings. Where the Tribunal proceeds to make an award without notice to a party, the award is nothing but a nullity. In such circumstances, the Tribunal has not only the power, but also the duty to set aside the exparte award and to direct the matter to be heard afresh. As regards the contention that the Tribunal has become functus officio after rendering the award and therefore has no jurisdiction to set aside the exparte award, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has in Grindlays Bank (supra) held that such a contention cannot be sustained. It has been held that the proceedings with regard to a reference under Section 10 of the Act are therefore not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then, the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date, it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. Thus, it is contended that the Labour Court was not without jurisdiction to set aside the award, which it is submitted had effectively been rendered ex parte. Till then, the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date, it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. Thus, it is contended that the Labour Court was not without jurisdiction to set aside the award, which it is submitted had effectively been rendered ex parte. Further reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the order dated 10.01.2022 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, 2022 (1) KLT 315 (SC) which was rendered whereby inter alia, the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, was excluded for the purposes of limitation, as prescribed under any general or special laws, in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. It is thus prayed by the learned counsel that the learned Single Judge had correctly rendered the impugned judgment after taking due note of the COVID-19 pandemic situation that prevailed, and hence the same did not merit any interference. 7. We have heard both sides in detail and have considered the contentions put forth. We note that the learned Single Judge has specifically taken note of the fact that the Labour Court proceedings had been held during COVID-19 pandemic period and that the respondent has specifically sworn to an affidavit to the effect that when the case was posted before the Labour Court, the counsel appearing for the respondent was quarantined due to COVID-19 pandemic. The Labour Court, therefore, deemed it fit to give one more opportunity to the respondent. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case. The learned Single Judge has also stated that Exts.P5 and P10 orders of the Labour Court, Kollam impugned in the W.P.(C) have been considered and that no illegality warranting interference has been noted. Taking note of the above as well as the legal position as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank (supra) as referred to above, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The Writ Appeal fails, and it is dismissed. No costs.