JUDGMENT : Easwaran S., J. These appeals have presented before us certain unique facts. On the one hand, the State as well as the requisitioning authority contend that the amount of compensation granted by the reference court is on the higher side, whereas on the other hand, the claimants contend that the amount fixed by the land acquisition officer is dismally low and it was therefore that the reference under Section 18 of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was sought and the same was answered in their favour. The facts are unique in the sense that in respect of a single cause for land acquisition covered by one notification, land owners are differentiated on two different criteria; (a) the award passed under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and (b) the award passed under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 [Act 30 of 2013]. Different market values are fixed for the same category of lands acquired for the very same purpose albeit under two different enactments. Facts of the case 2. A total extent of 105.27 hectares of land was sought to be acquired for establishment of a “Life Science Park” on request of the Kerala State Industrial Development Corporation ('KSIDC', for short). Section 4(1) notification was published on 14.10.2008 and award was passed on 21.11.2011. Possession was taken on 16.01.2012. The land acquisition officer categorised the land into six categories as follows: Category Nature 1 Dry land on the side of National Highway 2 Dry Land with PWD road 3 Dry Land with Panchayat road 4 Dry land with Pathway 5 Reclaimed land without access 6 Reclaimed land with access The land acquisition officer relied on the basic document, Sale Deed No.2083/2008 dated 15.4.2008. In these appeals, we are concerned with category Nos. 2, 3, and 5. The land value fixed by the land acquisition officer for these categories is Rs.1,88,461/-, Rs.1,38,273/- & Rs.88,149/-, respectively. The reference court relied on sale deed No.925/2008 dated 15.4.2008 and refixed the land value at Rs.3,83,083/- for category No.2 and Rs.3,55,730/- for category No.3. The appeals arising out of the proceedings under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are detailed as below: Sl No Appeal by state Appeal by Requisition Authority LAR Nos.
The reference court relied on sale deed No.925/2008 dated 15.4.2008 and refixed the land value at Rs.3,83,083/- for category No.2 and Rs.3,55,730/- for category No.3. The appeals arising out of the proceedings under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are detailed as below: Sl No Appeal by state Appeal by Requisition Authority LAR Nos. Catego ry Amount fixed by LAO per Are Amount fixed by Reference Court per Are 1 LAA No. 558/2022 Nil 133/2012 II 1,88,461/- 3,83,084/- 2 LAA No. 555/2022 LAA No. 597/2022 & CO No 191/2022 128/2012 V 88,149/- 2,73,631.50 3 LAA No. 571/2022 LAA No. 97/2023 132/2012 II 1,38,273/- 3,55,730/- 4 LAA No. 131/2021 Nil 139/2012 III 1,38,273/- 3,55,730/- 5 LAA No. 200/2019 Nil 1/2013 III 1,38,273/- 2,16,049/- 6 LAA No. 98/2019 Nil 138/2012 III 1,38,273/- 2,90,123/- 7 LAA No. 106/2021 NIL 134/2012 III 1,38,273/- 2,90,123/- 3. As stated above, certain tracts of land were not subjected to any proceedings under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but award was passed after the promulgation of Act 30 of 2013 on 3.11.2017. The land acquisition officer followed the categorization for the purpose of the acquisition under the new Act as well and determined the compensation, accordingly. In these appeals, we are concerned about category Nos.2, 3, 4, 5 & 6. The value fixed by the land acquisition officer for these categories is as follows: Category Value (Rs.) 2 1,28,000/- 3 96,000/- 4 91,200/- 5 86,640/- 6 35,000/- Dissatisfied with the fixation of the market value, the claimants sought reference under Section 64 of the Act 30 of 2013. The reference court enhanced the market value as follows: Category Value (Rs.) 2 5,47,264/- 3 5,25,000/- 4 5,21,000/- 5 4,10,000/- 6 4,56,000/- 4. Altogether nine references were answered and the State as well as the requisitioning authority have preferred the following appeals: N o Sl Appeal by State Appeal by requisitioning Authority LAR Nos.
The reference court enhanced the market value as follows: Category Value (Rs.) 2 5,47,264/- 3 5,25,000/- 4 5,21,000/- 5 4,10,000/- 6 4,56,000/- 4. Altogether nine references were answered and the State as well as the requisitioning authority have preferred the following appeals: N o Sl Appeal by State Appeal by requisitioning Authority LAR Nos. Category Awarded by LAO (in Ares) Amount awarded by reference (in Ares) 1 LAA No. 560/2022 Nil LAR No. 24/2018 II 1,28,000/- 5,47,264/- 2 LAA No. 524/2022 Nil LAR No. 25/2018 V 86,640/- 4,10,000/- 3 LAA No .531/20 22 Nil LAR No. 13/2018 II 1,28,000/- 5,47,264/- 4 LAA No. 522/2022 LAA No. 98/2023 LAR No. 20/2018 VI 35,000/- 4,56,000/- 5 LAA No. 587/2022 Nil LAR No. 18/2018 III & VI 96,000/- 35,000/- 5,25,000/- 4,56,000/- 6 LAA No. 614/2022 Nil LAR No. 17/2018 IV 91,200/- 5,21,000/- 7 LAA No. 603/2022 Nil LAR No. 14/2018 VI 35,000/- 4,56,000/- 8 LAA No. 296/2021 Nil LAR No. 15/2018 VI 35,000/- 4,56,000/- 9 LAA No. 617/2022 Nil LAR No. 16/2018 IV 91,200/- 5,21,000/- Submissions on behalf of the State as well as the requisitioning authority 5. The learned Senior Government Pleader, Sri.T.K.Shajahan, raised twofold contentions touching upon the method adopted by the reference court in respect of these references under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as well as under the new Act. The primary objection taken by the State against the findings of the reference court is that the reference court erred egregiously in relying on sale deed No.925/2008 without looking into the value of the land fixed in the prior deed, which was executed nine months prior to the same. According to the learned Senior Government Pleader, the land value is exorbitantly high in sale deed No.925/2008 and therefore, the same ought not to have been taken by the reference court. The submissions on behalf of the learned Senior Government Pleader were supported by Sri.P.U.Shailajan, the learned counsel appearing for the requisitioning authority, KSIDC, who pointed out that the reference court had relied on the aforesaid document and fixed market value at Rs.2,43,211.72 per Are purely on a guesswork, which was challenged by the KSIDC in L.A.App. No.76/2017 and the matter was remanded back.
No.76/2017 and the matter was remanded back. On remand, the claimant failed to adduce any evidence to substantiate his claim that Ext.A2, sale deed No.925/2008, was properly valued and in the absence of any evidence, the claimant is not entitled to the land value fixed by the reference court. In short, the primary opposition of the State as well as the requisitioning authority is against reckoning of sale deed No.925/2008. 6. The secondary contention raised by the State as well as by the requisitioning authority is against the methodology adopted by the reference court in fixing the market value of the land in respect of the awards passed under the Act 30 of 2013. The learned Senior Government Pleader pointed out that in terms of the mandate contained under Section 26 of the Act 30 of 2013, the reference court could not have fixed the market value solely in terms of sale deed No.925/2008. Submissions on behalf of the claimants 7. On behalf of the claimants, we have heard Sri.George Varghese Perumpallikuttiyil, Sri.V.Ajaykumar, Sri.R.S.Kalkura, Sri.J.G.Syamnath, Sri.S.Vinod Bhat, Sri.K.Dhruv Kumar, Sri.J.Harikumar, Sri.R.Sunil Kumar and Sri.K.Siju. 8. Sri.George Varghese Perumpallikuttiyil, the learned counsel appearing for the cross objector in C.O.No.191/2022, pointed out that the land acquisition officer and the reference court applied the belting system incorrectly. 9. Even assuming that the reference court was justified in accepting the belting system, still according to the learned Counsel, his clients were entitled to have the land value fixed at Rs.3,55,730/-, since the category of land was changed by the reference court from category 5 to category 3, but only an amount of Rs.2,73,631.50 was awarded. Alternatively, it is contended that despite no evidence being adduced by the requisitioning authority to disprove the claim of the cross objectors, the reference court went wrong in deducting 50% of the amount from the value fixed under sale deed No.925/2008. 10. Sri.V.Ajaykumar, the learned counsel appearing for the claimants would further point out that the acceptance of document No.925/2008 was no doubt questioned by the requisitioning authority earlier and the said challenge was accepted by this Court and the reference was remanded back to Sub Court, Attingal for a fresh consideration. On fresh consideration once the reference court accepted the evidence, namely sale deed No.925/2008, on appeal, the requisitioning authority and the State cannot question the findings in the absence of any evidence before the reference court. 11.
On fresh consideration once the reference court accepted the evidence, namely sale deed No.925/2008, on appeal, the requisitioning authority and the State cannot question the findings in the absence of any evidence before the reference court. 11. Sri.R.S.Kalkura, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant in L.A.App. No.27/2022 would point out that the reference court did not fix the land value in terms of sale deed No.925/2008, despite the land being included in category No.3. Alternatively, all the learned counsel appearing for the claimants unanimously opposed the belting system adopted by the land acquisition officer as well as by the reference court. 12. We have considered the rival submissions raised across the bar. Evaluation of the submissions 13. Based on the rival submissions raised across the bar, we find that multiple issues require to be addressed by this Court touching upon the validity of document No.925/2008 and also the methodology adopted by the reference court qua the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as well as the Act 30 of 2013. Belting system 14. The land acquisition officer categorized the land into six categories as stated above. The categorization or otherwise called as the belting system is normally adopted by the State in respect of the determination of the compensation payable under the provisions of the respective Land Acquisition Act. The categorization or the belting system, as the case may be, suits to the convenience of the State who seeks to deprive the right of the land owners under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, since the State can deprive the constitutional right to hold property only in accordance with law, which mandates a fair and equivalent compensation. Therefore, if the belting system is adopted, the State can fix different compensation to different categories and thereby justify the grant of compensation which would fall within the domain of fair and equivalent compensation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again frowned upon the State adopting the belting system when large tracts of land are acquired for a common purpose. In this case, 105.27 hectares of land is being acquired for establishment of a “Life Science Park” by the KSIDC. Though in these appeals we are not concerned about the ultimate public purpose, we cannot remain oblivious of the fact that, essentially, the State seeks to deprive its citizens of their constitutional right to hold the property.
In this case, 105.27 hectares of land is being acquired for establishment of a “Life Science Park” by the KSIDC. Though in these appeals we are not concerned about the ultimate public purpose, we cannot remain oblivious of the fact that, essentially, the State seeks to deprive its citizens of their constitutional right to hold the property. We find that adoption of belting system is impermissible in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Besco Limited v. State of Haryana [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1071]. Paragraph No.24 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: “24. The subject lands are acquired under one notification and the plan brought on record evidences the location and proximity to development in and around the acquired land. The belting of area for valuation would be incorrect. We reject the argument of the State. Since we have not applied incremental value on the exemplar, we deem it just to determine uniform market value to the lands under acquisition.” 15. In Asraf Ali Vs State of Haryana and ors [ (2013)5 SCC 527 ], the Supreme Court held that considering the potentiality of the land sought to be acquired, it would not be appropriate to apply belting system. 16. In Andra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd Vs G. Mohan Reddy [(2010) 15 SCC 442], the Supreme Court held that belting system is permissible only when the land in different survey numbers and in different locations belonging to different owners are acquired. 17. On consideration of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as above, we find that the land acquired are lying contiguously and are acquired for the same purpose under same notification. Therefore, by adopting belting system, the land owners will be certainly discriminated. We are definite in our view that the land acquisition officer as well as the reference court could not have adopted the belting system. 18. Still further, from the evidence adduced by both parties especially Ext.B2 group sketch in LAR No.128/2012 evidencing the lie of the entire land sought to be acquired, we find that the belting system done by the land acquisition officer as well as by the reference court was completely improper and unsustainable. Therefore, we hold that the belting system adopted by the land acquisition officer is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. Determination of the market value 19.
Therefore, we hold that the belting system adopted by the land acquisition officer is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. Determination of the market value 19. The determination of the market value is one of our prime concern in these appeals. As stated above, the land acquisition officer adopted different methods to determine the land value/market value in respect of the lands in same survey number covered by the same notification, but for the fact that in respect of certain lands, the award was not passed before 1.4.2013. How far the delay in passing the award will influence the rights of the claimants, must be seriously considered by us. 20. Before proceeding to determine, whether the findings of the land acquisition officer as modified by the reference court in determining the market value of the land are proper or not, we must notice certain glaring defects on the side of the State as well as on the part of the requisitioning authority. The land acquisition officer relied on the basic deed as sale deed No.2083/2008 dated 15.4.2008. The claimants, on the other hand, relied on Exts.A2 sale deed No.925/2008 dated 15.4.2008 in which the land value is seen fixed at Rs.5,47,264/- per Are in LAR No.24/2018. In LAR No.139/2012 in which L.A.App.No.131/2021 preferred by the requisitioning authority arises, the reference court had fixed the land value at Rs.2,43,211.72 by judgment dated 17.11.2015. The requisitioning authority preferred an appeal against the judgment in LAR No.139/2012 dated 17.11.2015 as L.A.App.No.76/2017. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court by judgment dated 7.6.2018 allowed the appeal and remanded the matter back to the reference court for fresh consideration. The Division Bench of this Court accepted the argument of the requisitioning authority stating that the market value fixed by the reference court on a guesswork without looking into the comparability of the land is unacceptable. It is worthwhile to extract the findings rendered by the Division Bench in paragraph Nos.5, 6 & 7. “5. Contention of the appellant is that, the value fixed based on the guess work made by the reference court has no basis. It is pointed out that the burden lies totally on the claimant to prove through convincing materials that the market value prevailing at the time of acquisition is higher than the value awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer.
Contention of the appellant is that, the value fixed based on the guess work made by the reference court has no basis. It is pointed out that the burden lies totally on the claimant to prove through convincing materials that the market value prevailing at the time of acquisition is higher than the value awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. According to the appellant, the claimant had failed in discharging such burden. Since no evidence was adduced with respect to comparability of the land covered under the exemplar document produced, we find merit in the contention that the reference court went wrong in placing any sort of reliance on Ext.A2, after having been found that there is no evidence to prove the comparability. The enhancement given based on the guess work, by merely finding that there existed a steep hike, cannot be sustained as a judicial approach which is prudent and justifiable. Therefore we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment is liable to be interfered with. 6. At this stage, learned counsel for the first respondent/claimant made a request to this court to remit the matter for a fresh consideration and disposal, based on the plea that he may be afforded with sufficient opportunity to prove the aspect of comparability between the property covered under Ext.A2 document and the acquired property. It is pointed out that the factual scenario existed at the time of acquisition is that the prevailing market value was much higher than what was reflected in Ext.B1 basic document. 7. We take note of the settled legal principle that the courts dealing with the reference under Section 18 of the Act is at an obligation to ensure that fair and just compensation is awarded to the land owners taking into consideration of the market value prevailing in the locality at the time of acquisition. In the case at hand, the claimant had produced Ext.A2 as the best exemplar document and given evidence to the effect that Ext.A2 reflects the true market value which prevailed as on the date of acquisition. But, as observed by the reference court, the value reflected in Ext.A2 as such cannot be accepted, because there was total lack of evidence regarding the comparability of the land in the matter of similarity, proximity, prominence, nature and lie of the land.
But, as observed by the reference court, the value reflected in Ext.A2 as such cannot be accepted, because there was total lack of evidence regarding the comparability of the land in the matter of similarity, proximity, prominence, nature and lie of the land. In order to ensure complete justice, we are inclined to take a lenient view to accede to the request made on behalf of the claimants, to afford a further opportunity to adduce proper evidence before the reference court. This is all the more with the view that the reference court can be equipped with ample materials on record to arrive at a just conclusion with respect to the market value of the land which prevailed in the locality at the time of the acquisition.” 21. On remand, the claimant in LAR No.139/2012 took out an advocate commissioner, who submitted his report on 4.9.2018 and examined him as PW2. The reference court found that the claimant had discharged the burden of proving that the acquired land and the land covered by Ext.A2 are comparable plots. The findings of the reference court are recorded at paragraph No.45, which is extracted hereunder: “45. All the available evidence on record clubbed with the unchallenged Ext.C1 report without any iota of doubt proves that the land in Ext.A2 and acquired land are comparable plots. Even though the land in Ext.A2 contains a building, the land value in A2 can be made use to ascertain the actual market value reflected on the spot. In order to do comparisons of land in Ext.A1 and A2 deeds, it is brought out that the only -ve factor attached to acquired land is that the same is not having a building. Apart from that negativity related to the lack of a house in the acquired land, the individual comparisons of land in Ext.A1 and A2 brings a material fact that both are otherwise comparable in all the remaining plus and minus factors in an equal manner and therefore, Ext.A2 can be treated as an exemplar deed subject to depreciation to be provided for the minus factor discussed above.” Pertinently, we find that no contra evidence was adduced either by the State or by the requisitioning authority. In fact, it is surprising to note that in certain cases the requisitioning authority even remained ex parte. Impact of the judgment of the Division Bench in L.A.App.No.76/2017 22.
In fact, it is surprising to note that in certain cases the requisitioning authority even remained ex parte. Impact of the judgment of the Division Bench in L.A.App.No.76/2017 22. During the course of the argument, when we raised a query regarding the inaction on the part of the requisitioning authority in adducing evidence before the reference court after remand, the learned counsel, Sri.P.U.Shailajan, pointed out that even if no evidence was adduced on the side of the requisitioning authority, it must be noted that this Court had not accepted the value fixed in sale deed No.925/2008 and the court below also failed to notice that sale deed No.925/2008 was executed for a fancy price. Although the requisitioning authority did not produce the prior title deed mentioned in document No.925/2008, it has filed an application under Order-XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). 23. We are constrained to note that the said plea is untenable for more reasons than one. The entitlement of the party appealing against the judgment and decree of the court below to produce additional documents under Order-XLI Rule 27 of the CPC is guided by sound principles. What is produced before us is only a photocopy of the certified copy of the document, which remains inadmissible in evidence. Even if we are to assume for a moment that the additional evidence produced can be looked into by us, we find that the same may not help the requisitioning authority, since they are bound by the findings rendered by the co-ordinate bench of this Court in L.A.App.No.76/2017. 24. It must be remembered that the co-ordinate bench in L.A.App.No.76/2017, while remanding the reference back to the trial court had confined the consideration of reference to the comparability of the land covered by sale deed No.925/2008 and the land acquired. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the remand ordered by this Court in L.A.App.No.76/2017 was a closed remand and not an open remand entitling the parties to adduce fresh evidence and re- opening of the entire case. This Court did not accept the fixation of the land value by the reference court solely on the ground that no evidence was available to compare the land covered by document No.925/2008 with that of the land acquired.
This Court did not accept the fixation of the land value by the reference court solely on the ground that no evidence was available to compare the land covered by document No.925/2008 with that of the land acquired. On remand, once the claimant was successful in adducing further evidence to prove the comparability of the land acquired by taking out an advocate commissioner for local inspection, the infirmity attached to document No.925/2008 no longer exists. It has come out in evidence that no application under Order-XXVI Rule 10 of the CPC was filed by the requisitioning authority to remit the report of the advocate commissioner. 25. There is yet another reason as to why we should reject the contentions of the learned counsel for the requisitioning authority. On an entire reading of the judgment of the Division Bench, we find that no contention was raised by the requisitioning authority regarding the acceptability of document No.925/2008 qua the value of the land. Therefore, we are of the view that the present contention raised by the requisitioning authority is clearly hit by Explanation-IV to Section 11 of the CPC as well as the principle governing Order-II Rule 2 of the CPC. Therefore, we reject the aforesaid contention. Determination of the market value of the land 26. Once the objection taken by the requisitioning authority as well as the State against sale deed No.925/2008 is obliterated, the necessary corollary is that the market value of the land fixed therein has to be adopted. Coupled with the fact that prima facie evidence is available to show the land covered by sale deed No.925/2008 as well as the land acquired are in the same vicinity, we are inclined to fix the market value of the land acquired at Rs.5,47,264/- per Are. The inevitable consequence of setting aside the belting system is that all notified land owners for acquisition in terms of the notification dated 14.10.2008, are entitled to have the land value fixed at Rs.5,47,264/-per Are. Question of parity in compensation 27. We note that only one claimant has preferred a cross-objection. The claimants in LAR No.128/2012, in whose favour the reference court answered the reference by changing the category fixed by the land acquisition officer from category No.5 to category No.3 and fixing the land value at Rs.2,73,631.50, have come up before this Court.
Question of parity in compensation 27. We note that only one claimant has preferred a cross-objection. The claimants in LAR No.128/2012, in whose favour the reference court answered the reference by changing the category fixed by the land acquisition officer from category No.5 to category No.3 and fixing the land value at Rs.2,73,631.50, have come up before this Court. However, on an analysis of the evidence, since we have found that the land value is liable to be fixed at Rs.5,47,264/- per Are, in order to maintain parity in compensation, the question is whether we can ascertain powers under Order-XLI Rule-33 of the CPC to ensure that all land owners would get the same benefit. 28. In order to appreciate the contentions of the land owners that they are entitled to the land value fixed at Rs.5,47,264/- per Are, we must consider the scope of the power of this Court under Order-XLI Rule-33 of the CPC be invoked to do complete justice. Scope of the power under Order-XLI Rule-33 of the CPC 29. Order-XLI Rule-33 CPC reads as under: “ORDER XLI APPEALS FROM ORIGINAL DECREES xxx xxx xxx 33. Power of Court of Appeal.—The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees: Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35A in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order.” The principles governing the invocation of power under Order-XLI Rule-33 require no elaboration. Though the said power is unlimited, the exercise of the power under the said provision must be sparingly used to do complete justice.
Though the said power is unlimited, the exercise of the power under the said provision must be sparingly used to do complete justice. There is a school of thought that preaches that the courts should not use the said provision in favour of a person who has given up his claim or lost, but application of the said principle in cases involving constitutional rights to hold a property under Article-300A stands on a different footing. 30. In Banarasi & Ors v. Ram Phal [ 2003 (9) SCC 606 ], the Supreme Court considered the provision and laid down certain standards under which the said power has to be invoked. It is worthwhile to extract paragraph 10 of the said judgment, which reads as under: “10. The CPC amendment of 1976 has not materially or substantially altered the law except for a marginal difference. Even under the amended Order 41 Rule 22 sub-rule (1) a party in whose favour the decree stands in its entirety is neither entitled nor obliged to prefer any cross-objection. However, the insertion made in the text of sub-rule (1) makes it permissible to file a cross-objection against a finding. The difference which has resulted we will shortly state. A respondent may defend himself without filing any cross- objection to the extent to which decree is in his favour; however, if he proposes to attack any part of the decree he must take cross-objection. The amendment inserted by the 1976 amendment is clarificatory and also enabling and this may be made precise by analysing the provision. There may be three situations: (i) The impugned decree is partly in favour of the appellant and partly in favour of the respondent. (ii) The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent though an issue has been decided against the respondent. (iii) The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent and all the issues have also been answered in favour of the respondent but there is a finding in the judgment which goes against the respondent.” 31 The prime consideration of this Court while considering the request of the land owners for exercising the said power would be whether it offends any of the three situations envisaged in Banarasi (supra). 32.
32. In Prahlad & Others v. State of Maharashtra [ (2010) 10 SCC 458 ], the Supreme Court again considered the invocation of the powers under Order-XLI Rule-33 of the CPC in respect of enhancement of compensation in land acquisition cases and it was held that the high courts can step in and exercise the power to render complete justice. 33. When we read the expression “make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require,”….. it becomes clear that the appellate court is empowered to pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed by the trial court. This would obviously mean an order which justice of the case requires to be made. The expression “case” would mean the justice of the case. Obviously, this power cannot be exercised ignoring the prohibition imposed by the law. 34. We are also guided by the observation of the learned Author Mulla on Code of Civil Procedure, 15 th edition at page 2647, wherein the learned author had observed that this rule is modern on Order-59 Rule-10(4) of the Supreme Court of Judicature in England and further opined that purpose of this rule is to do complete justice between the parties. 35. Having spelt out the broad spectrum under which the power under Order-XLI Rule-33 has to be exercised by the courts, we now proceed to consider the request of the land owners for fixing the land value in parity. 36. In Ravishankar Prakash Sarma v. State of UP [ (2019) 15 SCC 301 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that insofar as the claim of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the enhancement of the compensation must be in parity with the amount awarded in other cases.
36. In Ravishankar Prakash Sarma v. State of UP [ (2019) 15 SCC 301 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that insofar as the claim of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the enhancement of the compensation must be in parity with the amount awarded in other cases. Since we have already held that the claimants in Cross Objection No.191/2022 are entitled to a land value of Rs.5,47,264/- per Are, we are of the view that in the interest of doing complete justice and in order to protect the constitutional right to hold property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, we ought to invoke the power under Order-XLI Rule-33 of the CPC and fix the compensation at Rs.5,47,264/- per Are for all the non-appealing claimants who are respondents before this Court in the appeals preferred either by the State or by the requisitioning authority, as the case may be. Cases under the new Act (Act 30 of 2013) 37. Following cases arises under the new Act: S l. No. Appeal by the State Appeal by requisitioni ng Authority LAR No. Categor y Awarded by LAO (per Are) Amount awarded by reference (per Are) 1 LAA No. 560/2022 Nil LAR No. 24/2018 II 1,28,000/- 5,47,264/- 2 LAA No. 524/2022 Nil LAR No. 25/2018 V 86,640/- 4,10,000/- 3 LAA No. 531/2022 Nil LAR No. 13/2018 II 1,28,000/- 5,47,264/- 4 LAA No. 522/2022 LAA No. 98/2023 LAR No. 20/2018 VI 35,000/- 4,56,000/- 5 LAA No. 587/2022 Nil LAR No. 18/2018 III & VI 96,000/- 35,000/- 5,25,000/- 4,56,000/- 6 LAA No. 614/2022 Nil LAR No. 17/2018 IV 91,200 5,21,000/- 7 LAA No. 603/2022 Nil LAR No. 14/2018 VI 35,000/- 4,56,000/- 8 LAA No. 296/2021 Nil LAR No. 15/2018 VI 35,000/- 4,56,000/- 9 LAA No 617/2022 Nil LAR No. 16/2018 IV 91,200/- 5,21,000/- The primary contention of the State as well as the requisitioning authority is that the reference court did not take into consideration the methodology of fixing the market value under Section 26 of the Act 30 of 2013. The land acquisition officer in these cases also adopted the categorization and awarded the amounts, which we have detailed in the table above. 38. We must notice that these cases arise out of the very same notification dated 14.10.2008 under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
The land acquisition officer in these cases also adopted the categorization and awarded the amounts, which we have detailed in the table above. 38. We must notice that these cases arise out of the very same notification dated 14.10.2008 under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The land acquisition officer adopted the criteria of comparing the sale deeds in the near vicinity of the property sought to be acquired and fixed the land value. While fixing the land value, no explicit reasons are assigned as to why document No.925/2008 dated 15.4.2008 was not taken into consideration. Ultimately, because of the said exercise, the land acquisition officer fixed the value which came below the value fixed by him in respect of similar lands covered by the same notification under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 39. Aggrieved by the above fixation, the claimants sought reference under Section 64 of the Act 30 of 2013. The reference court accepted document No.925/2008 and proceeded to fix the land value at Rs.5,47,264/- per Are, which the State as well as the requisitioning authority have questioned on the ground that the reference court ignored the mandate under Section 26 of the Act 30 of 2013. 40. In our considered view, the stand of the State as well as the requisitioning authority cannot be appreciated for multiple reasons. The conduct of the requisitioning authority leaves a lot to be desired. It has come out in evidence that the property covered by sale deed No.925/2008 was purchased by the requisitioning authority in an e-auction conducted by Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam for recovery of dues to the State Bank of India . The total sale consideration paid is Rs.45,10,000/-. However, the learned counsel for the KSIDC took up a very strange argument before us that the purchase of the land by the KSIDC was out of sheer compulsion and therefore, the said value cannot be considered by the reference court. We find that the stand taken by the requisitioning authority is not only dichotomous, but also unreasonable. No doubt, the purchase by the requisitioning authority is post notification, but the reference court has not fixed the land value in terms of the post notification document and only concluded that the said purchase gives credence to the land value fixed in document No.925/2008.
No doubt, the purchase by the requisitioning authority is post notification, but the reference court has not fixed the land value in terms of the post notification document and only concluded that the said purchase gives credence to the land value fixed in document No.925/2008. We are in perfect agreement with the findings rendered by the reference court and do not see any illegality or jurisdictional infirmity which requires interference by us in exercise of the appellate power. 41. Coming to the contention regarding the fixation of the market value ignoring the mandate of Section 26 of the Act 30 of 2013, we must note that the said contention is also seriously flawed. Section26 of the Act 30 of 2013 reads as under: “26. Determination of market value of land by Collector.– (1) The Collector shall adopt the following criteria in assessing and determining the market value of the land, namely:— (a) the market value, if any, specified in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) for the registration of sale deeds or agreements to sell, as the case may be, in the area, where the land is situated; or (b) the average sale price for similar type of land situated in the nearest village or nearest vicinity area; or (c) consented amount of compensation as agreed upon under sub-section (2) of section 2 in case of acquisition of lands for private companies or for public private partnership projects, whichever is higher: Provided that the date for determination of market value shall be the date on which the notification has been issued under section 11. Explanation 1.—The average sale price referred to in clause (b) shall be determined taking into account the sale deeds or the agreements to sell registered for similar type of area in the near village or near vicinity area during immediately preceding three years of the year in which such acquisition of land is proposed to be made. Explanation 2.—For determining the average sale price referred to in Explanation 1, one-half of the total number of sale deeds or the agreements to sell in which the highest sale price has been mentioned shall be taken into account.
Explanation 2.—For determining the average sale price referred to in Explanation 1, one-half of the total number of sale deeds or the agreements to sell in which the highest sale price has been mentioned shall be taken into account. Explanation 3.—While determining the market value under this section and the average sale price referred to in Explanation 1 or Explanation 2, any price paid as compensation for land acquired under the provisions of this Act on an earlier occasion in the district shall not be taken into consideration. Explanation 4.—While determining the market value under this section and the average sale price referred to in Explanation 1 or Explanation 2, any price paid, which in the opinion of the Collector is not indicative of actual prevailing market value may be discounted for the purposes of calculating market value. (2) The market value calculated as per sub-section (1) shall be multiplied by a factor to be specified in the First Schedule.
(2) The market value calculated as per sub-section (1) shall be multiplied by a factor to be specified in the First Schedule. (3) Where the market value under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) cannot be determined for the reason that— (a) the land is situated in such area where the transactions in land are restricted by or under any other law for the time being in force in that area; or (b) the registered sale deeds or agreements to sell as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) for similar land are not available for the immediately preceding three years; or (c) the market value has not been specified under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) by the appropriate authority, the State Government concerned shall specify the floor price or minimum price per unit area of the said land based on the Price calculated in the manner specified in sub-section (1) in respect of similar types of land situated in the immediate adjoining areas: Provided that in a case where the Requiring Body offers its shares to the owners of the lands (whose lands have been acquired) as a part compensation, for acquisition of land, such shares in no case shall exceed twenty-five per cent, of the value so calculated under sub- section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) as the case may be: Provided further that the Requiring Body shall in no case compel any owner of the land (whose land has been acquired) to take its shares, the value of which is deductible in the value of the land calculated under sub-section (1): Provided also that the Collector shall, before initiation of any land acquisition proceedings in any area, take all necessary steps to revise and update the market value of the land on the basis of the prevalent market rate in that area: Provided also that the appropriate Government shall ensure that the market value determined for acquisition of any land or property of an educational institution established and administered by a religious or linguistic minority shall be such as would not restrict or abrogate the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.” 42.
At first blush, it may appear that the argument of the State that the reference court by fixing the land value at Rs.5,47,264/- violated the mandate under Act 30 of 2013, however, a closer scrutiny would reveal that it is not so. The compelling facts disclosed above would show that there are two sets of proceedings under two different enactments, i.e., erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and Act 30 of 2013, in respect of the properties covered in the same survey number and covered by one single notification, i.e. 14.10.2008. The question before us would be whether there can be a differentiation between two sets of land owners under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and as well as under the new Act, i.e. Act 30 of 2013. No doubt, the State may argue that in the absence of any lapsing of the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it is obliged to follow the procedure under the new Act for determination of the market value. It is in this context that we are required to judge the action of the State as to whether it offends the mandate of Article-14 of the Constitution of India. Article-14 of the Constitution of India no doubt guarantees its citizens the right of equality to be treated on par with other citizens. When the property rights of land owners are being infringed, which is a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, the land owners are entitled to claim protection of Article-14 of the Constitution of India. [See Nagpur Improvement Trust and another Vs Vithal Rao and other [ (1973)1 SCC 500 ]]. 43. Still further, Section 26 of the Act 30 of 2013 envisages a situation where the market value is not determined in respect of the lands for the purpose of acquisition. In this case, the notification for the land acquisition under both the Acts is one and the same, and the properties are also covered under the same survey number. Therefore, it passes one’s comprehension as to how the State could differentiate between two sets of land owners i.e. under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as well as under the new Act, Act 30 of 2013.
Therefore, it passes one’s comprehension as to how the State could differentiate between two sets of land owners i.e. under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as well as under the new Act, Act 30 of 2013. When the reference court or the High Court determines the market value in respect of a land covered by the same notification, it is immaterial as to whether the subsequent proceedings for determination of the compensation is under the erstwhile regime of land acquisition or under the new regime. Therefore, it must be held that there can be only one market value in respect of the properties covered under the same notification, irrespective of subsequent proceedings for determination of the compensation. To hold otherwise would certainly create two different classes of land owners which will offend Article-14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we hold that the reference court was perfectly justified in fixing the land value at Rs.5,47,264/- per Are. 44. Lastly, we are required to deal with yet another incongruous situation. The reference court accepted the belting system adopted by the land acquisition officer and fixed different land values based on the categorization done by the land acquisition officer. No doubt, the reference court has enhanced the compensation even adopting the categorization. However, since we have held as above that the categorization or the belting system adopted by the land acquisition officer is not permissible, we will have to see to what extent the land owners are entitled to be compensated. 45. Since we have held that the fixation of the market value of the land covered by LAR No.24/2018 at Rs.5,47,264/- is perfectly legal and justified, by invoking the powers under Order-XLI Rule-33 of the CPC, we restore parity in compensation for all land owners who are respondents before us in these appeals preferred either by the State or by the requisitioning authority. 46. As an upshot of these discussions, we are of the considered view that the appeals preferred by the State as well as by the requisitioning authority are liable to be dismissed.
46. As an upshot of these discussions, we are of the considered view that the appeals preferred by the State as well as by the requisitioning authority are liable to be dismissed. While dismissing the appeals preferred by the requisitioning authority, we are inclined to impose costs, especially in the light of the fact that the requisitioning authority despite being granted an opportunity to adduce evidence before the reference court, either chose to remain ex parte, or did not produce any evidence to substantiate their claim, but still ventured to prefer appeals before us questioning the compensation granted by the reference court. Therefore, the appeals preferred by the requisitioning authority are hereby dismissed with costs, which we quantify at Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) to each claimant. The same shall be recovered by the claimants in due proceedings. L.A.App.No.27/2022 and Cross Objection No.191/2022 are thus allowed re-fixing the land value at Rs.5,47,264/- per Are. The claimants are entitled to all statutory benefits, including proportionate costs in the cross objection. By exercising the power under Order-XLI Rule-33 CPC, we hereby fix the land value of the properties of all the claimants, who are respondents before us either in the appeals preferred by the State or by the requisitioning authority at Rs.5,47,264/- per Are. The claimants/respondents before us would also be entitled to all statutory benefits under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as well as under the Act 30 of 2013. Ordered accordingly.