JUDGMENT : Renuka Yara, J. Heard Sri Pratap Narayan Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Singam Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel for the appellants and Dr. P. Ravi Shankar, learned counsel representing Sri B. Nageshwar Rao, learned counsel for respondent No.1. 2. This is an Intra-Court appeal preferred by the appellants aggrieved by the order dated 14.11.2024 passed by a learned Single Judge in W.P.No.25602 of 2016, whereby, the order dated 28.02.2015 reverting respondent No.1 from the position of Administrative Officer (AO) to Assistant Administrative Officer (AAO) has been quashed. Further, the adverse remarks in respondent No.1’s Annual Performance Appraisal Report (APAR) for the year 2014-2015 issued by respondent No.2 are quashed. Further, the appellants were directed to restore respondent No.1 to her position as Administrative Officer (AO) with all consequential benefits i.e. to pay arrears of salary, allowances and other financial benefits which were denied to her as a result of reversion and adverse remarks in the Annual Performance Appraisal Report (APAR). Brief facts leading to filing of the appeal: 3. The respondent No.1 is an Assistant Administrative Officer (AAO) of the appellants’ corporation and is aggrieved by the reversion order dated 28.02.2015, whereby, she is reverted from the position of Administrative Officer (AO) to Assistant Administrative Officer (AAO). 4. The respondent No.1 was promoted as Administrative Officer (AO) vide order dated 11.05.2013 and took charge on 20.05.2013. After promotion, respondent No.1 was on probation for a period of one year which may be extended for a maximum of one more year. 4. The respondent No.1 was promoted as Administrative Officer (AO) vide order dated 11.05.2013 and took charge on 20.05.2013. After promotion, respondent No.1 was on probation for a period of one year which may be extended for a maximum of one more year. While so, she availed various leaves from 22.07.2013 to 28.02.2015 during her probation period as follows: 22.07.2013 to 07.08.2013 - Privilege Leave - 17 days 08.08.2013 to 07.09.2013 - Privilege Leave - 31 days 08.09.2013 to 07.10.2013 - Sick Leave - 30 days 08.10.2013 to 07.11.2013 - Sick Leave - 31 days 08.11.2013 to 03.01.2014 - Sick Leave - 57 days 04.01.2014 Saturday attended office 06.01.2014 to 04.07.2014 - Maternity Leave - 180 days 05.07.2014 to 18.07.2014 - Sick Leave - 14 days 19.07.2014 to 18.08.2014 - Converted sick leave - 31 days 19.08.2014 to 02.09.2014 - Converted sick leave - 15 days 03.09.2014 to 21.09.2014 - Converted sick leave - 19 days 22.09.2014 to 01.10.2014 - Privilege Leave - 10 days 02.10.2014 to 11.10.2014 - Privilege Leave - 10 days 12.10.2014 to 01.11.2014 - Extra Ordinary Leave - 21 days 02.11.2014 to 01.12.2014 - Extra Ordinary Leave - 30 days 02.12.2014 to 31.12.2014 - Extra Ordinary Leave - 30 days 01.01.2015 to 28.02.2015 - Extra Ordinary Leave - 59 days 405 days leave availed during probation excl Maternity Leave 180 days (Out of 405 days Extra Ordinary Leave availed was 140 days PL-68 days, SL - 132 days, CSL - 65 days, EOL - 140 days = Total 405 Leave availed after Reversion 5. During the probation period, the respondent No.1 was transferred to Nizamabad Branch as an Administrative Officer (AO) vide order dated 09.05.2014. On 21.05.2014, respondent No.1 sought her retention in the place of posting on transfer by presenting representation and the same was rejected by the competent authority. On 23.05.2014, the competent authority extended the probation period by 4 months with effect from 20.05.2014 up to 19.09.2014. On 28.09.2014, the respondent No.1 made a request for transfer to Hyderabad as her husband is working in the Zonal office, Hyderabad. On 14.10.2014, the competent authority extended the probation period by 2 months with effect from 20.09.2014 up to 19.11.2014. Again on 29.10.2014, the competent authority proposed transfer of respondent No.1’s husband to Nizamabad subject to his consent. On 16.12.2014, the competent authority extended the probationary period by 3 months from 20.11.2014 up to 19.02.2015. On 14.10.2014, the competent authority extended the probation period by 2 months with effect from 20.09.2014 up to 19.11.2014. Again on 29.10.2014, the competent authority proposed transfer of respondent No.1’s husband to Nizamabad subject to his consent. On 16.12.2014, the competent authority extended the probationary period by 3 months from 20.11.2014 up to 19.02.2015. When respondent No.1 did not complete her probation period, on 28.02.2015, she was reverted from AO to AAO vide Central Office order as per Rule 16(2) of Staff Rules, 1960. 6. Aggrieved by the reversion order, respondent No.1 filed writ petition alleging that she gave birth to a premature baby on 27.01.2014, which required specialized medical care including 40 days in an incubator. Ever since, respondent No.2 started harassing her and one such instance included transfer of respondent No.1 from Hyderabad to Nizamabad Branch in May 2014 while she was on still maternity leave. According to respondent No.1, she gave a formal complaint on 22.06.2013 to appellant No.3 alleging sexual harassment of women at work place. The respondent No.3 called her on 30.06.2013, but proper inquiry was not conducted and no action was taken on her complaint. According to the respondent No.1, said failure to address her complaint and to take action against respondent No.2 was a part of effort to discredit her professional record. Also, her reversion was not based on her performance but was an act of retaliation for her complaint against respondent No.2. 7. The aforementioned grounds urged by the respondent No.1 are upheld by the learned Single Judge as follows: “8. The petitioner has alleged that she was subjected to harassment and gender discrimination by the fourth respondent, including derogatory comments about her pregnancy and health. The Court finds that the petitioner’s claims, if proven, would constitute a violation of her rights under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013. The respondents failed to address the petitioner’s complaint of harassment in a timely and effective manner. The petitioner’s claim of being subjected to sexist remarks and humiliation, particularly in the workplace, is concerning, and the Court finds that the failure to conduct a proper inquiry into these allegations is a serious lapse on the part of the respondents. This Court further notes that respondents have not provided sufficient evidence to counter petitioner’s claims of harassment or retaliation. This Court further notes that respondents have not provided sufficient evidence to counter petitioner’s claims of harassment or retaliation. Failure to act on her complaint and subsequent action taken against her, including reversion and adverse remarks, suggest a pattern of retaliatory behaviour in response to petitioner’s complaints against the 4 th respondent. 9. …. This Court finds that there is a reasonable basis to suspect that transfer was punitive in nature and petitioner was unfairly subjected to this transfer ….” (emphasis supplied) 8. On the basis of above findings, the learned Single Judge held that respondent No.1’s allegations as to sexual harassment, gender bias and retaliation are substantiated and therefore, set aside the order of reversion dated 28.02.2015 with all consequential benefits in terms of arrears of salary, allowances and other financial benefits leading to filing of the writ appeal. Contentions of the appellants: 9. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is erroneous as the respondent No.1 was absent from duties for major part of her probation period resulting in inability to assess her suitability for the promoted post. On that count, learned counsel for the appellants referred to the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Rules, 1960 at Rule 16 (1) and (2) which is extracted and produced below: Probation on Promotion: 16. (1) An employee promoted to a higher post shall be treated as on probation in the higher post for a period of one year in the case of promotions to posts belonging to Classes I and II and 6 months in other cases. Provided, however, that the competent authority may in its discretion extend the period of probation, but in no case shall the total period of probation exceed (a) in the case of promotions to posts belonging to Classes I & II 2 Years. (b) in other cases 1 year. (2) An employee on probation shall be liable to be reverted without notice at any time 10. The probation period of respondent No.1 as an Administrative Officer (AO) commenced on 20.05.2013 for a period of one year up to 20.05.2014. As per above section, respondent No.1 belonged to Class I and Class II employee and therefore, the probation period shall not exceed two years i.e. total period of about 730 days. 1) The respondent No.1 failed to complete her probation period within one year. As per above section, respondent No.1 belonged to Class I and Class II employee and therefore, the probation period shall not exceed two years i.e. total period of about 730 days. 1) The respondent No.1 failed to complete her probation period within one year. 2) Her period of probation was extended three times for a period of 9 months. 3) Out of said period of 730 days, as referred in paragraph No.5, respondent No.1 was absent for a total number of 405 days excluding maternity leave of 180 days. 11. In that context, the learned counsel for the appellants referred to judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Swati Singh vs. M.P.Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co.Ltd. , [ (2014) 1 MPLJ 308 ] , wherein, it is held as follows: “22. In the opinion of this court, there is a difference between malice in fact and malice in law. Malice in fact means express or actual malice, ill-will towards a particular person; an actual intention to injure. It implies desire or intent to injure while malice in law or implied malice means wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse (See: Black- s Law Dictinoary-Six Deluxe Edn.). Malice in fact or actual malice relates to the actual state or condition of mind of the person who did the act. Malice in fact is where the malice is not established by legal presumption or proof of certain facts, but is to be found from the evidence in the case [See (2003) 8 SCC 567 : ( AIR 2003 SC 4536 ) (Chairman and MD, BPL Ltd. V. S.P.Gururaja)]. Malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed for a wrongful act done intentionally, but without just cause or excuse or one of reasonable or probable cause. The term ‘malice in fact’ would come within the purview of the said definition. [See AIR 2006 SC 2912 (R.S.Garg v. State of U.P.) and AIR 1991 SC 1260 (State of Bihar v. P.P.Sharma)]”. 12. Further, the learned counsel for the appellants referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Rajneesh Khajuria v. M/s. Wockhardt Ltd. , [AIRONLINE 2020 SC 34] , for the same legal proposition. 13. Further, the learned counsel for the appellants referred to the definition of “sexual harassment” in comparison with the allegations made by respondent No.1 alleging sexual harassment. 13. Further, the learned counsel for the appellants referred to the definition of “sexual harassment” in comparison with the allegations made by respondent No.1 alleging sexual harassment. It is vehemently argued that the allegations made by respondent No.1 do not fall under the definition of sexual harassment and therefore, no bias can be alleged on the part of the writ appellants in not taking action pursuant to the complaint given by respondent No.1. It is argued that the respondent No.1 was reverted only on account of her absence to duty during the probation period. More particularly, it is emphasized that during pendency of the writ petition, respondent No.1 was confirmed in the post of Administrative Officer with effect from 01.06.2017 and the same shows that there was no malicious intent in reverting respondent No.1 Contentions of respondent No.1: 14. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 would submit that the writ appellants have acted with malice and bias in reverting respondent No.1 from the post of Administrative Officer to Assistant Administrative Officer by failing to extend the probation period and by failing to act on the complaint given by her against respondent No.2. 15. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 vehemently emphasized that though the respondent No.1 has given complaint against respondent No.2, the writ appellants have maliciously taken the appraisal of respondent No.1 with regard to her performance as Administrative Officer from respondent No.2, that too after his retirement from post. It is emphasized that respondent No.2 has no locus standi to give appraisal report about performance of respondent No.1 post his retirement. In that context, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 referred to the statute enacted for preventing sexual harassment of women at workplace and the definition of “sexual harassment” at workplace against women. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 referred to judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Sarita Choudhary vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh and another , [Writ petition (C) No.142 of 2024] in Writ Petition (C) No.142 of 2024, referring to Article 10 of International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights for special protection to mothers during reasonable period before and after child birth coupled with freedom from discrimination or equal protection of laws during pregnancy and maternity of a woman are precious rights of women at workplace. Further, the learned counsel for respondent No.1 referred to judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Medha Kotwal Lele and others vs.Union of India and others, (2013) 1 SCC 297 , wherein, it is held as follows: “Even after 15 years of Vishaka judgment dated 13.08.1997, many women still struggle to have their most basic rights protected at workplaces. The belief of the Constitution Framers in fairness and justice for women is yet to be fully achieved at the workplaces in the country. The attitude of neglect in establishing an effective and comprehensive mechanism in letter and spirit of Vishaka Directions by the States as well as employers in the private and public sector has defeated the very objective and purpose of the directions”. 16. With respect to adverse remarks in relevant record, reference is made to judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Indu Bhushan Dwivedi vs. State of Jharkhand and another , [ AIR 2010 SC 2472 ] , wherein it is held that imposition of punishment, past uncommunicated adverse remarks and entries in service records cannot be sustained. 17. In Anoop Jaiswal vs. Government of India and another, AIR 1984 SC 636 it is held that reasonable opportunity should be given to defend the allegations of grave misconduct which may lead to stigma. Likewise, in S. Ramachandra Raju vs. State of Orissa , [ AIR 1995 SC 111 ] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that solitary adverse report against employee for one year to the exclusion of entire service should not form a foundation for forming opinion resulting in compulsory retirement. 18. Further, judgment in Sukhdeo vs. Commissioner Amravati Division, Amravati and another , [ (1996) 5 SCC 103 ] is about compulsory retirement which is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Dev Dutt vs. Union of India and others, (2008) 8 SCC 725 is about gradings, performance of employees is ‘good’, ‘very good’, ‘average’ of ‘poor’ and said gradation is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Analysis of the Court: 19. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Dev Dutt vs. Union of India and others, (2008) 8 SCC 725 is about gradings, performance of employees is ‘good’, ‘very good’, ‘average’ of ‘poor’ and said gradation is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Analysis of the Court: 19. A perusal of the record reveals that respondent No.1 challenged her reversion primarily on two grounds i.e. 1) Non- extension of probation period due to maternity leave and 2) malice on the part of the writ appellants in not conducting proper enquiry into the allegations made by her against respondent No.2. On this count, the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Rules, 1960 clearly stipulate that the employee who is promoted to a higher post would be treated as on probation and the total period of probation shall not exceed two years. Further, as per Rule 16 (2), an employee on probation can be reverted at any point of time without notice. Since respondent No.1 was promoted to the post of Administrative Officer (AO) with effect from 20.05.2013, her probation was to end on 19.05.2014 and her suitability for said post was to be assessed during said time period. Due to her leave extensions during probationary period for 4 months i.e. from 20.05.2014 up to 19.09.2014, later 2 months i.e. from 20.09.2014 up to 19.11.2014 and 3 months i.e. from 20.11.2014 up to 19.02.2015, the probation period was extended for total period of 9 months i.e. up to 19.02.2015. 20. The purpose of probation as held in Rajesh Kumar Srivastava vs. State of Jharkhand, (2011) 4 SCC 447 is that “a person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service”. It is further held that there are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation and that at that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the probationer are generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service. 21. Further, in Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Sr. 21. Further, in Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Sr. Sec. School vs. J.A.J.Vasu Sena , [ (2019) 17 SCC 157 ] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that, “the purpose of probation is to enable an assessment to be made of the performance of an employee and that it serves as an opportunity for probationers to establish by the dint of their work which is rendered during the period of probation, that they are suitable for being retained in service. It is further held that on the part of the employer, probation enables the appointing authority to determine the suitability of the probationer for retention in service”. To determine the suitability of respondent No.1 for the post of A.O., her performance was to be assessed for a period of one year, which may extend upto a maximum period of two years. While so, respondent No.1 went on leave for various periods shown at paragraph No.5. 22. In addition to going on maternity leave for a period of 180 days from 06.01.2014 to 04.07.2014, respondent No.1 went on leave again on various counts of leave from 05.07.2014 to 28.02.2015. The respondent No.1 was on leave for a period of 585 days out of 730 days of probation period. Alternatively, it can be said that respondent No.1 worked for only for a short period of 145 days out of 730 days of probation period. When respondent No.1 was going on leave continuously, the writ appellants extended the probation period on three occasions on 23.05.2014, 14.10.2014 and 16.12.2014 for a period of 9 months i.e., 4 months with effect from 20.05.2014 up to 19.09.2014, 2 months with effect from 14.10.2014 up to 19.11.2014 and 3 months with effect from 16.12.2014 up to 19.02.2015. The same is reflected in the relevant record of respondent No.1. Therefore, there is no locus for respondent No.1 to allege that there is failure on the part of the writ appellants in extending her probation. Only due to failure on the part of respondent No.1 to attend duties during her probation period continuously, the reviewing officer reported that her performance could not be assessed as she was on leave. Therefore, there is no locus for respondent No.1 to allege that there is failure on the part of the writ appellants in extending her probation. Only due to failure on the part of respondent No.1 to attend duties during her probation period continuously, the reviewing officer reported that her performance could not be assessed as she was on leave. It is a point to be noted that the reviewing officer continuously reported that her performance could not be assessed on account of her absence but there are no adverse remarks passed by the reviewing officer as to the quality of performance of respondent No1. Therefore, we do not see any strength in the contention of respondent No.1 as to failure on the part of the writ appellants in extending the probation period. To accommodate respondent No.1 due to her maternity leave, the writ appellants not only gave maternity leave for the period of 180 days but gave additional leave of 405 days such as Sick leave, Privilege leave and Extra ordinary leave. 23. The next count canvassed by respondent No.1 is about sexual harassment meted by respondent No.2 and failure of writ appellants to take action against respondent No.2 for his alleged misconduct against women at workplace. In that context, there is a need to peruse the definition of the term ‘sexual harassment’ as per Section 2 (n) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, which is as follows: (n) “sexual harassment” includes any one or more of the following unwelcome acts or behavior (whether directly or by implication) namely:— (i) physical contact and advances; or (ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or (iii) making sexually coloured remarks; or (iv) showing pornography; or (v) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature; 24. Respondent No.1 gave complaint dated 22.06.2013 against respondent No.2 alleging harassment as follows: “The Regional Manager (Legal), Sri K. Jayasimha Rao has “humiliated” me when I went for discussion of DOPA goals with other fellow officers. He was complaining me with other male officer and “trying to magnify all errors in typing”. This is not the first occasion and at every instance, he was “commenting sarcastically about my knowledge levels”. I tried to put before him that I was deeply hurt and getting democratized by his attitude. He was complaining me with other male officer and “trying to magnify all errors in typing”. This is not the first occasion and at every instance, he was “commenting sarcastically about my knowledge levels”. I tried to put before him that I was deeply hurt and getting democratized by his attitude. After 2 occasions, the called me and he tried to divert the topic and put blame on me. I am very sensitive and if anything happens to me, he will be solely responsible if he dices not change his attitude towards me” 25. The above allegations are about “humiliation” during discussion of DOPA goals with other fellow officers, “magnifying errors in typing” and “sarcastic remarks about knowledge levels” of respondent No.1. The complaint shows that respondent No.2 allegedly humiliated respondent No.1 in a group discussion of DOPA goals. In a group discussion, there can hardly any scope for indulging in sexual harassment. The second allegation is complaining to other male officers magnifying the errors in typing. Complaining about errors in typing can hardly be equated to sexual harassment. Lastly, respondent No.2 allegedly made sarcastic comments about the knowledge level of respondent No.1. The comments about the knowledge levels cannot be in the nature of sexual harassment. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the complaint given by respondent No.1 against respondent No.2 prima facie fails to make out a case of sexual harassment against her by respondent No.2. When the allegations made by respondent No.1 against respondent No.2 are general in nature without any iota of scope for initiating enquiry against respondent No.2 for indulging in sexual harassment, no bias can be found on the part of the writ appellants for not taking action against respondent No.2 on the basis of complaint given by respondent No.1. 26. Lastly, the grievance of respondent No.1 is that her reversion is based on the review given by respondent No.2 after his retirement. To ascertain the truth in allegations made by respondent No.1, her original relevant record was called for perusal by this Court. The reviewing officer i.e. respondent No.2 retired from service 10 months prior to his appraisal which was given on 25.03.2016. In this context, it is to be noted that his assessment was not only taken after the retirement but his review was taken even while he was in service. The reviewing officer i.e. respondent No.2 retired from service 10 months prior to his appraisal which was given on 25.03.2016. In this context, it is to be noted that his assessment was not only taken after the retirement but his review was taken even while he was in service. The record shows that the reviewing officer continuously recommended for extension of probation but not reversion. The authorities at every stage have given approval to the extension of probation to the maximum extent possible. Only after availing maximum amount of leave period, since her performance could not be assessed, only on the ground of adverse leave record, respondent No.1 was reverted to the post of Assistant Administrative Officer (AAO). In the circumstances, we do not see any injustice being meted out to respondent No.1 in her reversion from the post of Administrative Officer (AO) to the post of Assistant Administrative Officer (AAO). Respondent No.1’s own choice of leave and her adverse leave record led to her reversion. There is no inaction on the part of the writ appellants in considering respondent No.1’s maternity leave nor bias and malice on the part of respondent No.2 and the writ appellants in the backdrop of complaint given by respondent No.1 against respondent No.2 for sexual harassment. The record does not make out a valid case of violation of the rights of the respondent No.1 under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge failed to examine the contents of respondent No.1’s complaint dated 22.06.2013 vis-a-vis definition of “sexual harassment” and arrived at an erroneous conclusion. As such, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained. 27. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 14.11.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.25602 of 2016. As a sequel, Miscellaneous Petitions, pending if any, stand disposed of.