JUDGMENT : C. PRATHEEP KUMAR, J. 1. The plaintiff in OS. No.155/2012 on the file of Sub Court, Kattappana is the appellant. (For the purpose of convenience, the parties are hereafter referred to as per their rank before the trial court). 2. The plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 23.12.2005 and in the alternative for return of advance amount. According to the plaintiff, the defendants agreed to sell the plaint schedule property, which the defendants are entitled to as per the final decree proceedings in I.A. No.677/2003 in OS No.29/2000 pending before the Sub Court, Kattappana, to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.20,00,000/- As per the agreement, the plaintiff paid an advance amount of Rs.2,00,000/- to the defendants. As per the agreement, the balance consideration is to be paid and the sale deed is to be executed within a period of six months. It was also agreed that in case of any unexpected delay in passing the final decree, the agreement is to be performed within a period of three months after passing of the final decree. 3. According to the plaintiff, on the date of agreement itself, the plaintiff was put in possession of the plaint schedule property and a power of attorney dated 5.1.2006 was also executed in favour of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiffs cultivated the property with cardamom spending a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- and now it is a high yielding cardamom plantation getting attractive profit. The plaintiff has performed substantial part of the agreement, settled an appeal preferred by the brother of the 2 nd defendant and brother-in-law of the 2 nd defendant before the High Court as AS.No.93/2003 paying a sum of Rs.6,10,000/- and thereby the specific performance of the agreement became possible. However, now the defendants are not willing to perform the contract after receiving the balance sale consideration. The power of attorney executed in favour of the plaintiff was also cancelled on 6.3.2009. The plaintiff also came to know that the defendant is taking hasty steps to sell the plaint schedule property to third persons, ignoring the agreement executed with the plaintiff. In the above circumstances, the plaintiff instituted a suit before the Sub Court, Kattappana as OS No.235/2010 after issuing a lawyers notice on 29.1.2010. The plaintiff also came to know that the defendant is taking hasty steps to sell the plaint schedule property to third persons, ignoring the agreement executed with the plaintiff. In the above circumstances, the plaintiff instituted a suit before the Sub Court, Kattappana as OS No.235/2010 after issuing a lawyers notice on 29.1.2010. Since the defendants failed to perform the contract in spite of issuing lawyer notice dated 29.1.2010 (Exhibit A7), the plaintiff preferred the suit. 4. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement contending that the suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC, as the plaintiff failed to seek relief of specific performance in O.S. No.235/2010. Further according to them, the agreement dated 23.12.2005 (Exhibit A1) was intended to be performed within a period of six months from the date of its execution and it was never intended to be postponed for a period of three months after passing the final decree. The plaintiff was never put in possession of the plaint schedule property under the agreement as the property was under the co-ownership of other owners also. The defendants executed a power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff for the sole purpose of cultivating and managing plaint schedule property as they were residing elsewhere. The plaintiff was liable to furnish proper accounts of the income received from the property. Since he did not furnish the accounts of the income received from the plaint schedule property, the power of attorney was cancelled. The defendants are not aware of the settlement entered into between the plaintiff and the appellant in AS.No.93/2003 and the payments made by the plaintiff to the appellant therein. 5. After the dismissal of the appeal, the final decree was passed and separate possession of the respective shares were also allotted to the parties. Therefore, the suit for specific performance, is a premature one. Since the plaintiff failed to pay the balance sale consideration within six months from the date of the agreement, the plaintiff was not at all ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Now, it is inequitable to grant specific performance of schedule property for the price fixed at the time of agreement in 2005. The above sale consideration is too low when compared to the present market value of the property. Granting specific performance will cause irreparable loss and injury to the defendants. Now, it is inequitable to grant specific performance of schedule property for the price fixed at the time of agreement in 2005. The above sale consideration is too low when compared to the present market value of the property. Granting specific performance will cause irreparable loss and injury to the defendants. Therefore, according to the defendants, the plaintiff is only entitled to get return of the advance amount and nothing else. 6. The trial court framed seven issues. The evidence in the case consists of the oral testimonies of PWs 1 to 8, DW1, Exhibits A1 to A24 and B1 to B5. After evaluating the evidence on record, the trial court declined the prayer for specific performance, but decreed the prayer for return of advance amount of Rs.2,00,000/- along with interest. Aggrieved by the above judgment, the plaintiff preferred this appeal. 7. Now, the points that arise for consideration are the following: 1) Whether the suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC? 2) Whether the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract? 3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for specific performance as claimed? 8. Heard Sri. T. Krishnanunni, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Sri. P. Haridas, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants. 9. The Points: As per Exhibit A1 agreement dated 23.12.2005, the defendants agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiffs for a sum of Rs.20,00,000/-. At the time of executing the sale deed, the plaint schedule property was the subject matter of the final decree proceedings in I.A. No.677/2003 in O.S. No.29/2000 on the file of the Sub Court, Kattappana. On the date of execution of Exhibit A1 agreement itself, a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendants. On 5.1.2006, Exhibit A2 power of attorney was executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff and possession of the plaint schedule property was also handed over to the plaintiff. While according to the plaintiff, the possession of the plaint schedule property was handed over to him for managing and nurturing the property, according to the defendants, it was for the purpose of cultivating and managing the property as the defendants were residing elsewhere. While according to the plaintiff, the possession of the plaint schedule property was handed over to him for managing and nurturing the property, according to the defendants, it was for the purpose of cultivating and managing the property as the defendants were residing elsewhere. Though in Exhibit A1 agreement, the period of six months was prescribed for paying the balance sale consideration and for executing the sale deed, it contained a further stipulation that in case passing of final decree is delayed, the contract can be performed within a period of three months from the date of passing final decree. In this case, final decree was passed by the Sub Court, Kattappana only on 25.9.2010 and thereafter the suit was filed on 2.12.2010. In the meantime on 29.1.2010, a lawyers notice (Exhibit A7) was also issued. Further on 2.12.2010, the plaintiff filed a suit as O.S. No.235/2010 seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants from alienating the plaint schedule property against the terms and conditions of Exhibit A1 sale agreement. According to the learned counsel for the defendants, since in Exhibit A8 suit, the prayer for specific performance was not raised, the present suit is barred by Order II rule 2 CPC. 10. On the other hand, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the cause of action for filing the suit for specific performance did not arise when Exhibit A8 suit was filed and as such the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC does not apply to the facts of this case. He has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. M/s. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd. 2025 KHC 6046 SC, in support of his argument. Further according to the learned senior counsel, as per Exhibit A1 sale agreement, a period of three months was provided from the date of passing the final decree and the same had not expired when Exhibit A8 suit was filed. Therefore, according to the learned senior counsel, the cause of action for filing a suit for specific performance did not arise on 2.12.2010 when Exhibit A8 suit was filed and as such the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC does not apply. In other words, according to the learned senior counsel, the present suit for specific performance is perfectly maintainable. In other words, according to the learned senior counsel, the present suit for specific performance is perfectly maintainable. Further according to him, if a prayer for specific performance was included along with Exhibit A8 suit, it would have been styled as a premature suit. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Virgo Industries (Eng.) P. Ltd. v. M/s. Venture Tech Solutions P. Ltd. (2013) 1 SCC 625 , in support of his argument that the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC will apply in the facts of this case. 12. Order II Rule 2 CPC states as follows: “ 2. Suit to include the whole claim .— (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim.—Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.—A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. Explanation.—For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action. ” 13. In the decision in Cuddalore Powergen Corporation (supra), the land owner (respondent No.2) entered into an agreement for sale with respondent No.1 to sell a particular property for a consideration of Rs.1,50,000/- and also executed a power of attorney in favour of the 1 st respondent to comply with the other formalities of registration of the document. Later on, respondent No.2 revoked the power of attorney and offered the advance consideration received by him. Later on, respondent No.2 revoked the power of attorney and offered the advance consideration received by him. At the same time, the 1 st respondent tried to register the sale deed on the basis of the power of attorney executed in his favour. However, he could not succeed in registering the sale deed in the light of a Government Order banning the registration of certain parcels of land including the property involved in the case. In the meantime, the respondent No.1 filed a suit against forceful dispossession and in the meantime, the 2 nd respondent executed a sale deed in respect of the same property in favour of the appellant. When the 1 st respondent came to know about the sale deed executed by the 2 nd respondent in favour of the appellant, he filed the 2 nd suit for specific performance. In the meantime, in the public interest litigation filed before the High Court challenging the Government Order, the High Court set aside the Government Order. The trial court dismissed the suit for specific performance under Order II Rule 2 CPC, but the High Court reversed the finding of the trial court. In appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the High Court and held that in the light of the Government Order banning registration of the sale deed the 1 st respondent could not have filed a suit for specific performance at the time when he filed the 1 st suit for injunction. Therefore, the Apex Court held that in the facts of this case, the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC did not apply. 14. In the decision in Virgo Industries (supra.), the respondent being the original plaintiff filed two suits seeking permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the appellants/defendants from alienating, encumbering or dealing with the plaint schedule properties to anybody other than the plaintiff. Though suits were filed on the basis of two sale agreements entered into by the plaintiffs and the defendants on 27.7.2005 in respect of two different parcels of immovable property, in the injunction suits the plaintiff had stated that on the pretext that restrictions on the alienation of the suits land were likely to be issued by the Central Excise Department on account of getting revenue demands, the defendants were attempting to frustrate the agreements in question. In the plaint, they have further stated that as the period of six months fixed for execution of sale deeds under the agreements in question was not yet over, the plaintiff is not claiming specific performance of the agreements. Further, they sought leave of the court to omit claim the relief of specific performance with liberty to sue for the said relief at a later point of time, if necessary. The injunction suits were filed on 28.8.2005 and 9.9.2005 respectively. Thereafter on 29.5.2007, the plaintiff filed two suits for specific performance. In the suits for specific performance, the plaintiff has specifically contended that at the time of filing the suits for injunction, the period provided for execution of sale agreement has not expired and also that at the time of filing the suit for injunction, the prayer for specific performance would have been premature. Even then, rejecting the arguments raised by the plaintiff/appellant, the Apex Court held in paragraph 14 as follows: “14. The averments made by the plaintiff in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 of 2005,particularly the pleadings extracted above leave no room for doubt that on the dates when C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 of 2005 were instituted, namely,28.8.2005 and 9.9.2005, the plaintiff itself had claimed that facts and events have occurred which entitled it to contend that the defendant had no intention to honour the agreements dated 27.7.2005. In the aforesaid situation it was open for the plaintiff to incorporate the relief of specific performance alongwith the relief of permanent injunction that formed the subject matter of above two suits. The foundation for the relief of permanent injunction claimed in the two suits furnished a complete cause of action to the plaintiff in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 to also sue for the relief of specific performance. Yet, the said relief was omitted and no leave in this regard was obtained or granted by the Court.” 15. Further, in paragraph 15, the Apex Court held that: “15. Furthermore, according to the plaintiff, which fact is also stated in the plaints filed in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833, on the date when the aforesaid two suits were filed the relief of specific performance was premature inasmuch as the time for execution of the sale documents by the defendant in terms of the agreements dated 27.7.2005 had not elapsed. Furthermore, according to the plaintiff, which fact is also stated in the plaints filed in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833, on the date when the aforesaid two suits were filed the relief of specific performance was premature inasmuch as the time for execution of the sale documents by the defendant in terms of the agreements dated 27.7.2005 had not elapsed. According to the plaintiff, it is only after the expiry of the aforesaid period of time and upon failure of the defendant to execute the sale deeds despite the legal notice dated 24.2.2006 that the cause of action to claim the relief of specific performance had accrued. The above stand of the plaintiff found favour with the High Court. We disagree. A suit claiming a relief to which the plaintiff may become entitled at a subsequent point of time, though may be termed as premature, yet, can not per se be dismissed to be presented on a future date. There is no universal rule to the above effect inasmuch as “the question of a suit being premature does not go to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court” as held by this Court in Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India. In the aforesaid case this Court has taken the view that whether a premature suit is required to be entertained or not is a question of discretion and unless “there is a mandatory bar created by a statute which disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or before a particular date or the occurrence of a particular event”, the Court must weigh and balance the several competing factors that are required to be considered including the question as to whether any useful purpose would be served by dismissing the suit as premature as the same would entitle the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on a subsequent date. We may usefully add in this connection that there is no provision in the Specific Relief Act, 1963 requiring a plaintiff claiming the relief of specific performance to wait for expiry of the due date for performance of the agreement in a situation where the defendant may have made his intentions clear by his overt acts.” 16. In the decision in Pramod Kumar and Anothers v. Zalak Singh and Others. In the decision in Pramod Kumar and Anothers v. Zalak Singh and Others. (2019) 6 SCC 621 , relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, two items of properties were involved, having a total extent of 8.22 acres. Those properties were sold by Mr. Tikaram through two sale deeds, one in respect of 3.20 acres dated 21.01.1959 and the second one for 4.82 acres as per sale deed dated 11.2.1959. The suit was filed in 1983 to set aside the first sale deed by the relatives of Mr. Tikaram, claiming that the said property is a joint ancestral property. The trial court dismissed the above suit stating that the above 8.22 acres of property belong to Tikaram through family partition and that he is the absolute owner of the said property. In 1971 they filed another suit to set aside the sale deed in respect of the remaining properties. In the above facts, the apex court held that the second suit was barred by Order II Rule (2) CPC. In the above decision, the plaintiff entered into a sale agreement with the 1 st defendant for purchasing the property belonging to the 1 st defendant and her children for a price of Rs.62,000/- per acre. The time stipulated for completing the performance was 13.3.1994 and the date of agreement was on 18.9.1993. The plaintiff alleging that though he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the defendant was not ready to execute the sale deed, filed a suit as O.S.37/1994 against the 1 st defendant preventing any breach of terms in Exhibit A3 agreement. The injunction suit was dismissed on 24.8.1994. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a suit for specific permanence as O.S No.166/1994. In the meantime, the defendant filed a suit as O.S.No 164/1994 against the plaintiff alleging that the plaintiff is trying to trespass into the property covered by Exhibit A3 agreement. While holding that the second suit is barred under Order II Rule (2) CPC, the Apex court held in paragraph 23 as follows: “23. The Privy Council proceeded to summarize the principles relating to O.2 R.2 CPC, in paragraph 61, which reads as follows: “61. While holding that the second suit is barred under Order II Rule (2) CPC, the Apex court held in paragraph 23 as follows: “23. The Privy Council proceeded to summarize the principles relating to O.2 R.2 CPC, in paragraph 61, which reads as follows: “61. The principles laid down in the cases thus far discussed may be thus summarized: (1) The correct test in cases falling under O.2 R.2, is “whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit. (2) The cause of action means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment. (3)If the evidence to support the two claims is different, then the causes of action are also different. (4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be the same if in substance they are identical. (5) The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence that may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers….. to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.” 17. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant would argue that in this case the suit for injunction was filed before the expiry of the period stipulated in the agreement for specific performance and at that time, suit for specific performance was premature. Further according to the learned senior counsel, the defendant has not intimated that they are not willing to execute the sale deed. Therefore, the learned senior counsel would argue that the bar under Order II Rule (2) CPC does not apply to the facts of this case. However, the argument that the suit for specific performance would have been premature before the expiry of the period stipulated in the agreements does not hold good in the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Virgo industries (supra). In the above decision, the Apex Court held that a suit for specific performance is not barred even if filed before the expiry of the period stipulated in the agreement. 18. In the instant case, Exhibit A1 sale agreement was executed on 23.12.2005. In the above decision, the Apex Court held that a suit for specific performance is not barred even if filed before the expiry of the period stipulated in the agreement. 18. In the instant case, Exhibit A1 sale agreement was executed on 23.12.2005. The defendants in the suit filed OS. No.29/2000 before the Sub Court, Kattappana for partition and Exhibit B1 preliminary decree was passed in the said suit on 31.7.2002. AS No.93/2023, filed against the preliminary decree before this Court was dismissed as withdrawn as revealed from Exhibit A6, on 22.8.2009. In the final decree proceedings, namely IA.No.677/2003, the Advocate Commissioner deputed by the Court filed a report on 2.11.2005. It was thereafter on 23.12.2005 Exhibit A1 sale agreement was executed. Even the final decree was passed by the Sub Court on 25.9.2010. It was thereafter on 2.12.2010, the plaintiff filed the suit for injunction. It is true that, in the injunction suit, the right to file suit for a specific performance was reserved. It is also true that in Exhibit A1 sale agreement, the period prescribed for performance was three months after passing of final decree. 19. In the plaint in OS.235/2010, the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that he got believable information that as soon as the proceeding in the final decree application are over, the defendants are planning to sell the plaint schedule property to third parties, against the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 23.12.2005. In paragraph 7 of the plaint, it is further stated that it is also learned by the plaintiff that the defendants have entrusted one real estate broker named Sajan in the locality to sell the plaint schedule property to third parties. It is also pleaded that the apprehended sale of the plaint schedule property is illegal and the defendants have no right to sell the plaint schedule property to third parties against the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 23.12.2005. It is further pleaded that, in the meantime, the power of attorney executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff on 5.1.2006 was also cancelled on 6.3.2009. In OS. 235/2010 the cause of action alleged is on 6.3.2009 and 18.11.2010, the dates on which the plaintiff came to know about the plan and preparations of the defendant to alienate the plaint schedule property to the third parties and to dispossess the plaintiff from the plaint schedule property. In OS. 235/2010 the cause of action alleged is on 6.3.2009 and 18.11.2010, the dates on which the plaintiff came to know about the plan and preparations of the defendant to alienate the plaint schedule property to the third parties and to dispossess the plaintiff from the plaint schedule property. The relief sought for in the suit is a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from alienating the plaint schedule property against the terms and conditions of the agreement and from dispossessing the plaintiff from the schedule property. 20. On a perusal of the above pleading in the plaint itself, it can be seen that, even before filing the above suit, the plaintiff got reliable information that the defendants are planning to sell the plaint schedule property to third parties and also that they are not going to honour Exhibit A1 sale agreement. In the above circumstance, it is crystal clear that even at the time of filing OS No..235 of 2010 the plaintiff was aware of the fact that the defendants are not going to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and the attempt of the defendants was to sell the schedule properties to strangers. Therefore, at the time of filing the suit OS. No. 235/2010 the plaintiff had the option to sue for specific performance also. Though in the said suit the right to sue for specific performance was reserved, the leave of the court was not obtained as required under Order II Rule 2 CPC. Therefore, this is a case in which the bar under Order II Rule 2 squarely applies and as such the trial court was perfectly justified in holding that the present suit is hit by Order II Rule 2 CPC. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the trial court was not justified in not answering issue Nos. 2 to 6 and disposing of the suit merely on the basis of the finding on the preliminary issue under Order II Rule 2 CPC. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the trial court was not justified in not answering issue Nos. 2 to 6 and disposing of the suit merely on the basis of the finding on the preliminary issue under Order II Rule 2 CPC. It is true that, by virtue of O.XIV Rule 2 CPC, notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues and as such, even though the court found that the suit is not maintainable in the light of Order II Rule 2 CPC, the trial court ought to have decided the other issues also. 22. It is true that this court also found that the suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC. Even then, of O.XIV Rule 2 CPC, it is advisable to dispose of the other issues also, on merits. This is a suit for specific performance. Exhibit A1 is the agreement for sale dated 23.12.2005. The period provided for specific performance is six months. However, it is to be noted that at the time of executing Exhibit A1 agreement, the defendant did not have possession and delivery of the property he agreed to be sold to the plaintiff. The defendant filed a suit for partition and the final decree proceedings were pending at the time of executing Exhibit A1 agreement. It is true that in Exhibit A1 there is a clause to the effect that sale deed can be executed within a period of three months from the date of passing of final decree, in case there is delay in passing the final decree. In the above circumstance, the learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the suit filed on 19.7.2012 is within the period of three months from the date of passing the decree, as the final decree was passed only on 25.9.2010. It means that the plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance more than 6½ years after the date of execution of Exhibit A1 sale agreement. 23. In the meantime, on 29.1.2010 the plaintiff issued Exhibit A7 lawyers notice to the defendant calling upon him to execute the sale deed. It means that the plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance more than 6½ years after the date of execution of Exhibit A1 sale agreement. 23. In the meantime, on 29.1.2010 the plaintiff issued Exhibit A7 lawyers notice to the defendant calling upon him to execute the sale deed. In the said notice, it is also stated that if the defendant fails to execute the sale deed as demanded in the said notice, he will initiate appropriate legal proceedings against the defendant. However, even then the plaintiff waited till 19.7.2012 to file the suit for specific performance. In this context, it is worthwhile to note that, in Exhibit A7 lawyers notice, the plaintiff has not expressed his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the agreement. The law is well settled that the person who seeks specific performance of an agreement should always be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. However, conspicuously, such pleadings regarding readiness and willingness are absent in Exhibit A7 lawyers notice. Moreover, even though the defendant did not execute the sale deed as demanded, in Exhibit A7, he has waited more than 2 1 / years after Exhibit A7 suit 2 notice, to file the suit for specific performance. 24. It is true that as per Exhibit A1, the plaintiff could get the sale deed executed after the passing of the final decree and the final decree was passed in this case only on 25.9.2010. Even then, the plaintiff filed only a suit for injunction on 2.12.2010 and filed the suit for specific performance only on 19.7.2012. Failure on the part of the plaintiff in pleading his readiness and willingness in Exhibit A7 and in waiting for 6 ½ years for seeking specific performance is fatal to the claim for specific performance. 25. As per the terms of Exhibit A1 sale agreement, possession was handed over to the plaintiff and a power of attorney was also executed on 5 . 1.2006. However, the said power of attorney was cancelled by the defendant on 6.3.2009. Thereafter, though as per Exhibit A7 notice, specific performance was demanded on 29.1.2010, the defendant failed to comply with the demand for specific performance. In the above circumstance, the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit for specific performance immediately after Exhibit A7 notice. 1.2006. However, the said power of attorney was cancelled by the defendant on 6.3.2009. Thereafter, though as per Exhibit A7 notice, specific performance was demanded on 29.1.2010, the defendant failed to comply with the demand for specific performance. In the above circumstance, the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit for specific performance immediately after Exhibit A7 notice. The plaintiff has not offered any satisfactory explanation for not filing the suit for specific performance, at least immediately after Exhibit A7 lawyers notice. There is also no explanation from the side of the plaintiff in not pleading his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract in Exhibit A7 lawyers notice. 26. The law is well settled that relief of specific performance is only a discretionary relief and even if it is found that the breach of contract was committed by the defendant, the court is not bound to grant the relief of specific performance. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act dealing with the discretion to be exercised by the court while considering the relief of specific performance is extracted below for reference: "20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.— (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance:— (a)where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Explanation 1.—Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). Explanation 2.—The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. (3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. (4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the party.” 27. In this case, the total sale consideration was Rs.20,00,000/- and the plaintiff had advanced only a sum of Rs.2,00,000/-, to the defendant at the time of executing Exhibit A1. From the evidence on record, it is revealed that after getting possession of the plaint schedule property, the plaintiff spent amounts for cultivating cardamom and he was also taking yield from the said cardamom. As held by the trial court, though the plaintiff has spent money for cultivating cardamom in the schedule property, he himself has taken the yield from the said property and as such in this case there is no reliable evidence to show that the plaintiff has in fact sustained any loss on account of non-performance of Exhibit A1 agreement. At the same time, as I have already noted above, as per Exhibit A1 agreement dated 23.12.2005, the total sale consideration was Rs.20,00,000/- and only Rs.2,00,000/- was paid as advance and in the above circumstance, if specific performance is granted at this stage, the same will be inequitable to the defendant. Moreover, granting specific performance will lead to unfair advantage to the plaintiff. Therefore, on merits also, the plaintiff is not entitled to get the discretionary relief of specific performance as prayed for. In the above circumstance, I do not find any irregularity or illegality in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court so as to call for any interference. Therefore, on merits also, the plaintiff is not entitled to get the discretionary relief of specific performance as prayed for. In the above circumstance, I do not find any irregularity or illegality in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court so as to call for any interference. Points answered accordingly. 28. In the result, this appeal stands dismissed. Considering the entire facts, I direct both parties to suffer their respective costs. All pending interlocutory applications shall stand dismissed.