ORDER : SUREPALLI NANDA, J. Heard Sri A.Krishnam Raju, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Smt. Anjali Agarw al, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 and Sri N.Srinivas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2. 2. The petitioners approached this Court seeking the prayer as under: “....to issue a Writ or direction more particularly one in the nature of a Writ of Certiorari after calling for the records relating to and connected with order dt.23.12.2020 in I.A.No. of 2019 in Application No.MW/158/2019 passed by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) & Authority under Minimum Wages Act, 1948 , Hyderabad and quash or set aside the same by declaring it as illegal, arbitrary and to pass......” 3. The case of the petitioners, in brief, is that Respondent No.2 worked as a messenger in the petitioners' bank, Indian Overseas Bank, from 2008 to 2014. Initially, Respondent No.2 had approached the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner, Hyderabad, seeking absorption into the service of the petitioners' bank as a Messenger. After conciliation proceedings failed, Respondent No.2 filed an application before Respondent No.1 under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 , which was registered as MW.No.158/2019, with a delay of 4028 days. The application should have been made within six months, as per Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act. Despite this, Respondent No.1, vide order dated 23.12.2020, condoned the delay without assigning any reasons. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed the present writ petition. 4. PERUSED THE RECORD: 5. The relevant portion of the impugned order dated 23.12.2020 passed in I .A.No. of 2019 in Application No.MW/158/2019 passed by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) & Authority is extracted hereunder: “Counsels of applicant and OP are present. Submission of applicant and objection of OP with regard to delay in filing the claim application was examined and the delay in filing the claim application is condoned. Posted to 16.03.2021 at 14.30 hrs for OP to file the main written submission/objection.” 6. Submission of applicant and objection of OP with regard to delay in filing the claim application was examined and the delay in filing the claim application is condoned. Posted to 16.03.2021 at 14.30 hrs for OP to file the main written submission/objection.” 6. The relevant portion of the interim order of this Court, dated 19.04.2021 passed in I .A.No.1 of 2021 in W.P.No.9225 of 2021, w hich is in force as on date is extracted hereunder: “There shall be interim stay of the proceedings in Application No. MW/158/43/2019 issued by the first respondent subject to condition of the petitioner depositing a sum of Rs.3,50,000/- (Rupees three lakhs and fifty thousand only) before the first respondent, within a period of four weeks from today.” 7. Section 20 (2) of Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is extracted hereunder: “Where an employee has any claim of the nature referred to in sub-section (1), the employee himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector, or any person acting with the permission of the Authority appointed under sub-section (1), may apply to such Authority for a direction under sub- section (3): Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages or other amount became payable: Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.” 8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners mainly puts forth the ground that the impugned order passed by Respondent No.1, dated 23.12.2020, is not in accordance with the law, specifically the second proviso to Section 20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 . The order of Respondent No.1 is not a judicious order, as Respondent No.1 failed to assign reasons while condoning the delay of 4028 days. Therefore, the impugned order passed by Respondent No.1, dated 23.12.2020, clearly indicates that Respondent No.1 condoned the delay without application of mind. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contends that the writ petition should be allowed as prayed for. 9. Therefore, the impugned order passed by Respondent No.1, dated 23.12.2020, clearly indicates that Respondent No.1 condoned the delay without application of mind. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contends that the writ petition should be allowed as prayed for. 9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, places reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court dated 19.02.1987 in " Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katiji and others " , contending that the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on their merits. Additionally, placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court dated 03.09.1989 in " N. Bala Krishnan Vs. M. Krishna Murthy " in support of the respondents' case, the counsel contends that Respondent No.1 was convinced with the delay explained by the respondents and, therefore, there is no illegality and the impugned order warrants no interference by this Court. 10. The Apex Court in the Judgment reported in 1978 (1) SCC 405 in “ Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others ” at paragraph No.8, observed as under: “8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji [Commr. of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16 ] : “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16 ] : “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.” Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.” 11. This Court opines that it is a settled principle of law that a quasi-judicial authority, while exercising power under a statute, shall necessarily mention reasons while allowing or dismissing an application. 12. A bare perusal of the record indicates that the affidavit filed by Respondent No.2 in support of the delay petition, as well as the rejoinder, is totally silent and does not explain why Respondent No.2 could not approach the authority, i.e., Respondent No.1 herein, earlier, and what prevented Respondent No.2 from making the application within six months, since it is expressly provided in the second proviso to Section 20(2) that the application may be admitted after the period of six months only when the applicant satisfies the authority that they had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. 13. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496 in “ Kranthi Associates Private Limited and another Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and others ” at paragraph No.47 observed as under: “47. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds: a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or ` rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737). n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires,"adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires,"adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of"Due Process".” 14. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in (1976) 2 SCC 981 in “The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co of India vs. The Union of India” at paragraph No.6 observed as under: “ 6. Before we part with this appeal, we must express our regret at the manner in which the Assistant Collector, the Collector and the Government of India disposed of the proceedings before them. It is incontrovertible that the proceedings before the Assistant Collector arising from the notices demanding differential duty were quasi-judicial proceedings and so also were the proceedings in revision before the Collector and the Government of India. Indeed, this was not disputed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M. Desai v. Testeels Ltd. [ C. A. No. 245 of 1970, decided on December 17, 1975] . But, unfortunately, the Assistant Collector did not choose to give any reasons in support of the order made by him confirming the demand for differential duty. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law. The Collector in revision did give some sort of reason but it was hardly satisfactory. He did not deal in his order with the arguments advanced by the appellants in their representation dated December 8, 1961 which were repeated in the subsequent representation dated June 4, 1965. It is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of a Court of law. He did not deal in his order with the arguments advanced by the appellants in their representation dated December 8, 1961 which were repeated in the subsequent representation dated June 4, 1965. It is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of a Court of law. But the order of the Collector could have been a little more explicit and articulate so as to lend assurance that the case of the appellants had been properly considered by him. If courts of law are to be replaced by a administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. The Government of India also failed to give any reasons in support of its order rejecting the revision application. But we may presume that in rejecting the revision application, it adopted the same reason which prevailed with the Collector. The reason given by the Collector was, as already pointed out, hardly satisfactory and it would, therefore, have been better if the Government of India had given proper and adequate reasons dealing with the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants while rejecting the revision application. The reason given by the Collector was, as already pointed out, hardly satisfactory and it would, therefore, have been better if the Government of India had given proper and adequate reasons dealing with the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants while rejecting the revision application. We hope and trust that in future the customs authorities will be more careful in adjudicating upon the proceedings which come before them and pass properly reasoned orders, so that those who are affected by such orders are assured that their case has received proper consideration at the hands of the Customs Authorities and the validity of the adjudication made by the Customs Authorities can also be satisfactorily tested in a superior tribunal or court. In fact, it would be desirable that in cases arising under customs and excise laws an independent quasi-judicial tribunal, like the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, is set up which would finally dispose of appeals and revision applications under these laws instead of leaving the determination of such appeals and revision applications to the Government of India. An independent quasi- judicial tribunal would definitely inspire greater confidence in the public mind.” 15. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594 in “ S.N.Mukherjee Vs. Union of India” at paragraph Nos.35 to 40 observed as under: “ 35. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency. 36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. 37. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. 37. Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The Committee expressed the opinion that “there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise” and that “where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity”. (p. 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view that “natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice”. (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th edn. p. 548.) In Siemens Engineering Co. case [ (1976) 2 SCC 981 : 1976 Supp SCR 489 ] this Court has taken the same view when it observed that “the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process”. This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well known principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a judge in his own cause, and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [ (1969) 2 SCC 262 : (1970) 1 SCR 457 ] wherein it has been held : (SCR pp. 468-69 : SCC p. 272, para 20) “The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely : (i) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must he held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice.” 38. A similar trend is discernible in the decisions of English courts wherein it has been held that natural justice demands that the decision should be based on some evidence of probative value. (See : R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex p. Moore [ (1965) 1 QB 456 : (1965) 1 All ER 81] ; Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd. [1984 AC 648 : (1984) 3 All ER 201] ) 39. The object underlying the rules of natural justice “is to prevent miscarriage of justice” and secure “fair play in action”. As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underly-ing such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. 40. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi- judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.” 16. I n view of the fact as borne on record that the impugned order dated 23.12.2020 passed in unnumbered I .A. of 2019 in Application No.MW/158/2019 is bereft of reasons, this Court opines that petitioner is entitled for the relief as prayed for herein. 17. This Court opines that the Judgment relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents do not apply to the facts of the case and the pleas put forth by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents are untenable and hence rejected. 18. 17. This Court opines that the Judgment relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents do not apply to the facts of the case and the pleas put forth by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents are untenable and hence rejected. 18. Taking into consideration: a) The aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, b) The submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and N.Srinivas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2, c) The impugned order dated 23.12.2020 passed in unnumbered I .A. of 2019 in Application No.MW/158/2019 by the respondent No.1, d) The interim order of this Court, dated 19.04.2021 passed in I .A.No.1 of 2021 in W.P.No.9225 of 2021, w hich is in force as on date, e) Section 20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (referred to and extracted above) and, f) The fact as borne on record that the respondent No.1 herein w hile exercising pow er under statute, failed to mention the reasons in deciding the condonation delay petition filed by the respondent No.2 herein seeking condonation of delay of 4028 days and admittedly, as borne on record, the affidavit filed by Respondent No.2 in support of the delay petition, as w ell as the rejoinder, is totally silent and does not explain w hy Respondent No.2 could not approach the authority, i.e., Respondent No.1 herein by making an application w ithin a period of limitation, g) The observations of the Apex Court in the various Judgments referred to and extracted above, The writ petition is allow ed as prayed for and the impugned order dated 23.12.2020 passed in unnumbered I A. of 2019 in Application No.MW/158/2019 by the respondent No.1 is set aside. How ever, there shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Writ Petition shall also stand closed.