P. v. Suresh Babu VS Union Of India, Represented By The Secretary, Ministry Of Commerce And Industry, Department Of Commerce, Udyog Bhawan, New Delhi
2025-09-23
SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI, SYAM KUMAR V.M.
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Syam Kumar V.M., J. This Writ Appeal is filed challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 02.02.2023 in W.P.(C) No.722 of 2012. Appellant was the petitioner in the W.P.(C). 2. Appellant had in the Writ Petition challenged Exhibits P8, P13 and P16 which were issued as part of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. The Disciplinary Authority imposed a penalty of reduction in pay upon him and he alleged that the penalty imposed upon him would incur a pecuniary loss of more than Rs.17,00,000/-. He had contended that while the other employee, who had been charge sheeted along with him for the very same offence, had only been given a lesser penalty of withholding increments for 3 years, he was visited with a more harsh and disproportionate punishment. The appellant had thus filed the W.P. (C) seeking the to quash Exhibits P8, P13 and P16. 3. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides dismissed the Writ Petition inter alia terming the same as one devoid of merits. It was held that once the report of Enquiry Officer has been deliberated upon by the Disciplinary Authority and also pondered by the Appellate Authority in the statutory appeal filed, the Writ Court cannot interfere in the findings until and unless it is shown that there has been certain violations of guidelines issued in various judgments regarding non-supply of a copy of the enquiry or any violation of principles of natural justice. Holding that there was no reason to interfere, the W.P.(C) was dismissed. This Writ Appeal is filed challenging the said findings of the learned Single Judge. 4. Heard Sri.Kishore D., Advocate for the appellant and Sri.Abraham Joseph Markos, Advocate, Standing Counsel for the respondent. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge had failed to consider the contentions raised by the appellant regarding the non supply of crucial documents recorded during the preliminary enquiry and that such non supply had impaired the appellant from properly defending the charges levelled against him. This, it is contended, would singularly render illegal, the entire disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. The learned Single Judge had overlooked the said crucial aspect, though the same was specifically highlighted by the appellant.
This, it is contended, would singularly render illegal, the entire disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. The learned Single Judge had overlooked the said crucial aspect, though the same was specifically highlighted by the appellant. The learned counsel referring to exhibits produced especially Exhibit P25 investigation report dated 30.11.2006, submits that the same on its very face established that a preliminary enquiry had been conducted and statements of various persons had been recorded. However, the copy of the investigation report, preliminary report, or statement of the witnesses in the said enquiry had not been handed over to the appellant which detrimentally impacted the rights of the appellant as he was handicapped from effectively cross examining the said witnesses. Though legally bound to supply the same, the appellant never received such copies though all the persons whose statements had been thus recorded had been examined as witnesses by the management in the enquiry proceedings. The learned counsel specifically points to Exhibit P25 which refers to the statements of Sri.P.T.Philippose, Sri.K.C.Kedarlal, Sri.A.K.Peuosmon and Sri K.G.Biju, who were examined as PW1 to PW4 by the management, whom the appellant was not able to confront insofar as the statements rendered by them had not been provided. Thus, the right of the appellant to defend the case, according to the learned counsel, was seriously impaired. It is contended that the learned Single Judge ought to have found that the case highlighted by the appellant comes within the guidelines prescribed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with respect to interference in the disciplinary proceedings and further that the punishment imposed on the appellant was strikingly disproportionate to the charges levelled against him. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel on the dictum laid down in Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of Indi a [1986 KHC 811] , State of Mysore and others v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makapur [ AIR 1963 SC 375 1963 KHC 483] and State of UP v. Mohd. Sharif [1982 KHC 569] to substantiate his contentions. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the judgment of the learned Single Judge did not call for any interference and that the same had been rendered validly and in accordance with law.
Sharif [1982 KHC 569] to substantiate his contentions. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the judgment of the learned Single Judge did not call for any interference and that the same had been rendered validly and in accordance with law. It is contended that there was nothing warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and that the reduction in pay was ordered on the basis of the enquiry conducted and misconduct proved in the enquiry. It is contended that all the statements recorded during the course of investigation were produced and admitted in the enquiry in the presence of the appellant and he had been given opportunity to disprove the contents of the statements. The appellant had been given permission to defend his case with the assistance of a legal practitioner of his choice, as a special case, and that the same revealed the bonafides of the respondents. The Investigating Officer had appreciated the evidence adduced before him in the enquiry both by the prosecution and the defence while arriving at his conclusions, and the Disciplinary Authority had passed a speaking order after a meticulous examination of the enquiry report dated 31.12.2007. The depositions made by the witnesses in the enquiry and the statements recorded and produced in the enquiry and the representation dated 29.02.2008 submitted by the appellant had been considered and it is based on cogent evidence that the matter was proceeded with. It is contended by the learned counsel that, the deposition of PW1 was recorded in the presence of the appellant and his defence assistant, and the deposition of PW1, the statements submitted in the enquiry as PD2, PD3 and PD4 were forwarded for consideration to the appellate authority. PD3 and PD4 statements were those made by Sri P.T.Philipose, the Watcher, and he had made such statements on his own volition, without any duress, as alleged by the appellant. It is contended that if such statements were obtained under force, the appellant could have proved it through cross examination and rather than doing the same, the appellant had resorted to making allegations and had dishonestly stated that PD 3 and 4 statements were manufactured by the Board.
It is contended that if such statements were obtained under force, the appellant could have proved it through cross examination and rather than doing the same, the appellant had resorted to making allegations and had dishonestly stated that PD 3 and 4 statements were manufactured by the Board. It is contended that the Disciplinary Authority did not pass the order on the statement of the witnesses alone, but after appreciating the enquiry report, deposition of witnesses recorded in the enquiry in the presence of the appellant and the representation submitted by the appellant in accordance with the relevant Rules. 7. We have heard both sides and considered the contentions put forth. The scope of interference by the High Court in disciplinary proceedings is no longer res integra. In the State of Rajasthan and others v. Bhupendra Singh [2024 KLT OnLine 2034 (SC)], the Hon’ble Supreme Court had affirmatively quoted the dictum laid down in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao [ AIR 1963 SC 1723 ], which reads as follows: “7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.
The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” (emphasis supplied) After a detailed survey of the precedents on the point including the dictum laid down in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao [ (1975) 2 SCC 557 ]; State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K.Sharma [ (1996) 3 SCC 364 ]; Union of India and another v. K G Soni [ (2006) 6 SCC 794 ]; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Man Mohan Nath Sinha and another [ (2009) 8 SCC 310 ], State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar and another [ (2011) 10 SCC 249 ]; Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S.Raghavendra [ (2024) 6 SCC 418 ], it was concluded by the Hon’ble Court in Bhupendra Singh (supra) that while reappraisal of facts and evidence is not impermissible by the High Court, the infirmity in the underlying order has to be greater than ordinary. We deem it necessary to thus remind ourselves of the law on the point especially in the light of the valid reasoning of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment that the Writ Court cannot interfere in the findings until and unless it is shown that there has been certain violations of guidelines in binding precedents and that none such is found in the matter at hand.
We now proceed to consider the contentions put forth to ascertain whether there are any valid reasons based on the principles of natural justice that would merit an interference in the matter as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant and stoutly objected to by the learned counsel for the respondents. 8. We find merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Exhibit P25 investigation report prima facie establishes that a preliminary enquiry was conducted and the statements of various persons had been recorded. As regards the question whether the appellant had been served with a copy of the investigation report/preliminary enquiry or the statement of witnesses in the said enquiry, though it is seen that there had been repeated requests from the part of the appellant seeking the same, there is nothing tangible to show that the same were provided. The contention apparently is that since the said statements were not relied upon in the course of the proceedings to arrive at the conclusion, there was no question or need to serve copies of the same to the appellant. We note that as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, there is indeed reference to Exhibit P25 investigation report in Exhibit P2 charge memo and it had been specifically stated therein that the complaint of the appellant dated 07.11.2006 addressed to the Deputy Director was investigated. The said investigation is revealed as per Exhibit P25 investigation report. Exhibit P8 enquiry report as well as Exhibit P25 investigation report was referred to and it could be seen that Exhibit P25 investigation report was heavily relied on by the Enquiry Officer to arrive at the alleged guilt of the appellant, though the relevant documents pertaining to the same had been furnished to him. It is the specific case of the appellant that there was a fact finding enquiry by the Vigilance Officer and that the enquiry report was never served on him. However, the vigilance report had been relied on by the Enquiry Officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority while finding the guilt of the appellant and while imposing the major penalty.
It is the specific case of the appellant that there was a fact finding enquiry by the Vigilance Officer and that the enquiry report was never served on him. However, the vigilance report had been relied on by the Enquiry Officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority while finding the guilt of the appellant and while imposing the major penalty. It is the specific contention of the appellant that the investigation report had been suppressed, while the Disciplinary Authority had relied on the enquiry report as well as the evidence of the deposition of the Vigilance Enquiry Officer, as well as the Farm Superintendent. The statement of imputations of misconduct/ misbehaviour in support of the articles of charge framed against the appellant alleging that the appellant had committed gross misconduct in violation of Rule 3 of the Rubber Board Employees Conduct Rules makes specific references to the statements of Sri P.T.Philippose, Sri.K.C.Kedarlal, Sri.P.K.Peuosmon and Sri.K.G.Biju. It is also clear that all the said persons who had given statements had been examined as witnesses from the side of the management in the enquiry proceedings. It is seen that in the Report on enquiry into the charges of misconduct/misbehaviour against the appellant dated 31.12.2007, the Inquiry officer has specifically concluded as follows: “I have evaluated the evidence of the material witnesses and the documents forming part of the enquiry and in the light of the depositions of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4, PW5, PW6, PW7 and DW1 and the documentary evidence of PD3, PD4, PD5, PD6, PD7, PD8 and PD1 forming part of the enquiry, I find that the charge against the CO on this count is substantiated in all respects and accordingly hold that charge No.1 stance as proved.” In the very same report while dealing with Charge No.3, it had been further concluded as follows: “The evidence of PW1, PW3, PW4, PW5, PW6 and DW1 and the documentary evidence namely Exhibits PD3, PD4, PD6, PD7, PD8 and PD10 are material evidence in the enquiry to consider this charge.
It had been the specific case of the appellant that in Exhibit P9 explanation dated 29.02.2008 submitted by him before the respondent No.3 that, "material evidence in the enquiry had been suppressed by the prosecution to grind him" by which what he apparently meant that the Farm Superintendent with whom the alleged investigation was entrusted and who had submitted the report, taking the statements of the relevant persons, had been suppressed and that the investigation/ inquiry was fake and a charade. As revealed from Exhibit P25 and other documents produced along with the reply affidavit, it is seen that the appellant had not been served with a copy of the report of the fact finding enquiry by the Farm Superintendent at the relevant time. The inquiry report and the copies of the statements or witnesses recorded during the preliminary enquiry had not been furnished to him at the time of the disciplinary inquiry and he had to obtain the report of the Farm Superintendent under the Right to Information Act on 24.03.2012. Exhibit P25 reveals that on 30.11.2006, a fact finding enquiry had indeed been conducted, behind the back of the appellant and several witnesses had been examined and their statements taken. The appellant had evidently not been given a copy of Exhibit P25 before the departmental enquiry and it is not a valid and legally sustainable contention that the same is of no consequence since the Disciplinary Authority had not based its decision on the statement of the witnesses alone. It was incumbent on the part of the management to have shared the copies of the relevant documents as requested for by the appellant. The said request was not met. There is thus merit in the contention that the appellant did not get an opportunity to confront the witnesses with their statements taken at the time of their enquiry. It is noted that Exhibit P13 order issued by the Disciplinary Authority specifically refers to the enquiry report dated 31.12.2007. Insofar as the said report dated 31.12.2007 and the statements apparently relied thereon, had not been provided to the appellant, the vice of non compliance with the principles of natural justice is attracted. In Mohd. Sharif (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the copies of statements of witnesses recorded during the preliminary inquiry are not furnished to the delinquent employee, the proceedings are vitiated.
In Mohd. Sharif (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the copies of statements of witnesses recorded during the preliminary inquiry are not furnished to the delinquent employee, the proceedings are vitiated. Similarly, in Kashinath Deekshita (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that refusal to supply copies of statements of witnesses recorded ex parte at pre inquiry stage and documents relied on by the Department to establish charges before commencement of the inquiry, vitiates the inquiry. The said factual and legal position makes it evident that Exhibits P8 and P13 orders rendered against the appellant in the disciplinary proceedings cannot be sustained in law. The same are fit to be set aside on the said count. Exhibit P16, order of the Appellate Authority overlooks the glaring discrepancy detailed above and as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant has been rendered mechanically and without proper application of mind to the relevant aspects. Exhibit P16 too is thus fit to be set aside. In view of the above discussion, the Writ Appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. Exhibits P8, P13 and P16 are found legally unsustainable and are quashed.