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2025 DIGILAW 254 (GUJ)

Kamla Electricals and Engineering Co. (KEECO) v. Jigar I. Patel

2025-03-11

PRANAV TRIVEDI, SUNITA AGARWAL

body2025
JUDGMENT : (PRANAV TRIVEDI, J.) 1. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner seeks to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) and further seeks to challenge the order dated 29.6.2024 passed by the Presiding Officer, Commercial Court and Principal Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commercial Court’) below Exh-59 in Commercial Civil Suit No. 5 of 2020, whereby the application of the present petitioner under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code came to be rejected. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the filing of the present writ petition is that the present petitioner is the original defendant No.1 in Commercial Civil Suit No. 5 of 2020 filed before the learned Commercial Court. The Commercial Civil Suit was instituted by the plaintiff- respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the respondent’) praying for a decree of recovery to the tune of Rs.1,69,41,044.49 jointly and severally against the present petitioner and other defendants of the Suit. Further prayer was also made for the interest on the amount of recovery. It was the case of the petitioner that the respondent while instituting the commercial suit, had clearly stated that the cause of action for filing of the suit arose on 5.6.2015. However, the suit was instituted in the year 2020, which came to be numbered as Commercial Civil Suit No. 5 of 2020. 3. Along with the written statement filed on 28.3.2022, the petitioner has also filed an application under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code below Exh-59 praying for rejection of the plaint. The contention raised by the petitioner was that the respondent-original plaintiff had instituted a suit which was clearly barred by period of limitation, more particularly Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and, therefore, the plaint was deserved to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code. It was also the case of the petitioner that there was no cause of action to institute the suit at the relevant point of time and, therefore, the plaint deserves to be rejected under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code as well. 4. It was also the case of the petitioner that there was no cause of action to institute the suit at the relevant point of time and, therefore, the plaint deserves to be rejected under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code as well. 4. The respondent in its reply Exh-64 raised the contention that the first cause of action arose for filing of the suit on 5.6.2015 when the respondent- original plaintiff was assigned the work at various sites which was carried out and thereafter bills were raised on 15.6.2015. The further cause of action arose on 1.10.2015 when the plaintiff had completed the work and sent the bill to the petitioner-original defendant. Thereafter, cause of action arose on 16.7.2015 when the defendant had submitted Tax Deduction at Source (TDS) deposit challans and mentioned that they had paid total amount of Rs.61,39,582/- and deducted tax deduction at source of Rs.61,397/- for the transaction. Further, the cause of action also arose on 1.7.2017 when the respondent –original plaintiff came to know about the fraud perpetrated by the defendant by reverting the Tax Deduction at Source credit actually shown and which was connected with payment obligation of Rs.61,39,582/-, shown as amount paid/ credited to the plaintiff towards part payment. 5. Therefore, according to respondent-original plaintiff, it was the case of continuing cause of action due to accounting and tax fraud committed on the part of the respondent and the plaintiff had no occasion to know about the actual effect of the fraudulent accounting till it came into light on 1.7.2017 by way of intimation under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act. The respondent- original plaintiff, thus, contended that the cause of action finally arose on 1.7.2017 and the suit was instituted on 27.1.2020, which was well within the period of limitation. 6. Pursuant to the arguments canvassed by both the parties and taking into consideration the contention raised by both the parties, the learned Commercial Court by way of the impugned order dated 29.6.2024 was pleased to reject the application of the present petitioner- original defendant under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. Being aggrieved by the order dated 29.6.2024 rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11, the petitioner has preferred the present petition. 7. We have heard Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Darshan Varandani and Mr. Being aggrieved by the order dated 29.6.2024 rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11, the petitioner has preferred the present petition. 7. We have heard Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Darshan Varandani and Mr. Jamshed Kavina, learned advocates for the petitioner. 8. Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, learned senior counsel has submitted that the impugned order is against the settled principles of the provision of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code and the learned Commercial Court has failed to appreciate that while deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, only averments of the plaint and the documents filed along with plaint are to be seen. 9. It was submitted by Mr. Sanjanwala, learned senior counsel that in Para-25 of the plaint, the plaintiff himself stated that the cause of action arose on 1.10.2015, inasmuch as, according to the plaintiff, the recovery of the money from the defendant-petitioner for the work executed from 5.6.2015, became due on completion of the work on 1.10.2015. On 1.10.2015, the respondent had even issued notice to the petitioner demanding a sum of Rs.45,25,582/- as outstanding amount which was replied on 7.10.2015. Another notice was issued on 21.10.2015 and was replied on 3.11.2015. Thus, when the cause of action arose in the year 2015, the suit preferred on 27.1.2020 was clearly barred by the Law of Limitation. The contention is that the suit being clearly hit by the provisions of Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code, the learned Commercial Court has gravely erred in not appreciating the provisions of Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code and rejecting the application preferred by the petitioner. 10. It was further submitted that the suit of the respondent ought to have been filed within a period of 3 years as per Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. On 7.10.2015, there was a clear and unequivocal denial by the petitioner/ original defendant of the alleged claim of the respondent and, therefore, the period of limitation would reckon from 7.10.2015 or at the most from 1.10.2015. It was further submitted that the trial Court has completely failed to consider that as per Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, limitation would be 3 years from "when the work is done" and, therefore, the suit was hit by order VII Rule 11 of the Code. 11. It was further contended by Mr. It was further submitted that the trial Court has completely failed to consider that as per Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, limitation would be 3 years from "when the work is done" and, therefore, the suit was hit by order VII Rule 11 of the Code. 11. It was further contended by Mr. Sanjanwala, learned senior counsel that learned Commercial Court has materially erred in considering subsequent dates mentioned in the statement for cause of action by the plaintiff instead of considering the material date. The period of limitation began to run from the date when the right to sue ‘first' accrued. It is settled law that successive violations would not give rise to a fresh cause of action and the suit is liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued. The learned Commercial Court has erred in observing the issue as a mixed question of facts and law in rejecting the application for rejection of plaint. 12. Even otherwise, the plaintiff is guilty of suppression of material facts. Pursuant to the transaction, a written complaint was filed by the plaintiff against the defendant before Gorwa Police Station on 18.5.2016 which fact has not been brought on record. The submission is that if the limitation is counted from 18.5.2016 when the plaintiff initiated action against the defendant for the due amount, then also the plaint is barred by the limitation for instituting the suit. The impugned order, thus, is contrary to law, evidence on record and suffers from perversity of law and facts and, therefore, warranting interference of this Court. 13. Having heard Mr. Sanjanwala, learned senior counsel and perused the material on record and after looking into the pleading of the plaint, the main thrust of argument canvassed by Mr. Sanjanwala is with regard to the period of limitation which will lead the suit being barred by law as per the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code. 14. If the cause of action pleaded by the respondent is perused carefully, then it is the case of the respondent that the cause of action for filing the suit first arose on 5.6.2015 when the work was assigned and, thereafter, on 15.6.2015 when the work was subsequently completed. 14. If the cause of action pleaded by the respondent is perused carefully, then it is the case of the respondent that the cause of action for filing the suit first arose on 5.6.2015 when the work was assigned and, thereafter, on 15.6.2015 when the work was subsequently completed. Thereafter cause of action arose on 16.7.2015 when the defendant-petitioner submitted the tax deposit at source challans under the provisions of Income tax Act and, thereafter, the cause of action also arose on 1.10.2015 when the respondent-original plaintiff finally completed the work and sent a bill of completed work to the defendant. The total amount of the bill was Rs.61,39,532/- and the tax deduction at source by the petitioner was to the tune of Rs.61,397/-. 15. It was the case of the plaintiff that cause of action, thereafter, arose when the original defendant No.3 admitted in his statement before the police authorities that he was actually submitting tenders and signing it in the name of defendant No.1, i.e. present petitioner. Therefore, according to the respondent, there was a clear fraud and suppression of material fact which was revealed for the first time. And lastly the cause of action arose on 1.7.2017 when the plaintiff came to know about the fraud perpetrated by the defendant by reverting the tax deduction at source credit actually shown, which was connected with the payment obligation of Rs.69,39,582/- and the deducted amount was actually shown as amount paid / credited to the plaintiff towards part payment. 16. It was the case of the plaintiff that when there is a fraudulent act of concealment from the plaintiff, the period of limitation did not begin to run until the plaintiff had discovered fraud with reasonable diligence. It was a case of concealed document and the plaintiff had no means of compelling production of concealed document. As per the plaintiff-respondent, fraud was perpetrated by the petitioner at stages and it was lastly done on 1.7.2017, which has given rise to the cause of action and the suit was filed on 27.1.2020, was within the period of limitation. 17. In order to decide that the suit was barred by limitation, we have to note that in this case the question of limitation is not a question of law or where from the pleadings itself it has become apparent that the suit was barred by limitation. 17. In order to decide that the suit was barred by limitation, we have to note that in this case the question of limitation is not a question of law or where from the pleadings itself it has become apparent that the suit was barred by limitation. The present is a case where the question of limitation would be a mixed question of fact and law, the suit, thus, cannot be said to be barred by limitation on the face of it. The facts necessary to prove the limitation must be pleaded and the issue raised shall then be adjudicated on the evidence of the parties. 18. In the present case, the question of limitation is intricately linked first with the completion of the work, then non-payment and then with relation to the deducting of the tax at source and, thereafter, reverting back the amount of tax which was deducted at source. All these facts would be intricately interwoven and fact of initial non-payment or partial payment, thereafter deduction of tax at source for the full payment and thereafter reversal of such tax would lead to intricate question of fact. The starting point of limitation has been ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. However, when there is interwoven question of facts and law, the suit cannot be dismissed as barred by limitation invoking the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC, without proper pleadings, framing of issue of limitation and taking of evidences. When the question of limitation is mixed question of law and facts, on plain reading of the plaint, it cannot be held that the suit is barred by limitation. 19. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the present suit cannot be dismissed as barred by limitation under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, without proper pleadings, framing of issue of limitation, taking of evidence. Further, once the facts are disputed about limitation, the determination of question of limitation cannot be even made under Order XIV Rule 2(2) as "a preliminary issue" or other issue of law. It would be necessary that issues be determined to give a finding on a question of law. It is settled that mixed question of facts and law cannot be determined as a preliminary issue. 20. It would be necessary that issues be determined to give a finding on a question of law. It is settled that mixed question of facts and law cannot be determined as a preliminary issue. 20. Hence in the instant case, when the present question of limitation is mixed question of law and facts, we see no reason in interfering with the impugned order passed by the learned Commercial Court. 21. In view of the observations made hereinabove, the present writ petition is devoid of merits and hence dismissed with no order as to costs.