ORDER : P. V. Balakrishnan, J. Under challenge in this revision petition is the conviction and sentence rendered against the revision petitioner under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. 2. The revision petitioner is the accused in S.T.No.1993 of 2009 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-VI, Thiruvananthapuram. He stood trial before that court for committing an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. 3. The case of the complainant is that the accused who was a family friend of hers, borrowed a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- from her to meet his urgent business needs, by promising to repay the amount within a period of one month. For the purpose of discharging the above liability, the accused also issued Ext.P1 cheque dated 15.06.2009 for Rs.9,00,000/- drawn on Canara Bank, Arumanoor Branch. When the cheque was presented for collection, it got dishonoured stating that 'funds are insufficient'. The statutory notice issued was responded with a reply notice dated 20.08.2009, raising untenable contentions and the cheque amount remained unpaid. Hence, the complainant approached the trial court by filing the afore complaint. 4. The trial court, on an elaborate appreciation of the evidence on record, found the the accused guilty and convicted him under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. It sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs.11,88,000/- under Section 138 of the N.I.Act, with a default clause. The fine amount, if realised, was ordered to be paid to the complainant as compensation under Section 357(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. 5. The accused carried the matter in appeal by preferring Crl.A.No.488 of 2013 before the Additional Sessions Court-V, Thiruvananthapuram. The said court, by judgment dated 12.04.2016, allowed the appeal in part and while confirming the conviction, modified and reduced the sentence to one of simple imprisonment till the rising of the court, by retaining the fine amount and the default clause. 6. Heard Adv.M.R.Rajesh, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner. There is no representation for the 2 nd respondent. Perused the records. 7. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that both the trial court as well as the appellate court failed to appreciate the evidence in a proper perspective and has arrived at a wrong conclusion of guilt against the accused. There is no representation for the 2 nd respondent. Perused the records. 7. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that both the trial court as well as the appellate court failed to appreciate the evidence in a proper perspective and has arrived at a wrong conclusion of guilt against the accused. He submitted that the complainant has not proved the execution of the cheque or the passing of consideration and the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I.Act does not carry with it the quantum of the debt or consideration. He also argued that the version of the complainant regarding the transactions is not believable. He further contended that even though the proceedings in the trial court commenced by adopting summary trial procedure as is evidenced by the nomenclature 'ST', in the midst of the proceedings, the procedure of trial for summons cases was adopted, without passing a speaking order and that the same is fatal to the case. 8. In the instant case, in order to prove the case of the complainant, she herself got examined as PW1 and marked Exts.P1 to P5 documents. PW1 has filed a proof affidavit in tune with the averments in the complaint. She deposed that the accused had borrowed Rs.9,00,000/- from her on 15.05.2009 for his business needs and has issued Ext.P1 cheque dated 15.06.2009 to discharge the said liability. Her evidence also reveals that the accused came with Ext.P1 cheque with the entries typed and thereafter, signed it in front of her and handed it over to her. The evidence of PW1 coupled with Ext.P1 is sufficient to hold that the complainant has discharged the initial onus cast upon her in proving the execution of the cheque and in establishing the basis for attracting the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I.Act, which includes a presumption of the existence of a legally enforceable debt/liability (see Rangappa v. Mohan [ (2010) 11 SCC 441 ] ). Now it is for the accused to rebut the presumptions at least by probabilities. 9. Now it is for the accused to rebut the presumptions at least by probabilities. 9. In the present case, when PW1 was cross-examined, the specific suggestion made to her by the counsel for the accused was that the mother of the complainant, Syamala Bai had invested in the financial institution run by the accused and as security, title documents and cheques were given to Syamala Bai and the same has been misused in this case. But PW1 stoutly denied the said suggestion. It is to be taken note that even though PW1 has been cross-examined in extenso, nothing has been brought out to probabilise the afore version or improbabilise version of the complainant regarding the transactions and the issuance of the cheque. 10. Now be that as it may, it is very pertinent to note that in order to prove his case, the accused himself got examined as DW2, apart from examining DW1; the bank manager, where he was maintaining his account. When thus examined, DW2 stated that, during 1998, the complainant's mother had deposited Rs.2,00,000/- in the institution run by him, for interest, and at that time, he had given as security the title deed of a property having an extent of 25 cents and a promissory note. Later, when the complainant's mother demanded the accused to execute a sale deed with respect to the property or to offer two blank cheque leaves as security, he issued two signed blank cheques to her. Even though the amount of Rs.2,00,000/- with interest was repaid, the documents were not returned and a cheque was misused in this case. At this juncture, it is very pertinent to note that the afore version as spoken to by DW2 was not at all put to PW1 during cross-examination and her explanation sought for. 11. Further, it would be apt to take note that when the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C, his version was that at the time of depositing the money, he had handed over the title deed of the 25 cents of property and a blank signed cheque bearing No.907363 as security to Syamala Bai. The afore version of the accused again, considerably varies with the version given by him, when examined as DW2, since it mentions only about a single cheque being given to the complainant. The afore version of the accused again, considerably varies with the version given by him, when examined as DW2, since it mentions only about a single cheque being given to the complainant. That apart, it is again interesting to note that, in Ext.D1 reply notice, what is stated by the accused is that at the time of deposit of money by the mother of the complainant, the accused had issued a signed blank cheque to her and nothing more. Ext.D1 is totally silent about the title documents and promissory notes allegedly given to Symala Bai. The afore versions of the accused clearly show that the accused is not having a consistent version regarding the transactions and the issuance of Ext.P1 cheque and that he is groping in dark, to somehow make out a defence. In these circumstances, the finding of the trial court and the appellate court that the accused has failed to bring out a probable version and that he has thus failed in rebutting the statutory presumptions, cannot be faulted with. 12. As regards the contention of non proving the original transaction and the source to advance the money, it is a settled law that it is only when the accused brings out a probable version, the onus will shift upon the complainant to prove afore facts [see Rohit Bhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat [ AIR 2019 SC 1876 ] and Jacob v. State of Kerala [2020(3) KLT SN6 (C.No.8)] . In the instant case, since no such circumstance exist, the contention has no legs to stand. 13. Coming to the contention regarding switching over proceedings from summary trial to summons case procedure, again, I am of the view that there is no merit in it. On the basis of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, I had called for the records including the 'B' Diary proceedings from the trial court and examined it in detail. On such examination, it can be seen that, right from the commencement of the proceedings in the case, the trial court has only followed the procedure for trial of summons cases and nothing more. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner also could not point out any material to substantiate his contention. On such examination, it can be seen that, right from the commencement of the proceedings in the case, the trial court has only followed the procedure for trial of summons cases and nothing more. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner also could not point out any material to substantiate his contention. Further, the nomenclature of the case, which is 'ST' is not summary trial as contended by the learned counsel, but only summons trial (See Notification bearing No.D1(A)-2010/98 dated 11.04.2003 issued by the High Court regarding nomenclatures) 14. The upshot of the afore discussions is that the revision petitioner could not point out any illegality or irregularity in the trial court and the appellate court appreciating the evidence and in reaching a conclusion of guilt against the accused. The sentence imposed by the appellate court on the accused also cannot be stated as unjust or excessive. In such circumstances, I find no merit in this revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. The revision petitioner/accused is granted three months time from today to remit the fine amount. The revision petitioner/accused shall appear before the trial court on 26.12.2025 to receive the sentence.