JUDGMENT : Muralee Krishna, J. Respondents 3 and 4 in W.P.(C)No.32631 of 2022 filed this writ appeal under section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act , 1958, challenging the judgment dated 05.12.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition. 2. The 1 st respondent was selected and appointed to the post of Lecturer in Mahatma Gandhi University (the ‘M.G. University’, in short) and her appointment was approved by Ext.P1 order dated 15.04.2004. The Government, vide order dated 06.04.2017, approved the Memorandum of Association, Rules and Regulations for the establishment of the 1 st appellant Centre for Professional and Advanced Studies (‘CPAS’, in short), which is a Society registered under the Travancore and Cochin Literary Scientific and Charitable Societies Act. The M.G. University resolved to accept the order constituting the 1 st appellant Society and, in it’s syndicate meeting dated 17.07.2017, further resolved to disengage the teaching and other staff in the self-financing institutions being run by the M.G. University. Since the resolution of the syndicate was sought to be enforced by the M.G. University, writ petitions were filed before this Court. While so, the M.G. University terminated the services of the teaching staff and immediately thereafter the teaching staff were directed to submit their willingness to be engaged in the service of CPAS. Accordingly, the 1 st respondent and other teaching staff submitted their willingness, without prejudice to their right to challenge the orders before this Court. 2.1. The 1 st respondent filed W.P.(C)No.32363 of 2017 before this Court, and by the judgment dated 16.11.2018, this Court found that the 1 st respondent and other similarly situated persons have no statutory protection and their appointments were only under a contract of transfer service. Being aggrieved, the 1 st respondent filed W.A.No.188 of 2019 before this Court. A Division Bench of this Court considered that writ appeal with some other similar appeals, and by a common judgment dated 03.07.2019, allowed the writ appeals declaring that the appellants therein are permanent employees of the M.G. University, having the status of teachers of the self-financing institution, which has the status of an unaided affiliated college managed by the University. Some consequential directions were also issued in that judgment. Some consequential directions were also issued in that judgment. The M.G. University, as well as CPAS, challenged the judgment of the Division Bench before the Supreme Court of India by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.6378 of 2020 and connected cases. By the order dated 11.05.2022, the Supreme Court disposed of the Special Leave Petition, affirming the judgment of the Division Bench. 2.2. The 1 st respondent further averred in the writ petition that even after the lapse of four months’ time granted by the Apex Court to comply with the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Court, neither the M.G. University nor CPAS complied those directions. By virtue of Ext.P3 proceedings dated 07.03.2022 issued by CPAS, the 1 st respondent was transferred to the Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Puthuppally campus, from Cheruvandoor, wherein she was initially engaged as a Lecturer. While so, the 2 nd appellant Principal of the Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences, issued Ext.P4 letter dated 29.08.2022 to the 1 st respondent, instructing her to enter her name in the portal as Associate Professor in Pharmacognosy, attaching therewith the e-mail communication dated 27.08.2022 issued by the CPAS. On receipt of Ext.P4, the 1 st respondent submitted Ext.P5 letter dated 30.08.2022 to CPAS informing that as per the academic records, she is specialised in pharmaceutics during her post-graduation from Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani and her name was registered in the pharmaceutics department during the commencement of faculty enrolment programme by the Kerala University of Health Sciences (‘KUHS’ in short) and she was receiving orders from that University where Pharmaceutics has been specified as her department. If the 1 st respondent enters her name in KUHS web portal as an Associate Professor in Pharmacognosy, it amounts to misrepresentation and is unethical. She produced Ext.P6 certificate issued by the Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani, along with Ext.P5 letter. 2.3. While so, the 1 st respondent was served with Ext.P7 notice dated 14.09.2022 alleging that she appeared to have adopted postures not differential to the commands of the authorities, and in terms of Clause 9 of the contract agreement CPAS is rescinding the contract agreement because of her failure to ensure compliance with Clause 5 of the agreement. 2.3. While so, the 1 st respondent was served with Ext.P7 notice dated 14.09.2022 alleging that she appeared to have adopted postures not differential to the commands of the authorities, and in terms of Clause 9 of the contract agreement CPAS is rescinding the contract agreement because of her failure to ensure compliance with Clause 5 of the agreement. Meanwhile, the KUHS issued Ext.P8 letter dated 16.09.2022 to the 2 nd appellant Principal informing that the 1 st respondent is ineligible to be an Associate Professor of pharmacognosy and the application for continuation of provisional affiliation of B.Pharm course for the academic year 2022-23 cannot be processed further due to the deficiencies and the processing of application of M.Pharm Pharmaceutics has also been put on hold. As advised, the 1 st respondent submitted Ext.P10 request dated 17.09.2022 to the Vice Chancellor of M.G. University and met the Vice Chancellor. She was advised not to challenge Ext.P7, and necessary directions will be issued to CPAS to revoke Ext.P7 notice. On receipt of Ext.P8, the 1 st respondent again submitted Ext.P11 request dated 20.09.2022 to CPAS to revoke Ext.P7 notice. But CPAS did not revoke Ext.P7 notice, and instead the 1 st respondent was informed by the 2 nd appellant Principal that the college has not received any communication in respect of Ext.P7. In such circumstances, the 1 st respondent filed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs: “(a) call for the records leading to Exts. P4 and P7 and quash the same by issuing a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction; (b) declare that the 3 rd respondent cannot issue a direction in the nature of Ext.P4 and a notice in the nature of Ext.P7 to the petitioner. (c) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction commanding the 3 rd respondent to consider Ext. P11 and revoke Ext.P7 notice forthwith”. 3. In the writ petition, the appellants filed a counter affidavit dated 18.10.2022 opposing the reliefs sought therein and producing therewith Exts.R3 (a) to R3(g) documents. It is contended in that counter affidavit that the appointment of the 1 st respondent was purely on a contract basis with a specific stipulation that the contract is terminable with one month's notice or pay in lieu of such notice. It is contended in that counter affidavit that the appointment of the 1 st respondent was purely on a contract basis with a specific stipulation that the contract is terminable with one month's notice or pay in lieu of such notice. The 1 st respondent was appointed and engaged as an Associate Professor in the branch of pharmaceutical science and was engaged for teaching pharmacognosy. The degree obtained by the 1 st respondent is a general degree, and the course contains a paper in pharmacognosy, and she has been teaching this branch of study for several years. A large number of M. Pharm students have submitted their dissertations under the guidance of the 1 st respondent in pharmacognosy. Evidencing the said contention, the appellants produced Exts.R3 (a) to R3(g) dissertations submitted by the students mentioned therein. 3.1. It is further contended by the appellants that pharmacognosy is an important branch of pharmaceutical science, and it needs a teacher in the cadre of Associate Professor. Since the 1 st respondent herself says that she cannot continue as an Associate Professor in that branch and that she cannot be engaged in that subject, the appellants have no other option but to disengage her from service and terminate her from that post in order to appoint a person who can teach this branch of study. Going by the Division Bench judgment of this Court, which was approved by the Apex Court, the appellants are entitled to terminate the service of a contract employee on abolition of the course of study or otherwise. A situation has arisen in the institution where the 1 st respondent says that she cannot be engaged in the branch of study, and since the post is filled by a qualified candidate, the 1 st respondent, being an excess, was compelled to be disengaged. Her termination is with reasons and within the power of the appellants. Since the 1 st respondent is only a contract employee, she cannot be compelled to continue in service since contract personnel service is not enforceable by filing a writ petition. 4. To the counter affidavit filed by the appellants, the 1 st respondent filed a reply affidavit dated 02.11.2022, producing therewith Exts. P13 to P17 documents. Along with a memo dated 10.11.2022, the learned counsel for the appellants produced the agreement dated 01.01.2022 entered into between the 1 st respondent and the appellants. 5. 4. To the counter affidavit filed by the appellants, the 1 st respondent filed a reply affidavit dated 02.11.2022, producing therewith Exts. P13 to P17 documents. Along with a memo dated 10.11.2022, the learned counsel for the appellants produced the agreement dated 01.01.2022 entered into between the 1 st respondent and the appellants. 5. After considering the rival contentions of the parties and the materials on record, by the impugned judgment dated 05.12.2022, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and set aside Ext.P7 notice dated 14.09.2022 issued by CPAS; however, leaving full liberty to CPAS to take any action as may be permissible to them under the terms of the agreement dated 01.01.2022, following due procedure. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed the present writ appeal. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned counsel for the 1 st respondent, the respective learned Standing Counsel for M.G. University and KUHS and the learned Senior Government Pleader. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that in the writ petition, no grounds are taken to the effect that the termination of the 1 st respondent is a stigmatic termination and it is violative of the terms of the agreement. It is without any pleading and materials, the learned Single Judge arrived at a finding that the termination of the 1 st respondent is stigmatic. In the judgment dated 03.07.2019 in W.A.No.188 of 2019, it is specifically stated that if the service of the teacher is terminated, they will be treated as teachers retrenched from M.G. University and that the liability to pay retrenchment compensation or restoration in service is that of the University. What CPAS terminated is only the contract of engagement and substantive right, if any of the 1 st respondent is still with the M.G. University and for the said reason, she has not sought any relief against the appellants. The appellants are entitled to terminate the service of the contract employee on abolition of the course of study or otherwise. Since the 1 st respondent herself says that she cannot continue as an Associate Professor in that branch and that she cannot be engaged in that subject, the appellants have no other option but to disengage the 1 st respondent from service. The prior notice was also issued to the 1 st respondent, and the period was over by 13.10.2022. Since the 1 st respondent herself says that she cannot continue as an Associate Professor in that branch and that she cannot be engaged in that subject, the appellants have no other option but to disengage the 1 st respondent from service. The prior notice was also issued to the 1 st respondent, and the period was over by 13.10.2022. It was after the period of notice and disengagement that the 1 st respondent preferred the writ petition. The learned Single Judge failed to consider all these aspects while allowing the writ petition. 8. The learned counsel for the 1 st respondent/writ petitioner would submit that the 1 st respondent was actually not retrenched, and otherwise she was deployed to CPAS. Since the qualification of the 1 st respondent is in pharmaceutics, it was impossible for her to enter her name in KUHS as an Associate Professor in pharmacognosy, as it would amount to misrepresentation and would be unethical. By the agreement dated 01.01.2022, the engagement of the 1 st respondent was not as an Associate Professor in pharmacognosy, but in the department of pharmaceutical sciences. She is qualified to teach other subjects in pharmaceutical sciences, and the attempt of the appellants was to oust her, stating that she does not have the qualification in pharmacognosy. On the basis of an impossible task, she was terminated by CPAS. 9. The learned Standing Counsel for M.G. University would submit that the 1 st respondent was retrenched by the University and she was paid all the retrenchment benefits as directed by the Apex Court in the Special Leave Petition and noting the same the contempt petitions filed by the 1 st respondent and others was closed by the Apex Court as per the order dated 01.05.2025 in Contempt Petition (Civil) Nos.631-665 of 2022. 10. In reply to the argument of the learned counsel for the 1 st respondent, the learned counsel for the appellants pointed out Annexure-A timetable for the fourth year B.Pharm of the academic year 2019-20, wherein the subject taught by the 1 st respondent is entered as pharmacognosy. 11. The 1 st respondent was appointed at M.G. University as a Lecturer and her appointment was approved by virtue of Ext.P1 order dated 15.04.2004. Later, the 1 st appellant Society was registered with the approval of the Government for managing and administering all self-financing institutions run by the M.G. University. 11. The 1 st respondent was appointed at M.G. University as a Lecturer and her appointment was approved by virtue of Ext.P1 order dated 15.04.2004. Later, the 1 st appellant Society was registered with the approval of the Government for managing and administering all self-financing institutions run by the M.G. University. The constitution of the 1 st appellant society was accepted by M.G. University. Subsequently, the M.G. University terminated the services of the teaching staff, and they were directed to submit their willingness to be engaged in the service of the 1 st appellant Society. Accordingly, the 1 st respondent submitted her willingness, without prejudice to the right to challenge the orders before this Court. Though the 1 st respondent filed W.P.(C)No. 32363 of 22017 before this Court, the same was dismissed by the judgment dated 16.11.2018, holding that the 1 st respondent and other similarly situated persons have no statutory protection and their appointments were only under a contract of transfer service. However, by a common judgment dated 03.07.2019 in W.A. No.188 of 2019 and connected matters, the Division Bench allowed the writ appeals filed by the 1 st respondent and other similarly situated persons. Though the appellants challenged the Division Bench judgment before the Apex Court, the same was dismissed by Ext.P2 common order dated 11.05.2022 in SLP (C) Diary Nos.6378 of 2020. In Ext.P2 order, the Apex court extracted the conclusions that were arrived at by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment dated 03.07.2019 in W.A.No.188 of 2019 and connected matters, which are as under: “XII(i) We allow all the writ appeals except W.A Nos.10, 663 & 1018 of 2019 and the claims of appellants 4 to 7 in W.A. No.9 of 2019, setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and finding the terminations illegal. XII (ii) W.A. Nos.10, 663 & 1018 of 2019 and the claims of appellants 4 to 7 in W.A. No.9 of 2019 shall stand rejected and the following reliefs and directions shall not apply to them. XII (iii) The resolution of the Syndicate produced at Exh. P21 (W.A. No. 156/2019) and the consequent termination of the appellants by orders similar to Exh.P22 (W.A. No.156/2019), in the appeals allowed, would stand set aside. XII (iii) The resolution of the Syndicate produced at Exh. P21 (W.A. No. 156/2019) and the consequent termination of the appellants by orders similar to Exh.P22 (W.A. No.156/2019), in the appeals allowed, would stand set aside. XII (iv) We declare the appellants to be permanent employees of the University, having the status of Teachers of the Self-financing Institution, which has the status of an unaided affiliated college, managed by the University. XII (v) The termination of the appellants having been found illegal they would be restored to the services of the University and deemed to have been continued in the service of the University uninterruptedly with all benefits dehors the orders of termination, which are set aside. XII (vi) We would not interfere with Ext. P23 (W.A. No.156/2019) since we do not find any infirmity in the constitution of the Society which was for the purpose of better administration and management of the SFI's. The formation of the Society and the transfer of SFI's by the University, are decisions which do not fall for interference by way of judicial review and we decline such prayers. XII (vii) The formation of the Society and the transfer of the SFI's cannot affect the service of the appellants who are declared to be permanent employees of the University by the Supreme Court and this Court. They are to be either deployed to the Society or employed in the university or retrenched in accordance with law. XII (viii). The appellants who are now engaged by the CPAS engaged by CPAS, the will be deemed to be deployed by the university on identical terms and conditions they had with the University. Their pay and allowances will stand protected. The liability to the same shall be either on the society or the University, as decided by the State; which decision is final as per the MoA and shall be binding on both. XII (ix) The appellants shall be paid their entire back wages due within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and shall be continued to be paid in accordance with the regular scales of pay they enjoyed earlier, with increments granted on the due dates starting from the 10 th of this month, till and if they are retrenched. XII (x) Where by reason of lack of qualification or by abolition of a course or otherwise, a teacher is terminated or a post abolished by the Society then the appellants who are thus terminated, shall be retrenched with six months notice, as provided in Statute 2 of Chapter III of the M.G. University Statute, 1997 or pay in lieu of notice and paid one months salary as on the date of termination, for every completed year of service, which includes the gratuity payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 as also retrenchment compensation akin to Section 25F of the ID Act. XII (xi) The liability to retrenchment compensation and for salary to those appellants restored to the service shall be that of the University." 12. In Ext.P2 order, the Apex Court, after hearing the submission of the learned counsel appearing on both sides, while dismissing that special leave petition, further held as under: “One of the submissions advanced by Mr. P.N. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate to the effect that the concerned persons having opted to work under CPAS and having received salary for their work with CPAS, if are allowed back wages in terms of the directions issued by the High Court, it may amount to give double benefit of remuneration to the persons concerned, however needs acceptance. In case, there are such instances, whatever has been made over by CPAs shall be accounted for while granting back wages in terms of the directions issued by the High Court. The rest of the directions issued by the High Court are left intact and shall be operative. All the directions shall be complied with within four months.” 13. During the course of arguments, the learned standing counsel for the M.G. University submitted that after Ext.P2 order of the Apex Court, the University has granted all the service benefits to the 1 st respondent, which will come to Rs.12,17,403/- 14. From the contentions of the 1 st respondent, we notice that according to the 1 st respondent, she does not have the qualification to teach the subject pharmacognosy. According to her, she is qualified to teach another subject in pharmaceutical science and not pharmacognosy. From the contentions of the 1 st respondent, we notice that according to the 1 st respondent, she does not have the qualification to teach the subject pharmacognosy. According to her, she is qualified to teach another subject in pharmaceutical science and not pharmacognosy. She contends that by the agreement dated 01.01.2022, she was not appointed on a contract basis for teaching the subject pharmacognosy and on the other hand, she was appointed generally in the department of pharmaceutical sciences without stipulating the subject. But Exts.R3(a) to R3(g) documents produced by the appellants would show that the 1 st respondent was guiding M.Pharm students, and they have submitted dissertations under the guidance of the 1 st respondent in pharmacognosy. Similarly, Annexure A time table of fourth year B.Pharm for the academic year 2019-20 produced by the appellants, would show that the 1 st respondent was teaching the subject pharmacognosy. Therefore, the contention of the 1 st respondent that she is engaged to teach some other subjects and not pharmacognosy is liable to be rejected. 15. As per the direction XII(x) of the Division Bench judgment of this Court, which was confirmed in Ext.P2 order of the Apex Court, where by reason of lack of qualification or by abolition of a course or otherwise, a teacher is terminated or a post abolished by the Society then the teachers who are thus terminated, shall be retrenched with six months notice, as provided in Statute 2 of Chapter III of the M.G. University Statute, 1997 or pay in lieu of notice and paid one months salary as on the date of termination, for every completed year of service, which includes the gratuity payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 as also retrenchment compensation akin to Section 25F of the ID Act. As per direction XII(xi), the liability to pay retrenchment compensation and salary to those teachers restored to the service shall be that of the University. As mentioned hereinbefore, the stand of the M.G. University is that such retrenchment benefit was already paid to the 1 st respondent by the University. The order dated 01.05.2025 of the Apex Court in Contempt Petition (C)Nos.631-665 of 2022 would show that, taking into consideration the submission of the respondents therein, the Apex Court closed that contempt petitions with liberty to the petitioners therein to raise the issue of increment before this Court. 16. The order dated 01.05.2025 of the Apex Court in Contempt Petition (C)Nos.631-665 of 2022 would show that, taking into consideration the submission of the respondents therein, the Apex Court closed that contempt petitions with liberty to the petitioners therein to raise the issue of increment before this Court. 16. As discussed above, the 1 st respondent does not have sufficient qualifications to teach the subject pharmacognosy. By Ext.P8 letter dated 16.09.2022, KUHS has made it clear that the 1 st respondent is ineligible to be an Associate Professor of pharmacognosy. The agreement entered into between the 1 st respondent and CPAS would show that either party to that agreement shall be at liberty to terminate the agreement on giving the other party one month’s notice in writing provided also that in cases of gross misconduct, dereliction of duty or violation of any terms of that agreement, the CPAS may terminate that agreement forthwith without any notice or compensation in lieu of notice on paying the 1 st respondent the proportion of consolidated remuneration due up to the date of termination. In the instant case, the service of the 1 st respondent was terminated by CPAS after issuing due notice as stipulated in that agreement and completing the period of one month. 17. Though the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment found that the termination of the 1 st respondent is stigmatic, there is no such case for the 1 st respondent in the writ petition. Moreover, the conditions pertaining to the termination of service of a permanent employee is not applicable as far as a contract employee who is fully governed by the terms of the contract. In such circumstances, we find no illegality in Ext.P7 termination notice issued by CPAS to the 1 st respondent under Clause 9 of the agreement. Therefore, we hold that the 1 st respondent has not made out sufficient ground to grant reliefs sought in the writ petition. The learned Single Judge failed to consider the rival contentions of the parties in its proper perspective and hence arrived at a wrong finding in the impugned judgment. Hence, the appeal is liable to be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment dated 05.12.2022, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.32631 of 2022, and the writ petition stands dismissed.