JUDGMENT : 1. We have heard Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Shreya Gupta learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner; learned Standing Counsel for the respondents- state and Mr. Abhimanyu Chauhan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Bareilly Development Authority. 2. The case of the petitioner is that though the land of the petitioner was declared as surplus under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (in short hereinafter referred to as 'Act') but actual physical possession has not been taken and thus he would be entitled to the benefit of sub-section (3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (in short hereinafter referred to as 'Repeal Act'). 3. Specific case of the petitioner is that actual physical possession had not been taken and mere symbolic possession would not be sufficient as the petitioner has continued in possession of the plot in question. His name is duly recorded in the revenue records on the basis of sale deed executed in his favour on December 29, 2010. 4. The issue was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Chandra Pandey vs. State of U.P. 2010 (82) ALR 136 , wherein it was held that mere symbolic possession does not amount to taking over actual physical possession. It was further held that unless actual physical possession has been taken by the State, the party would be entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act, 1999. 5. The same view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Hari Ram, JT 2013 (4) SC 275 : 2013 (4) SCC 280 . The question for consideration before the Apex Court in the said case was whether deemed vesting of surplus land under section 10(3) of the Act would amount to taking over de facto possession depriving the landholders of the benefit of the saving clause under sub-section (3) of the Repeal Act. This issue was answered by the Apex Court in para 36, 39 and 42 of the said judgment, which reads as under:- "Forceful dispossession 36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10. This issue was answered by the Apex Court in para 36, 39 and 42 of the said judgment, which reads as under:- "Forceful dispossession 36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) of Section 10 again speaks of "possession" which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force—as may be necessary—can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub-section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted to only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations i.e. taking possession by giving notice, that is, "peaceful dispossession" and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10(5), then "forceful dispossession" under sub-section (6) of Section 10." *** 39. The abovementioned directives make it clear that sub-section (3) takes in only de jure possession and not de facto possession, therefore, if the landowner is not surrendering possession voluntarily under sub-section (3) of Section 10, or surrendering or delivering possession after notice, under Section 10(5) or dispossession by use of force, it cannot be said that the State Government has taken possession of the vacant land. 42. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.3.1999. State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those situations, the land owner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act." 6. The same issue has been reaffirmed by the Apex Court in the case of Gajanan Kamlya Patil vs. Addl. On failure to establish any of those situations, the land owner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act." 6. The same issue has been reaffirmed by the Apex Court in the case of Gajanan Kamlya Patil vs. Addl. Collector & Comp. Auth. & Ors. JT 2014 (3) SC 211. 7. There is no material in the counter affidavit to demonstrate that the State or the Bareilly Development Authority, Bareilly has taken peaceful possession, nor is there any material to demonstrate that the possession was handed over by the petitioner voluntarily or was taken over by use of force. There is not even a whisper in respect of any notice having been issued under section 10(6) of the Act. The facts clearly indicates that only de jure possession has been taken by the State, not de facto possession, before coming into force of the Repeal Act. 8. The petitioner is thus entitled to get the benefit of the section 3 of the Repeal Act. In the facts and circumstances, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 9. Accordingly, the writ petition succeeds and stands allowed. The impugned order dated November 9, 2022 is quashed. A writ of mandamus is issued commanding the respondents not to interfere in the actual physical possession of the petitioner over the land in dispute. There shall be no order as to costs.