ORDER : SUBBA REDDY SATTI, J. The above writ petition is filed to declare the action of respondent No.2 in not selecting the petitioner as Manager (Mining) in respondent No.2 organization, in pursuance of, employment notification dated 06.10.2024, as illegal and arbitrary. 2. The averments in the affidavit, in brief, are that the petitioner, who completed his Bachelor of Technology in Mining Engineering in the year, 2016 joined respondent No.2 organization in the year, 2019 and worked till 26.09.2024, on a contract basis. The respondents initially appointed the petitioner as Deputy Manager vide letter Ref.No.APMDC/HRD/Contract/2023/921 dated 21.09.2023 and later promoted the petitioner as Manager (Mining). The petitioner worked in the said capacity from 01.10.2023 to 26.09.2024. While so, respondent No.2 issued an employment notification dated 06.10.2024 for filling up various positions including 6 posts of Manager (Mining) (Location-Byrates Project, Mangampeta) on a contract basis for three years. The petitioner applied for the post of Manager (Mining). The petitioner’s application was shortlisted and he attended an interview scheduled on 20.11.2024. The interview committee informed the petitioner that he was one of the six shortlisted candidates. Five other shortlisted candidates received communication. However, the petitioner has not received any communication. The respondents, with a mala fide intention, have not considered the petitioner for the post of Manager (Mining). A contract employee cannot be replaced with another contract employee. 3. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent No.2. It was contended, interalia, that the petitioner was hired on a contractual basis for a limited period to meet the needs of the Barytes Project at Mangampet and his contract ended on 30.09.2024. Respondent No.2 issued an employment notification dated 06.10.2024 for filling up various positions. The selection process was carried out, in adherence to, the prescribed guidelines and the petitioner participated in the said process. As per the selection criteria, candidates are required to secure a minimum of 50% marks to qualify for appointment to any of the notified posts. Whereas the petitioner secured 19 marks out of 50. Hence, the petitioner’s candidature was rejected. The interview committee never informed the petitioner that he would be issued appointment orders. The post of Manager (Mining) in the Barytes Project is a post specifically intended to oversee the management and operational affairs of the project. Whereas the petitioner secured 19 marks out of 50. Hence, the petitioner’s candidature was rejected. The interview committee never informed the petitioner that he would be issued appointment orders. The post of Manager (Mining) in the Barytes Project is a post specifically intended to oversee the management and operational affairs of the project. Therefore, the petitioner’s reliance on the legal principle that a contractual employee cannot be replaced with another contractual employee does not apply to the facts of the case. After the expiry of the petitioner’s tenure, a fresh notification was issued. The petitioner having consciously participated in the selection process without challenging the notification cannot challenge the validity of the process. Eventually, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 4. A reply affidavit is filed on behalf of the petitioner. It was contended that Clause 10 of the employment notification does not speak about the minimum or maximum cut-off marks. However, respondent No.2 interview panel, in the middle of the employment process, arbitrarily and intentionally prescribed the cut-off marks as 50% and the same is unsustainable in the law. In the interview mark sheets, enclosed to the counter affidavit, only two members viz. Vice President (HMBS) and Executive Director have mentioned that a person, scored more than 25 marks may be for appointment and those who have got average marks of above 50% may be considered for appointment. The rule is inserted in the middle of the appointment process only to deprive the petitioner’s rights. The interview marks which are enclosed in the counter affidavit are manipulated and altered with an ulterior motive. The petitioner has got more than 25 marks as per the marks sheets enclosed to the counter. As such, the petitioner is entitled to get employment in respondent No.2 organization. The employment notification is not challenged as the respondents assured the petitioner earlier that there would not be any threat to his position. 5. Heard Sri R. Yellareddy, learned counsel representing Smt. R. Vara Lakshmi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Yathindra Dev, learned Special Government Pleader for the respondents. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that in the notification, respondent No.2 did not mention the marks to be secured in the interview. Thus, changed the rules after the game began and such a course is impermissible. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that in the notification, respondent No.2 did not mention the marks to be secured in the interview. Thus, changed the rules after the game began and such a course is impermissible. The petitioner’s experience was not considered properly in the interview and lesser marks are awarded to the petitioner. The members of the interview panel acted arbitrarily. Learned counsel drew the attention of this Court to the copies of interview marks sheets, filed along with the counter affidavit and pointed out the corrections reflected in the marks awarded to the petitioner. 7. Conversely, the learned Government Pleader would contend that the petitioner did not take a plea in the affidavit that the interview was conducted without following the norms and that no mala fides were attributed against the interview committee. The committee members are not arrayed as party respondents. The post notified is still vacant and unfilled. Respondent No.2 never assured the petitioner regarding employment. The notification was issued after the completion of the petitioner’s term. The petitioner having participated in the selection process, cannot approbate and reprobate qua contract employee cannot be filled up with another contract employee. 8. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side, the following points arise for consideration: 1. Whether, non-mentioning of the minimum marks to be secured in the interview, in the notification vitiates the selection process? 2. Whether the correction of marks in the marks sheet, vitiates the selection process? CONSIDERATION: 9. The selection process for public employment and interference in the said process by the Court is no longer res-integra. The Court while exercising review jurisdiction cannot step into the shoes of the Selection Committee and assume an appellate role to examine whether the marks awarded by the Selection Committee in the interview are excessive and not corresponding to their performance in such test. Unless mala fide or arbitrary action is apparent, normally, the Court while exercising jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not interfere with the selection process. The Court also cannot sit in appeal against the decision and will not take up the expert role. 10. In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. Dr. B.S. Mahajan , (1990) 1 SCC 305 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “9. The Court also cannot sit in appeal against the decision and will not take up the expert role. 10. In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. Dr. B.S. Mahajan , (1990) 1 SCC 305 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “9. … It is needless to emphasise that it is not the function of the court to hear appeals over the decisions of the selection committees and to scrutinize the relative merits of the candidates. Whether the candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted selection committee which has the expertise on the subject. The court has no such expertise. The decision of the selection committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the committee or its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved malafides affecting the selection etc. …” 11. A similar view was taken in the Secretary (Health) Department of Health and F.W. V. Dr. Anita Puri , (1996) 6 SCC 282 wherein it was observed as under: “9. …It is too well settled that when a selection is made by an expert body like the Public Service Commission which is also advised by experts having technical experience and high academic qualification in the field for which the selection is to be made, the courts should be slow to interfere with the opinion expressed by experts unless allegations of mala fide are made and established. It would be prudent and safe for the courts to leave the decisions on such matters to the experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the courts. If the expert body considers suitability of a candidate for a specified post after giving due consideration to all the relevant factors, then the court should not ordinarily interfere with such selection and evaluation. …” 12. The same position was reiterated in M.V. Thimmaiah v. Union Public Service Commission , (2008) 2 SCC 119 which reads thus: “21. Now, comes the question with regard to the selection of the candidates. Normally, the recommendations of the Selection Committee cannot be challenged except on the ground of mala fides or serious violation of the statutory rules. The courts cannot sit as an Appellate Authority to examine the recommendations of the Selection Committee like the court of appeal. Now, comes the question with regard to the selection of the candidates. Normally, the recommendations of the Selection Committee cannot be challenged except on the ground of mala fides or serious violation of the statutory rules. The courts cannot sit as an Appellate Authority to examine the recommendations of the Selection Committee like the court of appeal. This discretion has been given to the Selection Committee only and courts rarely sit as a court of appeal to examine the selection of the candidates nor is the business of the court to examine each candidate and record its opinion… 30. We fail to understand how the Tribunal can sit as an Appellate Authority to call for the personal records and constitute a Selection Committee to undertake this exercise. This power is not given to the Tribunal and it should be clearly understood that the assessment of the Selection Committee is not subject to appeal either before the Tribunal or by the courts. One has to give credit to the Selection Committee for making their assessment and it is not subject to appeal. Taking the overall view of ACRs of the candidates, one may be held to be very good and another may be held to be good. If this type of interference is permitted then it would virtually amount that the Tribunals and the High Courts have started sitting as Selection Committee or act as an Appellate Authority over the selection. It is not their domain, it should be clearly understood, as has been clearly held by this Court in a number of decisions…..” 13. Thus, from a conspectus of the above authorities, it can be concluded that it is not within the domain of the Courts while exercising the power of judicial review, to embark upon a roaring inquiry into a selection process, an exclusive task and within the expert domain of a Selection Committee, ofcourse, subject to a caveat that if there are proven allegations of malfeasance or violations of statutory rules, in such cases of inherent arbitrariness, the Courts can intervene. 14. In the case at hand, the Managing Director of respondent No.2 issued a paper notification (Ex.P1), inviting applications from eligible candidates for the posts of Manager (Mining), Manager (IT) Manager (Legal), on a contract basis for a minimum period of three years, which is extendable further, basing on the requirements of the Corporation. 14. In the case at hand, the Managing Director of respondent No.2 issued a paper notification (Ex.P1), inviting applications from eligible candidates for the posts of Manager (Mining), Manager (IT) Manager (Legal), on a contract basis for a minimum period of three years, which is extendable further, basing on the requirements of the Corporation. The job description; place of work, assessment, qualification, and experience are mentioned in the notification. Clause 10 of Annexure-I, indicates that the selection is based on the marks awarded by the interview panel members. 15. As per the averments in the counter affidavit, a total of 21 applications were received for the post of Manager (Mining) and after scrutiny, respondent No.2 shortlisted ten candidates for the recruitment process and the petitioner was informed about the interview scheduled on 20.11.2024. Out of 10 shortlisted candidates, six candidates including the petitioner, appeared for the interview conducted on 20.11.2024 and the petitioner participated in the interview. 16. In the notification, no doubt, nothing was mentioned regarding the marks to be secured in the interview, however, it was stated that the shortlisted candidate will be called for an interview and selection is based on marks awarded by the interview panel members. Thus, in the annexure-I, notification, it was mentioned regarding conducting interviews, and the selection based on the marks. Having mentioned the criteria, respondent No.2 should have disclosed the marks to be secured, in the advertisement, itself, so that the candidates participating in the selection process would be aware of the yardstick. It also brings transparency and enhances public trust in the selection process. Whether non-disclosure of marks, in advance, before initiating selection vitiates the selection process? In the opinion of this Court, the answer would be negative, if the criteria applied is ultimately found to be just, fair and reasonable. 17. A committee consisting of a core of officials i.e. 1) Vice President (Coal), 2) Vice-President (HMBS), 3) Executive Director, 4) General Manager (HRD & Legal) was constituted to conduct interviews. As seen from the original record produced by the learned Special Government Pleader, in the marks awarded by the Vice President, one of the members of the interview panel, there are some corrections in awarding marks to the petitioner as well as three other candidates. Whereas no such corrections are found in the marks awarded to three other candidates. As seen from the original record produced by the learned Special Government Pleader, in the marks awarded by the Vice President, one of the members of the interview panel, there are some corrections in awarding marks to the petitioner as well as three other candidates. Whereas no such corrections are found in the marks awarded to three other candidates. The corrections are apparent that the marks awarded were initially written in pencil and later by pen. 18. Sri Bipin Kumar (Vice President) Coal, one of the interview members awarded a total of 23 marks to the petitioner. However, three corrections are visible to the naked eye. Against C, D and E the marks awarded with pencil are 5, 5 and 6, however, with the pen, the marks awarded are 4,4, and 5.Thus, the petitioner lost three marks. 19. Sri Joseph Kumar (Addl. GM, HRD, Legal and IT) awarded a total of 32 marks, however, in the total it was shown as 24. Thus, there is a calculation wrong, whereby the petitioner lost 8 marks. The aforementioned interviewers did not mention that persons who secured more than 50% may be considered for appointment. 20. The other two interviewers awarded marks of 16 and 13 marks and noted that those persons who secured more than 50% or 25 marks may be considered for appointment. Thus, prima facie, there is no consensus among the interview panel members regarding the marks to be secured in the interview. Had the notification mentioned the marks to be secured in the interview, the present situation would have not arisen. No explanation is offered in the counter affidavit regarding the consensus among the members of the interview panel or the marks prescribed to be selected. The process should be fair and transparent. This instance is certainly a flaw in the selection process. 21. Of course, a perusal of the marks further discloses that the persons selected, got above 50%, whereas the petitioner secured less than 50% i.e. 25 marks on an average. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, one of the panel members, though awarded more marks, the total marks awarded to the petitioner are less, no doubt true, but this itself will not improve the case of the petitioner since the petitioner secured less than 50% on an average. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, one of the panel members, though awarded more marks, the total marks awarded to the petitioner are less, no doubt true, but this itself will not improve the case of the petitioner since the petitioner secured less than 50% on an average. But one should not be oblivious regarding the corrections, wrong total and no consensus among the panel members regarding the cutoff marks. Though it was mentioned in para 5 of the counter affidavit regarding securing a minimum marks of 50%, the same is explicitly absent in the notification. 22. It is a well-settled principle of law that pleading cannot substitute a reason in an administrative order. This view is fortified by the decision of the Constitution Bench in Mohinder Singh Gill Vs the Chief Election Commissioner , (1978) 1 SCC 405 wherein it was held that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned therein and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the share of an affidavit or otherwise; otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to the Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional reasons or grounds later brought in. The Apex Court referred to an earlier decision reported in Commissioner of Police, Bombay Vs Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 . 23. As pointed out supra, in this case at hand, the notification doesn’t indicate the marks to be secured. However, in para 5 of the counter affidavit, it wasmentioned regarding securing of 50% marks in the interview. Such an improvement in the counter, in the considered opinion of this court, vitiates the selection process and is also against a fair and transparent process. 24. The other contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, that after the game began, respondent No.2 changed the rules, has no application to the case at hand. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another , 2008 (3) SCC 512 may not apply to the fact situation. 25. The law concerning the applicability of the doctrine of precedents is well settled. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another , 2008 (3) SCC 512 may not apply to the fact situation. 25. The law concerning the applicability of the doctrine of precedents is well settled. It has been consistently held that a judgment is only an authority for what it decides and not what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. To fully understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision, it is always necessary to see what were the facts of the case in which the decision was given and what was the point decided. 26. In the case of The State of Orissa Vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors., AIR 1968 SC 647 by referring to the observations made by Earl of Halsbury LC in Quinn Vs. Leathem, 1901 AC 495, it was stated thus: “12...A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury L.C. said in Quinn v.Leathem, 1901 AC 495. "Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of theexpressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." 27. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." 27. A similar view was taken in Union of India vs. Amrit Lal Manchandra and others , [ (2004) 3 SCC 75 ] , and after referring to the decisions in London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. Vs. Horton , [ 1951 AC 737 ] , Home Office Vs. Dorcet Yacht Co., , [1970 (2) ALL ER 294] and Herrington Vs. British Railways Board , [ 1972 (2) WLR 537 ] , it was stated that observations of the Court must be read in the context in which they appear and that one additional or different fact may make a world of difference. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder: “15...Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret Page 14 of 16 Page 14 of 16 judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Pock Co. Ltd. v. Horton ( 1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judges." 28. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judges." 28. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., , [1970 (2) All ER 294] , Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board ( 1972 (2)WLR 537 ) Lord Morris said: "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." 17. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 18. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." 29. The other contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, that a contract employee cannot be replaced by another contract employee, does not apply to the case at hand. Having participated in the process, the petitioner, cannot turn around and contend that a contract employee cannot be replaced with another contract employee. The law is well settled in that regard. 30. The other contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, that a contract employee cannot be replaced by another contract employee, does not apply to the case at hand. Having participated in the process, the petitioner, cannot turn around and contend that a contract employee cannot be replaced with another contract employee. The law is well settled in that regard. 30. In Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala Shukla , AIR 2002 SC 2322 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that when a candidate appears at an examination without objection and is subsequently found to be not successful, a challenge to the process is precluded. The question of entertaining a petition challenging an examination would not arise where a candidate has appeared and participated. He or she cannot subsequently turn around and contend that the process was unfair or that there was a lacuna therein, merely because result is palatable. 31. The same principle is reiterated in Union of India v. S. Vinodh Kumar, 2007 (8) SCC 100 and held as under: “18. It is also well settled that those candidates who had taken part in the selection process knowing fully well the procedure laid down therein were not entitled to question the same.” 32. During the hearing learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the interview committee report and submitted that thereport doesn’t contain the signature of one of the members. No doubt, the copy of the report filed along with the counter affidavit dated 24.12.2024 does not contain the signature of one of the panel members. However, in the original record produced, he signed on 24.12.2024. This is one more circumstance that vitiated the process of selection. 33. Given the discussion, respondent No.2 shall constitute a fresh interview panel; issue a call letter to the petitioner; conduct an interview and pass necessary orders regarding the post of the Manager (Mining). Such an exercise shall be completed in six weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. 34. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. No costs. The original record is returned to the learned Government Pleader. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.