JUDGMENT : Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J. The present intra-court appeal filed under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act , 1958, assails the judgment dated 10.03.2015 passed in W.P(C)No.21317 of 2009, whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant was working as District Judge. He was dismissed from service vide order dated 26.05.2007 (Ext.P23). The appellant had also challenged Ext.P2 dated 10.10.2001 in the writ petition, whereby he was suspended by the High Court of Kerala and also challenged the consequential disciplinary proceedings initiated against him as well as Ext.P23 order by which he was dismissed from service. 3. The appellant had entered into subordinate judiciary of the State as a Munsiff in the year 1983, pursuant to selection made by the Kerala Public Service Commission in a special recruitment conducted for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe candidates. Thereafter the appellant was promoted as Sub Judge in the year 1989 and subsequently promoted as District Judge in the year 1998. Satisfactory completion of his probation in the cadre of District Judge was declared in the year 2000. While the appellant was working in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, he was suspended from service with effect from 10.10.2001. Being aggrieved, the appellant had challenged the suspension order dated 10.10.2001 (Ext.P2) in O.P.No .30922 of 2001 which was dismissed in limine vide judgment dated 16.10.2001 (Ext.P3). 4. The order of the learned Single Judge was confirmed by a Division Bench in a Writ Appeal No.3874 of 2001 vide judgment dated 03.12.2001 (Ext.P4). Thereafter a preliminary inquiry was conducted against the appellant through the Registrar (Vigilance), High Court of Kerala. Based on the preliminary enquiry report, a show cause notice was issued to the appellant, intimating proposal for initiating disciplinary action under Rule 15 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CCA Rules’ for short) and called for his explanations, if any. The appellant thereafter submitted a detailed reply to Ext.P5 notice, vide Ext.P6 dated 01.12.2001. The appellant filed an appeal against the order of suspension under Rule 22 of the CCA Rules. Additionally one application for revocation of suspension was also filed. The appeal as well as the request for revocation of suspension was declined vide Ext.P9 order dated 02.08.2002. The appellant thereafter submitted a detailed reply to Ext.P5 notice, vide Ext.P6 dated 01.12.2001. The appellant filed an appeal against the order of suspension under Rule 22 of the CCA Rules. Additionally one application for revocation of suspension was also filed. The appeal as well as the request for revocation of suspension was declined vide Ext.P9 order dated 02.08.2002. Ex.P10 Memo of Charges dated 18.02.2002 was issued to the appellant containing statement of allegations. The appellant filed a written statement of defence vide Ext.P11. During the pendency of the said proceedings another ‘Memo of Charge’ enclosing detailed ‘statement of allegations’ was issued against the appellant as per Ext.P12. The appellant again submitted a detailed written statement of defence as per Ext.P13. Thereafter a detailed enquiry was conducted by the District Judge as the Presiding Officer. On completion of the enquiry, a detailed enquiry report dated 16.03.2006 (Ext.P20) was submitted to the High Court, recommending dismissal of the appellant from the service, considering the grave nature of the charges proved against him. Based on the enquiry report, the High Court had issued a show cause notice dated 25.03.2006 (Ext.P21) proposing punishment of dismissal from service to which the appellant filed a detailed representation vide Ext.P22. Thereafter the High Court recommended his dismissal to the State Government based on which Ext.P23 order dated 26.05.2007 which is impugned in the writ petition was issued awarding penalty of dismissal from service with effect from the date of his suspension, i.e., from 10.10.2001, as per Rule 11 (i) & (viii) of the CCA Rules. 5. Being aggrieved the appellant approached the State Government in Review Petition which was filed by him on 17.07.2007 (Ext.P24). The Government failed to consider the Review Petition despite sending two reminders dated 18.01.2008 and 26.03.2008. Being aggrieved, the appellant had approached this Court. On 24.08.2009 in I.A.No .9641 of 2009 this Court directed the competent Authority to pass the final orders on the Review Petition within a time limit stipulated therein. Pursuant to the said order, the Review Petition was considered by the Government and the same was rejected vide Ext.P30 dated 25.11.2009. The appellant challenged the said order, by virtue of amendment brought in the writ petition. 6. The suspension of the appellant was based on the allegations of corruption, official misconduct and objectionable behaviour. Pursuant to the said order, the Review Petition was considered by the Government and the same was rejected vide Ext.P30 dated 25.11.2009. The appellant challenged the said order, by virtue of amendment brought in the writ petition. 6. The suspension of the appellant was based on the allegations of corruption, official misconduct and objectionable behaviour. In the preliminary enquiry report it was found that the appellant had received huge amounts as bribe for passing awards for accident claim cases and that one Sri.Radhakrishnan and the Driver of the appellant were working as agents for collecting money and that the award amounts were depending upon the amount of bribe paid to the appellant. Similar complaints were also received against the appellant. Certain instances have been cited in the Memo of Chargesheet where the appellant demanded bribes and did not pass awards unless and until he received the bribe. The appellant has filed the present writ appeal against the dismissal of the writ petition. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition inasmuch as the conclusions arrived by the Enquiry Officer is perverse and without any basis. No material evidence was collected during the enquiry in order to arrive at a conclusion that the appellant had demanded and received money from the clients for passing the awards in the claim cases. The learned counsel contended that the copy of the complaint was not supplied to the appellant along with the Memo of Charges. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in the case of Nirmala Chakraborty v. Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta and Others . [MANU/WB/0389/1966] to contend that the documents on the strength of which the preliminary enquiry was started against him must be supplied to the delinquent so that he may effectively exercise his right to cross-examine the complainant, to make out his defence. The right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses is an essential element of natural justice and anything that renders this right ineffective must be struck down as unfair and invalid. 8. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant had made Ext.P14 request to the respondents to supply the copy of the complaint, but the same was not supplied. 8. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant had made Ext.P14 request to the respondents to supply the copy of the complaint, but the same was not supplied. The learned counsel further pointed out that even if there may be no provision to participate in the preliminary enquiry, still it is the obligation of the respondents to supply the copy of the complaint to the delinquent, and in case of non supply, it violates Article 311 of the Constitution of India . The learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan [ AIR 1961 S.C. 1623 ] to contend that the documents could not have been withheld from the delinquent employee, since he would have been able to cross examine the witnesses adequately and in its absence, he suffered from handicapped, which in the result, deny him a reasonable opportunity which is guaranteed to him under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India . 9. Thirdly learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Ext.P17 list of witnesses contained 28 witnesses. However, the appellant was allowed to examine only three witnesses which again violates Rule 15(7) of the CCA Rules. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Mohd. Yousef Ali v. The State of Andhra Pradesh through the Secretary, Revenue Department, Hyderabad [1973 (1) S.L.R. 650] to contend that the denial of a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses amounts to a denial of natural justice, since it is the bounden duty of the Enquiry Officer to examine all the witnesses and at this stage it would be futile to anticipate their value. He further submitted that there is no provision which empowers the Enquiry Officer to refuse to record the evidence for whatever reasons. 10. The fourth contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the copy of the written arguments were not supplied to him. The next contention is that the findings are perverse based on no evidence, the complainant was not examined, the charges are so vague that the charge sheet could not have been issued. It is the settled legal position that charges must be specific and not general. The next contention is that the findings are perverse based on no evidence, the complainant was not examined, the charges are so vague that the charge sheet could not have been issued. It is the settled legal position that charges must be specific and not general. In the present case, the charges levelled are general in nature, therefore, could not have been upheld. 11. Finally, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that no witnesses have stated that the appellant demanded money and received the same. The complainant was also not examined. One important thing to notice is that as per Ext.P21, no complaints have been received by the authorities against the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . It is settled legal position that in case perversity is found in the order and the procedure have not been followed, then certainly this Court has powers to review the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The learned Single Judge ought not to have dismissed the writ petition, but ought to have allowed the same and directed the respondents to reinstate the appellant in service and grant all consequential benefits. Hence this appeal. 12. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the afore prayer and submitted that revaluation or reappreciation of evidence adduced before the enquiry authority is not at all contemplated in a judicial review while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . They placed reliance on the Apex Court decision in the case of K.L.Shinde v. State of Mysore [ AIR 1976 SC 1080 ], wherein it is held that whether or not there is sufficient evidence against the delinquent to justify the punishment is a matter on which this Court cannot embark. It is further observed that the departmental proceedings do not stand on the same footing as of a criminal prosecution, in which a high degree of proof is required. The departmental proceedings are not governed by strict Rules of evidence as contained in the Evidence Act. It is further observed that the departmental proceedings do not stand on the same footing as of a criminal prosecution, in which a high degree of proof is required. The departmental proceedings are not governed by strict Rules of evidence as contained in the Evidence Act. They further relied on another decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa [ AIR 1963 SC 375 ] wherein the Apex Court has observed that the domestic tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not courts and therefore, they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in courts nor are they bound by strict Rules of evidence. They can obtain all information and materials for the points under enquiry from all sources and through all channels, without being fettered by Rules and proceedings governed in court. The Apex Court further went on to observe that the only obligation which law casts on them is that, they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the parties against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. They pointed out a decision of this Court in the case of Syndicate Bank v. B.K.Mahim [ 2000 (2) KLJ 151 ] wherein it held that while exercising powers of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally substitute their own conclusions to impose penalty. In the said decision, while reversing the judgment of a Single Judge, the Bench observed that, it was not justifiable to sit in over judgment of the Enquiry Officer as well as the orders passed by the disciplinary authority. It is found that a judicial review is possible only in exceptional and rare cases where the High Court exercising powers of judicial review is of the opinion that it shocks the conscience of the court that the decision was totally not supported by any cogent reasons. They relied on another decision of this Court in Pushkaran v. State of Kerala [ 2005 (2) KLJ 484 ] it was observed that, in normal circumstances the punishment cannot be interfered with by the Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction on mere non-compliance of technicalities or procedural formalities. They relied on another decision of this Court in Pushkaran v. State of Kerala [ 2005 (2) KLJ 484 ] it was observed that, in normal circumstances the punishment cannot be interfered with by the Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction on mere non-compliance of technicalities or procedural formalities. They submitted that in view of the aforesaid, no ground is made out to interfere with the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and the writ appeal deserves to be dismissed. 13. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 14. We have considered the contentions put forth. The scope of interference by the High Court in disciplinary proceedings is no longer res integra. In the State of Rajasthan and others v. Bhupendra Singh [2024 KLT OnLine 2034 (SC)] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had affirmatively quoted the dictum laid down in State of Andhra Pradesh v S Sree Rama Rao, [ AIR 1963 SC 1723 ] , which reads as follows: "7. …….. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds . But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied) 15. After a detailed survey of the precedents on the point including the dictum laid down in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao [ (1975) 2 SCC 557 ] ; State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K.Sharma [ (1996) 3 SCC 364 ] ; Union of India v KG Soni [(2006) 6 SCC 794 ] ; State of Uttar Pradesh v Man Mohan Nath Sinha [ (2009) 8 SCC 310 ] ; State Bank of India v Ram Lal Bhaskar [ (2011) 10 SCC 249 ] ; Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S.Raghavendra [ (2024) 6 SCC 418 ] , it was concluded by the Hon'ble Court in Bhupendra Singh (supra) that while reappraisal of facts and evidence is not impermissible by the High Court, the infirmity in the underlying order has to be greater than ordinary. We deem it necessary to thus remind ourselves of the law on the point that the Writ Court cannot interfere in the findings until and unless it is shown that there has been certain violations of guidelines in binding precedents and that none such is found in the matter at hand. 16. The learned Single Judge has examined the case in great detail. The Single Judge has also considered the scope and ambit of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . 16. The learned Single Judge has examined the case in great detail. The Single Judge has also considered the scope and ambit of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . There is ample evidence available on record to come to the conclusion that one person named Sri.Radhakrishnan had contacted various clients and their relatives and had also made attempts to persuade them to give bribes to the appellant, promising higher amounts as compensation. In some cases, the appellant met with clients, engaged in conversations regarding the cases, and negotiated the amount of bribe as well as the compensation he should pay to them. From the evidence it is clear that PW 22 was taken to the appellant's residence and had engaged in a conversation and that the evidence of PW22 was found reliable. The detailed narration of the evidence is also reproduced in Ext.P20. The learned Single Judge also found that there was ample evidence adduced before the enquiry officer to prove that the person named Sri.Radhakrishnan had contacted at least three other clients under similar circumstances and demanded bribes for the appellant, for passing the awards. The learned Single Judge has also relied on various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court to come to the conclusion that there is ample and reliable material and evidence available on record to support the conclusions. The findings arrived by the enquiring authority are based on all circumstantial evidence and on preponderance of probabilities. The learned Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the order is not perverse or totally baseless and absolutely there is no evidence in support of such contentions. The contentions raised by the appellant in the writ petition have been dealt with properly by the learned Single Judge, therefore, we do not find any merit in the appeal. Accordingly the writ appeal is hereby dismissed and the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is upheld. No order as to costs.