JUDGMENT : C. Jayachandran, J. The issue involved in this Writ Petition is with respect to the interpretation of Section 6(2) of the Kerala Forest Act , 1961 ('the 1961 Act', for short). To be more precise, what is the ambit and scope of the expression 'known or reputed owner or occupier' as employed in Section 6(2), is the question involved. 2. The facts:- The petitioner would claim that his father, late Vasu Ashary, was in absolute possession of 1 hectare and 9 ares of land in Re-Survey No.44/9 in Block no.4 of Vagamon Village. The said Vasu Ashary also constructed a residential building in the said property, which was assessed by the Elappara Grama Panchayat and issued with Building No.IV/316. Vasu Ashary died on 26.11.2005, as evident from Ext.P2 death certificate. This Court discounts the minor discrepancy in the name of petitioner's father as Vasu Ashary, as pleaded in this Writ Petition and Vasu Achary, as reflected in some of the documents, including Ext.P2. Ext.P4 is a receipt evidencing payment of property tax in the name of Vasu Ashary. Ext.P6 - a document heavily relied on by the petitioner - is the field register of the property comprised in the Re-Survey No.44/9 of Block No.4 of Vagamon Village. The property is shown as a 'purayidam' and the name of the person in occupation is shown as Vasu Ashary. The extent is 1 hectare and 9 ares. Ext.P6 field register refers to the fact that the said Vasu Ashary is residing in that premises, upon constructing a house. As regards the manner in which the said Vasu Ashary came into possession of the property, the pleadings are contained in paragraph no.8 of the Writ Petition. Vasu Ashary was an employee in K.L.D. Board at Vagamon and he was residing in the subject property, along with his family in the residential Building bearing No.IV/316. Though, Vasu Ashary had applied for issuance of Patta before the Taluk Office, Peerumedu, under the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964, which has been numbered as C21666/1999, he could not complete the above the proceedings. Nevertheless, the said Vasu Ashary and upon his death, the petitioner and other legal heirs of Vasu Ashary are in settled possession of the subject property. Nevertheless, the said Vasu Ashary and upon his death, the petitioner and other legal heirs of Vasu Ashary are in settled possession of the subject property. The petitioner's grievance now is that, the above said 1 hectare and 9 ares of land is sought to be declared as a Reserve Forest, for which purpose, necessary survey has already been done, the plan of which is produced at Ext.P5. 3. The essential contention raised is that the petitioner was not issued with a notice under Section 6(2) of the 1961 Act, wherefore, the rest of the proceeding culminating in Ext.P11 Order, in terms of Section 10 of the 1961 Act, is bad in law. The petitioner seeks issuance of a Writ of Certiorari quashing Ext.P11, as also, a declaration that the subject property having an extent of 1 hectare and 9 ares is liable to be excluded from the scope of Ext.P8 proclamation/ notification issued under Section 6 of the 1961 Act. The petitioner also seeks issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directing the 3 rd respondent/Forest Settlement Officer to reconsider Ext.P11, after hearing the claim of the petitioner. It appears from the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, it is this relief which is being pressed before this Court. 4. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner is seriously opposed by the learned Special Government Pleader (Forest). On facts, it is the contention of the respondents that the petitioner has another extent of land, which is quite nearby to the subject extent of 1 hectare and 9 ares, and the building number made mention of in the Writ Petition is the number of the residential building situated in that land. The respondents would contend that the petitioner is a trespasser and hence not liable to be considered as a 'known or reputed owner or occupier', for the purpose of issuance of notice under Section 6(2) of the 1961 Act. The learned Special Government Pleader relied on a Bench decision of the Travancore–Cochin High Court in Meeran Rowther v. State [1955 KHC 51] and also a decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Meenu Srivastava v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others [W.P.(C) No.9627/2022 dated 29.06.2022]. 5. The learned Special Government Pleader relied on a Bench decision of the Travancore–Cochin High Court in Meeran Rowther v. State [1955 KHC 51] and also a decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Meenu Srivastava v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others [W.P.(C) No.9627/2022 dated 29.06.2022]. 5. Having regard to the complexity of the issue, especially in the light of the Bench decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Meeran Rowther (supra), this Court appointed Adv.S.Vinod Bhat as Amicus Curiae. The learned Amicus would refer to the Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, the Black's Law Dictionary and Wharton's Law Lexicon, to expatiate the meaning of the term 'reputed owner', more so when the same is not defined in the 1961 Act. The learned Amicus then took me through Section 3, read with Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act, to point out that the Government can only constitute a land at its disposal as reserve forest and that under Section 2(g), land owned by a registered owner/real owner stands excluded. According to the learned Amicus, a reputed owner under the 1961 Act means a person who is not the real owner of the land. Coming to Section 6(2), it is the argument advanced by the learned Amicus that the language employed is 'shall', insofar as the requirement to serve notice is concerned, besides mandating that the notice shall be served by registered post. The learned Amicus relied on the judgment of the Madras High Court in Mysore Balakrishna Rao v. Secretary of State [AIR 1916 Madras 789(2)]. On the Bench decision of the Travancore- Cochin High Court in Meeran Rowther (supra), the learned Amicus would submit that the same is not binding on this Court, since the Kerala High Court is not a successor Court to the Travancore-Cochin High Court. In this regard, the learned Amicus relied on Ryru Nair v. Govindan Nair [ AIR 1961 Ker 75 ] . The time-tested principle in Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) 1 Ch.D. 426] is relied upon to point out that when the statute require a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it shall be done in that matter alone, or not done at all. 6. This Court is in perfect agreement with the submissions made by the learned Amicus. The time-tested principle in Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) 1 Ch.D. 426] is relied upon to point out that when the statute require a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it shall be done in that matter alone, or not done at all. 6. This Court is in perfect agreement with the submissions made by the learned Amicus. Inasmuch as the falcrum of controversy centers around Section 6(2) of the 1961 Act, the same is extracted here-below: “ 6. Proclamation by Forest Settlement Officer .- (1) xxx (2) The Forest Settlement Officer shall also serve a notice to the same effect on every known or reputed owner or occupier of any land included in or adjoining the land proposed to be constituted a Reserved Forest, or on his recognised agent or manager. Such notice may be sent by registered post.” (underlined by me, for emphasis) 7. As already indicated, the balance will tilt based on the interpretation of the expression, 'known or reputed owner or occupier of any land'. This Court may have to immediately notice that the expression 'known or reputed owner' has to be contra-distinguished from the expression 'absolute owner'. An absolute owner is a person, who has all the incidents of ownership, including title and possession. What is contemplated in Section 6(2) is not the absolute owner, but a known or reputed owner. Let us keep aside the issue pertaining to 'known or reputed occupier' for the time being. Thus a 'known or reputed owner' is a person, who has a lesser right over the property, than the 'absolute owner'. 8. The word 'reputed owner' has been interpreted in the various law dictionaries as follows: In Wharton's Law Lexicon (15 th edition), the term reputed owner is described thus, at page 1491. “ Reputed owner , one who has, to all appearances, the right and actual possession of property.” Of course, the above interpretation has been placed in the context of the Bankruptcy Act, 1940. In Black's Law Dictionary (6 th edition), a reputed owner is dealt with thus, at page no.1106 as follows: “ Reputed owner. One who has to all appearances the title to, and possession of, property; one who, from all appearances, or from supposition, is the owner of a thing. In Black's Law Dictionary (6 th edition), a reputed owner is dealt with thus, at page no.1106 as follows: “ Reputed owner. One who has to all appearances the title to, and possession of, property; one who, from all appearances, or from supposition, is the owner of a thing. He who has the general credit or reputation of being the owner or proprietor of goods.” In P.Ramanatha Aiyar's 'The Law Lexicon' (3 rd edition), a reputed owner is depicted thus, at page 1569. “ Reputed owner. One who has, to all the right of ownership or actual possession of property.” In Prem and Saharay's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (second edition, Volume-IV), reputed owner has been defined to mean: “If property is in a trader's possession, order or disposition, with the permission of the owner, in circumstances which would reasonably lead persons dealing with him to infer that he was the owner, the property is said to be in the reputed ownership of the trader nd so was divisible among his creditors if he became bankrupt.” 9. The hallmark of the above referred treatises on 'reputed owner' is the appearance to the concerned public as to who is the owner of the property or goods. Essentially, if one is to project himself as the owner of the property - so as to appear so before the concerned public - one among the concomitant factors will be his possession over the property. As Black's Law Dictionary puts it, he who has the general credit or reputation of being the owner, is that which matters. In P.Ramanatha Aiyar's 'The Law Lexicon', the right of ownership or actual possession has been cited, so as to appear to all, that the person concerned is a reputed owner. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that it cannot be insisted that the one who is the absolute owner, with adequate back up title, is what is meant by the expression 'known or reputed owner of any land'. Lending support to the above proposition, profitable reference can be made to Section 3, as also, to Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act. Section 3 empowers the Government to constitute any land at the disposal of the Government, a reserved forest. Lending support to the above proposition, profitable reference can be made to Section 3, as also, to Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act. Section 3 empowers the Government to constitute any land at the disposal of the Government, a reserved forest. A land at the disposal of Government is defined in Section 2(g), which specifically excludes the properties of landowners such as Jenmies, Devaswoms, or holders of Inam lands and all other registered holdings of land in proprietary right. Importantly, Section 2(g) includes all lands occupied without permission. It could thus be seen that, an absolute registered holding with the proprietary rights - or in other words, a land which is in the absolute ownership of a person - cannot be treated as a land at the disposal of the Government, for the purpose of constituting a reserved forest under Section 3. Per contra, a land which is occupied without permission is a land which is at the disposal of the Government, for the purpose of constituting a reserve forest. It is in the backdrop of Section 3, read with Section 2(g), that Section 6(2) is liable to be interpreted, which would also add life to the interpretation that a reputed owner need not be - if not, cannot be - an absolute owner of the property. 10. Still lesser will be the rights of a known or reputed ' occupier' of the land, as envisaged under Section 6(2) of the 1961 Act. While the term 'owner' may take within its sweep the possessory and other incidents of ownership, the term 'occupier' refers to a person, who merely occupies the land, the precondition being that such occupation should be known or reputed. The definitions of known or reputed owner, taken note of above, would equally apply to a reputed 'occupier' as well, with the solitary difference that he should appear to be the person in occupation of the land in the minds of the concerned public. Thought so, an intermittent occupation once in a while may not perhaps qualify and answer the requirement of a reputed occupier. Per contra, if a person is in continuous occupation of the land, albeit without title, such person will surely qualify the requirements of a known or reputed occupier. Section 6(2) envisages a right of notice to both 'known or reputed owner ', as also, 'known or reputed occupier '. 11. Per contra, if a person is in continuous occupation of the land, albeit without title, such person will surely qualify the requirements of a known or reputed occupier. Section 6(2) envisages a right of notice to both 'known or reputed owner ', as also, 'known or reputed occupier '. 11. In the instant facts, it is important to note that the petitioner's father Vasu Ashary had constructed a residential building in the subject property, which has been assessed by the Elappara Grama Panchayat with Building No.IV/316. He was paying property tax as evidenced from Ext.P4. Ext.P6, an important document, the field register of the subject property specifically shows that the property is a purayidam; and the name of the person in occupation is Vasu Ashary. Ext.P6 field register refers to the fact that Vasu Ashary is residing in that premises upon constructing a house. In the wake of these telling evidence and circumstances, it cannot be said that Vasu Ashary, or for that matter, the petitioner, is not a known or a reputed occupier of the land in question. Therefore, denial of the right under Section 6(2), cannot be countenanced in law. In this regard, it is worthy enough to notice that the language employed in Section 6(2) is that the Forest Settlement Officer shall serve notice to every known or reputed owner or occupier. Subsection (2) of Section 6 also contemplates notice by registered post. So, the requirement that a notice shall be served and that too by registered post, highlight the significance of strict compliance of the requirements of the provision. This Court also takes into account the fact that the above referred interpretation in favour of the petitioner, who is the occupier of the land, is made in the context of Section 6(2), which only affords a right to receive notice, before proclamation by the Forest Settlement Officer that the land is liable to be included within the vested forest. That enables the owner or occupier to make an appropriate application, thus ensuring his pivotal right of audi alterem partem, before an Order under Section 10 of the 1961 Act is passed. Section 11 of the 1961 Act provides for an appeal from the Orders of the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 10 ; and Section 12A, to an appeal to the High Court. These rights, which are of seminal significance, cannot be deprived to the petitioner. Section 11 of the 1961 Act provides for an appeal from the Orders of the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 10 ; and Section 12A, to an appeal to the High Court. These rights, which are of seminal significance, cannot be deprived to the petitioner. 12. The impact of not complying with the requirement of serving notice in terms of Section 16 of the Madras Forest Act, was considered by a Division Bench in Mysore Balakrishna Rao (supra). Learned Amicus brought this decision to the notice of this Court to point out that both the Judges, Wallis, C.J . and Coutts-Trotter, J. were in unison to hold that failure to issue notice in terms of Section 16 of the Madras Forest Act to the known or reputed owner or occupier of the land, is fatal. A contention to the effect that though no notice was issued, the plaintiff was aware of the lands being included as reserve forest, was negated. In the concurring judgment, Coutts-Trotter, J. held that, in construing an expropriating Act (the Madras Forest Act), the machinery provided in such Act has to be followed scrupulously. The issuance of notice has been held to be mandatory and in fact, a condition precedent for the exercise of the whole jurisdiction conferred. Learned Amicus has given a compilation, whereby the relevant provisions of the Travancore Forest Act, 1887, the Travancore-Cochin Forest Act, 1951 and the Kerala Forest Act , 1961 has been compared to show that the provision mandating service of notice to every known or reputed owner or occupier of the land, had remained the same. 13. Having held as above, this Court will now refer to the judgment relied on by the learned Special Government Pleader (Forest). Much reliance has been placed upon Meeran Rowther (supra), a judgment by a Division Bench of the Travancore- Cochin High Court. The precise issue of non-issuance of notice was considered by the Division Bench, in the context of Section 6 of the Forest Act, 1069 (T). There, the Division Bench found that though the plaintiff’s predecessor had several documents to show the bona fide occupation of the land in question, the failure to issue notice was refused to be recognized as a ground, since the plaintiff had no antecedent title or recognizable right to possession. There, the Division Bench found that though the plaintiff’s predecessor had several documents to show the bona fide occupation of the land in question, the failure to issue notice was refused to be recognized as a ground, since the plaintiff had no antecedent title or recognizable right to possession. The Division Bench held that a squatter is not entitled to notice under Section 6 of the 1961 Act. With great respect, I find myself unable to endorse the view of the Division Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court. To use the precise words of a learned Single Judge of this Court in paragraph no.5 of Ryru Nair (supra), sitting as a Judge of the Kerala High Court, I am not bound by the decisions of the Travancore- Cochin High Court. In holding so, the learned Single Judge in Ryru Nair (supra) has relied on the following three Full Bench decisions: i) Lekshmykutty Amma v. Madhavan Pillai [ 1957 KLT 1196 (F.B.)]. ii) Subbarayndu v. The State (S) [MANU/AP/0058/1955]. iii) Basappa v. The State [AIR 1959, Mysore 1]. 14. The Kerala High Court is not a successor of either the Travancore-Cochin High Court or the Madras High Court and hence the judges of the Kerala High Court are not bound by the decisions of either of the said High Courts, as held by the learned Single Judge in Ryru Nair (supra). Now, comes the Division Bench decision of this Court in Kanakamani Thampuratty R. v. State of Kerala [2024 KHC 7193], which held that a Writ Petition shall not be entertained against a notification declaring a land as reserved forest, since substantive remedies of two appeals are provided under the 1961 Act itself. This Court is of the opinion that in the attendant facts of the given case, the said judgment cannot be of any assistance to the respondents/forest officials. Primarily, this Court notice that the grievance espoused herein pertains to violation of natural justice, in the context of the right to receive a notice, more so when it is statutorily recognized. Secondly, the issue pertains to the interpretation of Section 6(2) of the 1961 Act; and it is not advisable to relegate an issue of interpretation to the statutory authority, especially when the issue as to the binding nature of a decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court surfaces for consideration. 15. Secondly, the issue pertains to the interpretation of Section 6(2) of the 1961 Act; and it is not advisable to relegate an issue of interpretation to the statutory authority, especially when the issue as to the binding nature of a decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court surfaces for consideration. 15. In the circumstances, this Writ Petition succeeds and the same is allowed. All further proceedings pursuant to Ext.P11 shall be kept in abeyance, until the petitioner has been issued with a notice and heard in accordance with the scheme of the 1961 Act. The Forest Settlement Officer will issue necessary statutory notice in terms of Section 6(2) to the petitioner and shall proceed with the enquiry on the petitioner’s case espoused and shall pass an Order in terms of Section 10 of the 1961 Act. Ext.P11 shall be proceeded only thereafter. This Writ Petition is allowed, as indicated above. This Court places on record its sincere appreciation to the learned Amicus, who rendered assistance to this Court in an enviable manner.