JUDGMENT : C.PRATHEEP KUMAR, J. The plaintiff in O.S.45 of 2010 on the file of the Sub Court, Nedumangad is the appellant. (For the purpose of convenience, the parties are hereafter referred to as per their rank before the trial court). 2. The plaintiff filed this suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 13.2.2008, along with an alternative prayer for return of advance. According to the plaintiff, on 13.2.2008, he had entered into an agreement for sale with the defendant and thereby the defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule property having an extent of 13 cents for Rs.75,000/- per cent. As per the terms of the agreement, an advance amount of Rs.25,000/- was given to the defendant and the period stipulated for the performance was four months. As per the terms of the agreement, the defendant had to convince the extent of the property after measurement and also encumbrance-free title to the plaintiff. Since the defendant failed to perform the contract in spite of demand and the defendant tried to alienate the said property, the plaintiff filed a suit as O.S.119/2008 before the Munsiff's court, Attingal and obtained an injunction against the defendant. Though notice dated 3.6.2008 and 9.6.2008 were issued demanding specific performance, the defendant failed to perform the contract and hence the suit. 3. The defendant filed a written statement contending that consequent to the death of her husband on 10.3.2001, she was undergoing treatment at various hospitals including Santhigiri asramam, General hospital, Thiruvananthapuram and Medical college hospital. Due to financial constraints she borrowed a sum of Rs.25,000/- from the plaintiff after affixing her signature on two stamp papers worth Rs.50/- and blank papers and they were given to the defendant. She had no intention to sell the plaint schedule property. She had not executed any document in favour of the plaintiff agreeing to sell the plaint schedule property. The defendant conducted the marriage of her daughters agreeing to give shares from the scheduled properties. Three buildings are there in the plaint schedule property and the said property is worth Rs.2,00,000/- per cent during the year 2008. If the scheduled property is disposed of, the defendant and her children will be thrown out to the street. Therefore, she prayed for dismissing the suit. 4. The trial court framed five issues. Three buildings are there in the plaint schedule property and the said property is worth Rs.2,00,000/- per cent during the year 2008. If the scheduled property is disposed of, the defendant and her children will be thrown out to the street. Therefore, she prayed for dismissing the suit. 4. The trial court framed five issues. The evidence in the case consists of the oral testimonies of PWs1 to 5, DW1 and Exts.A1 to A6. After evaluating the evidence on record, the trial court declined the prayer for specific performance, but decreed the alternate relief of refund of advance amount of Rs.25,000/- along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of the agreement till the date of the decree and thereafter, at the rate of 6% per annum, till realization with costs. Dissatisfied with the above judgment and decree of the trial court, the plaintiff preferred this appeal. 5. Now the points that arise for consideration are the following : 1) Whether the defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff ? 2. Whether the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract ? 3. Whether the suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC ? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for specific performance as prayed for ? 6. Heard Smt.Ligey Antony, the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.R.Muraleekrishnan (Malakkara), the learned counsel for the respondent. 7. Admittedly the plaint schedule property having an extent of 13 cents belongs to the defendant. According to the plaintiff, as per Ext.A2 agreement dated 13.2.2008, the defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.75,000/- per cent. Further, according to the plaintiff, on the date of execution of Ext.A2, a sum of Rs.25,000/- was paid as advance and the sale deed was to be executed within a period of four months, from the date of the agreement. On the other hand, according to the defendant, she never executed any sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff and when she was in dire need of money, in connection with her treatment, she only borrowed a sum of Rs.25,000/- from the plaintiff after affixing her signature in two stamp papers and a white paper. On the side of the plaintiff, PW1 to 5 were examined. On the side of the plaintiff, PW1 to 5 were examined. The plaintiff was examined as PW1 and one of the attestors to Ext.A2, Selvan, was examined as PW3. In addition to the same, the plaintiff examined PWs2, 4 and 5 also. According to them, Ext.A2 sale agreement was executed by the defendant after agreeing to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff. On the side of the defendant, the defendant herself was examined as DW1. At the time of evidence she claimed that she only borrowed a sum of Rs.25,000/- from the plaintiff and that she never executed an agreement agreeing to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant would argue that even before the expiry of the period mentioned in Ext.A2, the plaintiff issued Ext.A3 lawyer's notice on 9.6.2008 and also Ext.A3(b) notice dated 3.6.2008 demanding her to execute the sale deed, after receiving the balance sale consideration. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the sale deed could not be executed due to the default of the defendant. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the defendant would argue that the defendant, who was a widow, due to her financial constraints, happened to affix her signature in blank papers at the instance of the plaintiff and as such, the trial court was justified in declining the relief of specific performance. He would also argue that the plaintiff has not succeeded in proving his readiness and willingness and especially his financial capacity to purchase the plaint schedule property. He would also argue that there are three residential buildings in the plaint schedule property and there was no mention of the same in Ext.A2. 9. The law is well settled that the relief of specific performance is a discretionary relief and merely for the reason that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court is not bound to grant the relief of specific performance. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 , dealing with the discretion to be exercised while granting a decree of specific performance is extracted below for reference : “20. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 , dealing with the discretion to be exercised while granting a decree of specific performance is extracted below for reference : “20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.— (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance:— (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; or (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Explanation 1.—Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). Explanation 2.—The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. (3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. (4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the party. 10. (4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the party. 10. According to the defendant, she is a widow and the mother of two daughters and they are residing in the residential building in the plaint schedule property. According to her, if the prayer for specific performance is allowed, they will be thrown out to the street. The specific case of the defendant is that there are three residential buildings in the plaint schedule property. However, in Ext.A2 sale agreement, there is no mention about any such buildings and valuation is given only to the landed property namely, Rs.75,000/- per cent of land. During the cross examination of PW1, when it was suggested to him that the defendant has four children and all of them are residing in three residential buildings situated in the said property, the same was not denied by him. He even pleaded ignorance when it was suggested that the defendant and children are residing in the residential building in the said property along with their family. He also deposed that he is not aware whether the defendant has any other property or residential building. 11. The fact that in Ext.A2 there is no mention about the three residential buildings and no valuation is given for the residential building and the value is given only for landed property on centage basis, is a strong circumstance probabilising the defence version that Ext.A2 was not a genuine sale agreement and improbabilising the plaintiff's case. 12. In Thomas P.A. (Died) & Ors. v.M/s.Southern Housing Corporation Ltd. 2025 KHC 364 relied on by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, a learned Single Judge of this Court held in paragraph 42 that : “42. As far as the legal position governing the grant of discretionary relief, the decisions cited by both sides will hold the field. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and the readiness and willingness has to be shown throughout and has to be established by the plaintiff. Clause (c) of S.16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 , lays down the conditions precedent to the enforcement of specific performance of a contract. Clause (c) of S.16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 , lays down the conditions precedent to the enforcement of specific performance of a contract. S.16(c) of the Act is couched in a negative form. It mandates that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who has failed to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. In terms of S.16(c), what are the obligations which the plaintiff has to comply with in reference to his plea and whether the plea of the plaintiff could not be construed to conform to the requirement of the aforesaid section, or does this section require specific words to be pleaded that he has performed or has always been ready and is willing to perform his part of the contract. In construing a plea in any pleading, courts must keep in mind that a plea is not an expression of art and science but an expression through words to place fact and law of one's case for a relief. Such an expression may be pointed, precise, sometimes vague but still it could be gathered what he wants to convey through only by reading the whole pleading, depending on the person drafting a plea.” 13. Relying upon the decision in Shama Naik R. v. G.Srinivasiah , 2024 KHC 6671 the learned counsel for the defendant would argue that it is the burden of the plaintiff to prove that he had the funds to purchase the property. In the above decision, in paragraph 10 the Apex Court held that : “ The law is well settled. The plaintiff is obliged not only to make specific statement and averments in the plaint but is also obliged to adduce necessary oral and documentary evidence to show the availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time.” 14. During the cross examination, PW1 claimed that he mobilised the balance amount of 9.5 lakhs by selling the share of his wife at Chadayamangalam in October, 2007. He also claimed that he retained the sale proceeds of his wife’s share worth Rs.9.5 lakhs till the expiry of the period in Ext.A2. Though he agreed to produce documents to prove the above fact, he has not produced any such documents. He also claimed that he retained the sale proceeds of his wife’s share worth Rs.9.5 lakhs till the expiry of the period in Ext.A2. Though he agreed to produce documents to prove the above fact, he has not produced any such documents. Even at the time of argument before this Court, he could not produce any documents to prove that he had mobilized Rs.9.5 lakhs by selling the property of his wife. Failure on the part of the plaintiff in producing such documents which are claimed to be within his reach persuades me to believe that he has no such documents to be produced, to prove that he was in possession of Rs.9.5 lakhs as claimed. In that case, an adverse inference is to be drawn against the plaintiff that he was not in possession of Rs.9.5 lakhs by selling the property of his wife. If so, it is to be further held that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, as claimed. Further, if Ext.A2 was a genuine sale agreement, in addition to the value of the landed property, the value of the residential buildings situated therein also would have been included as part of sale consideration. The above circumstances probabilises the case of the defendant that it was only a loan transaction and that he never intended to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff. In the above circumstance, the trial court was justified in declining the prayer for specific performance. 15. In the proof affidavit the plaintiff admits that before filing the suit for specific performance, he filed a suit as O.S. 119/2008 before the Munsiff's court, Attingal, when he came to know that the defendant was about to sell the plaint schedule property to strangers. Even then, instead of filing a suit for specific performance, he filed a simple suit for injunction. Order II Rule 2 CPC reads as follows :- “ Rule 2. Suit to include the whole claim. (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. Suit to include the whole claim. (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim- Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs- A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. Explanation.—For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action.” 16. In this context it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme court in M/s.Virgo Industries (Eng.) P. Ltd. v. M/s. Venture Tech Solutions P. Ltd. (2013) 1 SCC 625 . In the above decision, the respondent being the original plaintiff filed two suits seeking permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the appellants/defendants from alienating, encumbering or dealing with the plaint schedule properties to anybody other than the plaintiff. Though suits were filed on the basis of two sale agreements entered into by the plaintiffs and the defendants on 27.7.2005 in respect of two different parcels of immovable property, in the injunction suits the plaintiff had stated that on the pretext that restrictions on the alienation of the suits land were likely to be issued by the Central Excise Department on account of getting revenue demands, the defendants were attempting to frustrate the agreements in question. In the plaint, they have further stated that, as the period of six months fixed for execution of sale deeds under the agreements in question was not yet over, the plaintiff is not claiming specific performance of the agreements. In the plaint, they have further stated that, as the period of six months fixed for execution of sale deeds under the agreements in question was not yet over, the plaintiff is not claiming specific performance of the agreements. Further, they sought leave of the court to omit claim the relief of specific performance with liberty to sue for the said relief at a later point of time, if necessary. The injunction suits were filed on 28.8.2005 and 9.9.2005 respectively. Thereafter on 29.5.2007, the plaintiff filed two suits for specific performance. In the suits for specific performance, the plaintiff has specifically contended that at the time of filing the suits for injunction, the period provided for execution of sale agreement has not expired and also that at the time of filing the suit for injunction, the prayer for specific performance would have been premature. Even then, rejecting the arguments raised by the plaintiff/appellant, the Apex Court held in paragraph 14 as follows: “14. The averments made by the plaintiff in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 of 2005, particularly the pleadings extracted above leave no room for doubt that on the dates when C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 of 2005 were instituted, namely,28.8.2005 and 9.9.2005, the plaintiff itself had claimed that facts and events have occurred which entitled it to contend that the defendant had no intention to honour the agreements dated 27.7.2005. In the aforesaid situation it was open for the plaintiff to incorporate the relief of specific performance along with the relief of permanent injunction that formed the subject matter of above two suits. The foundation for the relief of permanent injunction claimed in the two suits furnished a complete cause of action to the plaintiff in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 to also sue for the relief of specific performance. Yet, the said relief was omitted and no leave in this regard was obtained or granted by the Court.” 17. Further, in paragraph 15, the Apex Court held that: “15. Furthermore, according to the plaintiff, which fact is also stated in the plaints filed in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833, on the date when the aforesaid two suits were filed the relief of specific performance was premature inasmuch as the time for execution of the sale documents by the defendant in terms of the agreements dated 27.7.2005 had not elapsed. Furthermore, according to the plaintiff, which fact is also stated in the plaints filed in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833, on the date when the aforesaid two suits were filed the relief of specific performance was premature inasmuch as the time for execution of the sale documents by the defendant in terms of the agreements dated 27.7.2005 had not elapsed. According to the plaintiff, it is only after the expiry of the aforesaid period of time and upon failure of the defendant to execute the sale deeds despite the legal notice dated 24.2.2006 that the cause of action to claim the relief of specific performance had accrued. The above stand of the plaintiff found favour with the High Court. We disagree. A suit claiming a relief to which the plaintiff may become entitled at a subsequent point of time, though may be termed as premature, yet, can not per se be dismissed to be presented on a future date. There is no universal rule to the above effect inasmuch as “the question of a suit being premature does not go to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court” as held by this Court in Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India[6]. In the aforesaid case this Court has taken the view that whether a premature suit is required to be entertained or not is a question of discretion and unless “there is a mandatory bar created by a statute which disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or before a particular date or the occurrence of a particular event”, the Court must weigh and balance the several competing factors that are required to be considered including the question as to whether any useful purpose would be served by dismissing the suit as premature as the same would entitle the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on a subsequent date. We may usefully add in this connection that there is no provision in the Specific Relief Act, 1963 requiring a plaintiff claiming the relief of specific performance to wait for expiry of the due date for performance of the agreement in a situation where the defendant may have made his intentions clear by his overt acts.” 18. We may usefully add in this connection that there is no provision in the Specific Relief Act, 1963 requiring a plaintiff claiming the relief of specific performance to wait for expiry of the due date for performance of the agreement in a situation where the defendant may have made his intentions clear by his overt acts.” 18. In this case the plaintiff filed the above suit for injunction, without obtaining leave of the court to file a suit for specific performance and as such, the present suit is hit by Order II Rule 2 CPC also. 19. In the light of the above discussions, it is to be held that there is no irregularity or illegality in the judgment and decree of the trial court so as to call for any interference. Points answered accordingly. 20. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. All pending interlocutory applications in the appeal will stand dismissed.