JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, J. 1. Heard Mr. Ankit Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Shahid Yunus, learned counsel for opposite party nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. Suraj Singh, learned counsel for opposite party no.3. 2. This petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying therein to quash the award dated 27.08.2010 passed by Permanent Lok Adalat, Deoghar in P.L.A. Case No. 42/2010 (Kartik Nath Thakur vs. Rameshwar Thakur & Ors.). The further prayer is made to declare the award dated 27.08.2010 void, nullity in the eyes of law and not binding against the petitioners as it is fraudulently and collusively executed between the parties to debar the petitioners from their ancestor properties. 3. Mr. Ankit Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the land and properties appertaining to Jamabandi No.7 of Mouza Amarwa, Thana No.530 within Police Station Mohanpur, Sub-Division and District-Deoghar along with Jamabandi No.8, Mouza Agiya, Thana No.527, within Police Station Mohanpur, Sub-Division and District- Deoghar are the subject matter for the present petition. He further submits that the said properties are ancestor, non-transferrable raiyati Jamabandi lands of the petitioners and opposite parties recorded in the name of their ancestors, namely, Jagat Chandra Thakur during last Gentzer Survey Settlement and subsequently his son Rajanikant Thakur and further his son Shambhunath Thakur inherited the properties and after the death of Shambhunath Thakur, the opposite party nos. 1 to 3 being the son of Shambhunath Thakur inherited the joint ancestral properties and the petitioners are the sons of opposite party no.3. He also submits that the petitioners are co-parcener in the joint Hindu family and the aforesaid land and property belongs to the joint property among them. He then submits that the petitioners were working in a private company in different cities and, therefore, they were residing outside Deoghar. He further submits that opposite party nos. 1 and 2 suppressed and concealed the fact and fraudulently misrepresented opposite party no.3 about the compromise and family arrangement of the properties and received his signature over the document on the pretext of ongoing Survey Settlement proceeding. He then submits that there was no dispute between opposite party nos. 1, 2 and 3; neither in the civil court nor in revenue court and the said compromise was made in the pre-litigation stage itself before the Permanent Lok Adalat. He then submits that there was no dispute between opposite party nos. 1, 2 and 3; neither in the civil court nor in revenue court and the said compromise was made in the pre-litigation stage itself before the Permanent Lok Adalat. He also submits that opposite party no.3 being an old aged person aged about 73 years then fraudulently induced by other opposite parties to put his signature over the said document. He submits that the Permanent Lok Adalat, Deoghar by considering the said document in its prelitigative stage and registered the same as P.L.A. Case No.42/2010 and disposed of the matter by Award dated 27.08.2010. He submits that when this fact has come to the knowledge of the petitioners, they have filed the present C.M.P. He also submits that in light of the definition made under Section 22-A of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act, 1987”) only public utility service can be subject matter before the Permanent Lok Adalat and such type of litigation cannot be the subject matter in the Permanent Lok Adalat. On these grounds, he submits that the impugned award may kindly be quashed. 4. Mr. Suraj Singh, learned counsel for opposite party no.3 submits that the dispute in question cannot be the subject matter of the Permanent Lok Adalat. 5. Mr. Shahid Yunus, learned counsel for opposite party nos. 1 and 2 vehemently opposed the prayer and submits that after 14 years, the present petition has been filed and on the ground of delay and laches, this petition is fit to be rejected. He then submits that the signature of opposite party no.3 is there and in view of that, the learned court has passed the said award and, as such, there is no illegality in the award and in view of that, this petition may kindly be dismissed. 6. In the aforesaid background, this Court has to take call as to whether at this stage the said award can be quashed by this Court or not and further the dispute in question can be subject matter of the Permanent Lok Adalat or not. Chapter-VI-A of the Act, 1987 speaks of pre-litigation, conciliation and settlement. Section 22-A of the Act, 1987 reads as under: “22A. Definitions. Chapter-VI-A of the Act, 1987 speaks of pre-litigation, conciliation and settlement. Section 22-A of the Act, 1987 reads as under: “22A. Definitions. —In this Chapter and for the purposes of sections 22 and 23, unless the context otherwise requires— (a) “Permanent Lok Adalat” means a Permanent Lok Adalat established under sub-section (1) of section 22B; (b) “public utility service” means any— (i) transport service for the carriage of passengers or goods by air, road or water; or (ii) postal, telegraph or telephone service; or (iii) supply of power, light or water to the public by any establishment; or (iv) system of public conservancy or sanitation; or (v) service in hospital or dispensary; or (vi) insurance service, and includes any service which the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, in the public interest, by notification, declare to be a public utility service for the purposes of this Chapter.” 7. In view of the above definitions, only public utility service can be subject matter before the Permanent Lok Adalat, whereas, in the case in hand, on the basis of compromise with regard to properties the award has been obtained that too in absence of any litigation either before the civil court or before any revenue court. 8. It is well settled in law that Lok Adalats have no adjudicatory or judicial functions. Their functions relate purely to conciliation. A Lok Adalat determines the reference on the basis of a compromise or settlement between the parties and puts it seal of confirmation by making the award in terms of compromise. It is equally well settled legal proposition that if any party wants to challenge the award based on settlement, the same can be examined in a writ petition under Article 226 and/or 227 on very limited grounds. In Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 SC 340 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law and its invalidity can be challenged even in collateral proceedings. Similar view has been taken in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 853 . 9. Similar view has been taken in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 853 . 9. It is further well known that the award of a Lok Adalat is not a result of a contest on merits, just as a regular suit by a Court in a regular trial is, however it is as equal and on par with a decree on compromise and will have same binding effect and be conclusive. A reference may be made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job , (2005) 6 SCC 4781. 10. It is trite law that validity of a compromise decree can be challenged on the ground that it was obtained by playing fraud. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A.A. Gopalkrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board & others, (2007) 7 SCC 482 . 11. Since the award passed by the Lok Adalat is akin to a compromise decree, its validity can be challenged by a party in a writ petition on the ground that the same has been obtained by playing fraud. "Fraud" means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:- (1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without intention of performing it; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent. A reference may be made to the Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Third Edition Reprint 2007. 12. In view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh , (2008) 2 SCC 660 the law laid down in that judgment is binding on all the Courts in the country by virtue of mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution. 12. In view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh , (2008) 2 SCC 660 the law laid down in that judgment is binding on all the Courts in the country by virtue of mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in no uncertain terms, has laid down that challenge to the award of Lok Adalat can be done only by filing a writ petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court and that too on very limited grounds. In the light of clear pronouncement of the law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the only remedy available to the aggrieved person has to file a writ petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court for challenging the award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat. It is then for the writ Court to decide as to whether any ground was made out by the petitioner for quashing the award and, if so, whether those grounds are sufficient for its quashing or not. 13. What has emerged from the above and coming to the facts of the present case, opposite party no.3 has also conceded that the Permanent Lok Adalat has got no jurisdiction and the allegations are made that opposite party nos. 1 and 2 by way of fraudulent means, got the signature of opposite party no.3, who happened to be 62 years of age at the time of entering signature in the award and now he is aged about 77 years. 14. Section 22-A of the Act, 1987 is required to be read along with Section 22-B and Section 22-A (a) and (b) wherefrom it is evident that the Permanent Lok Adalat can be established only for exercising jurisdiction in respect of one or more public utility services as defined under Section 22-A. In view of the provisions made therein, the Permanent Lok Adalat is not having jurisdiction with respect to any matter other than public utility services as defined under Section 22-A (b) and Chapter VI-A of the said Act deals with prelitigation, conciliation and settlement. The Permanent Lok Adalat is having no jurisdiction in respect of the matter, which is pending in the Court. The Permanent Lok Adalat is having no jurisdiction in respect of the matter, which is pending in the Court. In view of the above, the subject matter of the property has no connection with public utility service, for which, Permanent Lok Adalats are established and only over which the Permanent Lok Adalat is having jurisdiction has been defined under Section 22-A(b). 15. The Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction at all to entertain the application filed by opposite party nos. 1 and 2 for any further purpose whatever with respect to the property in question. The allegations are made that fraudulently the signature of opposite party no.3 was obtained and it was filed before the Permanent Lok Adalat and that is also supported by the learned counsel for opposite party no.3 as he has submitted that the Permanent Lok Adalat has got no jurisdiction and it was pointed out that the said property is ancestral property of the petitioners and only on the basis of the compromise, the said award has been passed and, as such, the argument of learned counsel for opposite party nos. 1 and 2 with regard to entering into compromise with consent is, hereby, negated by this Court. 16. So far as the argument of the learned counsel for opposite party nos. 1 and 2 with regard to delay in filing of the present petition is concerned, it was pointed that the petitioners were residing outside Deoghar and they were doing the work in private company and when it has come to their knowledge, they have filed the present petition. 17. It is well settled that if any illegality has been committed by any court, that illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. A reference may be made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarup Singh and another v. Union of India and another, (2011) 11 SCC 198 . Paragraphs 27 and 30 of the said judgment read as under: “27. In Union of India v. Rangila Ram, (1995) 5 SCC 585 this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 586, para 4) “4. The point is no longer res integra. This Court has considered the scope of the power of the High Court under Sections 151 and 152 CPC and also under Section 13-A of the Act. In Union of India v. Rangila Ram, (1995) 5 SCC 585 this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 586, para 4) “4. The point is no longer res integra. This Court has considered the scope of the power of the High Court under Sections 151 and 152 CPC and also under Section 13-A of the Act. This Court has held that once the civil court made an award as per law then in force which became final and that there is no error of law as on that date. Subsequent amendment does not give power to the court to amend the decree under Sections 151 and 152 CPC. This was held in State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar, (1995) 3 SCC 316 and Union of India v. Pratap Kaur, (1995) 3 SCC 263 . In Maharau Srawan Hatkar Case (1995) 3 SCC 316 this Court held that the civil court lacked inherent jurisdiction and was devoid of the power to entertain an application to award additional benefits under Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The facts therein were that the award had become final and Amendment Act 68 of 1984 had come into force on 24-9-1984. The respondents made an application under Sections 151 and 152 CPC to award enhanced solatium and additional benefits, etc. and the civil court allowed and granted the same. In that context, considering the civil court’s power under Sections 151 and 152 CPC, this Court laid the above law.” 30. In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 845 this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 111-113, paras 30-31) “30. The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner. … Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court. The Court observed [Gursharan Singh v. NDMC, (1996) 2 SCC 459 , SCC p. 465, para 9] ‘9. …Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. The Court observed [Gursharan Singh v. NDMC, (1996) 2 SCC 459 , SCC p. 465, para 9] ‘9. …Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination.’ Again in Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 35 this Court considered the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and reiterated its earlier position regarding the concept of equality holding: (SCC pp. 51-52, para 28) ‘28. … Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalised. In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court was clearly in error in directing the appellants to allot the land to the respondents.’ 31. In State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann, (1997) 3 SCC 321 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 801 this Court observed: (SCC p. 322, para 3) ‘3. … The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon the existence of an enforceable right. He was discriminated and denied equality as some similarly situated persons had been given the same relief. Article 14 would apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or relationship in that behalf. The respondent has no right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief wrongly given to them i.e. benefit of withdrawal of resignation. The High Court was wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there was invidious discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after committing misappropriation of money, is dismissed from service and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is reinstated into the service. The High Court was wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there was invidious discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after committing misappropriation of money, is dismissed from service and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is reinstated into the service. Can a similarly circumstanced person claim equality under Article 14 for reinstatement? The answer is obviously “No”. In a converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong but the wrong order cannot be the foundation for claiming equality for enforcement of the same order. As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon an enforceable right to entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs can never make a right."” 18. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandigarh Administration & another v. Jagiit Singh & another , (1995) 1 SCC 745 in paragraph 8, which reads as under: “8. We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent- authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law — indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law — but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners’ case is similar to the other persons’ case. But then why examine another person’s case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person’s case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course — barring exceptional situations — would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises.)” 19. If an order is without jurisdiction that cannot be allowed to be perpetuated and the illegality can be interfered with by the Court, at any stage. 20. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis and considering that the Permanent Lok Adalat has got no jurisdiction, which has passed the award with regard to the property in question and it was pointed out by the learned counsel for opposite party no.3 that the signature was obtained for Survey Settlement proceeding, this petition is allowed. Accordingly, the award dated 27.08.2010 passed by Permanent Lok Adalat, Deoghar in P.L.A. Case No. 42/2010 (Kartik Nath Thakur vrs. Rameshwar Thakur & Ors.) is, hereby, quashed. 21. This petition is, therefore, allowed and disposed of.