JUDGMENT : EASWARAN S., J. The second appeal and the original petition arise out of execution of the judgment and decree in O.S No.101/2013 on the files of III Additional Sub Court, Kozhikode, as confirmed by the III Additional District Court, Kozhikode, in A.S. No.66/2015. The first appeal arises out the judgment in O.S No.477/2011 on the files of III Additional Sub Court, Kozhikode . 2. The fate of O.P.(C) No.2479/2018 and RSA No.1240/2017 will depend upon the decision of this Court in R.F.A No.446/2018 and hence it is felt expedient to consider the R.F.A No.446/2018 first. 3. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the first appeal are as follows :- The appellants are the legal heirs of one Balagangadharan Vaidyar, who is the husband of the 1 st plaintiff and father of the remaining plaintiffs. Late Balagangadharan Vaidyar derived right title and interest over the plaint schedule property by virtue of purchase certificate No.215/1981, issued as per order in S.M No.257/1980 of the Land Tribunal, Beypore. He had constructed a building and was manufacturing traditional Ayurvedic Medicines. He had applied for a loan from the Kerala Financial Corporation and the District Industries Centre, Kozhikode, for purchase of machineries. On default of the respective loans, when recovery proceedings were initiated, the plaintiffs were approached by one Sudeesh Babu, who agreed to finance the amount required for discharging the liability and accordingly, an amount of Rs.6,00,000/- was advanced to the 1 st plainti the liability. With the said amount secured by the 1 st plaintiff, the loan from the Kerala Finance Corporation was discharged by the 1st plaintiff. However, the documents were not released by the Kerala Finance Corporation on the pretext that the loan from the District Industries Centre is also required to be repaid. Accordingly, the plaintiffs borrowed some of Rs.2,50,000/- from the 1 st defendant and settled the liabilities. Believing the words of the 1 st defendant, the original documents in relation to the plaint schedule property was entrusted to the 1 st defendant. However, the 1 st defendant made the plainti that it is not sufficient, if the original documents are held as security and that a nominal sale deed has to be executed by the plaintiffs as a security for the amount advanced by them. However, the 1 st defendant made the plainti that it is not sufficient, if the original documents are held as security and that a nominal sale deed has to be executed by the plaintiffs as a security for the amount advanced by them. Accordingly, believing 1 st defendant, the plainti executed a sale deed on 20.01.2011 in favour of the 2 nd defendant. Though Rs.16,00,000/- is the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed, the plaintiffs allege that, they have not received the aforesaid consideration and thus the sale deed is vitiated and a sham document never intended to be put in operation. The plaintiffs after realising that the defendants had no intention to re-convey the property, issued a lawyer's notice on 17.06.2011, requiring the defendants to re-convey the property. Since, the defendants refused, the suit was filed initially for declaring that the sale deed dated 20.01.2011 is a fabricated document and signed in the blank paper and never intended to be operated and further the registered sale deed No.253/2011 dated 20.01.2011 executed in the name of the 2 nd defendant is intended to be as a security. Later, the plaint was amended and the prayer was confined to cancellation of the document No.253/2011. The defendants appeared and resisted the suit contending that none of the contentions raised in the suit/plaint are maintainable. The plaintiffs had in fact borrowed an amount of Rs.20,00,000/- from the 1 st defendant and that defendants 1 and 2 had various financial transactions and it is pursuant to which arrangement, the 1 st defendant had instructed the plainti sale deed in favour of the 2 nd defendant. According to the defendants, on 04.01.2011, a notice was issued to the plaintiff calling them to come forward for execution of the sale deed and in compliance with the said notice, they had appeared before the Sub Registrar office on 20.01.2011 and the sale deed was executed. Immediately on execution of the sale deed, the agreement dated 30.11.2010 was destroyed. It is further contended that the entire sale consideration was fixed at Rs.16,00,000/- to avoid the burden of capital gains to the plaintiffs and that the amounts were entrusted by the 2 nd defendant to the 1 st defendant, and accordingly, the sale was plead to the plaintiffs. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Exts.A1 to A24 documents were produced and PW1 and PW2 were examined. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Exts.A1 to A24 documents were produced and PW1 and PW2 were examined. On behalf of the defendants, Exts.B1 to B12 documents were produced and DW1 to DW3 were examined. CW1 was examined as court witness and Exts.C1 and C2 are the report and plan of the Advocate Commissioner. 4. The trial court framed the following issues for consideration:- 1. Whether the agreement dated 30.11.2010 is a fabricated one ? 2. Whether document; No.253/2011 of S.R.O. Feroke is executed as a security as alleged ? 3. Whether the cancellation sought for by the plaintiffs is allowable ? 4. Whether the injunction sought for by the plaintiffs are allowable? 5. Whether the suit valuation and payment of court fee are correct? 6. Reliefs and Costs ? 5. Immediately on institution of O.S No.477/2011, the 2 nd defendant instituted O.S No.101/2013 seeking for a mandatory injunction, directing the defendants therein/ plaintiffs in O.S No.477/2011 to vacate the plaint schedule property, which according to the 2 nd defendant herein, was held by them as a licensee, consequent to the execution of sale deed. In support of his contention, the licence deed was produced. The appellants/the plaintiffs in O.S No.477/2011 denied the execution of the license agreement and reiterated their contentions closely following the averments in O.S No.477/2011. Both the suits were tried together and in O.S No.101/2013 the following issues were framed:- 1. Has the plaintiff got right, title and interest over plaint schedule property by virtue of document No.253/11 of S.R.O. Feroke ? 2. Is the defendant a licensee of plaint schedule property under the plaintiff ? 3. Is the plaintiff entitled to get any amount from defendant as damages? 4. Reliefs and Costs? 6. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the trial court dismissed O.S No.477/2011 and decreed O.S No.101/2013. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree in O.S No.477/2011, the plaintiffs, filed this appeal with an application for condonation of representation delay as well as an application for condonation of filing delay. As against O.S No.101/2013, the 2 nd defendant herein approached the III Additional District Court, Kozhikode, in A.S No.66/2015, which was allowed by judgment dated 04.01.2017. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree in O.S No.477/2011, the plaintiffs, filed this appeal with an application for condonation of representation delay as well as an application for condonation of filing delay. As against O.S No.101/2013, the 2 nd defendant herein approached the III Additional District Court, Kozhikode, in A.S No.66/2015, which was allowed by judgment dated 04.01.2017. Aggrieved by the judgment, the respondent in the A.S No.66/2015 filed R.S.A No.1240/2017 raising the following substantial questions of law:- a) Whether, grant of right to reside in a building for a specified period would amount to license, as defined under Section 52 of the Easements Act, 1882 or whether such transfer of a right to enjoy the property for a certain time would fall within the definition of lease, as defined under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act ? b) When the right to enjoy the property absolutely, without the respondent retaining any control or possession over the demised premises was evident from Ext-B12, the first appellate court was justified in finding that Ext-B12 is a license deed ? 7. In the meantime, for execution of judgment and decree in O.S No.101/2013, the plaintiffs therein preferred an execution petition as E.P No.170/2017 before the I Additional Sub Court, Kozhikode, and the delivery was ordered. At that point of time, O.P(C) No.2479/2018 was preferred, in which this Court had interdicted the orders passed by the Execution Court for delivery of the plaint schedule property. 8. Heard Shri.K.M.Firoz, the learned counsel for the appellants and Smt.M.A.Zohra, the learned counsel for the defendants. 9. As stated earlier, the fate of the Second Appeal and Original Petition will be decided largely, how this Court will ultimately decide R.F.A No.446/2018. According to Shri K.M. Firoz learned counsel for the appellants, the courts below erred egregiously in the dismissing the suit preferred by them to declare the sale deed No.253/2011 as void and not intended to operate among the parties. The learned counsel would assert before this Court with reference to various provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 , especially under Sections 10 , 16 and 25 to contend that Ext.A1 Sale deed was intended to be only a nominal sale deed and that there was an understanding between the parties for re-conveyance of the property. The learned counsel would assert before this Court with reference to various provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 , especially under Sections 10 , 16 and 25 to contend that Ext.A1 Sale deed was intended to be only a nominal sale deed and that there was an understanding between the parties for re-conveyance of the property. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the appellants, that although the document mentions about the receipt of sale consideration of Rs.16,00,000/-, even going by the evidence of DW2, it is clear that the plaintiffs have not received any such amount and therefore, going by the first proviso to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 , the appellants are entitled to succeed. It is further contended that the position of the defendants over the plaintiffs being that of dominant nature, the contract is vitiated by undue influence as provided under Section 16 of the Contract Act. The defendants although contended that the plaintiffs have received a sale consideration of Rs.18,00,000/- as per agreement dated 30.11.2010, they failed to produce the said document. The reasons stated by the defendants that the agreement was destroyed soon after the execution of the sale deed cannot be believed and that even in the absence of original sale agreement, a copy could have been produced and marked as secondary evidence under Section 63 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, it is the specific case of the appellants that, when the sale price does not commensurate with the value of the property, the document has no legal sanctity. It is further pointed out that the bona fides of the plaintiffs is proved by the fact that they had offered to remit an amount of Rs.8,50,000/- together with interest from 2010 onwards, which they are borrowed for the discharge of the loan with the Kerala Finance Corporation as well as the District Industries Centre. 10. Per contra, Smt.M.A.Zohra, the learned counsel for the defendants, vehemently countered the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and contended that the suit preferred by the appellants is nothing but an experimental one. According to the learned counsel, on 04.01.2011, the 1 st defendant in O.S No.477/2011 had caused to issue a lawyer’s notice to the plaintiffs to come forward for an execution of sale deed. According to the learned counsel, on 04.01.2011, the 1 st defendant in O.S No.477/2011 had caused to issue a lawyer’s notice to the plaintiffs to come forward for an execution of sale deed. If the plaintiffs had any objection or apprehension regarding the none receipt of sale consideration or that they never intended to execute the sale deed, they could have restrained themselves from presenting before the Sub Registrar office for execution of the sale deed. In fact, the plaintiffs had caused to issued a reply notice on 17.06.2011 only and that to after execution of the sale deed. A reading of Ext.A1 sale deed would explicitly make it clear that the plaintiffs had received the sale consideration of Rs.16,00,000/- and therefore, it is only impermissible to them to adduce evidence to show that they have not received the sale consideration. No importance could be attached to the oral testimony of DW2. According to the learned counsel for the defendants, it has come out in evidence that both defendants 1 and 2 have some financial transactions and that it is under instructions from the 1 st defendant that the plaintiffs executed the sale deed in favour of the 2 nd defendant. The learned counsel for the defendants further submitted that the courts below had correctly appreciated the possession of the plaintiffs after execution of the sale deed, on the basis of the license agreement and that both courts have concurrently found that the appellants do not have any locus standi to continue in the property after execution of the sale deed and thus correctly decreed the suit preferred by the defendants for mandatory injunction. 11. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the Bar, perused the judgments and decree rendered by the courts below and the records of the case. 12. The registered document certainly carries a presumptive value and the registration is a prima facie proof regarding its execution. The Supreme Court in Prem Singh and others Vs Birbal and others [ (2006) 5 SCC 353 ] held that a registered document has a presumptive value and is prima facie proof regarding its execution. No doubt, the said presumption is rebuttable. But the question before this Court is to what extent the plaintiffs can adduce evidence against the contents of Ext.A1 sale deed. 13. No doubt, the said presumption is rebuttable. But the question before this Court is to what extent the plaintiffs can adduce evidence against the contents of Ext.A1 sale deed. 13. It must be remembered that, the plaintiffs do not have a case that they were misrepresented while executing Ext.A1 sale deed. In short, there is no case made out regarding misrepresentation of character of Ext.A1 sale deed. In such circumstances, the extent of adducing oral evidence is limited. Of course, Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872 , permits to a limited extent to lead evidence to disprove the contents of an instrument. Section 92 of the Evidence Act reads as under:- 92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from, its terms: Proviso (1): Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law: Proviso (2): The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document: Proviso (3): The existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved: Proviso (4): The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in case in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents: Proviso (5): Any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description may be proved: PROVIDED that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract: Proviso (6): Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts. 14. The question is whether the plaintiffs is O.S No.477/2011 had discharged their burden and were successful in disproving the contents of Ext.A1 sale deed. The plea of the appellants that Ext.A1 sale deed is vitiated for various factors including one, under Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act does not inspire confidence in the minds of this Courts for various reasons. Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 , reads as under:- 16. "Undue influence" defined.?(1) A contract is said to be induced by "undue influence" where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another? (a) where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or (b) where he makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress. (a) where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or (b) where he makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress. (3) Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another, enters into a contract with him, and the transaction appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other. Nothing in this sub-section shall affect the provisions of section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872). 15. The plaintiffs have sought to sustain their plea because of dominant position of the defendants over the plaintiffs by virtue of the loan advanced by them to the plaintiffs. But, it must be remembered that the plaintiffs does not have a case that the 1 st defendant had not advanced any money, but on contrary admit that the 1 st defendant had come forward to clear the liabilities over the plaint schedule property. In the present case, though the parties are at serious variance as regards the existence of an agreement of sale, once the sale deed has been executed, the agreement of sale loses its relevancy. It is pertinent to mention that on 04.01.2011, a lawyer’s notice was issued to the plaintiffs, calling them to appear before the Sub Registrar office to execute a sale deed. The plaintiffs have no case that they were forced to appear before the Sub Registrar office to execute the sale deed. A contract could be said to be induced by undue influence, when the relationship subsisting between the parties is such that one of the parties is able to dominate the Will of the other. The aforesaid condition forms the backbone of the principle under Section 16 (1) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 . 16. On a close scrutiny of the averments in the plaint, it is evident that ingredients of Order 6 Rule 4 as regards pleading in a case where fraud or undue influence is conspicuously absent. The aforesaid condition forms the backbone of the principle under Section 16 (1) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 . 16. On a close scrutiny of the averments in the plaint, it is evident that ingredients of Order 6 Rule 4 as regards pleading in a case where fraud or undue influence is conspicuously absent. What is contended is, that the plaintiff never intended to convey their right over the property and they intended to execute only a nominal sale deed. Admittedly, Ext A1 is a registered sale deed. 17. In Raja Ram Vs Jai Prakash Singh and others , [ (2019) 8 SCC 701 ] , the Supreme Court held that in a Registered sale deed there is a presumption regarding its validity and that the onus is on the plaintiff who alleges that the sale deed is vitiated by undue influence to prove the said fact and then only the burden shits to the defendants. 18. Except an assertion that defendants were in a dominant position, pleadings in the plaint is bereft of the requirement of law. Still further, it has come out in evidence that till the execution of the sale deed, the plaintiffs did not have a case that the 1 st defendant was in a dominant position over the plaintiffs by virtue of the loan advanced by him to clear the liabilities outstanding in the plaint schedule property. Therefore, when the principles governing Sub- Section 3 of Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 , are read and applied to the facts of this case, this Court cannot remain oblivious of the fact that the plaintiffs had come forward voluntarily on 20.01.2011 before the Sub Registrar officer to execute Ext.A1 sale deed. There is no explanation given by the Appellants for the same. 19. However, in the appeal what is projected to support their claim under Sub-Section 3 of Section 16 of the Contract Act, is the testimony of DW2. DW2, in whose favour Ext.A1 sale deed was executed, deposed in cross- examination that, he had not tendered any amount to the plaintiffs as stated in Ext.A1 sale deed. But on contrary, entrusted the amount to the 1 st defendant for payment to the plaintiffs. DW2, in whose favour Ext.A1 sale deed was executed, deposed in cross- examination that, he had not tendered any amount to the plaintiffs as stated in Ext.A1 sale deed. But on contrary, entrusted the amount to the 1 st defendant for payment to the plaintiffs. But when we turn to evidence of DW1, the 1st defendant clearly deposed that on receipt of the sale consideration from the 2 nd defendant, he had passed on the consideration to the plaintiffs, because the contract of sale of the plaint schedule property was between the plaintiffs and the 1 st defendant. 20. It is wholly impermissible for this Court to read the evidence of the DW2 in isolation to frame an opinion that the circumstance sited under Sub-Section 3 of Section 16 of the Contract Act has been made out so as to declare Ext.A1 sale deed as a void document. At any rate, the plaintiffs were never under any obligation to present themselves before the Sub Registrar office for Ext.A1 execution. No reasons are forthcoming from the side of the plaintiffs as to why they chose to appear before the Sub Registrar office to execute Ext.A1 sale deed. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that when the evidence of DW1 and DW2 are read in cumulative along with the contents of Ext.A1 sale deed, the plaintiffs have failed miserably to discharge the onus to prove the circumstances existing as per proviso (1) to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 . 21. It is next contended before this Court by the learned counsel for the appellants that under Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, an agreement without consideration is void, unless it is in writing and registered or is a promise to compensate for something done or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation. The learned counsel for the appellants referred extensively to the explanation to Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, and asserted before this Court that the moment it is held that the plaintiffs did not receive the sale consideration as stated under Ext.A1 sale deed, the agreement is deemed to be void. This court is unable to subscribe to the aforesaid argument for multiple reasons. Even going by the averments contained in the plaint, the receipt of Rs.8,50,000/- as sale consideration from the 1 st defendant is admitted. This court is unable to subscribe to the aforesaid argument for multiple reasons. Even going by the averments contained in the plaint, the receipt of Rs.8,50,000/- as sale consideration from the 1 st defendant is admitted. The point of dispute is whether the plaintiffs have received any further amount as stated in Ext.A1. Unfortunately, the quality of evidence adduced by the plaintiffs is not sufficient to hold that there is no passing of consideration while executing Ext.A1 sale deed. Still further, the most compelling fact being, the plaintiff’s presenting themselves before the Sub Registrar office on 20.01.2011 in pursuance to lawyers notice issued on 04.01.2011. Therefore, it cannot be said that the condition stipulated under Section 25 of the Contract Act are made out in the facts of the present case. 22. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, placed strong reliance on the decision of the Privy Council in Tyagaraja Mudaliyar and others v. Vedathanni [ AIR 1936 PC 70 ] to contend that oral evidence to disprove an agreement is admissible to prove that the document was never intended to be operated, but was brought into existence solely for the purpose of creating evidence of some other matter. This Court fails to comprehend as to how the principles laid down in the judgment as aforesaid would apply to the facts of the present case. The one compelling fact which would deter this Court to admit any sort of oral evidence against Ext.A1, is the handing over of the original title deeds relating to the plaint schedule property to the 1 st defendant. It is beyond one’s comprehension to hold that, the 1 st defendant would have advanced money to the plaintiffs solely for the purposes of discharging the liability over the plaint schedule property. Had such been the intention, then the transaction would have been accompanied by the execution of a demand promissory note followed by any other mode of security. Rather, in the present case, the plaintiffs themselves concede that they had handed over the original documents in relation to the plaint schedule property to the 1 st defendant. It is hard to believe that, if the plaintiffs intended to create a security over the plaint schedule property for the value received by them for discharging the loan amount, they would have simply handed over the original documents to the 1 st defendant. It is hard to believe that, if the plaintiffs intended to create a security over the plaint schedule property for the value received by them for discharging the loan amount, they would have simply handed over the original documents to the 1 st defendant. Therefore, all the characteristics of an agreement of sale between the 1 st defendant and the plaintiffs is present in the case. 23. In Svenska Handelsbanken Vs M/s Indian Charge Chrome and others [ (1994) 1 SCC 502 ], the Supreme Court held that oral evidence has to be excluded when there is a written agreement between the parties. Mere assertion of fraud is not sufficient to invalidate the written agreement and it has to be proved through material evidence. 24. In this case, except for the assertion of the plaintiff’s there is no other evidence to substantiate the plea of the plaintiff’s. Perhaps, realising the lacuna, the learned Counsel for the Appellant made a valiant attempt to stress the point that the 1 st defendant failed to produce the agreement of sale dated 30.11.2010 and the same should be held against him. However, this court is not impressed by the aforesaid argument. As stated earlier, the plaintiffs voluntarily presented themselves before the Sub Registrar Office pursuant to the lawyer’s notice dated 04.01.2011 and executed the sale deed. Therefore, the 1 st defendant had no reason to disbelieve the plaintiffs, and the consequential act of destroying the agreement of sale, which has lost its relevance, is a plausible act. Therefore, the failure of the 1 st defendant to produce the sale agreement before the trial court cannot be held against him. 25. Another compelling factor which persuaded this Court to not accept the argument of the appellants is, the oral testimony of the 1 st plainti examined, categorically deposed that she had full faith and belief in the 1 st defendant, till the execution of the sale deed. Therefore, the above testimony would go a long way to disprove the argument now raised before this Court that, the 1 st defendant was in a dominant position to dominate over the will of the plaintiffs, thereby coercing them to execute Ext.A1 sale deed. This Court cannot but conclude that the entire case set up by the plaintiffs is only an afterthought, after the execution of the sale deed. 26. This Court cannot but conclude that the entire case set up by the plaintiffs is only an afterthought, after the execution of the sale deed. 26. The learned counsel for the appellant as a last resort contended that the execution of Ext.A1 sale deed is found to be vitiated by fraud and coercion, is further fortified by a fact that subsequent to the filing of the suit, on a complaint raised against defendants 1 and 2 under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 , and Section 3(1)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SC/ST Act’), the Sessions Court, Kozhikode, in S.C.No.387/2016 had found defendants 1 and 2 as guilty of the offences charged against them and had convicted them to undergo imprisonment. This Court fails to understand what relevancy could be attached to the judgment of the Criminal Court convicting the defendants 1 and 2 for offences under Section 420 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(v) of the SC/ST Act in a civil proceeding. Admittedly, an appeal is carried forward by defendants 1 and 2 against the said judgment, which is pending before this Court. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the appeal preferred by the defendants 1 and 2 will have to be taken into a logical conclusion and it will be wholly impermissible for this court to comment its view on the same. 27. Suffice to say, when this Court considers the entire gambit of evidence adduced by the parties, it becomes irresistible to conclude that the plaintiffs failed miserably to prove any amount of coercion or fraud in execution of Ext.A1 sale deed in favour of the 2 nd defendant. On contrary, the plaintiffs cannot resile from the execution of the sale deed after presenting themselves voluntarily before the Sub Registrar office on 20.01.2011 pursuant to the lawyer’s notice dated 04.01.2011. Resultantly, the judgment and decree passed in O.S No.477/2011 does not suffer from any infirmities or irregularities, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate powers. Accordingly, the first appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. Respondents are entitled to costs throughout. Resultantly, the judgment and decree passed in O.S No.477/2011 does not suffer from any infirmities or irregularities, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate powers. Accordingly, the first appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. Respondents are entitled to costs throughout. RSA No.1240 of 2017 In view of the findings rendered by this Court confirming the judgment and decree in O.S.No.477/2011, it is inevitable for this Court to answer the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal against the appellant and finding that the concurrent findings of fact based on Ext.B12 license agreement dated 22.01.2011 do not call for any interference. Alternatively, even if it is found that the plaintiffs did not execute the license agreement, their continuation over the properties became unauthorized after they had parted with right title and interest. Therefore, the demand of the respondent/plaintiff in requiring the defendant/appellant to vacate the plaint schedule property cannot be said to be improper. Consequently, the substantial questions of law framed in this appeal are answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent holding that the appellant are bound to vacate the plaint schedule property and hand over vacant possession of the same to the respondent/2 nd defendant in O.S No.477/2011. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the Sub Court, Kozhikode, in O.S.No.101/2013 as affirmed in A.S.No.66/2015 by the III Additional District Court, Kozhikode is confirmed and the appeal fails, and accordingly, the same is dismissed with costs. OP(C)No.2479 of 2018 In view of the findings of this Court in RFA No.446/2018 and RSA No.1240/2017, nothing remains further to be adjudicated in the original petition. The judgment and decree in O.S.No.101/2013 is required to be executed, and the subsequent challenge to the order of delivery is only to be declined. Accordingly, O.P(C) No.2479/2018 will stand dismissed. Cost will follow.