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2025 DIGILAW 2594 (KER)

Santhosh Kumar Dubey v. Central Bureau Of Investigation

2025-10-06

A.BADHARUDEEN

body2025
ORDER : A. Badharudeen, J. The 1st accused in Crime No.RC8(A) of 2017 of Central Bureau of Investigation (for short, ‘CBI’ hereafter) Kochi, Ernakulam has filed this Criminal Revision Petition challenging the order dated 01.10.2024 in CRMP No.327 of 2023 passed by the Special Judge in a petition filed under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘CrPC’ hereafter) seeking discharge by the petitioner. Respondent is the CBI represented by the learned Special Public Prosecutor. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/1st accused as well as the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the CBI. 3. In this case the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 7, 11, 12 and Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(i) (d) & 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, the PC Act, 1988 hereafter) by the accused. The prosecution allegation is that the petitioner who was empanelled as a National Quality Monitor in National Rural Road Development Agency and was entrusted with the inspection of the Roads Built under PMGSY scheme while doing the said work of quality monitoring in Thrissur and Palakkad districts, had collected huge amounts from the contractors to the tune of Rs.2,44,790/- which was found in his pocket and in the open cupboard in Room No.107 in ATS Residency Hotel, Palakkad and the investigation revealed that the petitioner had collected the above said amount by way of illegal means by making illegal demand and accepted the amount from the contractors in order to give satisfactory completion report of the project to the bribe given and illegally denied satisfactory report for those had not given bribe and thereby committed the above mentioned offences. 4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused mainly contended that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the crime and that the Final Report has been filed without sufficient supporting materials. It is specifically pointed out by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused that the search conducted in Room No.107 of ATS Residency Hotel, Palakkad where the accommodation had been provided by the Department for the stay of the revision petitioner/1st accused was carried out in violation of Section 100, and more particularly Sections 100(4), 100(5) and 100(6) of the CrPC. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused, even though two witnesses were cited during the search, theywere persons brought from places far away from the scene of occurrence, and their statements do not, in fact, support the conduct of the search in terms of the statutory mandate. Referring to Section 165 of the CrPC, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused further argued that every officer conducting a search is required to record in writing the grounds of his belief and, as far as possible, specify in such writing the thing for which the search is to be made, and that a search memorandum must be prepared in this regard. It is pointed out that the said procedure has been blatantly noticed in the instant case. 5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused placed decisions of the Apex Court and various High Courts viz. It is pointed out that the said procedure has been blatantly noticed in the instant case. 5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused placed decisions of the Apex Court and various High Courts viz. AIR 1960 SC 210 State of Rajasthan v. Rehman, AIR 1968 SC 59 Board of Revenue Madras v. R S Jhaver, 1961 (1) Crl.J 828 State of Bihar v. Bipat Gope, AIR 1933 OUDH 305 Sohanlal v. Emperor, 2016 (4) KLT 613 Sukumaran v. Sub Inspector of Police, 1991 Cri.L.J. 1942 Selvan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 Madras 313 S N Sundaram and Company v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, AIR 1968 Delhi 208 State v. Bhawani Singh and others, 1960 Cri.L.J. 1447 State v. Raijibhai Chaturbhai Slanki, 1963 (1) Cri.L.J. 669 A P Kuttan Panicker and others v. State of Kerala , AIR 1971 Madras 275 M S M Mangudi v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1984 Cri.L.J. 1131 Premchand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 Ajmer 10 Beoparia and Others v. State of Ajmer, (2016) 12 SCC 150 V Sejappa v. State by Police Inspector Lokayukta Chitradurga, (2004) 13 SCC 227 State of Andhra Pradesh v. T Venkateswara Rao, 2022 (5) KLT 433 Ajith Kumar v. State of Kerala, (2022) 4 SCC 574 K. Shanthamma v. State of Telangana, (2011) 6 SCC 450 State of Kerala and Anther v. C.P. Rao, (2015) 10 SCC 152 P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, (1979) 4 SCC 526 Panalal Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra, (1979 ) 4 SCC 725 Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Administration), (1992) 1 SCC 304 Ayya Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 3 SCC 779 C M Girieesh Babu v. CBI Cochin, High Court of Kerala to contend that recording of reasons under Section 165 of the CrPC is obligatory— Non-compliance makes search illegal under Section 165 of the CrPC. Similarly, a search and seizure carried out in violation of the provisions of Sections 100 and 165 of the CrPC, without following the procedure prescribed therein, is illegal. It is further pointed out by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused that, according to the statement of witness No.19, Dinesh Kumar P., he had paid ?40,000 between 2.00 p.m. and 3.00 p.m., and thereafter stated that, out of this amount, after accepting ?30,000, the accused returned ?10,000. It is further pointed out by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused that, according to the statement of witness No.19, Dinesh Kumar P., he had paid ?40,000 between 2.00 p.m. and 3.00 p.m., and thereafter stated that, out of this amount, after accepting ?30,000, the accused returned ?10,000. However, in Ext.D1 First Information Report (for short, “FIR”), these aspects were already incorporated when the FIR was registered at 4.30 p.m. (16.30 hours), and, as per the copy of the FIR, it was dispatched to the court at 5.30 p.m. (17.30 hours) on 26.07.2017. It is further pointed out that the arrest of the petitioner is also illegal. In the arrest memo, the time of arrest was recorded as 9.30 a.m. (09.30 hours), whereas the independent witnesses to the arrest have stated that it occurred at 9.00 p.m. But in the remand application, the time of arrest was stated as 09.30 hours. The learned counsel also pointed out that the statements of the independent witnesses to the search are similarly worded. He has pointed out that in the statement of Sri.Surendran it was mentioned that “I and Surendran”. This would go to show that the statement of K. M. Rameshanunni, the other witness, also was copied as that of Sri.Surendran. Therefore, the statements recorded as that of Sri.Surendran and Sri.K.M. Rameshanunni were manipulated, that too after a week of the alleged search. Apart from this, it is argued that the prosecution sanction obtained in this case is by playing fraud and the same cannot be acted upon. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused further drew the attention of this Court to documents viz. D76, D77, D80, D81 and D82 to contend that, as per the cover marked as Ext.D82, it would be impossible to include the amounts allegedly recovered from the accused. This also probabilises the falsity of the prosecution case. It is also pointed out that Room No. 107 was not in the exclusive possession of the accused as it was provided by the Department on rent. Highlighting these anomalies, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused argued that these aspects were not considered by the Special Court while considering the plea of discharge. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside and the petitioner is entitled to be discharged as prayed for. 6. Highlighting these anomalies, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused argued that these aspects were not considered by the Special Court while considering the plea of discharge. Therefore, the order is liable to be set aside and the petitioner is entitled to be discharged as prayed for. 6. Per contra, the learned Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI argued that the revision petitioner/1st accused, a public servant, who was empanelled as a National Quality Monitor by the National Rural Roads Development Agency, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, New Delhi, during the period from 17.07.2017 to 26.07.2017, and that it was his duty to inspect the roads and certify whether they were in safe condition or otherwise. It is pointed out that the prosecution alleges that in order to issue certificate recording the work as satisfactory, the accused demanded and accepted bribe from various persons, including accused Nos. 2 to 5. Pursuant to search a total sum of ?2,44,930 was recovered from the petitioner. According to the learned Special Public Prosecutor, when a search was conducted in the room exclusively occupied by the accused and amounts given by various persons, including accused Nos. 2 to 5, were recovered as evident from Ext.D2 proceedings in this crime carried out in Room No. 107 of the ATS Residency Hotel, Palakkad. Thus from the prosecution records the offences alleged against the revision petitioner/1st accused under Sections 7, 11, 12 and 13(2) r/w Sections 13(1)(i)(d) and 15 of the PC Act, 1988 specifically made out prima facie warranting trial. The learned Special Public Prosecutor given emphasis to Document No. 2 to show the recovery, during the search conducted under Section 165 of the CrPC, of ?10,000 along with a packet of cardamom from the wooden almirah in the ATS Residency Hotel, Palakkad; ?24,500 from the pocket of the accused’s pants together with ?430 from his purse; ?30,000 kept in a black handbag inside the almirah, and ?1,80,000 from the room. That apart, Ext.D5 shows the recovery of ?24,500 along with ?430. Document No. 6 further fortifies the recovery of ?30,000 from the black handbag, and Document No. 15 establishes that the accused was empanelled as a National Quality Monitor (NQM) by the National Rural Roads Development Agency, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, New Delhi. 7. That apart, Ext.D5 shows the recovery of ?24,500 along with ?430. Document No. 6 further fortifies the recovery of ?30,000 from the black handbag, and Document No. 15 establishes that the accused was empanelled as a National Quality Monitor (NQM) by the National Rural Roads Development Agency, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, New Delhi. 7. Apart from the above documents, the learned Special Public Prosecutor relied on the statements of witnesses 3, 4, 12, 18 and 19 to substantiate the allegation of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused for issuing a satisfactory certificate, while threatening that, otherwise, he would issue a “U” (unsatisfactory) certificate. 8. The sum and substance of the argument advanced by the learned Special Public Prosecutor is that, on perusal of the prosecution records running into about 4,000 pages, the allegations against the revision petitioner/1st accused are clearly made out prima facie warranting trial. In view of this, the Special Court rightly dismissed the discharge petition, and the said order does not require any interference. 9. Having addressed the rival submissions it is to be borne in mind that what are the matters to be considered at the time of discharge is well settled. In the decision reported in 2024 KHC OnLine 586 Sandeep G v. State of Kerala, this Court epitomized the parameters that would govern, when plea of discharge under S.227 of CrPC and framing of charge under S.228 of CrPC are to be addressed, referring the Apex Court verdicts on the point and the same are as under: (i) The trial Judge shall look into the materials collected by the investigating agency produced before the Court, to see, prima facie, whether those materials would induce suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. (ii) The trial Judge has to apply his judicial mind to the facts of the case, with reference to the materials produced by the prosecution, as may be necessary, to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge/final report. (ii) The trial Judge has to apply his judicial mind to the facts of the case, with reference to the materials produced by the prosecution, as may be necessary, to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge/final report. (iii) Once the accused is able to demonstrate from the materials form part of the charge/final report at the stage of framing the charge which might drastically affect the very sustainability of the case, it is unfair to suggest that such material should not be considered or ignored by the court at this stage. (iv) At the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the materials which have been brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate said materials, in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the materials taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence/s alleged. (v) The defence of the accused not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks discharge. The expression "the record of the case" used in S.227 CrPC is to be understood as the documents and objects, if any, produced by the prosecution. (vi) The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record shall not be evaluated. (vii) At the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial. (viii) In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities, which are really the function of the trial Judge, after the trial. (ix) At the time of framing charge, if there is suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (ix) At the time of framing charge, if there is suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In such case also charge needs to be framed to permit the prosecution to adduce evidence. (x) If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot showthat the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 10. No doubt the same is the matters to be considered in warrant trial cases also. 11. Coming to the crux of the matter in fact, the majority contentions raised before this Court by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner were raised before the special court and were considered by the Special Court. The Special Court addressed these arguments and found that they were matters of evidence to be considered at the time of trial. The learned Special Judge further found that there were sufficient materials, including the telephone conversations between the revision petitioner/1st accused and the contractors/others, which would clearly indicate that the revision petitioner/1st accused had demanded illegal gratification and accepted the same as alleged by the prosecution. The samples obtained during investigation were sent to the FSL for voice analysis, and the documents produced by the Investigating Officer would support this finding. For these reasons, the Special Court was not inclined to allow the discharge petition. 12. On perusal of Ext.D1 FIR the same was registered at 16.30 hours on 26.07.2017 and the same was forwarded to the court at 17.30 hours. In Ext.D2 proceedings were drawn in this crime at Room No.107 of ATS Residency Hotel, Palakkad. It was stated that the proceedings started at 09.00 p.m. on 26.07.2017 and concluded at 05.30 a.m. on 27.07.2017. It is true that as per Ext.D7 search list the date and hour of search were recorded as 26.07.2017 20.30 hours to 27.07.2017 at 04.00 hours. So it is submitted by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused that Exts.D7 and D2 would not tally. It is true that as per Ext.D7 search list the date and hour of search were recorded as 26.07.2017 20.30 hours to 27.07.2017 at 04.00 hours. So it is submitted by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused that Exts.D7 and D2 would not tally. On perusal of Ext.D2 it is discernible that as stated by witness No.19 the accused obtained an amount or Rs.30,000/- as bribe from witness No.19 who represented M/s Anai Infra, Rs.10,000/- from one Mr.Kunjumon the representative of the contractor Sri.Ibrahim kutty arrayed as A5. Further the accused collected amounts from various contractors at Hotel Elite International, Thrissur in connection with the inspection in Thrissur. The number of the notes recovered from the accused were specifically narrated in Ext.D2. 13. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused in a small room eleven persons were gathered, then made the accused in a helpless condition and they have made false recoveries to attribute him for the offences alleged against him. In Ext.D5 arrest memo it was stated that the accused was arrested at 26.07.2017 at 09.30 hours and at the time Rs.24,500/- was recovered from his pants pocket along with Rs.430/- which was recovered from the purse kept in his pants pocket. Apart from that he possessed two mobile phones and the numbers of the same also specifically described in the mahazar. Ext.D6 is the recovery mahazar. As already pointed out Ext.D7 is the search list where Sri.Surendran S and Sri.Rameshanunni came were cited as witnesses. It is true that in the statement recorded by Sri.Surendran S also is stated that “I and Surendran”. Pointing out these anomalies, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused argued that this happened because the statements were not recorded by the Investigating Officer and the above statements were falsely prepared by the searching officer. Prima facie this is an impossibility, but this would require proof by examining the author thereof as well as the officer who recorded the same and this anomaly could not be reckoned as a reason to discharge the accused. 14. On perusal of the prosecution records it is true that Sections 100 and 165 of the CrPC have applications in respect of search provided therein. 14. On perusal of the prosecution records it is true that Sections 100 and 165 of the CrPC have applications in respect of search provided therein. In the instant case the prosecution case is that search was conducted by following the procedure under Section 165 of the CrPC and they have produced Ext.D7 search list and Ext.D6 recovery mahazar apart from Ext.D2 proceedings. Even though the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/1st accused argued based on documents D77 to D88 to doubt the recovery, in fact those aspects could not be considered at the pre-trial stage since they are matters of evidence to be addressed on completion of the trial. 15. It is a well settled principle of law that a court considering prosecution materials for the purpose of considering plea of discharge would not conduct a mini-trial and reach its conclusions without relegating the said aspects to be done by the trial court after adducing evidence. To put it otherwise when the prosecution materials prima facie would show the prosecution allegation or at least a strong suspicion the same are sufficient to proceed with trial, though a mere suspicion alone is insufficient on this count. On bearing these fundamental tenets in mind when the case at hand is analysed, it could be seen that the prosecution materials would substantiate prima facie that the allegation raised by the prosecution against the revision petitioner specifically made out prima facie, warranting trial. As far as the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner are concerned, as observed by the special court, the same could not be considered at the pre-trial stage and are matters to be considered after adducing evidence. Thus keeping liberty of the revision petitioner to raise these contentions during trial and after trial, this revision petition is liable to be dismissed. 16. Therefore this revision petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The interim order of stay stands vacated and the special court is directed to expedite the trial without much delay.