JUDGMENT : A. Badharudeen, J. These are appeals filed by accused Nos.1 and 2, respectively, in C.C.No.31/2007 on the files of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, challenging conviction and sentence imposed against them as on 15.10.2010. The respondent herein is the State of Kerala, represented by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, through the Special Public Prosecutor. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Special Public Prosecutor, in detail. Perused the verdict under challenge and the decisions placed by both sides. 3. The prosecution allegation is that the 1 st accused, while working as Special Village Officer and the 2 nd accused, while working as Village Officer, respectively, in Mundakkal Village, being public servants, demanded Rs.100/- each from PW1 for issuing possession certificate, sketch and plan of the landed property belonged to PW3, initially on 29.10.2004 and thereafter, on 01.11.2004 at about 10.05 a.m. Thereafter, both the accused accepted the same as illegal gratification. In this backdrop, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the PC Act, 1988’ hereinafter) and under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘the IPC’ hereinafter), by the accused. 4. The learned senior counsel appearing for the 1 st accused argued that in the instant case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution is insufficient to find demand of illegal gratification by the 1 st accused. It is also pointed out that even though there is a change in the name of the 1 st accused as per the FIR and the final report, there was no proper identification of the accused at the dock, at the instance of the witnesses. According to the learned senior Counsel, initially, in the prosecution records, the name of the 1 st accused was stated as ‘Viswanadhan’, and subsequently, his original name, Visweswaran Pillai, came into the picture. In such a case, specific identification of the 1 st accused would be necessary and lack of the said identification is fatal to the prosecution. According to the learned senior Counsel, initially, in the prosecution records, the name of the 1 st accused was stated as ‘Viswanadhan’, and subsequently, his original name, Visweswaran Pillai, came into the picture. In such a case, specific identification of the 1 st accused would be necessary and lack of the said identification is fatal to the prosecution. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that, in the present case, the bribe amount alleged to have been demanded and accepted by the 1 st accused is only a trivial sum of Rs.100/-, and, in such view of the matter, sub- section (3) of Section 20 of the PC Act, 1988, would have application. The said provision provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn. The learned senior counsel for the 1 st accused placed decision of the Apex Court in A.Subair v. State of Kerala reported in order/00100046865">[(2009) 8 SCC 587] , wherein, in paragraph Nos.22 and 23, the Apex Court considered a case involving Rs.25/- and held that the High Court went wrong in drawing presumption under Section 20 ignoring the trivial nature of the amount. 5. The learned counsel for the 2 nd accused also zealously shared the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel for the 1 st accused, while pointing out that the evidence of PW1 does not disclose any material to prove the initial demand, as alleged by the prosecution. That apart, the learned counsel for the 2 nd accused also found shelter under Section 20 (3) of the PC Act, 1988, by placing a decision of the Bombay High Court in Hanmantappa Murtyappa Vijapure v. State of Maharashtra reported in [2004 Crl.LJ 3001] to assert the point that in the said case, the Bombay High Court held that a sum of Rs.150/- in 1994 was a trivial amount for the purpose of Section 20 (3), and Rs.50/- in 1990 also was trivial in nature. Thus, Rs.100/- in 2004 is trivial to apply under Section 20 (3) of the PC Act, 1988. She also challenged Ext.P23 sanction contending that the same is not proper. Thus, Rs.100/- in 2004 is trivial to apply under Section 20 (3) of the PC Act, 1988. She also challenged Ext.P23 sanction contending that the same is not proper. In this connection, she has placed decision of the Apex Court in Mohd.Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. reported in [1979 KHC 667 : AIR 1979 SC 677] . In fact, this decision has no application in the present case, since the same was rendered when considering Section 6 of the PC Act, 1947, wherein there is no pari materia provisions akin to Sections 19(3) and 19(4) of the PC Act, 1988 were in the statute, viz., the PC Act, 1947. 6. The learned Special Public Prosecutor zealously opposed the contentions and pointed out that in the evidence of PW1, there is categorical assertion as to demand made by accused Nos.1 and 2 on 29.10.2004 and subsequent demand and acceptance on 01.11.2004. It is also submitted that the accused were persons known to each other and witnesses who had close contact with them during the trap proceedings when identified at the dock, the same alone is sufficient to prove the identification. Therefore, any other mode of identification of the accused at the dock is unnecessary, as the evidence taken as a whole clearly establishes that it was accused Nos.1 and 2 who demanded and accepted the bribe. Accordingly, the learned Special Public Prosecutor opposed interference in the verdict impugned. The learned Special Public Prosecutor placed decision of the Apex Court in Narendra Champaklal Trivedi and Another v. State of Gujarat reported in [2012 KHC 4330] and submitted that in the said decision, the Apex Court held that even if the amount accepted is small, minimum sentence has to be awarded, if the offence is proved, since corruption at any level does not deserve either sympathy or leniency. In response to the contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the 1 st accused regarding the trivial nature of the amount, the learned Special Public Prosecutor, with reference to Section 20 (3) of the PC Act, 1988, placed reliance on a three bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Chandrasha reported in [2024 KHC 6658] , wherein the Apex Court considered A.Subair ’s case (supra) and the Apex Court held that when the fact of receipt of payment or an agreement to receive the gratification stood proved, there is a clear case of nexus or corroboration and the presumption itself is irrelevant. Thus, it is specifically submitted by the learned Special Public Prosecutor that, in cases of such nature, even without the aid of Section 20 of the PC Act, 1988, the accused can be penalised. 7. On appraisal of the contentions on and off the issue, the points to be considered are; (i) Is it correct to say that the Special Court rightly entered into conviction for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988? (ii) Is it correct to say that the Special Court rightly entered into conviction for the offence punishable under Section13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988? (iii) Is it correct to say that the Special Court rightly entered into conviction for the offence punishable under Section 120B of the IPC? (iv) Whether the verdict would require interference? (v) The order to be passed? 8. Point Nos.(i) to (v) In this case, prosecution examined PW1, supported by the evidence of PW3 to prove demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused for issuance of possession certificate, sketch and plan in respect of the property owned by PW3. PW1 deposed that he had given Ext.P1 statement before the Vigilance team on 30.10.2004 and he deposed that he was working in a cashew factory run by PW3 and he was authorized to submit an application for getting possession certificate, sketch and plan of the property owned by PW3, which in turn, submitted before UCO Bank for applying a loan. He deposed that PW3 handed over an application to be submitted to the Village Officer and on 11.10.2007, he had reached Mundakkal Village Office, Kollam and the application so filed was identified as Ext.P2. He deposed that PW3 handed over an application to be submitted to the Village Officer and on 11.10.2007, he had reached Mundakkal Village Office, Kollam and the application so filed was identified as Ext.P2. According to him, Ext.P2 application was handed over to the 2 nd accused and he instructed to come after two days. Thereby, he reached the office on 13.11.2004, but the 2 nd accused was not present. On 14.11.2004, between 11 and 12 hours, he reached the Village Office and met the 2 nd accused. Then, the entrustment of the papers signed by the 1 st accused occurred when the 1 st accused had instructed him to reach by 3.00 p.m. PW1 further deposed that when the 1 st accused was asked whether money had been given to the Village Officer, he replied that he had not given any money and that he would come back after discussing the matter with PW3. Accordingly, he discussed the matter with PW3, and PW3 informed him that there must be an attempt to obtain the documents without paying any bribe. Later, he informed the 1 st accused that when the documents would be signed, he would carry out the necessary formalities. The 1 st accused then informed him that if money was not given, the documents would not be issued, and directed him to come with Rs.100/- each for accused Nos.1 and 2. Further, he instructed him to provide a copy of the title document of the property. Again, on 29.10.2004, he reached the Village Office and met the 2 nd accused, but he did not meet the 1 st accused, as he was on leave, Later, Ext.P1 was lodged and two 100/- rupee notes were entrusted to the Dy.S.P., two Gazetted Officers were present therein and he identified the said notes before the court as MO1 series two in numbers. About the demonstration of phenolphthalein test and subsequent colour change, he deposed that thereafter, he along with official witnesses and Vigilance team including the Dy.S.P., started towards the Village Office and he entered into the Village Office. Then, the Village Officer Paul sir (the 2 nd accused) asked whether the amount was brought. According to PW1, the said question was repeated by the 1 st accused Visweswaran Pillai also. Then, the Village Officer Paul sir (the 2 nd accused) asked whether the amount was brought. According to PW1, the said question was repeated by the 1 st accused Visweswaran Pillai also. PW1 replied in the affirmative and he entrusted Rs.100/- to the 2 nd accused and he accepted the money by using his right hand and kept the same inside the left pocket of his shirt. Similarly, the 1 st accused also accepted the money using the right hand and placed the same in the left pocket of his shirt. Later, they signed the certificate and given to PW1 and he came outside and given the signal by folding his dhoti, as directed by the Dy.S.P. 9. PW2 examined in this case is the decoy witness who accompanied the trap team. He deposed about the pre and post- trap proceedings. According to him, he reached the Vigilance Office on 30.10.2004. When the Dy.S.P. introduced PW1 and informed him about the complaint lodged by PW1, PW2 deposed that PW1 entrusted two notes of Rs.100/- each, which the Dy.S.P. received and marked with ‘V’ on the watermark using a ball pen. He identified the above notes as MO1 series. He deposed that, during the demonstration of the phenolphthalein test using a ten- rupee note in sodium carbonate solution, the solution turned pink. MO3 bottle was identified as the liquid used for the demonstration. He deposed that Ext.P3 mahazar was prepared for the purpose and thereafter, the Vigilance party including CW3 moved towards the Village Office and stopped the vehicle 100 meters away from them. He deposed further that Dy.S.P. instructed PW1 to give signal by lifting his documents on receipt of bribe by the accused persons. 10. PW10 is the Dy.S.P. and he supported the pre and post proceedings. PW2 and PW10 stated that on seeing the signal, they along with other officials rushed to the Village Office. PW6, who was the Inspector, who accompanied PW10 for trap also stated that on seeing the signal, he also went inside the Village Office. They found PW1 at the verandah of the Village Office. All these witnesses stated that PW10 asked PW1 whether the accused had received the bribe money. PW1 replied that they had received the bribe money and that accused Nos. 1 and 2 were inside the staff room. These witnesses, along with PW1, then went inside the staff room. They found PW1 at the verandah of the Village Office. All these witnesses stated that PW10 asked PW1 whether the accused had received the bribe money. PW1 replied that they had received the bribe money and that accused Nos. 1 and 2 were inside the staff room. These witnesses, along with PW1, then went inside the staff room. They deposed that accused Nos.1 and 2 were found sitting on two chairs, the 2 nd accused on the front chair and the 1 st accused on the back chair. On seeing the accused, PW1 informed the witnesses that they had received Rs.100/- each from him, and that the money was kept in the left pocket of their shirts. PW10, the Dy.S.P. disclosed the identity of all to the accused. He also questioned the accused who disclosed their identity - the name and designation. 11. It is true that the name of the 1st accused was mentioned in the FIR as ‘Viswanadhan’, whereas his original name is Visweswaran Pillai, as disclosed by the 1 st accused to PW10. However, PW1 specifically identified the 1 st accused as Visweswaran Pillai while giving evidence after naming him correctly. PW2 and PW6 stated that PW10 asked the 2 nd accused as to where he kept the bribe money. Though he did not reply at first, when the question was repeated, he stated that the money was kept in the left pocket of his shirt. The same question was repeated by PW10 to the 1 st accused. He also stated that the money was kept inside his left pocket of his shirt. The said fact is deposed by PW2, PW6 and PW10. These witnesses further stated that a mutual body search was conducted and the hands of PW2, CW3 and PW10 were dipped in sodium carbonate solution and no colour change was noted. The said solution was taken in a bottle, which was sealed, and a label containing the signatures of the witnesses was affixed thereon. The same was identified as MO6. PW2 and PW6 as well as PW10 testified further that the right hand fingers of the 1 st accused was dipped in sodium carbonate solution and the right hand fingers and the solution turned pink in colour. The same was taken in a bottle sealed the same, marked with letter 'F' and it was identified as MO7. PW2 and PW6 as well as PW10 testified further that the right hand fingers of the 1 st accused was dipped in sodium carbonate solution and the right hand fingers and the solution turned pink in colour. The same was taken in a bottle sealed the same, marked with letter 'F' and it was identified as MO7. Sodium carbonate solution was taken in another glass and right hand fingers of the 2 nd accused was dipped in the same, both fingers and the sodium carbonate solution showed pink colour change. The same was taken in a bottle sealed the same affixed with label containing the signature of PW2, PW10 and CW3, and marked with letter 'G'. This bottle was identified by these witnesses as MO8. A mahazar was prepared, showing all these details and the same was signed by PW2 and CW3. It was again stated by these witnesses that, as directed by PW10, the money from the left pocket of the 1 st accused was taken by the witness Gopalakrishnan. They found MO1 series 100/- rupee note in the said pocket. The same was identified by the witness as MO1(a). PW2 stated that he verified MO1(a) with the number he noted day before. The same was also verified with Ext. P6 entrustment mahazar. This was found to be the same. These witnesses further stated that the said currency note was dipped in sodium carbonate solution by CW3. The currency note and the solution showed pink colour change. This liquid was taken in a bottle, which was sealed, affixed with a label containing the signatures of the witnesses and PW10, and marked with the letter ‘H’. The same was identified by these witnesses as MO9. PW2 and PW10 stated that with the assistance of CW3, the other 100/- rupee note was taken from the pocket of the 2 nd accused. This was verified with entrustment mahazar and identified as MO1(b), the note entrusted by PW1 to PW10. The said note was again dipped in lime water and the lime water and the note turned pink in colour. These witnesses added that the same lime water was taken in a bottle sealed the same affixed the label containing the signatures of these witnesses and PW10 and the same was MO10. The said note was again dipped in lime water and the lime water and the note turned pink in colour. These witnesses added that the same lime water was taken in a bottle sealed the same affixed the label containing the signatures of these witnesses and PW10 and the same was MO10. PW2 and PW10 added that the shirt worn by the 1 st accused which was MO13 was taken and PW2 dipped the left pocket portion of the shirt in lime water. The lime water and that portion of the shirt turned pink in colour. This was taken in a bottle sealed affixed the label containing the signature of the witnesses and the same was identified as MO11. Again, MO14, the shirt worn by the 2 nd accused was taken by PW2 and the left pocket of the shirt was dipped in lime water. This lime water and the shirt portion also turned pink in colour. The said solution was taken in a bottle sealed the same and affixed the label containing signature of the witnesses and PW10. This was identified as MO12. The body search of the 1 st accused was conducted through the witness Gopalakrishnan and body search of the 2 nd accused was conducted through PW2. PW10 then arrested accused Nos.1 and 2. He prepared Ext.P5 mahazar. By this time, PW4 came to that office, as directed by the Tahsildar to take additional charge of the said office. PW6 - the Inspector seized the records from the said office, as per Ext.P9 mahazar. PW10 filed Ext.P25 report showing the correct name and address of accused Nos.1 and 2. MO1 series to MO14 were produced before court. PW10 questioned the witnesses and recorded their statements. 12. The learned senior counsel for the 1 st accused as well as the learned counsel for the 2 nd accused vehemently canvassed that no evidence available in this case to prove the demand, as contended by the prosecution and in this connection, the learned senior counsel read out the legible copy of the deposition of PW1 available with him. On reading the legible copy, it could be gathered that there was no demand by the 1 st accused. On reading the original deposition of PW1 before the Special Court, it emerges that PW1’s evidence was that the Village Officer, Paul sir, enquired whether the money requested had been brought. On reading the legible copy, it could be gathered that there was no demand by the 1 st accused. On reading the original deposition of PW1 before the Special Court, it emerges that PW1’s evidence was that the Village Officer, Paul sir, enquired whether the money requested had been brought. The same question was subsequently repeated by the 1 st accused also. Thereafter, PW1 handed over the money to accused Nos.1 and 2, who accepted the same with their right hands and placed the same in their left pocket. On reading the evidence of PW1 as regards to demand, nothing extracted to disbelieve his version during cross-examination. It is pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the 1 st accused that the reluctance in the matter of issuance of possession certificate was due to issuance of a possession certificate in the name of wife of PW3. PW3 supported the version of PW1 without much ambiguity. According to the learned senior counsel, because of issuance of a possession certificate in the name of the wife of PW3, possession certificate could not be issued without transferring the property in the name of PW3 and thereby, the accused persons demanded production of original documents. 13. Countering this argument, the learned Special Public Prosecutor would submit that, as per Ext.P20, page No.31, as on 8.10.2004 itself, mutation was effected in the name of PW3 also after execution of document, whereby the wife of PW3 shared her individual ownership to her husband. Therefore, this argument could not be appreciated. On perusal of Ext.P20, the contention raised by the learned Special Public Prosecutor could be gathered. Thus, it appears that even prior to the filing of Ext.P2 application by PW1 for obtaining the possession certificate, sketch, and plan, mutation had already been effected in the name of PW3. Therefore, even though the Village Officer already issued a possession certificate in the name of PW3, upon production of the title deed in 2003, the accused persons could very well issue the documents asked for by PW3 through PW1 and there is no justification for them to deny the documents asked for by PW1 and PW3, on the basis of issuance of possession certificate in the name of the wife of PW3. Thus, this contention is of no avail to the accused. act explained." data-para-type="court_observations" id="14">14. Thus, this contention is of no avail to the accused. act explained." data-para-type="court_observations" id="14">14. Now, it is necessary to address the ingredients required to attract the offences under Section 7 and Section 13 (1) (d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988. The same are extracted as under:- Section 7 :- Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. – Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government Company referred to in clause (C) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 13 :- Criminal misconduct by a public servant. – (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,- a) xxxxx (b) xxxxx (c) xxxxxx (d) If he,- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest. xxxxx (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than four years but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. act explained." data-page="22" data-para-type="ratio_decidendi" id="15">15. xxxxx (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than four years but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. act explained." data-page="22" data-para-type="ratio_decidendi" id="15">15. In this connection, it is relevant to refer a 5 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [ AIR 2023 SC 330 ], Neeraj Dutta v. State where the Apex Court considered when the demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the P.C.Act to be said to be proved along with ingredients for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and in paragraph No.68, it has been held as under : "68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” 16. Thus, the legal position as regards to the essentials under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act, 1988, is extracted above. Regarding the mode of proof of demand of bribe, if there is an offer to pay bribe by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. The mode of proof of demand and acceptance is either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. 17. In this context, it is relevant to refer the decision of this Court in Sunil Kumar K. v. State of Kerala reported in order/IND_HC_KLHC010626102016">[2025 KHC OnLine 983] , in Crl.Appeal No.323/2020, dated 12.9.2025, wherein in paragraph No. 12, it was held as under: “12. Indubitably in Neeraj Dutta’ s case (supra) the Apex Court held in paragraph No.69 that there is no conflict in the three judge Bench decisions of this Court in B.Jayaraj and P.Satyanarayana Murthy with the three judge Bench decision in M.Narasinga Rao, with regard to the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for offences under Section 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, when the direct evidence of the complainant or “primary evidence” of the complainant is unavailable owing to his death or any other reason. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above would accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above would accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. In view of the aforesaid discussion there is no conflict between the judgments in the aforesaid three cases. Further in Paragraph No.70 the Apex Court held that in the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary,oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. In paragraph No.68 the Apex Court summarized the discussion. That apart, in State by Lokayuktha Police ’s case (supra) placed by the learned counsel for the accused also the Apex Court considered the ingredients for the offences punishable under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act,1988 and held that demand and acceptance of bribe are necessary to constitute the said offences. Similarly as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Aman Bhatia ’s case (supra) the Apex court reiterated the same principles. Thus the legal position as regards to the essentials to be established to fasten criminal culpability on an accused are demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. To put it otherwise, proof of demand is sine qua non for the offences to be established under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and dehors the proof of demand the offences under the two Sections could not be established. Therefore mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of bribe or as undue pecuniary advantage or illegal gratification or the recovery of the same would not be sufficient to prove the offences under the two Sections in the absence of evidence to prove the demand.” 18. First of all, I shall address the question as to whether there was failure in identifying the 1 st accused, whose name initially, as per the prosecution records, is ‘Viswanadhan’ instead of Visweswaran Pillai. In this connection, it is relevant to refer the evidence of PW1. In the evidence of PW1, it is stated that the 1 st accused, Visweswaran Pillai, and the 2 nd accused, Paul Sir, separately demanded the money previously asked for and thereafter accepted the same on the date of trap. In this connection, it is relevant to refer the evidence of PW1. In the evidence of PW1, it is stated that the 1 st accused, Visweswaran Pillai, and the 2 nd accused, Paul Sir, separately demanded the money previously asked for and thereafter accepted the same on the date of trap. PW1 identified accused Nos.1 and 2 at the dock. It is true that, in the evidence, there is no separate identification of accused Nos.1 and 2. However, as pointed out by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, it is discernible from the facts of the case that this was a trap case, wherein PW1 lodged a complaint before the Vigilance Department after having established familiarity with the accused. Thereafter, the accused demanded and accepted the bribe money, following which they were arrested. Thereafter, at the dock, they were identified by naming them specifically. In such a case, the contention raised by the learned senior counsel, disputing the identity of the accused, would not stand and for the said reason, the said challenge is found to be unsustainable. 19. Regarding the argument advanced by the learned senior counsel for the 1 st accused, alleging lack of evidence of demand, as against the 1 st accused, the same cannot be countenanced as already discussed. In fact, the evidence of PW1, corroborated by the evidence of PW3, categorically established that accused Nos.1 and 2 demanded and accepted the bribe as alleged by the prosecution on 01.11.2004 in continuation of the demand earlier made on on 29.10.2004, thereby satisfying the ingredients of the offences in question. Therefore, the said contention also could not be considered. 20. Coming to the application of Section 20 (3) of the PC Act, 1988, where it has been provided that the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub- sections if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, is so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn. On reading the section itself, it is discernible that when the amount of bribe is negligible, the court has the discretion to decline drawing of presumption under Section 20 (1) of the PC Act, 1988. On reading the section itself, it is discernible that when the amount of bribe is negligible, the court has the discretion to decline drawing of presumption under Section 20 (1) of the PC Act, 1988. On reading Section 20 (1) of the PC Act, 1988, the presumption would be operative once it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself or for any other person any gratification other than legal remuneration. In Chandrasha ’s case (supra), in paragraph No.23, the Apex Court held that in view of the aforesaid analysis, we find that the trial Court based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, rightly found the respondent guilty of the offences punishable under S.7 and S.13(1)(d) r/w S.13(2) of the Act and sentenced him for the same. However, the High Court by placing reliance on the decision of this Court in A. Subair's case (supra), held that since no work was pending with the respondent as on the date of trap, the ingredient to attract and complete the offences punishable under S.7, S.13(1)(d) read with S.13(2) of the Act was not met. The view so taken by the High Court is unsustainable as the decision of this Court in A.Subair's case (supra) did not support the view. It was a case where the complainant was not even examined and there were discrepancies in the evidence of the other witnesses. In the present case, we do not find such infirmities. Insofar as the reference to sub-section (3) to S.20 regarding the triviality of the gratification, the act sought or performed, and the amount demanded cannot be considered in isolation to each other. The value of gratification is to be considered in proportion to the act to be done or not done, to forbear or to not forebear, favour or disfavour sought, so as to be trivial to convince the Court, not to draw any presumption of corrupt practice. It is also not necessary that only if substantial amount is demanded, the presumption can be drawn. The overall circumstances and the evidence will also have to be looked into. S.20 would come into operation only when there is no nexus between the demand and the action performed or sought to be performed. It is also not necessary that only if substantial amount is demanded, the presumption can be drawn. The overall circumstances and the evidence will also have to be looked into. S.20 would come into operation only when there is no nexus between the demand and the action performed or sought to be performed. But, when the fact of receipt of payment or an agreement to receive the gratification stands proved, there is a clear case of nexus or corroboration and the presumption itself is irrelevant. S.20 gets attracted when it is proved that the public servant has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification other than legal remuneration and in that case, presumption is that it is the motive or reward for any of the acts covered under S.7, S.11 or S.13(1)(b) of the Act. The presumption under S.20 is similar to S.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where the onus is on the accused to prove that he is not guilty of the offences charged. The first two limbs under sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 20 make it clear that adequacy of consideration is irrelevant to draw the presumption. That apart, sub-section (3) only grants a discretion to Court to decline from drawing any presumption if the amount is so trivial so that such inference of corruption is not fairly possible in the facts of the case. Therefore, it is not a rule but an exception available to the Court to exercise its discretionary power in the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present facts of the case, we are not inclined to exercise such discretion. As such, the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the materials on record. The above decision would lead to the conclusion that Section 20 (3) of the PC Act, 1988, is an exception available to the court to exercise its discretionary power in the facts and circumstances of a particular case and in Chandrasha ’s case (supra), the Apex Court was not inclined to exercise such discretion. Thus, the law is settled that once the fact in issue as to receipt of payment or an agreement to receive the gratification stands proved, beyond reasonable doubt, further corroboration and presumption of Section 20 (1) of the PC Act, 1988, is irrelevant, though the court can presume so. Thus, the law is settled that once the fact in issue as to receipt of payment or an agreement to receive the gratification stands proved, beyond reasonable doubt, further corroboration and presumption of Section 20 (1) of the PC Act, 1988, is irrelevant, though the court can presume so. That is to say, once the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant are established beyond reasonable doubt, the court need not go in aid of the presumption under Sections 20 (1) and (2) of the PC Act, 1988. Having noticed the legal position, I am not inclined to apply the discretion provided under Section 20 (3) of the PC Act, 1988 in the instant case. Therefore, this contention also must fail. 21. As regards the contention raised by the learned counsel for the 2 nd accused, appellant in Crl.A.No.2162/2010, contending that Ext.P23 sanction is not proper, it could be gathered that Ext.P23 sanction was proved through PW9. Ext.P23 would show that PW9 issued sanction on scrutiny of the prosecution materials and on applying the minds specifically. It is true that as per the decision in Mohd.Iqbal Ahmed ’s case (supra), the Apex Court held as argued by the learned counsel for the 2 nd accused while considering Section 6 of the PC Act, 1947 that it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that valid sanction has been granted by the Sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. It is noticeable that, on going through Section 6 of the PC Act, 1947, no pari materia provisions equivalent to Sections 19(3) and 19(4) of the PC Act, 1988 were available in the PC Act, 1947. In fact, Sections 19(3) and 19(4) were introduced to the statute by the subsequent amendment. The impact of sanction after a finding is entered or a sentence already passed by a Special Judge being considered by this Court shall be adhering to Sections 19(3) and 19(4) of the PC Act, 1988. 22. In fact, Sections 19(3) and 19(4) were introduced to the statute by the subsequent amendment. The impact of sanction after a finding is entered or a sentence already passed by a Special Judge being considered by this Court shall be adhering to Sections 19(3) and 19(4) of the PC Act, 1988. 22. It is pertinent to note the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala reported in [2007 (2) KHC 400 : JT 2007 (5) SC 525 : 2007 (2) KLT 529] and State by Police Inspector v. T. Venkatesh Murthy reported in [ (2004) 7 SCC 763 ] , is that the validity of sanction does not, by itself, affect the validity of the proceedings. A defect, omission, or irregularity in the sanction would warrant interference only if the court is satisfied that such defect has resulted in a failure of justice. 23. In State of Goa v. Babu Thomas reported in [2005 KHC 1803 : 2005 (4) KLT SN 87 : 2005 (8) SCC 130 : AIR 2005 SC 3606] , the Apex Court distinguished the decision in State by Police Inspector v. T.Venkatesh Murthy ’s case (supra) and held in paragraph 11 as under: 11. Referring to the aforesaid provisions, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the Court should not, in appeal, reverse or alter any finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge on the ground of the absence of any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless the Court finds a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. In this connection, a reference was made to the decision of this Court rendered in the case of State v. T. Venkatesh Murthy (2004) 7 SCC 763 : (2004) SCC (Cri) 2140). Reference was also made to the decision of this Court in the case of Durga Dass v. State of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 213 : (1973) SCC (Cri) 762) where this Court has taken the view that the Court should not interfere in the finding or sentence or order passed by a special Judge and reverse or alter the same on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub- section (1), unless the Court finds that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. According to the counsel for the appellant no failure of justice has occasioned merely because there was an error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required because evidence is yet to start and in that view the High Court has not considered this aspect of the matter and it is a fit case to intervene by this Court. We are unable to accept this contention of the counsel. The present is not the case where there has been mere irregularity, error or omission in the order of sanction as required under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. It goes to the root of the prosecution case. Sub-section (1) of Section 19 clearly prohibits that the Court shall not take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction as stated in clauses (a), (b) and (c). 24. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka reported in [ (2015) 14 SCC 186 ] . In paragraph 22 of the said judgment, the Apex Court held as under: 22. The legal position regarding the importance of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is thus much too clear to admit equivocation. The statute forbids taking of cognizance by the court against a public servant except with the previous sanction of an authority competent to grant such sanction in terms of clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). The question regarding validity of such sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The competence of the court trying the accused so much depends upon the existence of a valid sanction. In case the sanction is found to be invalid, the court can discharge the accused relegating the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with law. If the trial court proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution. 25. If the trial court proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution. 25. Going by the decisions extracted hereinabove, majority of the decisions would emphasize the point that, failure of justice if not occasioned, by way of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in sanction, the same by itself is not a ground to interfere the finding, sentence or order passed by the Special Judge. It is the fundamental principle of interpretation of statute that, when provisions of a statute are interpreted, the interpretation should be by giving effect to all the provisions, without making any of the provisions redundant or inoperative. 26. In the latest decision of the Apex Court reported in [ 2025 INSC 654 ] Dashrath v. The State of Maharashtra the Apex Court referred Neeraj Dutta ’s case (supra) and the decision reported in [ (2015) 2 SCC 33 ] Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India , and held in paragraph Nos.12 and 13 that, it is no longer res integra that requirement of sanction has a salutary object. Provisions requiring sanction to prosecute, either under Section 19, PC Act or Section 197 of the (now repealed) Cr. PC or under Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are intended to protect an innocent public servant against unwarranted and mala fide prosecution. Indubitably, there can be no tolerance to corruption which has the effect of undermining core constitutional values of justice, equality, liberty and fraternity; however, at the same time, the need to prosecute and punish the corrupt is no ground to deny protection to the honest. This is what was held by this Court in its decision in Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India while repelling a challenge raised in a Public Interest Litigation to the constitutional validity of Section 19 of the PC Act. Even otherwise, merely because there is any omission, error or irregularity in the matter of granting sanction, that does not affect the validity of the proceedings unless the court records its own satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice. 27. Even otherwise, merely because there is any omission, error or irregularity in the matter of granting sanction, that does not affect the validity of the proceedings unless the court records its own satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice. 27. In another decision of the Apex Court reported in [ 2025 INSC 50 ] , The State of Punjab v. Hari Kesh , after referring the decision of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka Lokayukta Police v. S.Subbegowda reported in [(2023) 17 Supreme Court Cases 699 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 911] , the Apex Court considered the combined effect of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 19 and reiterated that, in view of sub-section (3) clearly forbids the court in appeal, confirmation or revision, the interference with the order passed by the Special Judge on the ground that the sanction was bad, save and except in cases where the failure of justice had occurred by such invalidity. 28. Thus, the law emerges is that, in order to take cognizance for the offences under Sections 7 , 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the P.C. Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, sanction is necessary. After taking cognizance, during trial, when considering the validity of sanction on the ground of any error or omission or irregularity in the sanction, including the incompetency of the authority to grant sanction, a court in appeal, confirmation or revision, on those grounds, no finding, sentence or order passed by the Special Judge shall not be interfered, unless the court finds that such error or omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice. Therefore, even though sanction is necessary to take cognizance for offences under Sections 7 , 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the P.C. Act alleged to be committed by a public servant, unless there is a failure of justice, the finding, sentence or order passed by the Special Judge shall not be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision. act explained." data-para-type="ratio_decidendi" id="29">29. act explained." data-para-type="ratio_decidendi" id="29">29. In view of the above legal position, the mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction, by itself, does not constitute a ground for interference by an appellate or revisional court, or by a court confirming the order, on the basis of any error, omission, or irregularity in the sanction, unless the court is of the opinion that such omission has, in fact, resulted in a failure of justice. In the instant case, there is nothing to suggest that there is failure of justice, in any manner and the sanction order found to be in order. If any error, omission, or irregularity exists in the order of sanction, the same cannot, by itself, serve as a ground to negate the prosecution case in its entirety. 30. Having gone through the prosecution case and on re- appreciation of the evidence available, this Court is of the view that the Special Court rightly found the ingredients to find commission of offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988 by accused Nos.1 and 2 herein/the appellants. Therefore, conviction does not require any interference. 31. In the instant case, the Special Court convicted the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year each and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each. In default of payment of the fine, the accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months each for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988. Similarly, for the offence under Section 13 (1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988, the Special Court imposed rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year each and a fine of Rs.1,000/- each, with default rigorous imprisonment of three months each. For the offence under Section 120B of the IPC, the Special Court sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year each. 32. Considering the factual aspects discussed and the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the accused, I am inclined to reduce the sentence to the minimum permissible under law. 33. In the result, both these appeals stand allowed in part. The conviction imposed against accused Nos.1 and 2 is confirmed. The sentence stands modified as under: 34. 32. Considering the factual aspects discussed and the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the accused, I am inclined to reduce the sentence to the minimum permissible under law. 33. In the result, both these appeals stand allowed in part. The conviction imposed against accused Nos.1 and 2 is confirmed. The sentence stands modified as under: 34. The accused are sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and also to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, both the accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988. The accused are sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year each and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, the accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months each for the offence under Section 13 (1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988. For the offence under Section 120B , the accused are sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months each. 34. The substantive sentences shall run concurrently and the default sentences shall run separately. 35. The orders suspending sentence and granting bail to the accused stand cancelled and the bail bonds executed by the accused also stand cancelled. The accused are directed to surrender before the Special Court, forthwith to undergo the modified sentence, failing which, the Special Court is directed to execute the sentence, without fail. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment of the Special Court, forthwith, without fail, for information and compliance.