Order : (Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.) 1. The short question involved in the instant writ petition is whether respondent-South Eastern Coalfield Limited (for brevity “SECL”) is justified in denying employment to the petitioner herein under the Rehabilitation Policy after acquiring his land and making payment of compensation to the tune of Rs.5,27,805.60/- to him on 17.07.2012, by disputing validity of his sale deed by which the petitioner acquired title over the said land on wholly untenable ground? 2. The aforesaid question of law arises on the following factual backdrop:- (I) The petitioner herein was title holder of the land bearing Khasra No.630 area 0.66 acre situated at village Pondi, which he had purchased by registered sale deed dated 24.12.1992 by one Jyotibhushan Pratap Singh in which the caste of the seller and purchaser are mentioned as Schedule Tribe (Adivasi). (II) The above-stated subject land was acquired by the competent authority for the purpose of respondent-SECL under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition & Development) Act, 1957 (for brevity “the Act of 1957”) for Gevra-Project in 2004, accepting the clear and marketable title of the petitioner and compensation to the tune of Rs.5,27,805.60/- was paid to him on 17.07.2012 in lieu of such acquisition and no dispute whatsoever was raised qua his title while acquiring his land and making payment of the compensation to him. However, as per the scheme of Rehabilitation Policy of the respondent-SECL, they were required to provide employment to one member of the family whose land was subjected to acquisition by the SECL, to which the petitioner had claimed by making representation and which remained unadjudicated leading to filing of writ petition No.663/2015 which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 02.03.2015 directing the SECL to consider the petitioner’s representation. Consequently, the SECL considered vide letter/order dated 11.04.2015 in which the SECL had issued direction to the petitioner herein to satisfy two conditions which state as under:- “(i) to produce the caste certificate issued by the Competent Authority; & (ii) to explain as to why the particulars of his age and fact of minor are not mentioned in sale deed dated 24.12.1992.” (III) It has also been held in above-stated letter/order dated 11.04.2015 that employment will be grantable to the petitioner only upon fulfulling the aforesaid twin conditions enumerated herein-above. 3. 3. The petitioner has filed this writ petition stating inter alia that under the Rehabilitation Policy he is entitled for the employment in the respondent-SECL, which has not been granted to him, therefore, appropriate writ or direction be issued to respondent-SECL for providing the employment in accordance with the Rehabilitation Policy. 4. The return has been filed by the respondent-SECL in which it has been stated by the respondent that the petitioner’s land has been subjected to acquisition under the Act of 1957, against which compensation of Rs.5,27,805.60/- has already been paid to the petitioner on 17.07.2012 and he is also entitled for grant of employment subject to vacancy for that village and other eligibility. It has also been stated that the petitioner prima facie appears to be eligible for grant of employment and his name was considered and his case was processed. It has been further stated that the subject land situated in the tribal area which was owned by Jyotibhushan Pratap Singh (seller) who also belonged to aboriginal tribe from whom the petitioner herein had purchased the subject land in the year 1992 by registered sale deed and in the said registered sale deed, the caste of both seller and buyer has been mentioned as Schedule Tribe, but the petitioner was minor on the date of execution of sale deed and he did not produce his caste certificate as mentioned in the registered sale deed. It has been further stated that transaction between the tribal and non-tribal is hit by Section 165 (6) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short “the Code, 1959”) and since the petitioner has not produced the caste certificate and also failed to explain as to why the particulars of his age and fact that he was minor at that time are not mentioned in sale deed dated 24.12.1992, his case cannot be considered for grant of employment. No rejoinder has been filed. 5. Mr. No rejoinder has been filed. 5. Mr. Deepak Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that once the petitioner’s title has been acknowledged, land has been acquired and compensation has been paid to him for acquisition of his land, the validity of the sale deed cannot be disputed at subsequent stage that too by the third party to the sale deed i.e. SECL that too after acquisition and after payment of compensation to the petitioner and only in order to deprive him of his legitimate right of getting employment which the Rehabilitation Policy mandates and which has also been accepted by the SECL in its reply and the grant of employment has nothing to do with his caste whether he is a member of an aboriginal tribe or the General category and the denial of such employment is violative of his right guaranteed under the Rehabilitation Policy. As such, appropriate writ or direction be issued to the respondent- SECL to consider and grant employment to the petitioner herein within stipulated time. 6. Mr. Vaibhav Shukla, learned counsel for the respondent-SECL, would submit that though the petitioner is eligible for grant of employment as per the Rehabilitation Policy, but since he did not provide his caste certificate as desired by letter/order dated 11.04.2015, and also he did not submit his clarification as to why the particulars of his age and fact that he was minor at the relevant point of time, have not been mentioned in sale deed dated 24.12.1992. Therefore, the petitioner has rightly been denied employment against the Rehabilitation Policy as it would be in contravention to Section 165 (6) of the Code, 1959. 7. Mr. Anurag Dayal Shrivastava, learned amicus curiae, would submit that once the title of the petitioner has been accepted by the State and the SECL as well and the compensation of Rs.5,27,805.60/- has been paid to the petitioner on 17.07.2012, subsequently, at the time of granting employment under the Rehabilitation Policy, the sale deed cannot be disputed. However, it is well settled law that validity of sale deed can only be challenged before the jurisdictional Civil Court as has also been held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Satya Pal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others , [ AIR 2016 SC 4995 ] . However, it is well settled law that validity of sale deed can only be challenged before the jurisdictional Civil Court as has also been held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Satya Pal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others , [ AIR 2016 SC 4995 ] . He would also submit that the doctrine of “Promissory Estoppel” would also attract, as the land has been acquired after accepting the title and making payment of the compensation. In this regard, he would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Delhi Cloth and General Mill Ltd. v. Union of India , [ AIR 1987 SC 2414 ] 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the records minutely. 9. It is not in dispute that the petitioner’s land bearing Khasra No.630 area 0.66 acre, situated at village Pondi has been subjected to acquisition by the competent authority for the benefit of SECL under the Act of 1957 for the Gevra project of the SECL in the year 2004 and against the subject land, compensation of Rs.5,27,805.60/- has been paid to the petitioner on 17.07.2012. Admittedly, the land has been taken for the Gevra project and it has been vested with the Government free from all encumbrances. However, as per prevalent policy of the Coal India Limited, a person whose land has been acquired is also entitled for the grant of employment, which the SECL has also admitted in its return/reply holding that, prima facie, petitioner appears to be eligible for grant of employment and his case was also considered, but since as per letter/order dated 11.04.2015 the petitioner did not submit his caste certificate being the member of an aboriginal tribe and he also did not offer his explanation as to why in the registered sale deed dated 24.12.1992 the fact of his being minor at that time has not been mentioned, employment has been denied to the petitioner as per the Rehabilitation Policy. 10.The petitioner’s title and ownership have already been admitted by the acquiring authority and the SECL and his land has already been acquired and compensation has also paid to him without raising any kind of dispute with regard to his title and ownership and the sale deed, even otherwise, has become final which cannot be questioned by the third party including the SECL and the validity of the sale deed can only be questioned before the jurisdictional Civil Court in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Satya Pal Anand (supra) , which states as under:- “34. The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged, once the document is registered (see Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan [State of U.P. v. Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan, AIR 1961 SC 787 ] ). Section 17 of the 1908 Act deals with documents which require compulsory registration. Extinguishment deed is one such document referred to in Section 17(1)(b). Section 18 of the same Act deals with documents, registration whereof is optional. Section 20 of the Act deals with documents containing interlineations, blanks, erasures or alterations. Section 21 provides for description of property and maps or plans and Section 22 deals with the description of houses and land by reference to government maps and surveys. There is no express provision in the 1908 Act which empowers the Registrar to recall such registration. The fact whether the document was properly presented for registration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its registration. The power to cancel the registration is a substantive matter. In absence of any express provision in that behalf, it is not open to assume that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) would be competent to cancel the registration of the documents in question. Similarly, the power of the Inspector General is limited to do superintendence of Registration Offices and make rules in that behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel the registration of any document which has already been registered. 36. If the document is required to be compulsorily registered, but while doing so some irregularity creeps in, that, by itself, cannot result in a fraudulent action of the State Authority. Non-presence of the other party to the extinguishment deed presented by the Society before the Registering Officer by no standard can be said to be a fraudulent action per se. If the document is required to be compulsorily registered, but while doing so some irregularity creeps in, that, by itself, cannot result in a fraudulent action of the State Authority. Non-presence of the other party to the extinguishment deed presented by the Society before the Registering Officer by no standard can be said to be a fraudulent action per se. The fact whether that was done deceitfully to cause loss and harm to the other party to the deed, is a question of fact which must be pleaded and proved by the party making such allegation. That fact cannot be presumed. Suffice it to observe that since the provisions in the 1908 Act enables the Registering Officer to register the documents presented for registration by one party and execution thereof to be admitted or denied by the other party thereafter, it is unfathomable as to how the registration of the document by following procedure specified in the 1908 Act can be said to be fraudulent. As aforementioned, some irregularity in the procedure committed during the registration process would not lead to a fraudulent execution and registration of the document, but a case of mere irregularity. In either case, the party aggrieved by such registration of document is free to challenge its validity before the civil court.” 11.Not only this, the Supreme Court in the matter of Jamila Begum v. Shami Mohd., and another , [ AIR 2019 SC 72 ] has held that there is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed and a registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law and held in paragraph No. 16 as under:- “16. Sale deed dated 21-12-1970 in favour of Jamila Begum is a registered document and the registration of the sale deed reinforces valid execution of the sale deed. A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to show that the transaction is not valid in law. In Prem Singh v. Birbal [Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353 ] , it was held as under: (SCC pp. 360-61, para 27) “27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. In Prem Singh v. Birbal [Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353 ] , it was held as under: (SCC pp. 360-61, para 27) “27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.”” 12.Coming to the facts of the case in light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of Satya Pal Anand (supra) and Jamila Begum (supra) , it is quite vivid that the SECL has travelled beyond its jurisdiction. The sale deed being a registered document which the SECL/State has already admitted as it is by acquiring his land and making payment of compensation to the tune of Rs.5,27,805.60/- to the petitioner on 17.07.2012 and did not dispute while acquiring his land and making payment of compensation to him. Now, the other obligation as per the SECL is to provide employment to one member of the family, whose land has been acquired, which the petitioner claimed but, the SECL questioned the validity of the sale deed and came to the conclusion that the sale deed is not validly executed and suspected that the petitioner did not belong to an aboriginal tribe or Schedule Tribe and further the petitioner was minor on the date of registration of the sale deed in his favour. 13.At the time of acquisition, the SECL/State has clearly promised to the petitioner; firstly, that on acquisition of the land, compensation will be paid to him and secondly, that upon acquisition of his land, one member of his family will be given employment. The first promise i.e. payment of compensation has been fulfilled by the SECL, but the SECL has declined to grant employment to one member of petitioner’s family which is hit by the doctrine of “Promissory Estoppel”. The first promise i.e. payment of compensation has been fulfilled by the SECL, but the SECL has declined to grant employment to one member of petitioner’s family which is hit by the doctrine of “Promissory Estoppel”. The said doctrine states as under:- “where one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the party who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relationship as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced, even though it is not supported in point of law by any consideration, but only by his word.” 14.The concept of promissory estoppel relates to a representation of the future intention. If the promise is made with the intention that the other party should act upon it then it may give rise to the person to whom it is made from the conduct of the person who has offered such promise. The alteration of position by the party is the only indispensable requirement of the doctrine of promissory estoppels and it is not necessary to prove further any damage, detriment or prejudice to the party asserting the estoppel. In the matter of Delhi Cloth and General Mill Ltd. (supra) it has been observed in paragraphs No.18 to 20 as under:- 18. Here the Railways Rates Tribunal apparently, appears to have gone off the track. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has not been correctly understood by the Tribunal. It is true, that in the formative period, it was generally said that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked by the promisee unless he has suffered “detriment” or “prejudice”. It was often said simply, that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. But this has now been explained in so many decisions all over. All that is now required is that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given to him. Must have relied upon the representation made to him. But this has now been explained in so many decisions all over. All that is now required is that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given to him. Must have relied upon the representation made to him. It means, the party has changed or altered the position by relying on the assurance or the representation. The alteration of position by the party is the only indispensable requirement of the doctrine. It is not necessary to prove further any damage, detriment or prejudice to the party asserting the estoppel. The court, however, would compel the opposite party to adhere to the representation acted upon or abstained from acting. The entire doctrine proceeds on the premise that it is reliance based and nothing more. 19. This principle would be clear if we study the cases in which the doctrine has been applied ever since it burst out into sudden blaze in 1946. Lord Denning in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [1947 KB 130 : (1956) 1 All ER 256] , sitting as a trial Judge, asserted: A promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon, and in fact acted upon is binding. 20 . The history of the High Trees [1947 KB 130 : (1956) 1 All ER 256] principle is too well known to bear repetition. It will be enough to make the following points. The promisor is bound because he led the promisee to commit himself to change the position. If the promisee has acted upon the promise, the promisor is precluded from receding (sic resiling from) his promise. No further detriment to the promisee upon his temporary interests need be established. This position has been made clear by Lord Denning himself in his article “Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Consideration” [ Modern Law Review, Vol. 15 at p. 5] : “A man should keep his word. All the more so when the promise is not a bare promise but is made with the intention that the other party should act upon it. Just as contract is different from tort and from estoppel, so also in the sphere now under discussion promises may give rise to a different equity from other conduct. The difference may lie in the necessity of showing “detriment”. Just as contract is different from tort and from estoppel, so also in the sphere now under discussion promises may give rise to a different equity from other conduct. The difference may lie in the necessity of showing “detriment”. Where one party deliberately promises to waive, modify or discharge his strict legal rights, intending the other party to act on the faith of promise, and the other party actually does act on it, then it is contrary, not only to equity but also to good faith, to allow the promisor to go back on his promise. It should not be necessary for the other party to show that he acted to his detriment in reliance on the promise. It should be sufficient that he acted on it.” 15.As such, the respondent-SECL is bound by the promise which has been made at the time of acquisition of petitioner’s land for making payment of the compensation and to provide employment to one member of his family by the doctrine of “Promissory Estoppel”. The first promise of making payment of compensation has already been made to the petitioner, but the employment to one member of the family has not been granted which is against the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. Even otherwise, validity of the sale deed cannot be questioned by the third party or by the stranger to the sale deed and it can be put to question before the jurisdictional Civil Court by person aggrieved. Even the sale deed of the petitioner has not been declared null and void by the Collector under the provisions of Section 165 (6) of the Code, 1959. 16.The Supreme Court in the matter of Mohan Mahto v. Central Coal Field Ltd. and others , [ (2007) 8 SCC 549 ] , which relates to Central Coalfields Ltd., which is also subsidiary company of the Coal India like the respondent-SECL frowned upon the Central Coalfields Limited and held that public sector undertaking is the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, it must act fairly and reasonably. It was observed as under:- “17. It was observed as under:- “17. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the case for grant of compassionate appointment of a minor was required to be considered in terms of Sub-clause (iii) of Clause 9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A.V. In terms of the said provision, the name of the appellant was to be kept on a live roster. He was to remain on the live roster till he attained the age of 18 years. Respondents did not perform their duties cast on them thereunder. It took an unilateral stand that an application has been filed in the year 1999 in the prescribed form. For complying with the provisions of a settlement which is binding on the parties, bona fide or otherwise of the respondent must be judged from the fact as to whether it had discharged his duties thereunder or not. In this case, not only it failed and/ or neglected to do so, but as indicated hereinbefore it took an unholy stand that the elder brother of the appellant being employed, he was not entitled to appointment on the compassionate ground. Thus, what really impelled the respondent in denying the benefit of compassionate appointment to the appellant is, therefore, open to guess. We expect a public sector undertaking which is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India not only to act fairly but also reasonably and bona fide. In this case, we are satisfied that the action of the respondent is neither fair nor reasonable nor bona fide.” 17.In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have no hesitation to hold that the action of the respondent-SECL in denying employment after having made a promise, at the time of acquisition, is clearly illegal and arbitrary and smacks mala-fide. Consequently, the respondent-SECL is directed to consider and grant employment to one member of the family of the petitioner herein within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order without insisting the compliance of twin conditions mentioned in order dated 11.04.2015 and petitioner’s case will be considered as on 11.04.2015 i.e., the date on which he was first denied the employment by the SECL and he will be entitled for the consequential benefits w.e.f. 11.04.2015. 18.Accordingly, the instant writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s). 18.Accordingly, the instant writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s). 19.This Court renders a word of appreciation to Mr. Anurag Dayal Shrivastava, learned counsel, for his valuable assitance as amicus curiae in the present case.