Fareeda Sukha Rafiq, W/o. Fahd Korambayil v. Union Of India
2025-10-07
SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI, SYAM KUMAR V.M.
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J. The present Review Petition has been filed under Order XLVII Rule 1, read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, aggrieved by the judgment dated 14.08.2025, passed in W.A. No.1636/2025. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the review petitioners herein, being aggrieved by the communication dated 29.06.2017 informing that the amounts deposited in the three Public Provident Fund accounts, taken together, would exceed the limit prescribed under the Public Provident Fund Scheme 1968 (for short, ‘Scheme 1968’), since the first and second review petitioners were minors. On this ground, an amount of Rs. 6,87,021/- towards accrued interest credit in the three PPF Accounts put together was appropriated by the 2 nd respondent. Aggrieved, the review petitioners approached this Court in the writ petition. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition in favour of the review petitioners. 3. The Union of India approached this Court in W.A. No.1636/2025. This Court set aside the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and held that, as per the Scheme of 1968, if the mother, i.e., the 3 rd review petitioner, operates the account of minor children and deposits the amount, the amounts deposited in all three accounts taken together will be clubbed for the limit prescribed under the Scheme from time to time. The respondents herein were permitted to appropriate the accrued interest for the period from 20.03.2002 to 16.03.2005 and from 20.03.2002 to 24.03.2007 in respect of the 1 st and the 2 nd review petitioners, respectively. Being aggrieved, the present review petition has been filed by the respondents in the Writ Appeal. 4. Mr K Anand, the learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr S Vishnu, learned Counsel appearing for the review petitioners herein, contended that as per the Scheme of 1968, clause 3, i.e., Limit of subscription, provides that any individual may, on his own behalf or on behalf of a minor of whom he is the guardian, subscribe to the Public Provident Fund any amount not less than Rs.500/- and not more than Rs.1,50,000/- in a year. Meaning thereby, individuals as well as minors can deposit a maximum of Rs. 1,50,000/- each, and the amount cannot be clubbed and restricted to Rs.1,50,000/- only.
Meaning thereby, individuals as well as minors can deposit a maximum of Rs. 1,50,000/- each, and the amount cannot be clubbed and restricted to Rs.1,50,000/- only. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that, as per the notification dated 06.12.2000, the ceiling of the amount prescribed was brought into force with effect from 06.12.2000 and not prior to that. Therefore, the judgment deserves to the reviewed. 5. Per contra, Mr Jaishankar V Nair, the learned Counsel for the respondent/Union of India has opposed the prayer and submitted that as per Clarification No.(3) to clause 3 of the Scheme of 1968, the limit of deposit in a year by an individual in his self-account and accounts opened by him on behalf of his minor(s) of whom he is the guardian is combined under Rule 3(1) of the Scheme of 1968. In view of the aforesaid clarification, it is clear that the subscribers cannot deposit over and above the maximum limit in a year. 5.1 In the present case, the mother, being the guardian, had deposited amounts in her own account as well as her two minor children, which crossed the limits on two or three occasions. The Department has already paid interest prior to the year 2002. The appropriation is done only for the period from 20.03.2002 to 16.03.2005 and from 20.03.2002 to 24.03.2007, respectively, and after the 1 st and 2 nd review petitioners attained the age of majority, they are being paid the interest regularly as per the Scheme of 1968. The learned counsel for the review petitioners could not point out any apparent error on the face of the record that would warrant interference with the judgment under review. Therefore, the review petition deserves to be dismissed. 6. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Admittedly, as per the Scheme of 1968 and the Clarifications issued thereon, the PPF accounts held by the mother as well as two minor children are to be clubbed together, and they would only be eligible to deposit the maximum amount as prescribed from time to time. We see no reason to interfere with the judgment under review. None of the grounds under Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC is available to renew/review the order. Further, the scope of review cannot be enlarged to such an extent as to take the review to be an appeal.
We see no reason to interfere with the judgment under review. None of the grounds under Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC is available to renew/review the order. Further, the scope of review cannot be enlarged to such an extent as to take the review to be an appeal. The jurisdiction of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view/reasoning so taken in the order/judgment sought to be reviewed. The mere possibility of two different views cannot be a ground for review. On these grounds, the review petition cannot be entertained so as to re-appreciate or re-hear the entire issue which was the subject matter of the original writ petition and writ appeal. 8. In the considered opinion of this Court, none of the grounds available for successfully seeking review as recognized by Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC are made out in the present case. The Apex Court in the case of S. Bhagirathi Ammal v. Palani Roman Catholic Mission , reported in (2009) 10 SCC 464 has held that in order to seek review, it has to be demonstrated that the order suffers from an error contemplated under Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC which is apparent on the face of record and not an error which is to be fished out and searched. A decision or order cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous. In another case, the Apex Court in case of State of West Bengal Vs. Kamal Sengupta reported in (2008) 8 SCC 612 has held that "a party cannot be permitted to argue de novo in the garb of review." 9. On perusal of the record and in the light of the judgments passed in the case of S. Bhagirathi Ammal and State of West Bengal (supra), there is no error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference in the judgment impugned.