JUDGMENT : K. Babu, J. The petitioner is the Secretary of the Vanika Vaisya Educational and Employment Trust. The Trust runs educational institutions. The party respondents (respondent Nos.2 in each case) in these Writ Petitions were former employees of the Educational Institutions run by the Trust. After superannuation, the party respondents filed applications seeking gratuity under Section 7 (4) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 , ('the Act' for short) before the Controlling Authority. The Controlling Authority passed Awards (Ext.P1 in each case) in the applications filed by the party respondents. The petitioner failed to pay the amount awarded by the Controlling Authority to the party respondents. He also did not challenge the Awards before the Appellate Authority. These Awards are under challenge in these Writ Petitions. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Awards passed by the Controlling Authority are arbitrary and illegal. The learned counsel submitted that the Controlling Authority committed a grave error in awarding gratuity. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the remuneration paid to the party respondents does not fall under the definition of ‘wages’ as per Section 2(s) of the Payment of Gratuity Act The Awards are vitiated by gross procedural irregularity and non-compliance of the Statutory mandate prescribed under Section 7 of the Act r/w Rules 7 and 10 of the Payment of Gratuity (Central) Rules, 1972. 4. The learned Government Pleader submits that the Writ Petitions are not maintainable as there is a statutory remedy available to the petitioner to challenge the impugned Awards. It is submitted that when an effective and efficacious alternative statutory remedy is available, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not left with any efficacious remedy other than to approach this Court. 5. The Awards under challenge have been passed under Section 7 (4) of the Act. As per Section 7 (7) of the Act, any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf. As per Section 7 (7) of the Act, any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf. In response to a query as to why the petitioner did not prefer an appeal under Section 7 (7) of the Act, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner was unable to do so due to financial constraints. It is submitted that as per the second proviso to sub-section (7), the petitioner has to deposit an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4) before the Appellate Authority. 6. These are cases where the petitioners have an equally efficacious remedy of preferring appeals under Section 7 (7) of the Act to challenge the impugned Awards. 7. The High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions while considering the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. One of those restrictions is the availability of effective and efficacious remedies. The exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged. 8. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to establish any exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. 9. The Payment of Gratuity Act is a self-contained code. The Statute provides an effective and efficacious remedy to challenge the proceedings by an aggrieved person. As per Section 7 (7) of the Act, any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf. 10. The Apex Court has considered the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in interfering with the proceedings under the Act in a plethora of decisions. 11. 10. The Apex Court has considered the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in interfering with the proceedings under the Act in a plethora of decisions. 11. In State of Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [ (2018) 3 SCC 85 ] , the Supreme Court held that the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well-defined exceptions. 12. The Writ Petitions are therefore not maintainable and dismissed in limine. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for a direction to the Appellate Authority to admit the appeal as if there had not been any delay. It is submitted that the petitioner is bona fide prosecuting the matter before this Court. As per the first proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Act, the Appellate Authority, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within a period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days. If the petitioner prefers appeals challenging the impugned Awards, the Appellate Authority shall exclude the period during which the Writ Petitions were prosecuted before this Court.