JUDGMENT : ANITA SUMANTH, J. The challenge is to an order passed in three applications on 28.03.2024. The appellant is the plaintiff in C.S.No.536 of 1999 and the applicant in the applications. The prayers in the applications are as follows:- A.No. 974 of 2024:- Application praying that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass an order to initiate contempt proceedings against the 1 st Respondent for wilfully using false signatures in affidavit in A.No 5583 of 2022 in C.S No 536 of 1999. A.No 975 of 2024:- Application praying that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass an order to send the signatures of the deponent found in ANo 5583 of 2022 in C.S No 536 of 1999 for comparison by a competent handwriting expert with the signatures of the deponent found in the rejoinder affidavit o the 1st Respondent in A.No 5583 of 2022 in C.S No 536 of 1999 and the signatures of the 1st Respondent found in the deed of relinquishment dated 08.02.2017 registered as document no 506 in the office of the Sub-Registrar V (1) New Delhi and to obtain a report based on such examination. A.No 976 of 2024:- Application praying that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass an order to compare the signatures of the deponent found in the affidavit filed in support of A.No 5583 of 2022 in C.S No 536 of 1999 with the signatures of the deponent found in the rejoinder affidavit of the 1st respondent in A.No 5583 of 2022 in C.S.No 536 of 1999 and the signatures of the 1st Respondent found in the deed of relinquishment dated 08.02.2017 registered as document no.506 in the office of Sub-Registrar V(1) New Delhi 2. C.S.No. 536 of 1999 had been filed as against a Company and two directors seeking a money decree and costs. The respondents were set exparte vide order dated 16.04.2012 and the Suit ultimately came to be decreed on 26.04.2012 as prayed for. While so, the second respondent (D2 in suit) filed Application No.5583 of 2022 seeking to set aside the exparte decree and judgment. The Application, dated 04.09.2022, was filed belatedly, with a delay of 3784 days. 3. To be noted that that the deponent in that Affidavit was R1 (hereinafter referred to either as R1 or Mr.Samir Suri), and the affidavit was attested by one R.Sivakumar, Advocate, Chennai along with his address and enrolment particulars. The Application, dated 04.09.2022, was filed belatedly, with a delay of 3784 days. 3. To be noted that that the deponent in that Affidavit was R1 (hereinafter referred to either as R1 or Mr.Samir Suri), and the affidavit was attested by one R.Sivakumar, Advocate, Chennai along with his address and enrolment particulars. The Appellant had filed a Counter to that application on 19.12.2022 seriously objecting to the delay. 4. Inter alia, the Appellant had stated that there was no justification for the enormous delay in filing. They averred that the Suit had been correctly decided, specifically stating that the respondents had evaded service in the suit. According to them, direct service had been effected upon the last known residential address of the second defendant. Substituted service had also been effected upon the second defendant by way of paper publication in the international edition of the Hindu on 28.09.2002. 5. As far as the third respondent is concerned, substituted service was taken by way of paper publication in the Delhi edition of a newspaper and additionally, service was taken in the local edition of the Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles edition. Thus, the respondents had been duly served and there was no justification for the belated application for seeking setting aside of the decree and judgement in the Appellants’ favour. 6. A Rejoinder dated 27.12.2022 had been filed by the first respondent, upon receipt of which, the Appellant noticed discrepancies in the signatures in that Rejoinder and in the Application filed seeking condonation of delay of 3784 days. It is thus that the three Applications came to be filed setting out the prayers as adumbrated above. 7. The Applications had been countered by the respondents denying the allegations of forgery and fraud. However, they had conceded to the fact that the attestation in Chennai was improper as R1 had admittedly signed the Applications only in USA. A fresh Affidavit had been executed by R1 on 11.09.2023, tendering an apology for the aforesaid error. Upon a consideration of the rival submissions, the Applications had come to be dismissed vide order dated 28.03.2024, as against which order the present appeals have been filed. 8. A fresh Affidavit had been executed by R1 on 11.09.2023, tendering an apology for the aforesaid error. Upon a consideration of the rival submissions, the Applications had come to be dismissed vide order dated 28.03.2024, as against which order the present appeals have been filed. 8. The submissions of Mr.Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.K.Ashok Kumar for the appellant are to the effect that the signatures of the deponent, Mr.Samir Suri (in affidavit dated 04.09.2022 and vakalat dated 19.08.2022 on the one hand, and in affidavits dated 27.12.2022, 11.09.2023 and 29.02.2024 and Relinquishment Deed dated 08.02.2017, registered as Document No.506 in the office of the Sub-Registrar V(1), New Delhi on the other), do not tally and that the signatures in Affidavit dated 27.12.2022 and vakalat dated 19.08.2022 are forged. 9. The Appellant has also argued that since R1 was admittedly not in Chennai when affidavit dated 04.09.2022 had been signed and filed, both the signatures in the affidavit as well as the attestation to the effect that the party had signed the document in Chennai, are contrary to law and fact. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant relies on the following judgments:- (i) M.S.Ahlawat v State of Haryana and others, (2001) 1 SCC 278 (ii) Ajay Kumar Paramar v State of Rajasthatn, (2012) 12 SCC 406 (iii) Afzal and another v State of Haryana and others, (1996) 7 SCC 397 (iv) Sanjay Kumar Singh v State of Jharkhand, (2022) 7 SCC 247 (v) In Re : Perry Kansagra, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 858 (vi) Lalit Popli v Canara Bank and others, (2003) 3 SCC 583 (vii) C.Elumalai and others v A.G.L.Irudayaraj and another, (2009) 4 SCC 213 (viii) Nizar Zaffar Lilali v H.A.K.Mohammed Moshin and others, 1992 (2) LW  577 (ix) Abdul Kalam Azad and ors v Ananthalakshmi and others, 2012 (2) MNW (Civil) 63 (x) S.N.Vijayakumar v S.R.Velusamy , [ 2005 (2) L.W. 694 ] (xi) Mannalal Khetan and others v Kedar Nath Khetan and others , [ (1977) 2 SCC 424 ] (xii)Dy. General Manager, and others v Sudarshan Kumari and others , [ (1996) 3 SCC 763 ] 11. Mrs.N.Kavitha Rameshwar, learned counsel for the respondents concedes to the fact that affidavit dated 04.09.2022 in A.No.5583 of 2022 was not signed in Chennai. According to her, the application was signed in Los Angeles, sent to Chennai for attestation, and filed thereafter. General Manager, and others v Sudarshan Kumari and others , [ (1996) 3 SCC 763 ] 11. Mrs.N.Kavitha Rameshwar, learned counsel for the respondents concedes to the fact that affidavit dated 04.09.2022 in A.No.5583 of 2022 was not signed in Chennai. According to her, the application was signed in Los Angeles, sent to Chennai for attestation, and filed thereafter. To this end, R2 has filed a fresh affidavit dated 11.09.2023 in A. No.5582 of 2022 confirming the aforesaid position unequivocally. 12. R1 has tendered an apology for the above, which, according to him, is a curable aberration. He has also pleaded that the Advocate who had attested the signature as having been executed before him, should not suffer for the same. A second Rejoinder dated 11.03.2023 has thus come to be been filed by R1 in A.No.5583 of 2022, executed abroad and with Consular attestation. 13. Mr.Srinivas would however argue that by virtue of affidavit dated 11.03.2023, the Respondents have perpetrated the fraud played on the Court. Apart from the position that affidavit dated 04.09.2022 was illegally executed, the Respondents have, in Affidavit dated 11.03.2023, reiterated that the signatures in Affidavit dated 04.09.2022 are those of R1 only. The same position has been reiterated before the Court in defending the three Applications as well as now, in the present Appeal. 14. In the counter to A.Nos.974, 975 & 976 of 2024, Mr.Samir Suri has stated that the deponent intended to visit India and had hence signed the same, though in Los Angeles. Subsequently and since he had not been able to travel to India he had scanned and sent it to his advocates in Chennai in order that they may proceed with the processing and filing of the same. 15. The averments in para 6 of Affidavit dated 29.02.2024 thus make it clear that there is an aberration in affidavit dated 04.09.2022, at least in regard to the attestation, if nothing else. 16. In the present case, it is not only affidavit dated 04.09.2022 which is called into question but affidavit dated 29.02.2024 as well. If the Court is persuaded to accept the position that both the affidavits contain false statements, then clearly, that would lead to a conclusion of fraud having been committed upon this Court, and cannot be brushed away as being a mere inadvertent error. 17. If the Court is persuaded to accept the position that both the affidavits contain false statements, then clearly, that would lead to a conclusion of fraud having been committed upon this Court, and cannot be brushed away as being a mere inadvertent error. 17. Learned counsel for the first respondent relies on the following judgments:- (i) Mobarik Ali Ahamed v The State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857 (ii) Sasikala Pushpa and Ors v State of Tamil Nadu , [ (2019) 6 SCC 477 ] (iii) Atlanta Infrastructure Limited v Delta Marine Company , [ (2021) 20 SCC 593 ] (iv) K.S.Nageswara Aiyar v S.Ganesa Aiyar , [ 1942 2 MLJ 198 ] 18. We have heard learned counsel in detail and have also carefully considered the records as well as case law cited. We have devoted anxious consideration to the signatures of R1 as set out in affidavit dated 04.09.2022 and vakalat dated 19.08.2022 (referred to as documents in Group I) and affidavits dated 27.12.2022, 11.09.2023 and 29.02.2024 as well as deed of relinquishment dated 08.02.2017, registered as Document No.506 in the office of the Sub-Registrar V(1) New Delhi (referred to as documents in Group II). 19. Learned Judge has recorded the submission of the appellant relating to the alleged variance in the signatures of Mr.Samir Suri, in documents in Group I and II. He has dismissed the Applications, being of the view that nothing more needs to be looked into when the deponent to all those documents (both Group I and II) has himself stated/confirmed that he has executed the affidavits/documents in question. The Court has indicated that this is a fit case for imposition of costs but has refrained from doing so on the strength of the opinion that the deponent has owned the signatures and thus no further verification is required. 20. Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 enables the Court to make a comparison of writing samples with other admitted writing samples of that individual. On a careful comparison of the signatures in Group I and II documents, we find that there are very apparent differences between the signatures Group I documents and Group II documents. 20. Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 enables the Court to make a comparison of writing samples with other admitted writing samples of that individual. On a careful comparison of the signatures in Group I and II documents, we find that there are very apparent differences between the signatures Group I documents and Group II documents. We set out below in seriatim, the signatures in all the documents are aforesaid to buttress our point: Group I Affidavit dated 04.09.2022 (8 signatures) Vakalat dated 19.08.2022 Group II First rejoinder dated 27.12.2022 (5 signatures) Relinquishment Deed dated 08.02.2017 (6 signatures) Affidavit dated 11.09.2023 ( 18 signatures) Counter affidavit dated (29.02.2024) (8 signatures) 21. The admitted signatures of Mr.Samir Suri, as may be seen in the first rejoinder dated 27.12.2022, Relinquishment Deed dated 08.02.2017, affidavit dated 11.09.2023 and counter affidavit dated 29.02.2024, contain a stylised version of 'S' in 'Suri'. Per contra, affidavit dated 04.09.2022 and accompanying vakalat dated 19.08.2022 do not reflect the stylized 'S' and in addition, contain a spike prior to the 'S in 'Suri'. 22. We are thus of the view that the signatures in affidavit dated 04.09.2022 and accompanying vakalat dated 19.08.2022, contain material differences from the signatures in the documents in Group II. 23. In Ajay Kumar Parmar 17 , the Supreme Court undertook an examination of the signatures of the Prosecutrix in two sets of records, coming to the conclusion that the two sets of signatures do not tally, as there were apparent dissimilarities between them. At paragraphs 24 and 25, the Court observed as follows: 24. Evidence of identity of handwriting has been dealt with by three Sections of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (here- inafter referred to as the ‘Evidence Act’) i.e. Sections 45, 47 and 73. Section 73 of the said Act provides for a com- parison made by the Court with a writing sample given in its presence, or admitted, or proved to be the writing of the con- cerned person. (Vide: Ram Chandra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 381 ; Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Moham-17 [Foot Note Supra (2)] mad Isa, AIR 1963 SC 1728 ; Shashi Kumar Banerjee & Ors. (Vide: Ram Chandra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 381 ; Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Moham-17 [Foot Note Supra (2)] mad Isa, AIR 1963 SC 1728 ; Shashi Kumar Banerjee & Ors. v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529 ; Fakhruddin v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1326 ; and State of Ma harashtra v. Sukhdeo Singh & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 2100 ). 25. In Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 363 , this Court, while dealing with the said issue, held that, in case there is no expert opinion to assist the court in respect of hand- writing available, the court should seek guidance from some authorita- tive text-book and the courts own experience and knowledge, howev- er even in the absence of the same, it should discharge its duty with or without expert, with or without any other evidence. 24. After discussing the cases in A.Neelalohithadasan Nadar V. George Mascrene, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 619 and O.Bharathan v. K.Sudhakaran, AIR 1996 SC 1140 , where it was reiterated that Courts follow a self-imposed caution in matters of comparison of signatures, the Bench in Ajay Kumar Parmar, [Foot Note Supra (2)], notes that there is no legal bar to prevent the Court from comparing signatures or handwriting, using its own eyes and powers of observation. 25. While the Court would refrain from playing the role of an expert, the opinion of an expert is itself not conclusive, except in cases where there was already an opinion of an expert or of a witness, in which case, the Court may apply its own observations by comparing the signatures or handwritings and for providing a decisive weight or influence to its decision. 26. Based on the discussion and on its own appreciation of the signatures of the Prosecutrix in two different sets of records, the Court concluded that the apparent dissimilarities would certainly create a suspicion. So too in the present case, where the apparent dissimilarities would lead us to disbelieve that the signatures in Group I belong to Mr. Samir Suri. 27. In Afzal and another, [Foot Note Supra (3)], the Supreme Court was concerned with the affidavits containing erroneous statements before the Court and came down hard on two police officials for fabrication of false records. Samir Suri. 27. In Afzal and another, [Foot Note Supra (3)], the Supreme Court was concerned with the affidavits containing erroneous statements before the Court and came down hard on two police officials for fabrication of false records. They were convicted and sentenced under the appropriate provisions of the Indian Penal Code for undergoing rigorous imprisonment. The Court held that there is utmost importance to curb the tendency of fabricating records with false affidavits and placing them before the Courts and such actions would indicate gross depravity of conduct. 28. In Sanjay Kumar Singh, [Foot Note Supra (4)], the question that arose was whether the appellate Court could travel outside the record of the lower Court, by taking evidence in appeal. The Court noted that Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code enabled the Court to take evidence in exceptional circumstances, adding that such additional evidence may be permitted if the Court felt that it removed the cloud of doubt that hovered over the case and the evidence would have a direct and important bearing on the issue in suit. 29. What is important, the Court held, referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.Andisamy Chettiar V. A.Subburaj Chettiar, (2015) 17 SCC 713, is that the appellate Court must feel the need for that evidence to be adduced in order to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test laid down was whether the judgment could have been pronounced on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. 30. In the present case, we have not travelled outside the record, but restricted ourselves to the pleadings and the Relinquishment Deed which was produced by the parties before the lower Court. 31. In M.S.Ahlawat, [Foot Note Supra (1)], three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court set aside the conviction of that petitioner observing that to perpetuate an error is no virtue but to correct it is a compulsion of judicial conscience. 32. Mr. Srinivas would prod our conscience urging that the error committed by the lower Court must be corrected, particularly since the allegation against the respondents is one of fraud played as against the Court and not merely as against a private party. 33. 32. Mr. Srinivas would prod our conscience urging that the error committed by the lower Court must be corrected, particularly since the allegation against the respondents is one of fraud played as against the Court and not merely as against a private party. 33. In Re:Perry Kansagra, [Foot Note Supra (5)], said Perry was alleged to have tendered affidavits and undertakings containing false statements that would not only amount to fraud on Court but also to perjury and criminal contempt. In that context, the Court holds that when a person is proved to have made a false statement before the Court and attempt to deceive it, he interferes with the administration of justice and is guilty of contempt of Court. In such circumstances, the Court not only has inherent power but would be failing in its duty if that contemnor was not dealt with in contempt jurisdiction for abuse of process of the Court. 34. In the case of Sudarshan Kumari,[Foot Note Supra (12)], the application, affidavit and vakalatnama were held not to have been signed by the respondent Sudarshan Kumari. 35. In that case, Sudarshan Kumari who had appeared in Court was asked to sign in the open Court and the signatures were compared with the signatures on the vakalatnama and affidavits. The Court found that they were not consistent with her admitted signatures. Faced with that position, she had sought permission for withdrawal of the Writ Petition with liberty to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. Such liberty was granted. 36. The matter was taken in appeal before the Supreme Court by the Deputy General of ISB and on a consideration of the fact that the documents had admittedly not been signed by the respondents, the liberty granted by the High Court was reversed and action was directed to be taken as against the Notary. The Supreme Court Registry was thus directed to issue a show cause notice to the Notary as to why he should not be prosecuted and punished for attesting false affidavits of impersonators with all attendant consequences. The cross appeal filed by Sudarshan Kumari was dismissed with costs. 37. The Supreme Court Registry was thus directed to issue a show cause notice to the Notary as to why he should not be prosecuted and punished for attesting false affidavits of impersonators with all attendant consequences. The cross appeal filed by Sudarshan Kumari was dismissed with costs. 37. A reading of the aforesaid judgments would show that the consistent view of the Supreme Court has been to deprecate instances where pleadings are signed by somebody else on behalf of the deponent and affidavits are attested by Advocates/Notary without verification of the deponent and in matters where the deponent had been impersonated. 38. We now advert to the judgments relied on by the respondents. In Mobarik Ali Ahmed, [Foot Note Supra (13)], the Supreme Court dealt with the conviction of various offences under the Indian Penal Code. In the course of that hearing, the Court looked into certain letters that had been exchanged inter se the parties. Those letters and the signatures were disputed by the appellant and the objection came to be rejected by the Court. The specific observations relied upon by the respondents read thus: 11............The proof of the genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship of the document and is proof of a fact like that of any other fact. The evidence relating thereto may be direct or circumstantial. It may consist of direct evidence of a person who saw the document being written or the signature being affixed. It may be proof of the handwriting of the contents,or of the signature, by one of the modes provided in ss. 45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act. It may also be proved by internal evidence affordedby the contents of the document.This last mode of proof by the contents may be of considerable value where the disputed document purports to be a link in a chain of correspondence, some links in which are proved to the satisfaction of the court. In such a situation the person who is the recipient of the document, be it either a letter or a telegram, would be in a reasonably good position both with reference to his prior knowledge of the writing or the signature of the alleged sender, limited though it may be, as also his knowledge of the subject matter of the chain of correspondence, to speak to its authorship. In an appropriate case the court may also be in a position to judge whether the document constitutes a genuine link in the chain of correspondence and thus to determine its authorship. We are unable, therefore, to say that the approach adopted by the courts below in arriving at the conclusion that the letters are genuine is open to any serious legal objection. The question,if any, can only be as to the adequacy of the material on which the conclusion as to the genuineness of the letters is arrived at. That however is a matter which we cannot permit to be canvassed before us. 39. In that case, the lower Court appears to have taken into account the objectionable letters holding them to be links in a chain of correspondences, some links of which had been proved to the satisfaction of the Court. The Court notes that in such a situation, the recipient of the letter or telegram would be in a reasonably good position, both with reference to prior knowledge of the handwriting or signature of the alleged sender, as well as his knowledge of the subject matter of the chain of correspondence, to speak to its authorship. 40. The Court also noted that in some cases, the Court may itself be in a position to judge whether that document would be a genuine link in the chain of correspondence and thus come to a considered view as to its ownership. Either of these approaches would be proper approaches, the Court held, in deciding on whether a particular piece of correspondence would be genuine. Since the lower Court had followed the aforesaid approaches, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no error in the manner by which the Court had determined the genuineness of the letters. 41. The parties in that case had not been proceeded on the specifics of the signatures itself, but on the overall methodology to be followed in appreciation of evidence, proving the documents and standard of proof. 42. Our approach has been more factual, in that, as we have had the benefit of the entirety of the records that have been referred to by the parties. We have been in a position to appreciate the signatures minutely and have chronicled the apparent dissimilarities in the signatures. 43. 42. Our approach has been more factual, in that, as we have had the benefit of the entirety of the records that have been referred to by the parties. We have been in a position to appreciate the signatures minutely and have chronicled the apparent dissimilarities in the signatures. 43. In the case of Sasikala Pushpa[Foot Note Supra (14)], which travelled from our Court, the allegation was that the appellant had not executed the vakalatnama and documents which were alleged to have been forged. There is a factual finding in that order by the Court that the appellants have admitted their signatures in the vakalatnama and hence, the document was not a forged document. The Court was convinced by the aforesaid statement. 44. They note that there was no necessity for reference to a handwriting expert, since the appellant had admitted the signatures in the vakalatnama. The Court also found factually that the document was not a forged document. There is a specific finding that there was nothing on record to suggest that the appellants gained anything by playing fraud or practising deception. 45. In light of the aforesaid position, the Court concluded that there was no prima facie evidence of any intention to cause damage, injury or other acts. The error in that case was that the vakalatnama stated that it had been signed on a particular date at Madurai in the presence of an Advocate, which was an incorrect statement, as it had been signed by those appellants elsewhere and had been attested in a different location thereafter. In light of the factual position adumbrated in paragraphs 45 and 46 above, this Court concluded that what had been committed was only an error, which does not constitute fraud. 46. The facts in that matter when compared to the present are entirely different. In that case, the Court has rendered an unequivocal finding that the document was not forged and had been convinced with the statement of the appellants that the document had been signed by them. Not so in the present case as the signatures on Group I documents, in our view, reveal that they were not of the deponent at all. 47. Not so in the present case as the signatures on Group I documents, in our view, reveal that they were not of the deponent at all. 47. In K.S.Nageswara Aiyar[Foot Note Supra (16)], though there was a tentative statement involving fraud, the Court was of the view that that aspect has not been sufficiently indicated in the written statement of the respondent or by the Lower Court and hence, felt that the question of fraud was extraneous to the matter, quoting the judgment in Chinnayya V. Ramanna, (1913) 25 MLJ 228 48. We cannot take a casual view in such matters. When a comparison of signatures reveals to us that the signatures in Group I of the documents are different from those in Group II and we have arrived at a categoric conclusion that the signatures do not tally, nothing remains to be said as far as the fraud played by R1 is concerned. 49. R1 has chosen not to come clean but has continued to perpetuate the fraud insisting time and again that the signatures were correct and that he be permitted to pursue the matter. By way of abundant caution, a fresh affidavit has been executed on 11.09.2023 tendering an apology for obtaining a wrongful attestation. We are wholly unconvinced with the explanation that has been tendered under affidavit dated 11.09.2023, which, in fact, stands testimony to the reiteration of the error committed in the earlier affidavit. 50. The only ground on which the applications of the appellant have been dismissed by the learned Judge is that R1 has admitted the signatures in the documents in Group I. Naturally, Mr.Samir Suri would admit those signatures, seeing as he has everything to gain from such admission. The challenge to those documents can only be raised by a party who stands to lose from the proceedings initiated by virtue of the forged documents. 51. Hence, we do not concur with the conclusion that the allegation of forgery must be rejected merely on the statement of the interested party, who stands to benefit by acceptance of the offending signatures. Though normally, the acquiescence of a party to a document would be sufficient, an exception must be made in situations, such as the present, where the allegations of forgery must be tested and conclusion drawn, without reference to the statement of the interested party. 52. Though normally, the acquiescence of a party to a document would be sufficient, an exception must be made in situations, such as the present, where the allegations of forgery must be tested and conclusion drawn, without reference to the statement of the interested party. 52. O.S.A.No.132 of 2024 challenging the rejection of A.No.976 of 2024 seeking a comparison by the Court of the signatures found in Group I and Group II documents is allowed. 53. In light of our categoric finding that the signatures found in Group I and Group II differ, we see no need to refer the signatures for examination to a handwriting expert. Incidentally, this exercise has been undertaken by the appellant and the opinion of the handwriting expert has also been procured which would support our conclusion in A.No.976 of 2024 in relation to the apparent variations in Group I and Group II signatures. Hence, O.S.A.No.133 of 2024 challenging rejection of A.No.975 of 2024 is dismissed. 54. As far as A.No.974 of 2024 for initiating contempt against R1 is concerned, notwithstanding our conclusion in O.S.A.No.132 of 2024, we do not wish to precipitate the matter at this juncture and hence, close O.S.A.No.131 of 2024. No costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. C.KUMARAPPAN, J Few facts which are relevant and germane for deciding this case are as follows:- (a). The appellant herein is the plaintiff in CS.No.536 of 1999 and the respondents herein are the defendants. The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.62,64,658.40/- and for interest against the respondent/defendant, in which an ex-parte decree was passed on 26.04.2012. Thereafter, at the instance of the appellant, an Execution Petition was filed before this Court and subsequently, the same was transmitted to the jurisdictional executing Court at Delhi. (b). At this juncture, the 2 nd defendant filed an application to set aside the ex-parte decree, along with an application to condone the delay of 3784 days. The delay condonation application was filed before the Court on 02.12.2022. For deciding the present issue, the reason for delay, and the pleadings of the counter statement are not relevant. (c). (b). At this juncture, the 2 nd defendant filed an application to set aside the ex-parte decree, along with an application to condone the delay of 3784 days. The delay condonation application was filed before the Court on 02.12.2022. For deciding the present issue, the reason for delay, and the pleadings of the counter statement are not relevant. (c). It appears that subsequent to filing of the counter statement in delay condonation application, the 2 nd defendant filed a rejoinder, which triggered the plaintiff to file the present applications on the premise that the deponent named in the affidavit of delay condonation application is not the author of the signature found therein, and that the same is forged one, as the deponent was, admittedly out of Country at the relevant point of time qua at USA, but was attested at Chennai on 04.09.2022. It is in this background, the plaintiff filed three applications with a prayer to initiate contempt proceedings, to send the affidavit in A.No.5583 of 2022 for an expert opinion to compare the deponent's signature by a handwriting expert, and also sought for a prayer to compare the signature by the Court itself by employing Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. 2. However, the 2 nd defendant stoutly refuted the case of forgery, but owned the authorship of the signature found in the affidavit of delay condonation application, though he admits that, on the date of attestation of his signature [04.09.2022], he was not at all in India. It is his further submission that the act of attestation on 04.09.2022 at Chennai is only an inadvertent clerical mistake. For which, he also sought for an unconditional apology and pardon of this Court. In short, it is the contention of the respondent/2 nd defendant that neither any impersonation nor any forgery was committed by him as alleged by the plaintiff. 3. I have heard Mr.R.Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.K.Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mrs.N.Kavitha Rameshwar, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent. 4. Mr.R.Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff would vehemently contend that the learned Single Judge had not appreciated the fact and law in its right perspective, and that the very finding that there are no variance between the signature found in the original affidavit, and in the rejoinder, is ipso facto contrary to the factual position. 4. Mr.R.Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff would vehemently contend that the learned Single Judge had not appreciated the fact and law in its right perspective, and that the very finding that there are no variance between the signature found in the original affidavit, and in the rejoinder, is ipso facto contrary to the factual position. He would further contend that the impersonation and forgery would be apparent from the attestation of the deponent's signature at Chennai, when the 2 nd defendant was admittedly not in India, at the relevant point of time. It is his further submission that the conduct of the defendant is nothing but playing fraud against the Court, and such conduct should not be allowed to whittle down, by mere act of owning the forged signature. In support of their contention, they relied upon the following judgments:- 1. Afzal and another Vs. State of Haryana and others reported in (1996) 7 SCC 397 ; 2. Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand reported in (2022) 7 SCC 247 ; 3. M.S.Ahlawat Vs. State of Haryana and another reported in (2000) 1 SCC 278 ; 4. Lalit Popli Vs. Canara Bank and others reported in (2003) 3 SCC 583; 5. C.Elumalai and others Vs. A.G.L.Irudayaraj and another reported in (2009) 4 SCC 213 ; 6. Nizar Zaffar Lilali Vs. H.A.K.Mohammed Moshin and others reported in 1999 2 LW 577 ; 7. Abdul Kalam Azad and others Vs. Ananthalakshmi and others reported in 2012 (2) MWN (Civil) 63; 8. S.N.Vijayakumar Vs. S.R.Velusamy reported in 2005-2-LW- 694; 9. Mannalal Khetan and others Vs. Kedar Nath Khetan and others reported in (1977) 2 SCC 424 ; 10.Dy. General Manager redesignated as Dy.Director, ISB and others Vs. Sudarshan Kumari and others reported in (1996) 3 SCC 763 ; 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the first respondent/defendant would vehemently contend that what was admitted by the 2 nd defendant is only an inadvertence mistake of wrong attestation, and that the deponent signature found in the delay condonation application is that of the 2 nd defendant. She would further contend that when the author of the alleged disputed signature owned the same, there is no necessity arises to invoke Section 73 & 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, as the opinion evidence is not a conclusive proof. She would further contend that when the author of the alleged disputed signature owned the same, there is no necessity arises to invoke Section 73 & 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, as the opinion evidence is not a conclusive proof. She would further contend that when the factum of alleged forgery, or playing fraud is inconclusive, and yet to be proved, initiating contempt proceedings is unknown to law and premature one. Hence, he would pray to dismiss all the OSAs. In support of her contention, she relied upon the following judgments. 1. Mobarik Ali Ahmed Vs. The State of Bombay reported in 1957 SCC OnLine SC 46; 2. Sasikala Pushpa and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 2019 SC 2280 ; 3. Atlanta Infrastructure Ltd., Vs. Delta Marine Company and Others reported in 2021 (20) SCC 477; 4. K.S.Nageswara Aiyar Vs. S.Ganesa Aiyar reported in 1942 (2) MLJ 198 . 6. I have given my anxious consideration to either side submissions. 7. The short facts to be considered for the disposal of these OSA are in the backdrop of owning authorship of the alleged disputed signature, is there any necessity for the Court to send the disputed signatures for an opinion by a handwriting expert, and for a comparison by the Court, under Section 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act? 8. Both side relied so many precedents to bring home their respective point. Therefore, before delve into the merits of the matter, it is appropriate to deal with the precedents relied by either side to test it's relevance. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant relied Afzal’s case [cited supra]. According to the facts of the above reported case, it is an admitted fact that the signature was not subscribed by deponent Mr.M.S.Ahlawat. Only in that context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that a false or a misleading or a wrong statement before the Court to obtain a favourable order would nothing, but interfering with a due course of judicial proceedings. It is in this background, the Hon’ble Supreme Court initiated contempt proceedings, and also imposed punishment under Section 193 of Cr.P.C. Such an admission had been mentioned in paragraph 9 of the connected parent case reported in ( 1994) 1 SCC 425 [Afzal and another Vs. State of Haryana and others]. The relevant portion is extracted herein below:- “9. It is in this background, the Hon’ble Supreme Court initiated contempt proceedings, and also imposed punishment under Section 193 of Cr.P.C. Such an admission had been mentioned in paragraph 9 of the connected parent case reported in ( 1994) 1 SCC 425 [Afzal and another Vs. State of Haryana and others]. The relevant portion is extracted herein below:- “9. M.S. Ahlawat, Superintendent of Police filed another counter-affidavit dated November 5, 1993 to the effect that whatever was stated in the earlier counter-affidavit dated October 30, 1993 was factually wrong. He came to know of this case only on November 2, 1993. On November 15, 1993 he would go one step further and state that the earlier affidavit filed purported to be dated October 30, 1993 had not been signed or sworn by him . A preliminary fact finding enquiry into the matter has been ordered through the Deputy Superintendent of Police GRP, Hissar. He had submitted a report on November 7, 1993 to the effect that his signature had been forged by one Head Constable Krishan Kumar who had been put under suspension and transferred to GRP Lines, Ambala City.” [Emphasis supplied by this Court] 9. It is also relevant to refer yet another connected case, which serendipitously relied by the learned Senior Counsel in M.S.Ahlawat's case [cited supra], wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had set aside the conviction under Section 193 Cr.P.C imposed against the police officials in Afzal's case [cited supra], on the premise that while invoking Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court cannot altogether ignore the substantial provisions of Statute. 10. Thus, from the reading of the above three connected precedents dealt in paragraphs 8 and 9 supra, it becomes amply clear that the initiation of contempt in those cases was only based upon the admission of the parties upon the factum of commission of forgery. But, in the case in hand, the case of forgery is disputed by the 2 nd defendant, and in contrast, he owned the authorship of the signature. Therefore, there are no reasons to apply the ratio of the above precedents to the case in hand. 11. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant also relied upon other two reported judgments in (i) Nizar Zaffar Lilali's case [cited supra] and (ii) Sudarshan Kumari's case [cited supra]. Therefore, there are no reasons to apply the ratio of the above precedents to the case in hand. 11. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant also relied upon other two reported judgments in (i) Nizar Zaffar Lilali's case [cited supra] and (ii) Sudarshan Kumari's case [cited supra]. Even according to the facts of these cases, it is a proxy litigation, viz., by sub lessee. To put it differently, these reported cases are also based upon an admitted position of forgery. The learned Senior Counsel would also rely upon yet another, but recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perry Kansagra' case reported in (2022) SCC OnLine SC 858, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that tendering of false statement before Court is a direct interference with an administration of justice, and a guilty of contempt of Court. This Court absolutely has no quarrel with the above ratio. But, this Court yet to see the alleged false statement. 12. The learned Senior Counsel would also rely upon yet another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalit Popli' s case, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, even when expert evidence is not there, the Court has power to compare the writings and decide the matter. But, this decision was clarified in the subsequent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thiruvengadam Pillai Vs. Navaneethammal and another reported in (2008) 4 SCC 530 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that the decision in Murari Lal Vs. State of M.P reported in (1980) 1 SCC 704 and Lalit Popli's case [cited supra] should not be construed as laying a proposition that the Court is bound to compare the disputed and admitted finger impression and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. 13. We must also keep in mind that the Signature and handwriting identification is not a perfect science as that of the fingerprint identification. Therefore, the reliance of the handwriting expert’s report on it's face value is highly risky, that too in a case where the party owns the authorship of the disputed signature. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a recent judgment in Kamalakannan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 476 has extracted Murari Lal’s case to say about the imperfect nature of science of identification of handwriting . 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a recent judgment in Kamalakannan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 476 has extracted Murari Lal’s case to say about the imperfect nature of science of identification of handwriting . The relevant portion in Murari Lal’s case is extracted hereunder:- “11. We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule of law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystallised into a rule of law, that opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. But, having due regard to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the approach, as we indicated earlier, should be one of caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. All other relevant evidence must be considered . In appropriate cases, corroboration may be sought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of an handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial weight. We have said so much because this is an argument frequently met with in subordinate courts and sentences torn out of context from the judgments of this Court are often flaunted.” [emphasise supplied by this Court] What emerges from the above reading is that science of identification of handwriting is having it's own limitation. 15. The learned counsel also relied upon another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Elumalai's case [cited supra], which deals about the principles when apology could be accepted in a Contempt jurisdiction. 16. While discussing all the above precedents of the appellant, the one underlined factum permeated in all the above reported cases is, the admission of the parties regarding the commission of forgery. But, in the case in hand, as already stated, the case of forgery is disputed, contrarily the authorship of the signature was owned by the 2 nd defendant. According to him, he is the author of the disputed signature. Therefore, the precedent which had been relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, is not applicable to the present facts of this case, as the facts of the case in hand is running counter to the reported case. 17. According to him, he is the author of the disputed signature. Therefore, the precedent which had been relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, is not applicable to the present facts of this case, as the facts of the case in hand is running counter to the reported case. 17. At this juncture, it is appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao Vs. State of T.N. reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533 , where the constitution Bench has held that, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the conclusion in two cases. Therefore, the precedents relied by the appellant have no application to the present facts of this case. 18. However, the rulings submitted by the respondent in Sasikala Pushpa’s case [cited supra] would squarely cover the issue in hand. For ready reference, I deem it appropriate to extract the relevant paragraphs hereunder:- “19. There could be no two views about the proposition that even if forgery is committed outside the precincts of the court and long before its production in the court, it would also be treated as one affecting the administration of justice. But in the present case, the vakalatnama filed by the appellants in Crl. OP (MD) No. 15370 of 2016 seeking anticipatory bail in Crime No. 5 of 2016 cannot be said to be a forged document. As pointed out earlier, the appellants have admitted their signatures in the vakalatnama. They only allege that it was mistakenly recorded that it has been signed on 18-8-2016 at Madurai in the presence of the advocate. Of course, the version in the vakalatnama is an incorrect statement. In our opinion, the High Court was not justified in terming the said mistake or error as fraud . Fraud implies intentional deception aimed at achieving some wrongful gain or causing wrongful loss or injury to another. Intention being the mens rea is the essential ingredient to hold that a fraud has been played upon the court. The learned counsel for the State has submitted that upon examination of the signature in the vakalatnama, the handwriting expert has opined that it is not the signature of the appellants and therefore, the intention of the appellants to create a forged document has been clearly made out. The learned counsel for the State has submitted that upon examination of the signature in the vakalatnama, the handwriting expert has opined that it is not the signature of the appellants and therefore, the intention of the appellants to create a forged document has been clearly made out. We do not find any merit in the submission as the appellants themselves admitted their signatures in the vakalatnama. In the light of the statement of the appellants admitting their signatures in the vakalatnama, we do not think that the opinion of the handwriting expert would stand on any higher footing. There is nothing on record to suggest that the appellants gained anything by playing fraud or practising deception. In the absence of any material to substantiate the allegations, in our view, the High Court was not justified in accusing the appellants of fraud. 20. Even assuming that the version in the vakalatnama is wrong, mere incorrect statement in the vakalatnama would not amount to creating a forged document and it cannot be the reason for exercising the jurisdiction under Section 340 CrPC for issuance of direction to lodge the criminal complaint against the appellants.” [emphasise supplied by this Court] 19. According to the facts of the reported case, on the date of signing of vakalat, the author of the signature was not in India, further, the handwriting expert gave opinion that the signature found in the vakalat is not that of the person, who owned the signature. But, still the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, in the backdrop of the party's admission of the authorship of the disputed signatures, there is no merit in considering the expert opinion. Even in the case in hand, similar to that of Sasikala Pushpa' s case [cited supra] the deponent signed while he was in America and when such signed affidavit was forwarded to his Advocate office, an inadvertent mistake had crept in by attesting the said signature at Chennai. Such a wrong and inadvertent attestation cannot be stretched to an extent of forgery, by mere suspicion. As held in Sasikala Pushpa 's case [cited supra], once the deponent accepts the authorship of signature, the question of sending the signature for comparison by an expert would loose it's significance. Such a wrong and inadvertent attestation cannot be stretched to an extent of forgery, by mere suspicion. As held in Sasikala Pushpa 's case [cited supra], once the deponent accepts the authorship of signature, the question of sending the signature for comparison by an expert would loose it's significance. Accordingly, even in the case in hand, sending the disputed signature for handwriting expert will not arise at all, as the deponent own the authorship of the signature. 20. No doubt in the case in hand, there is a variance between the signature found in the original affidavit and in the rejoinder. But, when the 2 nd defendant himself admits his signature found in the original affidavit, the above signature will come within the parameter of another type of variance. It is pertinent to mention here that, the signature of a person is nothing but his physio-psychological movement, which necessarily will have some variance. That is why the experts are expected to get more sample signature. At this juncture, it is also relevant to reiterate that, the science of identification of handwriting is not a perfect science, and the likelihood of errors could not be ruled out. Besides by owning the signature, the deponent would benefit nothing, except arresting the further delay. 21. Therefore, I am of the indubitable view that the ratio laid down in Sasikala Pushpa’ s case [cited supra]is squarely applies to the facts of the present case. In such a view of the matter, when the deponent own the authorship of the signature, on the mere suspicion raised by the other party, there is no necessity for the Court to send the documents for handwriting expert’s opinion, and to invoke Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. Besides, from the above detailed discussion, apparently there are no factual foundation to invoke the contempt jurisdiction. Accordingly, I am of the firm view that there are no ground to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. 22. In the result, the present OSAs are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected CMPs are also closed.