JUDGMENT : Mridul Kumar Kalita, J. 1. We have heard Mr. C. Lalfakzuala, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants. Also heard Ms. H. Lalmalsawmi, the learned Government Advocate, State of Mizoram appearing for the respondent Nos. 8 to 9 as well as Ms. Zairemsangpuii, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India. 2. This writ appeal has been preferred by 576 of the 612 writ petitioners who had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 8/2021. In this intra-court appeal, the appellants have challenged the judgment and order dated 11.09.2023, passed by the learned Single Judge, in WP(C) No. 08/2021, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants. 3. In the aforesaid writ petition, the present appellants had prayed for issuance of direction for payment of compensation for acquisition of their lands, in pursuant to Award No. 1/2018 under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereafter referred to as LA Act, 1894). However, the said writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the grounds that there are disputed questions of fact, casting doubt on the authenticity of Award No. 1/2018. 4. The facts, as stated in the writ petition filed by the appellants before the learned Single Judge, relevant to the consideration of this appeal, in brief, are as follows: i. The appellants are the members of schedule tribe community of Mizoram and they are the owners of the residential and garden lands covered by Land Settlement Certificates (LSC for short) in the Chotapansury, Gulsingbapsora, Nagdarasora, Gerakuluksora, Jarulsury villages of the Chakma Autonomous District Council area (hereinafter referred to as the “CADC” ii. On 26.10.2012, the government of Mizoram, through the Principal Secretary, Land Revenue & Settlement Department, had issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act, 1894 for construction of the Indo-Bangla Border Fencing (IBBF) and approach road to border outpost within Lawngtlai District. iii. A declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act, 1894 was issued by the Government of Mizoram on 08.04.2013 to the effect that the aforesaid land was needed for public purpose. iv. The land which was proposed to be acquired for public purpose also included the land of the appellants. Thereafter, the Award No. 1/2018 was made for Rs. 31,99,91,282/- by the District Collector, Lawngtlai, as compensation for acquisition of lands, under the LA Act, 1894. v. The aforesaid draft award amounting to Rs. iv. The land which was proposed to be acquired for public purpose also included the land of the appellants. Thereafter, the Award No. 1/2018 was made for Rs. 31,99,91,282/- by the District Collector, Lawngtlai, as compensation for acquisition of lands, under the LA Act, 1894. v. The aforesaid draft award amounting to Rs. 31,99,91,282/- (Rupees thirty-one crore ninety-nine lakh ninety-one thousand two hundred eighty-two only) was approved by the Government of Mizoram, Land Revenue & Settlement Department by Memo No. K.12011/39/2012-REV dated 31.07.2018. vi. The appellants contend that some owners of the acquired land have been paid compensation only for crop damages, while no compensation has been paid for the market value of the acquired land, including solatium and interest, as required under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, for the compulsory acquisition of their land. vii. The appellants have further stated that compensation for damages to crops, land, and buildings, amounting to Rs.23,40,850/- and Rs.22,72,670/-, was paid for land falling between Chainage 49.10 km to 59.10 km (BP No. 2347/M to 2347/25) and Chainage 59.10 km to 69.10 km (BP No. 2347/25 to 2348/35), respectively. The payments were made through SBI Lunglei banker’s cheques: No. 1884356 (Rs.23,40,850/-) and No. 184357 (Rs.22,72,670/-), both dated 19.12.2007, to the Environment and Forest Department, CADC. viii. Thereafter, ’No claim certificate’ was allegedly executed by the President, Village Council Court, Chotapansury, Gulsingbapsora, Nagdarasora, Gerakuluksora, Jarulsury and the Assistant Revenue Officer, CADC and Assistant Conservator of Forest, CADC, Kamalanagar, certified that compensation cases for the village of Chotapansury, Gulsingbapsora, Nagdarasora, Gerakuluksora and Jarulsury (between km 49.100 to km 69.100 on IBB (S) road were genuine and that there would be no further claims besides the compensation submitted by the 72 RCC (GREF). However, it is contended by the appellants that the aforesaid compensation was not in respect of the acquired land, which was owned by the appellants. ix. It is contended by the appellants that though subsequently Award No. 1/2018 was made for an amount of Rs. 31,99,91,282/-. However, the said amount has not been paid to the appellants. x. The appellants have contended that they were dispossessed from their land in the year 2013. They have also deposited their land passes to the respondent authorities and the respondents have constructed border fencing and approach road on the land of the appellants. 31,99,91,282/-. However, the said amount has not been paid to the appellants. x. The appellants have contended that they were dispossessed from their land in the year 2013. They have also deposited their land passes to the respondent authorities and the respondents have constructed border fencing and approach road on the land of the appellants. They have also contended that they were not the signatories to any “No Claim Certificate”. xi. The writ petitioners (Appellants) also contended before the learned single judge that they are entitled to compensation under Section 24 of the “Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013” (hereafter referred to as RFCTLARR Act, 2013), in as much as, in spite of the passing of the Award No. 1/2018, no compensation has yet been paid to them. xii. The writ petitioners (Appellants) also contended that the denial of compensation for the acquisition of their land amounts to a violation of their constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution of India xiii. The respondent No. 1, i.e., the Union of India contended before the learned Single Judge that the Border Road Organization had already made payment to the tune of Rs. 22,40,850/- and Rs. 22,72,670/- on 19.12.2007 to the Environment and Forest Department, CADC for the damages caused to land, building, fruit bearing trees and non-fruit bearing trees. It was also contended that the said payment was authenticated and counter signed by the Deputy Commissioner, Lawngtlai on claim certificate for the acquired land. xiv. It was also contended that as the notification under Section 4 of the LA Act, 1894 was issued prior to coming to the force of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, hence, Section 24 of Act of 2013 is not applicable to this case. xv. The respondent No.1 had also contended that the Ministry of Home Affairs, Union of India had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the NPCC i.e., National Projects Construction Corporation Limited to undertake the work of fence for certain stretches in the State of Mizoram along Indo- Bangladesh Border and as per the provision of said MOU, it is the responsibility of NPCC Limited to acquire the land covered by the said MOU. However, it is contended by the Union of India that no land has been acquired by NPCC for any purpose. However, it is contended by the Union of India that no land has been acquired by NPCC for any purpose. Hence, the question of making payment for compensation does not arise. xvi. In their affidavit-in-opposition before the Trial Court during the writ proceeding, the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 namely, DG, Border Road Organization, Chief Engineer, Project Pushpak (GREF), and OC GREF respectively have contended that the Border Road Organization (BRO) had made payment for the damages of land, properties like garden/house site/WRC land and plants caused during construction to the affected persons and the said payment was authenticated and countersigned by the Deputy Commissioner, Lawngtlai on a no-claim certificate issued by him. xvii. In their affidavit-in-opposition filed before the learned Single Judge in the writ proceedings, the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 namely, National Project Construction Corporation Limited, it has contended that the National Project Construction Corporation Limited was awarded the construction work of Indo-Bangladesh Border fencing and approach road under phase 2 between border post 2338 to 2364 for a total sanction length of 150.013 km of IBB fence 140.013 km of IBB road and 71.620 km of IBB link road along with Indo-Bangladesh Border in the State of Mizoram. xviii. It has also been contended that out of the total actual length of IBB fence and road, the NPCC has gone for a land acquisition of 19.680 km in Lunglei district and 120.22 km in Lawngtlai district, total length of 139.90 km through the concerned Deputy Commissioners and in respect of the said acquisitions from the NPCC has paid a compensation amounting to Rs. 86,41,88,079/-. However, it has contended that land acquired under Award No. 1/2018 was not acquired by National Project Construction Corporation Limited. xix. It was also contended by respondent Nos. 6 and 7 that the notification issued under Section 4 of the LA Act, 1894 as well as declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act does not specify the particulars of land in respect of which said notifications/declarations were issued. Hence, it is contended by the said respondents that it is not clear as to whether Award No. 1/2018 was issued in respect of land for which the Section 4 notification under the LA Act, 1894 as well as declaration under Section 6 of the said Act was issued. xx. Hence, it is contended by the said respondents that it is not clear as to whether Award No. 1/2018 was issued in respect of land for which the Section 4 notification under the LA Act, 1894 as well as declaration under Section 6 of the said Act was issued. xx. Respondents Nos.6 and 7 have also contended that as the National Project Construction Corporation was not the acquiring department for the land, which was acquired under Award No.1/2018. Hence, the said award was returned back to the Deputy Commissioner, Lawngtlai. xxi. On the other hand, respondent Nos. 8 and 9 namely, the State of Mizoram as well as Deputy Commissioner, Lawngtlai, in their affidavit-in-opposition, submitted before the learned Single Judge in the writ proceedings that the Government of Mizoram had notified for acquisition of land of IBBF area covering four villages from Chotapansury to Gulsingbapsora. It was also contended that the lands were measured during verification carried out by the team headed by is SDO (C) and after proper verification and after proper measurement, it was found that the online area of the land is 2,81,813 sq meters and road (diversion) and quarry roads, which were affected during construction of IBBF for which the areas of these lands is 20,085 sq. meters. It was also contended that the Award No.1/2018 in favour of the person interested was made as per the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. xxii. In their affidavit-in-opposition, respondents Nos. 10, 11 and 12 namely, the Chakma Autonomous District Council (CADC), Senior Revenue Officer and the MDC, Conservator of Forests have contended that at the time of the verification of the land for construction of border roads and Indo Bangladesh border fencing, a joint verification was carried out by the Government of Mizoram and representatives of National Project Construction Company Limited and the district administration as well as the representative of CADC etc. were present. The said respondents also contended in their affidavit-in-opposition that Border Road Organization made road alignments from Chotapansury to Gerakuluksora, and at the initial stage they paid compensation amount taking only four meters into account against fruit and non-fruit bearing trees without calculating land valuation. It is also contended that no land acquisition process was initiated as per the provisions of LA Act, 1894. It is also contended that no land acquisition process was initiated as per the provisions of LA Act, 1894. The said respondents have supported the case of the petitioners by stating that the petitioners have lawful right to get fair compensation on their land which was used for construction of border fencing. xxiii. However, the learned Single Judge, relying on the contentions raised by the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 that an amount of Rs. 46,13,520/- has already been paid by the Border Road Organization (Respondent No.2) to the land owners; and that the award No. 1 of 2018 does not mentions the date of award as well as it does not specify the type of the road or as to what stretch of road is acquired to show that it corresponds to the notification issued under Section 4 of the LA Act, 1894 of 20.06.2012 and the declaration issued under Section 6 of the LA Act, 1894 on 08.04.2013, held that disputed questions of facts are involved in this matter and cast doubt about the authenticity of the Award No.1 of 2018 and accordingly, dismissed the writ petition. 5. Mr. C. Lalfakzuala, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the learned Single Judge have erred in overlooking the fact that the Award No.1/2018 was passed after measuring of the land during verification carried by the team headed by SDO (Civil), which has also been contended by the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 in their affidavit-in-opposition submitted before the learned Single Judge in the writ proceeding. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that the appellants were dispossessed from their land by the respondent authorities for construction of Indo-Bangladesh Border fencing without paying proper compensation to them as per law and this violates the mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution of India which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. 7. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that though the compensation for damages to crops, land and building amounting to Rs. 23,40,850/- and Rs. 22,72,670/- was paid to some of the land owners, however, same was not for the value of the land but for the damages caused to crops, land and building. 7. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that though the compensation for damages to crops, land and building amounting to Rs. 23,40,850/- and Rs. 22,72,670/- was paid to some of the land owners, however, same was not for the value of the land but for the damages caused to crops, land and building. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the aforesaid compensation was made in the year 2007 without there being any acquisition proceeding and without following due process of law. 8. He submits that the appellants could not have been deprived of their land for construction of Indo Bangladesh Border fencing and approach road to Border Outpost without following due procedure of law and without paying due compensation to them. 9. The learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that while casting aspersion on the authenticity of the Award No. 1/2018 for the reasons like the award does not mentions the date of award therein neither does it specify the type of road or what stretch of road is acquired to show that Award No.1/2018 corresponds to notification issued under Section 4 under the LA Act, 1894 on 26.10.2012 as well as declaration issued under Section 6 of the LA Act, 1894 on 08.04.2013, the learned Single Judge failed to take into consideration the fact that the Award has been duly approved by the Government on 31.07.2018. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that the respondent authorities mainly respondent Nos. 6 and 7 i.e., the National Project Construction Corporation have not challenged the award either under Section 18 of the LA Act, 1894 or by preferring an appeal under Section 54 of the LA Act, 1894 or by seeking relief by invoking writ jurisdiction, hence, the Award No.1/2018 is binding on the said respondents as the requiring authorities. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the learned Single Judge had erred in relegating the matter to the Civil Court merely on account of a factual dispute raised by one of the party without considering that the appellants are aggrieved only due to non- payment of compensation in terms of the Award No. 1/2018 and that the suggested course of actions would be dilatory and expensive, thereby depriving the appellants of their legitimate due. 12. 12. The learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that as in-spite of passing of Award No. 1/2018 and even after approval of the said award by the Government, the payment of awarded amount of Rs.31,99,91,282/- has not yet been made to the appellants, hence, they are entitled to be paid compensation as per the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. 13. On the other hand, Ms. Zairemsangpuii, the learned counsel appearing for the Union of India has submitted that the compensation for the acquired land to the tune of Rs. 23,40,850/- and Rs. 22,72,670/- respectively has already been paid to the Environment and Forest Department, CADC in the month of December’ 2007. She also submits that in this regard no claim certificates executed by the Village Council President, Chotapansury, Gulsingbapsora, Nagdarasora, Gerakuluksora, Jarulsury, Assistant Revenue Officer, CADC and Assistant Conservator of Forest, CADC certifying that the compensation cases for villages of Chotapansury, Gulsingbapsora, Nagdarasora, Gerakuluksora, Jarulsury between km 49.100 to km 69.100 on IBB (S) road are genuine and that there will be no further claims, bars any further claim by the appellants. She submits that the compensation has already been paid to the land owners for the land acquired for construction of Indo-Bangla Border Fencing (IBBF) and approach road. 14. Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned counsel further submits that none of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 were involved in during the making of Award No. 1/2018. She also submits that though the declaration under Section 6 was made on 08.04.2013, however, the Award No. 1/2018 was passed in the year 2018 in violation of Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894 and hence, the said Award is hit by the said provision. She has also submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly observed that the matter involves disputed questions of fact as the notification issued under Section 4 of the LA Act, 1894 as well as declaration made under Section 6 of the LA Act, 1894, no particulars with regard to the areas of the land acquired or regarding the ownership of land are mentioned. She accordingly, prays for dismissal of the instant Writ Appeal. 15. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for both the sides and have perused the materials on record very carefully. 16. She accordingly, prays for dismissal of the instant Writ Appeal. 15. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for both the sides and have perused the materials on record very carefully. 16. On perusal of the Award No. 1/2018, it appears that the said award was made in respect of the lands at seven different locations along Indo-Bangladesh International Border for construction of Indo-Bangla Border fencing and road in favour of Border Security Force. It is also stated in the Award that the process for acquisition of land was notified under Section 4 (1) of the LA Act, 1894 on 26.10.2012 and the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act was issued vide letter No. K.12011/39/2002-REV dated 08.04.2013 covering seven separate locations. The seven locations mentioned in the Award No. 1/2018 are as follows: a) Chotapansury (in respect of 173 persons) b) Gulsingbapsora (in respect of 170 persons) c) Nagdarasora (in respect of 63 persons) d) Gerakuluksora (in respect of 160 persons) e) Chotapansury Quarry Road (in respect of 5 persons) f) Chotapansury Diversion (in respect of 8 persons) g) Gulsingbapsora (in respect of 8 persons) 17. The list of the awardees has been appended to the Award as Annexure No.- I, which also includes the names of the present appellants. The nature of interest over the acquired land held by the awardees, the affected area of the land and their share in the Award after apportionment has been described in detail in the Annexure No.- I appended to the Award No. 1/2018. 18. The summary of the Award as provided therein is as follows: 1. Market Value of land area covered By LSC’s=281813 sq.mtrs @ Rs.50/- per sq. mtrs = Rs. 1,40,90,650/- 2. Crops/Tress etc. value = Rs.12,21,22,000/- 3. Building/Structure Value = Rs. 2,92,31,310/- 4. Total 12% interest w.e.f. 1.11.2012 - 14.12.2017 (1868 days)= Rs. 10,16,05,255/- 5. Total 30% Solatium = Rs. 4,96,33,188/- TOTAL = Rs.31,66,82,403/- E stablishment charge (Admin Cost 2%) = Rs. 33,08,879/- GRAND TOTAL = Rs.31,99,91,282/- (Rupees thirty one crore ninety nine lakh ninety one thousand two hundred eighty two) only 19. value = Rs.12,21,22,000/- 3. Building/Structure Value = Rs. 2,92,31,310/- 4. Total 12% interest w.e.f. 1.11.2012 - 14.12.2017 (1868 days)= Rs. 10,16,05,255/- 5. Total 30% Solatium = Rs. 4,96,33,188/- TOTAL = Rs.31,66,82,403/- E stablishment charge (Admin Cost 2%) = Rs. 33,08,879/- GRAND TOTAL = Rs.31,99,91,282/- (Rupees thirty one crore ninety nine lakh ninety one thousand two hundred eighty two) only 19. It is also pertinent to note that it has been also stated in the Award that the land notified for acquisition was marked out and measured by the surveyor of the Land Revenue and Settlement Department (CADC), Kamla Nagar in presence of the land owners, representative of the Acquiring Department i.e., the NPCC and the SDO (Civil), Chawngte. 20. The affidavit-in-opposition of respondent Nos. 6 and 7, i.e., the National Project Construction Corporation Limited, filed before the learned Single Judge, shows that the land in question falls within the areas of a total 20 kms of land of Indo Bangla Border Fence from the village of Chotapansury to Jarulsury and it was initially sanctioned to Border Road Organization (Respondent No.2) by the Ministry of Home Affairs vide Agenda Item No. IBB/6/12 th /2005 HLEC. It is also admitted by the said respondents that later on fencing work in the part of the stretch of 10 kms of IBB Fence from village Gerakuluksora to Jarulsury (BT No. 2347/2S to 2348/3S) was carried out by NPCC, on being entrusted to it by the Agenda Item No. IBB/21/17 th /2007HLEC by the Ministry of Home Affairs. 21. Although, the National Project Construction Corporation Limited (Respondent Nos. 6 and 7) stated in its affidavit-in-opposition that compensation for the acquired land fell under the purview of the Border Roads Organization (Respondent No. 2) and that records of the acquisition had not been handed over to it, however, it is evident that the land has already been utilized for the construction of the Indo-Bangla Border Fencing (IBBF) and the approach road. 22. It is also apparent that neither the NPCC, which is a Government of India undertaking, nor the Border Road Organization, which is a statutory body under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, has assailed the validity of the Award No. 1/2018. They have only tried to shift the burden, of paying compensation to the appellants. 22. It is also apparent that neither the NPCC, which is a Government of India undertaking, nor the Border Road Organization, which is a statutory body under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, has assailed the validity of the Award No. 1/2018. They have only tried to shift the burden, of paying compensation to the appellants. In this regard it is very pertinent to note the mandate of Section 12 (1) of the LA Act, 1894 which provides as follows: “(1) Such award shall be filed in the Collectors office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.” 23. A bare perusal of the above provision would show that when an Award is filed in the Collector’s Office, save and except as provided in the other provisions of the LA Act, 1894, it shall be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the person interested as regards whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not; of the true area and value of the land, and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. The finality attached by the Section 12 of the Act binds the appropriate Government as the collector had performed his duty as an agent of the appropriate Government. In the instant case, the Government of Mizoram is the acquiring authority and the Union Government, through the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 is the requiring authority. We are of the considered opinion that in view of the finality attached to the Award No.1/2018 by virtue of Section 12 (1) of the LA Act, 1894, even the requiring authority is bound by the same. In our considered opinion, the mere act of returning the Award by the NPCC to the Deputy Commissioner, Lawngtlai, via letter No. 70064/IBBW/MZ/774 dated 06.09.2019, would not be sufficient for the requiring authority to escape the liability for paying compensation to the appellants in respect of the acquired land, unless Award No. 1/2018 is challenged before the appropriate forum. 24. In our considered opinion, the mere act of returning the Award by the NPCC to the Deputy Commissioner, Lawngtlai, via letter No. 70064/IBBW/MZ/774 dated 06.09.2019, would not be sufficient for the requiring authority to escape the liability for paying compensation to the appellants in respect of the acquired land, unless Award No. 1/2018 is challenged before the appropriate forum. 24. Now, let us discuss the contention raised by the learned counsel for the Union Government that the Award No.1/2018 is hit by the Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894 as the same was made after a lapse of more than two years of the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. It is pertinent to note that even a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while taking up this matter, at the initial stage, on 11.09.2024, has observed that the Award No. 1/2018 appears to be in violation of Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894. 25. In this regard, the observations made by the Supreme Court of India in the case of “Indore Development Authority Vs. Manohar Lal and Others” reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 are relevant and same are reproduced herein below: 116. It is apparent from a plain reading of Section 16 (of the 1894 Act) that the land vests in the Government absolutely when possession is taken after the award is passed. Clearly, there can be lapse of proceedings under the 1894 Act only when possession is not taken. The provisions in Section 11-A of the 1894 Act states that the Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and if no award is made within two years, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall lapse. The period of two years excludes any period during which interim order granted by the court was in operation. Once an award is made and possession is taken, by virtue of Section 16, land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Vesting of land is automatic on the happening of the two exigencies of passing award and taking possession, as provided in Section 16. Once possession is taken under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the owner of the land loses title to it, and the Government becomes the absolute owner of the land. 26. Vesting of land is automatic on the happening of the two exigencies of passing award and taking possession, as provided in Section 16. Once possession is taken under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the owner of the land loses title to it, and the Government becomes the absolute owner of the land. 26. The Apex Court in the case of “ Delhi Airtech Private Service Limited and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Another” reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1408, while interpreting the ambit of Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894, has also observed that the raison d’Œtre behind the introduction of Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894 was for the land owners to have a remedy in the event of an award not been passed expeditiously. It has also observed that the benefit of the said provision (Section 11A) is available only to be invoked by the land looser and cannot be invoked by the acquiring authority to claim lapse by pointing to non-compliance since the “vice” of non-compliance cannot be permitted to be converted into a “virtue”. 27. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the land in question has already been utilized and the Indo-Bangla Border Fencing as well as the approach road has already been constructed thereon. Though, the respondent authorities, other than the State of Mizoram, are now questioning the validity/genuineness of the Award No.1/2018, however, they have failed to show as to under what authority the possession of the land of the appellants have been taken over for the construction of Indo Bangla Border Fencing and the approach road. 28. Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, allowing the Award to lapse on account of the violation of the Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894, would be detrimental to the interest of the appellants, who have already been deprived of their lands for the construction of the Indo Bangla Border Fencing and the approach road. Applying the rigours of the Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894, against the interest of the land losers would be against the legislative intent of including the said provision in the Act only for the benefit of the land owners to get the compensation within time. Applying the rigours of the Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894, against the interest of the land losers would be against the legislative intent of including the said provision in the Act only for the benefit of the land owners to get the compensation within time. We are of the view that if the Award is allowed to be lapsed, one available alternative would be to direct reverting the possession of the land to its original owners. However, same does not appear to be feasible, as the Indo Bangla Border Fencing and the approach road has already been constructed and same also involves the issue of national security. Another option is to direct the respondent authorities to initiate the fresh acquisition proceedings for acquiring the aforementioned lands, which, considering the fact that the appellants are not aggrieved with the Award No.1/2018 but only with non-payment of the compensation awarded to them, appears not only to be unjust to the State ex-chequer but also appears to be an unfair recourse for the land losers. 29. Under the above circumstances and in view of the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manohar Lal and Others (Supra), that once the Award has been passed and the possession of the land is taken, there would be no lapse of the acquisition proceedings, we are of the opinion that as the possession of the land has already been taken by the requiring authority and the Indo-Bangla Border Fencing and approach road has already been constructed thereon, as well as considering the fact that the land losers are only aggrieved due to non-receipt of due compensation and have not challenged the acquisition proceeding as well as the Award No.1/2018, the said Award would not lapse due to operation of the Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894 to the detriment of the land owner. 30. As to whether the observations made by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at the initial stage of this case, on 11.09.2024, regarding the application of Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894 to the Award No. 01/2018 would operate as res judicata or not, the observation made by the Apex Court in the case of “Government of NCT of Delhi and Another Vs. BSK Realtors LLP and Another” reported in (2024) 7 SCC 370 are very relevant and same are reproduced herein below: “32. The law, as we noticed aforesaid, aptly resolves the first issue. Res judicata, as a technical legal principle, operates to prevent the same parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been conclusively determined by a court. However, it is crucial to note that the previous decision of this Court in the first round would not operate as res judicata to bar a decision on the lead matter and the other appeals; more so, because this rule may not apply hard and fast in situations where larger public interest is at stake. In such cases, a more flexible approach ought to be adopted by courts, recognising that certain matters transcend individual disputes and have far-reaching public interest implications.” 31. We are of the considered opinion that the observations made by the Coordinate Bench of this Court on 11.09.2024, to the effect that the Award No. 01/2018 appears to be in violation of Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894, was made at a preliminary stage of this writ appeal. Since this observation appears to be contrary to the findings of the Apex Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal and Others (supra) and Delhi Airtech Private Service Limited and Another v. State of U.P. and Another (supra), as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, we are of the opinion that it shall not operate as any kind of bar on this Court in arriving at a just decision. 32. The Supreme Court of India has observed in the case of “ Ultra Tech Cement Limited Vs. Mast Ram and Others” (Supra) as follows: “49. Acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken under the power of eminent domain of the government much against the wishes of the owners of the land which gets acquired. When such a power is exercised, it is coupled with a bounden duty and obligation on the part of the government body to ensure that the owners whose lands get acquired are paid compensation/awarded amount as declared by the statutory award at the earliest. 50. The State Government, in peculiar circumstances, was expected to make the requisite payment towards compensation to the landowners from its own treasury and should have thereafter proceeded to recover the same from JAL. 50. The State Government, in peculiar circumstances, was expected to make the requisite payment towards compensation to the landowners from its own treasury and should have thereafter proceeded to recover the same from JAL. Instead of making the poor landowners to run after the powerful corporate houses, it should have compelled JAL to make the necessary payment.” 33. In the case of “ Delhi Airtech Private Service Limited and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Another” (Supra), the Apex Court has observed that the position of law is well established that in view of Article 300A and 31A of the Constitution of India, the owner of a land can be divested only in accordance with law after appropriately compensating if such land is required by the State for public purpose. 34. In the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court of India has also deprecated the practice of not following the statutory procedural requirement, by the State, while acquiring the land and then to argue that its own lapses rendered its acquisition illegal. The Apex Court has also clarified that where the land owners do not assail the acquisition, it may be open to them to seek a mandamus for payment to them, after a reasonable period, of the remaining compensation, which will thereupon metamorphose from a mere estimation to actual compensation of the expropriation. 35. In the instant case also, the appellants as writ petitioners approached the Court seeking a direction for payment of compensation amounting to Rs. 31,99,91,282/- (Rupees thirty-one crores ninety-nine lakhs ninety-one thousand two hundred and eighty-two only) along with interest calculated at the rate of 15% per annum as per the Section 80 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. It is pertinent to note that the appellants have not challenged the validity of Award No.1/2018 on the ground that the same was made beyond the statutory period of two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 36. In the instant case, though that the Border Road Organization has contended that the compensation amount of Rs. 23,40,850/- and Rs. 22,72,760/- respectively, has already been paid in the month of December’ 2007, in respect of the said land, however, no acquisition proceeding, initiated in the year 2007, in respect of the land in question, could be shown. 36. In the instant case, though that the Border Road Organization has contended that the compensation amount of Rs. 23,40,850/- and Rs. 22,72,760/- respectively, has already been paid in the month of December’ 2007, in respect of the said land, however, no acquisition proceeding, initiated in the year 2007, in respect of the land in question, could be shown. The learned counsel for the Union of India has failed to show as to how without initiating any acquisition proceedings in accordance with law, the possession of the land was taken and aforesaid compensation was paid to the appellants. 37. We are of the considered opinion that the mere submission of a ’No Claim Certificate’, purportedly signed by the Presidents of the respective Village Council Courts of the affected villages, stating that there would be no further claims beyond the compensation submitted by 72 RCC (GREF), without the initiation of the acquisition proceeding in accordance with the law, would not be sufficient for the requiring authority to escape its liability to pay the due compensation to the affected land owners. 38. Though, the State in exercise of its “power of eminent domain” can acquire private property for public purpose, however, the same has to be done in accordance with law. Before depriving a person of his right to property, if proper procedure established by law is not followed, such an acquisition will be illegal and unconstitutional. In the case of “ Ultra Tech Cement Limited Vs. Mast Ram and Others” (Supra), the Apex Court has observed as follows: “D. Role of the State under Article 300-A of the Constitution 43. The Right to Property in our country is a net of intersecting rights which has been explained by this Court in Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 968. A division bench of this Court identified seven non-exhaustive sub-rights that accrue to a landowner when the State intends to acquire his/her property. The relevant observations of this Court under the said judgment are reproduced below: “…27. … Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit non- exhaustive. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 968. A division bench of this Court identified seven non-exhaustive sub-rights that accrue to a landowner when the State intends to acquire his/her property. The relevant observations of this Court under the said judgment are reproduced below: “…27. … Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit non- exhaustive. These are: i) duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property – the right to notice, ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition – the right to be heard, iii) the duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire – the right to a reasoned decision, iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose – the duty to acquire only for public purpose, v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate – the right of restitution or fair compensation, vi) the duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings – the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting – the right of conclusion…” [Emphasis Supplied] This Court held that a fair and reasonable compensation is the sine qua non for any acquisition process.” 39. The Supreme Court of India has held in the case of “Dharnidhar Mishra (D) Vs. State of Bihar” reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 932 and “State of Haryana Vs. Mukesh Kumar” reported in (2011) 10 SCC 404 that the right to property is considered not only to be a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. The Apex Court in the case of “Tukaram Kana Joshi Vs. MIDC” reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353 has observed that in a welfare state, the statutory authorities are legally bound to pay adequate compensation and rehabilitate the persons whose land are being acquired. The non-fulfilment of such obligation under the grab of the industrial development, is not permissible for any welfare state as that would tantamount to uprooting a person and depriving them of their constitutional/human right. 40. Under such circumstances, when the Award No.1/2018 has not been put to challenge by any of the respondents, we are of the view that they are bound by it. 40. Under such circumstances, when the Award No.1/2018 has not been put to challenge by any of the respondents, we are of the view that they are bound by it. This being the position, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge ought not to have relegated the writ petitioners (appellants) to any other appropriate forum as it would amount to depriving them from availing the constitutional remedies for deprivation of their constitutional/human right to property. Instead of that, it should have directed the respondent authorities to pay the compensation awarded to the appellants as per the Award No.1/2018. 41. Section 31 of the Act of 1894 categorically imposes an obligation upon the Collector, on making an Award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 to tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, according to the Award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Sub-Section (2) of Section 31 of the Act of 1894. This statutory obligation cast upon the collector by Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, in our opinion, entitles the persons interested who have not received the compensation to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this regard, we find it relevant to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) wherein the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in clear terms observed that the Collector has to tender payment of compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the Award and failure to do so, the Collector shall be liable to pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of 9% from the time of taking possession until it had been so paid or deposited and after one year, from the date on which the possession is taken, interest payable shall be @15%. It was further observed that a payment has to be tendered under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 unless the Collector is prevented from making payment as provided in Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. Relevant Paragraphs of the said judgment being relevant are reproduced herein below: - 117. It was further observed that a payment has to be tendered under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 unless the Collector is prevented from making payment as provided in Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. Relevant Paragraphs of the said judgment being relevant are reproduced herein below: - 117. Payment of compensation under the 1894 Act is provided for by Section 31 of the Act, which is to be after passing of the award under Section 11. The exception, is in case of urgency under Section 17, is where it has to be tendered before taking possession. Once an award has been passed, the Collector is bound to tender the payment of compensation to the persons interested entitled to it, as found in the award and shall pay it to them unless “prevented” by the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 31. Section 31(3) contains a non obstante clause which authorises the Collector with the sanction of the appropriate Government, in the interest of the majority, by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land revenue on other lands or in such other way as may be equitable. 118. Section 31(1) enacts that the Collector has to tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay such amount to a person interested in the land, unless he (the Collector) is prevented from doing so, for any of the three contingencies provided by sub-section (2). Section 31(2) provides for deposit of compensation in court in case the State is prevented from making payment in the event of: (i) refusal to receive it; (ii) if there be no person competent to alienate the land; (iii) if there is any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation; or (iv) if there is dispute as to the apportionment. In such exigencies, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the court to which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted. 119. In such exigencies, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the court to which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted. 119. Section 34 deals with a situation where any of the obligations under Section 31 is not fulfilled i.e. when the amount of compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon @ 9% p.a. from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited; and after one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest payable shall be @ 15% p.a. The scheme of the 1894 Act clearly makes it out that when the award is passed under Section 11, thereafter possession is taken as provided under Section 16, land vests in the State Government. Under Section 12(2), a notice of the award has to be issued by the Collector. Taking possession is not dependent upon payment. Payment has to be tendered under Section 31 unless the Collector is “prevented from making payment”, as provided under Section 31(2). In case of failure under Section 31(1) or 31(3), also Collector is not precluded from making payment, but it carries interest under Section 34 @ 9% for the first year from the date it ought to have been paid or deposited and thereafter @ 15%. Thus, once land has been vested in the State under Section 16, in case of failure to pay the compensation under Section 31(1) to deposit under Section 31(2), compensation has to be paid along with interest, and due to non-compliance of Section 31, there is no lapse of acquisition. The same spirit has been carried forward in the 2013 Act by providing in Section 24(2). Once possession has been taken though the payment has not been made, the compensation has to be paid along with interest as envisaged under Section 34, and in a case, payment has been made, possession has not been taken, there is no lapse under Section 24(2). Once possession has been taken though the payment has not been made, the compensation has to be paid along with interest as envisaged under Section 34, and in a case, payment has been made, possession has not been taken, there is no lapse under Section 24(2). In a case where possession has been taken under the 1894 Act as provided by Section 16 or 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances, if compensation is not paid, there is no divesting there will be no lapse as compensation carries interest @ 9% or @ 15% as envisaged under Section 34 of the 1894 Act. The proviso to Section 24(2) makes some wholesome provision in case the amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, in such an event, not only those persons but all the beneficiaries, though for minority of holding compensation has been paid, shall be entitled to higher compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. The expression used is “all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act” i.e. the 1894 Act, means that the persons who are to be paid higher compensation are those who have been recorded as beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4. The proviso gives effect to, and furthers the principle that under the 1894 Act, the purchases made after issuance of notification under Section 4 are void. As such, the benefit of higher compensation under the proviso to Section 24(2) is intended to be given to the beneficiaries mentioned in the notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. 120. It is apparent from the 1894 Act that the payment of compensation is dealt with in Part V, whereas acquisition is dealt with in Part II. Payment of compensation is not made precondition for taking possession under Section 16 or under Section 31 read with Section 34. Possession can be taken before tendering the amount except in the case of urgency, and deposit (of the amount) has to follow in case the Collector is prevented from making payment in exigencies as provided in Section 31(3). Payment of compensation is not made precondition for taking possession under Section 16 or under Section 31 read with Section 34. Possession can be taken before tendering the amount except in the case of urgency, and deposit (of the amount) has to follow in case the Collector is prevented from making payment in exigencies as provided in Section 31(3). What follows is that in the event of not fulfilling the obligation to pay or to deposit under Sections 31(1) and 31(2), the 1894 Act did not provide for lapse of land acquisition proceedings, and only increased interest follows with payment of compensation.” 42. In the instant case as the lands of the appellants have already been utilised for construction of Indo Bangla Border Fencing and the approach road, hence, it is the bounden duty of the State of Mizoram as the acquiring authority as well as the Union of India and the National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd (NPCC) as the requiring authority to ensure that the appellants, whose lands have been utilised for construction of Indo Bangla Border Fencing and the approach road, are paid their due compensation as per the Award No.1/2018. Failure to pay due compensation to the appellants would amount to breach of the constitutional obligation contained in the Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 43. In view of the discussion and the observations made in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, we hereby allow the instant Writ Appeal with following directions – a) The impugned judgment and order dated 11.09.2023, passed by the learned Single Judge, in WP(C) No. 08/2021 is hereby set aside. b) The awardees of the Award No.1/2018 are entitled to the compensation amount mentioned in the said Award along with the interest computed thereon in terms of Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894. c) The State of Mizoram, being a welfare State, is statutorily obligated to make payment of the awarded compensation amount. d) The Government of India is directed to make requisite funds, for payment of compensation to the appellants, available to the National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd (NPCC). e) The the National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd (NPCC) shall deposit the compensation amount of Rs. d) The Government of India is directed to make requisite funds, for payment of compensation to the appellants, available to the National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd (NPCC). e) The the National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd (NPCC) shall deposit the compensation amount of Rs. 31,99,91,282/- (Rupees thirty-one crore ninety-nine lakh ninety-one thousand two hundred eighty-two only) awarded by the Award No. 1/2018 to the appellants, along with interest thereon, in terms of Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894 to the Government of Mizoram within a period of three months from the date of this judgement for disbursement of the same to the appellants. f) The State of Mizoram is directed to pay the compensation amount of Rs. 31,99,91,282/- (Rupees thirty-one crore ninety- nine lakh ninety-one thousand two hundred eighty-two only) awarded by the Award No. 1/2018 to the appellants, as per their entitlement, in terms of the said award, along with interest thereon, in terms of Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894 within a month of receiving the said amount from the National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. 44. With above directions this Writ Appeal is allowed and disposed of. 45. The Registry of the Principal Seat of this court is directed to immediately transmit the records of this case along with this judgment to the Registry of the Aizawl Permanent Bench of this Court.