JUDGMENT : (LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J.) Challenging the validity and legality of the judgment and decree dated 27.04.2023 in A.S.No.227 of 2018 passed by the III Additional District Judge at Ranga Reddy District, confirming the judgment dated 11.09.2018 in O.S.No.934 of 2008 passed by the I Additional Senior Civil Judge at Ranga Reddy District, the present Second Appeal is filed. 2. Heard Sri Pottigari Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the Appellant. 3. The appellant herein is defendant No.4 and respondent No.1 is plaintiff and respondent Nos.2 to 4 are defendant Nos.1 to 3 before the trial Court. For convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to as they were referred in the suit. 4. The facts of the case, in brief, are that plaintiff filed a suit for perpetual injunction in respect of suit schedule A property and to declare the title of plaintiff in respect of schedule B property and other consequential relief of physical possession after dismantling the temporary structures. 5. In the plaint, it is averred that, originally, one Kavali Yellaiah and Mohd.Hayath were joint owners and possessors of the agricultural land in Sy.No.92 admeasuring Acs.14.13 guntas situated at Mansoorabad Village, Hyderabad East. They have developed the lands and disposed of the plots to various persons, after obtaining the layout from the Gram Panchayat on 14.03.1968. One Vangala Venkat Reddy has purchased the plot bearing No.129 to an extent of 260 Sq.yards (herein after referred as suit schedule A property) under registered sale deed document bearing No.1100/1969, dated 28.03.1969 and the said Vangaala Venkat Reddy had executed a registered GPA bearing document No.9 of 1980 on 19.05.1980 in favour of Mr.M.Poorna Reddy, who executed registered sale deed bearing document No.7124 of 1980 on 22.07.1980 in favour of plaintiff and that the plaintiff has been in possession of suit schedule property. 6. It is averred that in the month of 2nd week of November, 2007, defendant No.1 made efforts to encroach the land of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has constructed a compound wall in the months of November/ December, 2007. 6. It is averred that in the month of 2nd week of November, 2007, defendant No.1 made efforts to encroach the land of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has constructed a compound wall in the months of November/ December, 2007. On 04.02.2008, when the plaintiff visited the suit plot, he noticed that dismantling of compound wall constructed by the plaintiff on northern side, and another compound wall was constructed across plot No.129 regarding 95 Square yards of B Schedule property and thus, plot No.129 is bifurcated into two parts, part A to an extent of 165 square yards and part B to an extent of 95 square yards and further a tin roof was constructed in Schedule B plot; that on verification of records at Sub-Registrar Office, Saroornagar, the plaintiff came to know that defendant Nos.2 and 3 have colluded and created a false, sham and nominal document to usurp the schedule B property. Defendant No.2 claimed that he purchased B Schedule property from one Mohd.Basheer through a GPA N.Sekhar and the said Mohd.Basheer has no right and title in respect of Plot No.129, to an extent of 260 Sq.yards, since his father sold plot No.129 during his life time itself. It is further averred that defendant No.3 has constructed two more small rooms and open gate towards road on southern side and has been continuing with the construction. The plaintiff approached the police, L.B.Nagar, but they have refused to entertain the complaint. Hence, the plaintiff is constrained to file a suit. 7. Defendant No.2 remained ex-parte. 8. Defendant No.3 filed a written statement opposing the allegations made in the plaint and contended that the plaintiff was never in possession of the suit schedule property at any point of time. 9. It is averred that defendants have purchased plot Nos.333 and 334 in Sy.Nos.12 to 16 of Tummubowli Village, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R.District through two registered documents vide document Nos.961 and 962 of 2008, dated 25.02.2008 from their original vendors Smt.Sharada Kumari and Pushpalatha, the legal heirs of late Shanker and Chandraiah, who have purchased the same from one Gopi Suryakala under registered sale deed. The said Gopi Suryakala purchased the said plot from one Srinivasulu and others who made lay out and made plots; that the defendants have been in possession and enjoyment of the same and have raised basement and also constructed compound wall as well as small room for security purpose and they are entitled to the possession of the land. 10. It is further averred that the land belonging to the defendants is in Sy.Nos.12 to 16, whereas, the plaintiff is claiming the plot in Sy.No.92 and basing on which, the defendants are trying to claim the land belonging to the pliantiff. 11. In the written statement filed by defendant No.3, he denied the allegations made in the plaint and contended that one Kavali Ellaiah was the owner of the land to an extent of Acs.8.34 guntas in Sy.No.92 and Mohd.Hayath was the owner of part of Sy.No.92 for the land to an extent of Acs.3.26 guntas situated at Mansoorabad, Ranga Reddy District and both of them obtained layout in Gram Panchayat on 14.03.1968 and M.Srinivasulu, who is the owner of plot No.128, has constructed a house in the said land and Gadde Shivamma, who is owner of plot No.130, has purchased the same from one Yadagiri under a registered sale deed. It is further averred that, after the death of Mohd.Hayath, his son Mohd.Basheer became the owner of plot No.128, admeasuring 236 Sq.yards, Plot No.129 admeasuring 240 Sq.yards, Plot No.130, admeasuring 270 Sq.yards total admeasuring 746 Sq.yards in Sy.No.92. Out of the said properties, the son of Mohd.Hayath Ali has executed a sale- cum-GPA registered agreement in favour of Mr.N.Sekhar in respect of B Schedule Property, which is being claimed by the plaintiff and possession was delivered to defendant No.2. Defendant No.3 purchased the same from defendant No.2 and raised one room and the same was assisted by GHMC and allotted municipal No.3-12-14/129 and the same was assessed to tax. Prior to purchase of the said property, this defendant has verified the pahanies from 1959 till 2003-04. Even in the pahanies for the years 1990-91, 1992-93, 1993- 94, 1994-95 and 1995-96 in column No.13, the possession of late Mohd.Hayat was shown in respect of Acs.3.29 guntas including the pattadar column No.12 and as such the allegation made by the plaintiff that the property was divided into plots in the year 1968 is not correct. 12. Even in the pahanies for the years 1990-91, 1992-93, 1993- 94, 1994-95 and 1995-96 in column No.13, the possession of late Mohd.Hayat was shown in respect of Acs.3.29 guntas including the pattadar column No.12 and as such the allegation made by the plaintiff that the property was divided into plots in the year 1968 is not correct. 12. Defendant No.2 filed written statement as that of defendant No.3 and further averred that defendant No.4 had purchased the schedule B property from defendant No.3 and, since then, he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same and prayed to dismiss the suit. 13. On the basis of the above pleadings of both the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues for trial:- (i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction in respect of A schedule property as prayed for? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title in respect of B Schedule property and for consequential recovery of possession by dismantling the structures in said property? (iii) Whether the alienation by the defendant Nos.2 and 3 in favour of defendant No.4 is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act ? (iv) To what relief? 14. On behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was examined as PW1 and Exs.A1 to A10 documents were marked and on the other hand, defendant No.3 was examined as DW1 and Exs.B1 to B32 documents were marked and one independent witness by name Sri N.Sekhar was examined as DW2. The Defendant No.4 was examined as DW3 and Exs.B33 to B36 documents were marked. 15. After full-fledged trial and upon considering the oral and documentary evidence and the contentions of both the parties, the trial Court decreed the suit, vide judgment and decree dated 11.09.2018. 16. The trial Court categorically observed as hereunder:- “Apparently and evidently, both parties claim right over B schedule property through registered sale deeds. The purchase by the plaintiff is through his vendor Vengala Venkat Reddy who had purchased from original vendors Kavali Yellaiah and Mohd Hayath. The purchase by the defendant no.3 is from defendant no.2 whe inturn had purchased from Mohd Basheer through his GPA holder N.S ekhar and the said Basheer is none other than the son of Mohd Hayath one of the original vendor for disputed Plot no.129. The purchase by the defendant no.3 is from defendant no.2 whe inturn had purchased from Mohd Basheer through his GPA holder N.S ekhar and the said Basheer is none other than the son of Mohd Hayath one of the original vendor for disputed Plot no.129. The plaintiff in order to substantiate his case that the suit property originally belongs to Kava Yellaiah and Mohd Hayath to an extent of Ac. 14.13 gts in S.No.92 art they had jointly obtained permission from the grampanchayath, Maroorabad on 14.03.1968 for converting into plots and had sold the plots intending purchasers and the suit plot 129 is one among them and they jointly sold to Vangala Venkat Reddy to an extent of 260 sqyds through registered sale deed dated 28.03.1969 had placed Ex.A-4. The plaintiff inturn had purchased the property from Venkat Reddy through his GPA holder Poorna Reddy ExA6 dated 14.03.1968. To show that there were no sale transactions during the period from 01.01.1970 to 18.05.2008 from the date of purchase by plaintiffs vendor to till alienation to the plaintiff had placed reliance on ExsA1 to A3 encumbrance certificates. ExA5 is the GPA executed by Venkat Reddy in favour of his GPA holder Poorna Reddy i respect of scit schedule property.” “On B schedule property, except defendant No.1 who had seriously disputed the case of the plaintiff that the plaintif or his vendor had never purchased the suit plot and they were neve in possession at any point of time and he never interfered with suit plot as it is not adjacent to his plots 333 and 334 which are in S.Nos12 to 16, and he never attempted to occupy A schedule property and there is no compound wall around suit plot and never dismantled compound wall on northern side. In support of his version, no evidence is forthcoming and failed to contest the suit subsequent to filing the written statement. Thus an adverse inference has to be drawn against him and the decision relied on by learned counsel for plaintiff in Vidhyadhar Vs Manik Rao and another in AIR 1999 SC 1441 wherein it was held that if the witness did not choose to enter into witness box to state his own case on oath, an adverse inference has to be drawn against him. The said decision is well applicable to the facts of the present case. The said decision is well applicable to the facts of the present case. Except mere and vague denials in the written statement nothing could be elicited to support the case of defendant no.1 and contested the suit on untenable grounds. So it can be safely presumed that due to alleged interference of the defendant no.1 on A schedule property, it put the plaintiff into great inconvenience. Unless contrary is proved, the plaintiff cannot be non suited. Thus entire evidence tilts in favour of plaintiff and against the defendant no.1.” “It is highly ridiculous to accept the case of contesting defendants when once the suit plot was sold to vendor of plaintiff through registered document for more than 3 decades ago and thereafter the purchase by the plaintiff in the year 1980 much prior to filing of the suit, the question of defendants or their vendors in possession during subsequent periods does not arise. Even mere entries in revenue records will not confer any title to the suit property when the registered documents of the plaintiff had rightly answered to the case of the dendants. So the defendants cannot take advantage of the situation because of mere entries in revenue records when they neither challer zed the documents of the plaintiff or his vendor till date and watched a a silent spectator all these daye and thereafte: created a series of dod ments from 2006. So it appears that Ex.B-1 to B-36 documents are just tagged on to have regularization of present dispute with an intention to create multiplicity of proceedings. Even it is strange to visualite that the defendant no.4 during the pendency of suit proceedings had purchased the property under Ex..-36 without obtaining prior permission from the court and thus hit by doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of T.P Act. The entire case of the contesting defendants are surrounded by suspicious circumstarices and they failed to prove their case either through the averments or through the evidence and nothing could be elicited from oral testimony of PW1 and in fact most part of elicitations of Dws 1 to 3 are ir. the nature of hearsay without any corroboration and are in accordanc to the case of the plaintiff. the nature of hearsay without any corroboration and are in accordanc to the case of the plaintiff. On the face of it, there is lack of transpare.ty and fairness on the part of the defendants in establishing their deferise and failed to shift burden on the plaintiff. Even from the sketch. map filed by the plaintiff, it is crystal clear that the defendants had encroached the B schedule plot by raising structures and thus made the plaintiff to run from pillar to coast by knocking the doors of the court. When no better evidence placed to replace the evidence of plaintiff, it becomes a factor to reject the case of the defendants. Thus the claim put forward by the plaintiff is in anyway superior to that of the defencants and thus entitled for recovery of possession of B-Schedule property by dismantling the structures in B-schedule property as the plaintiff declared to be absolute owner of B-Schedule property.” 17. On appeal, the first Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, re-appreciated the entire evidence and material available on record and dismissed the Appeal, vide its judgment dated 27.04.2023, confirming the judgment of the trial Court. 18. The first Appellate Court in its judgment observed as hereunder:- “The plaintiff and the defendant No. 2 to 4 are claiming the right over the B schedule property through a registered sale deeds. On perusal of the record, it reveals that K.Yellaiah and Mohd Hayath are the owners to an extent of Ac.14-13 gts in Sy.No.92 and they obtained permission from Gramapanchayath on 14.03.1968 for converting the land into plots and the said plots are sold to the purchasers and in the said process plot No.129, admeasuring 260 sq.yards was jointly sold to Vangala Venkat Reddy under Ex.A4/registered sale deed, dt.28.03.1969 and the said Vangala Venkat Reddy executed a GPA in favor of on 19.05.1980 vide Ex. A-5 in favor of M.Poorna Reddy and the plaintiff herein purchased the suit schedule plot from the Vangala Venkat Reddy through his GPA holder vide Ex.A6/registered sale deed, dt.14.03.1968 and to prove that there are no sale transaction during the period from 01.10.1970 to 18.05.2008 from the date of purchase by the plaintiff's vendor to till alienation to the plaintiff had placed reliance on Ex.A1 to A3/Encumbrance certificates and in order to substantiate that Ex.A-4 is genuine, the plaintiff placed reliance of Exs.A-9 and A-10 registered sale deeds of neighboring plot owners which tallies with the boundaries of suit schedule property and they had purchased from original owners Yellaiah and Mohd. Hayath and the recitals also indicates that they obtained layout permission from grampanchayat.” “The defendants contended that Mohd Hayath is owner of Ac.3-26 gts and after his demise, the property amongst Mohd. Basheer his brothers was partitioned and the suit schedule plot was allotted to Mohd Basheer. The defendants placed reliance on Ex. B-4 to B-27 pahanis, wherein, the names of Yellaiah to an extent of Ac. 8-34 gts and Mohd. Hayath to an extent of Ac. 3-26 gts is recorded and the defendant No.2, who is the vendor of defendant No.3, failed to contest the suit and the defendant No. 3 and 4 are not clear how their vendor Mohd. Basheer acquired title to the property which was sold by his father Mohd. Hayath in the year 1968 itself. Mere continuation of revenue entries in the name of Mohd. Hayath in the records, does not confer any title on Mohd. Basheer to alienate the suit schedule B property, when his father already alienated the same in the year 1968 itself and the said alienations were not challenged by Mohd. Hayath during his life time nor by their legal heirs and further the defendant No. 4 purchased the schedule B property during the pendency of the suit under Ex. B-36 without obtaining permission from the court and the same is hit by the provisions of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act.” “The case of the defendants is that Mohd Basheer being the owner executed Ex.B-3/agreement of sale-cum-GPA with possession dated 25.04.2006 in favour of N. Sekhar and the said GPA holder executed Ex.B-2/sale deed dåted favour of the defendant No.2 and the defendant No.2 inturn sold the schedule property in favour of defendant No. 3 vide Ex. B-1/agreement of sale-cum-GPA with possession dated 22.01.2008 and the defendant No. 2 through the GPA holder executed a sale deed in favour of defendant No.4 vide Ex.B-36/sale deed dated 6.10.2008. On perusal of the evidence of DWs1 to 3, they have not verified the title of their vendor and without verification they purchased the property and on date of purchase by the defendant No.2, already suit schedule plot was alienated in favour of plaintiff's vendor. As such, the Mohd Basheer do not have any title to alienate in favour of the defendant No.2. Hence, the court below rightly hold that the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of declaration and recovery of possession and decreed the suit. Hence, there are no grounds to interfere the impugned judgment.” 19. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence placed on record and have come to an erroneous conclusion and decreed the suit filed by plaintiff/respondent No.1. Learned counsel would further contend that the plaintiff should not take advantage of weakness of the defendants and has to prove his case on his own strength and merits. In the present case, though copy of sanctioned layout was not filed, the trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court allowed the suit of the plaintiff and thus, came to an erroneous conclusion. He further submitted that the trial Court as well as first Appellate Court have failed to appreciate the fact that the defendant/appellant has constructed the compound wall room which was also assessed by the Municipality and therefore, ought to have dismissed the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff. 20. A perusal of the record reveal that the trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court concurrently held that the plaintiff was able to prove his case, and the defendant has failed to prove and establish his contentions. The trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court have observed that the plaintiff had purchased the plot i.e., suit schedule property in the year 1969 whereas, the defendant is claiming title basing on the document of the year 2006 from one Mohd.Basheer. However, the defendant failed to prove the title of his vendor. 21. The first appellate Court has categorically observed that the defendant failed to establish as to how Mohd. However, the defendant failed to prove the title of his vendor. 21. The first appellate Court has categorically observed that the defendant failed to establish as to how Mohd. Basheer, who is the vendor of defendant, has acquired the title to the suit schedule property and how the same was sold in the year 1968 and that entries are continuing in the revenue records and it does not confer any title. The trial Court has also observed that defendant No.4 has purchased the suit schedule B property without obtaining permission from the Court authority concerned and the same is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The first Appellate Court further observed that the defendants have not verified the title of their vendor as on the date of purchase and failed to notice that as on the date of purchase, the suit schedule property was already alienated in favor of the plaintiff’s vendor’s and that Mohd. Basheer, vendor of defendant, has no title to alienate the suit schedule property of the defendant. 22. However, learned counsel for appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law to be decided by this Court in this Second Appeal. In fact, all the grounds raised in this appeal are factual in nature and do not qualify as the substantial questions of law in terms of Section 100 C.P.C. 23. It is well settled principle by a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court that in the Second Appeal filed under Section 100 C.P.C., this Court cannot interfere with the findings on facts arrived at by the first Appellate Court, which are based on proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record. 24. Further, in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki , [(2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 546] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the High Court sitting in Second Appeal cannot examine the evidence once again as a third trial Court and the power under Section 100 C.P.C. is very limited and it can be exercised only where a substantial question of law is raised and falls for consideration. 25. 25. Having considered the entire material available on record and the findings recorded by the first Appellate Court, this Court finds no ground or reason warranting interference with the said findings under Section 100 C.P.C. Moreover, the grounds raised by the appellant are factual in nature and no question of law, much less a substantial question of law arises for consideration in this Second Appeal. 26. Hence, the Second Appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs. 27. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.