ORDER : V.G.Arun, J. The short yet interesting question arising for consideration is whether the 2 nd proviso to Section 232 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ( BNSS ) prohibits the committal court from considering interlocutory applications filed before it. The facts, in brief, are as under; The petitioner is the accused in Crime No.1806 of 2024 registered at the Punalur Police Station, now pending as C.P.No.21 of 2025 before the JFCM-II, Punalur. His application for renewal of passport is not being considered by the learned Magistrate in view of Section 232 of BNSS . 2. Heard, Adv.Nidhin Raj Vettikkadan for the petitioner, Adv.Ajith Murali, the Public Prosecutor, Adv.O.M.Shalina, the DSGI and Dr.B. Kalam Pasha, who, on request, assisted the court. 3. In order to answer the question involved, it is essential to understand the difference between Section 232 of BNSS and Section 209 of Cr.P.C, the corresponding provision in the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The aforementioned provisions are extracted hereunder for convenience; “ 232. Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it. 3. In order to answer the question involved, it is essential to understand the difference between Section 232 of BNSS and Section 209 of Cr.P.C, the corresponding provision in the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The aforementioned provisions are extracted hereunder for convenience; “ 232. Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it. —When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall— (a) commit, after complying with the provisions of Section 230 or Section 231 the case to the Court of Session, and subject to the provisions of this Sanhita relating to bail, remand the accused to custody until such commitment has been made; (b) subject to the provisions of this Sanhita relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during, and until the conclusion of, the trial; (c) send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to be produced in evidence; (d) notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session: Provided that the proceedings under this section shall be completed within a period of ninety days from the date of taking cognizance, and such period may be extended by the Magistrate for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days for the reasons to be recorded in writing: Provided further that any application filed before the Magistrate by the accused or the victim or any person authorised by such person in a case triable by Court of Session, shall be forwarded to the Court of Session with the committal of the case. “ 209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it. “ 209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it. —When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall— (a) commit, after complying with the provisions of Section 207 or Section 208, as the case may be, the case to the Court of Session, and subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody until such commitment has been made; (b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during, and until the conclusion of, the trial; (c) send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to be produced in evidence; (d) notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session.” (underline supplied) 4. A comparison of the provisions reveals that the only change brought about by Section 232 BNSS is the incorporation of two provisos. Here, we are concerned about the 2 nd proviso, as per which applications filed before the committal Magistrate, in a case triable by the Court of Session, are to be forwarded to the Court of Session with the committal of the case. Pertinent to note that as per Section 209(c) of the Code, what was required to be forwarded by the committal court to the Sessions Court were only “the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to be produced in evidence”. According to Dr.Kalam Pasha, from his long experience as a Judicial Officer, the vague manner in which Section 209(c) of the Code was worded, had led to situations where only the records, documents and articles to be produced in evidence were forwarded to the Sessions Court, while retaining the pending applications in the committal court itself. As a result, there arose instances, where the Sessions Court had to call for those pending applications from the committal court. This, in turn, resulted in delaying the proceedings before the Sessions Court. As a result, there arose instances, where the Sessions Court had to call for those pending applications from the committal court. This, in turn, resulted in delaying the proceedings before the Sessions Court. The 2 nd proviso has been included in Section 232 of BNSS to tide over this anomalous situation by ensuring that all pending applications are forwarded to the Sessions Court along with the records and documents. The argument is well founded since, as per the 1 st proviso to Section 232 , the committal court has to complete the proceedings within 90 days of taking cognisance or within the extended period of 180 days. If the 2 nd proviso is understood as preventing the committal court from considering applications filed in the meanwhile, that would lead to an impasse as in the present case. In Vishnu v. State of Kerala [ 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 6547 ], the very question was considered by this Court in the context of bail applications. The relevant portion of that judgment is extracted below for easy reference; “ 8. The second proviso to Section 232 does stipulate that the Magistrate should forward the applications filed by the accused or victim to the Court of Session with the committal of the case. If the proviso is interpreted as making it obligatory for the Magistrate to forward the bail applications also to the Sessions Court, that would render the power conferred under sub-clause (a) of Section 232 nugatory. The settled legal position is that a proviso has to be construed as a qualification and not as a contradiction of the main provision. The legal maxim Ut res magis valeat quam pereat, meaning 'the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed' will apply in such situations. The courts should therefore interpret Section 232 and its proviso in such manner as to give effect to the statute as a whole.” 5.The attempt should also be to interpret the provision by understanding the mischief that is intended to be remedied. The law on this point is exposited by the Apex Court in Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress and Others [1991 Supp (1) SCC 600], in the following manner; “ 119 . The law on this point is exposited by the Apex Court in Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress and Others [1991 Supp (1) SCC 600], in the following manner; “ 119 . Whenever a statute comes up for consideration, it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language, and for that matter any language in use today, is not an instrument of mathematical precision. It has been said that our literature would have been much the poorer if it were. Leaving, however, the question of richness or poverty of our literature apart, we must proceed on the assumption that human mind cannot foresee everything. It has, therefore, been said that when a question arises whether the power has been properly conferred and even if so, the extent of it, Lord Denning has opined that a judge in such a situation cannot simply fold his hand and blame the draftsmen and look for new enactment. Lord Denning invites us to set to work on the construction task of finding the intention of the Parliament or the law making body and we must, however, do this not only from the language of the statute, because, as we have seen, language is an imperfect medium and very often thoughts are perpetually in search of 'broken language'. But the judge must also do it from a consideration of the social conditions which give rise to it, and of the mischief which it was intended to remedy and also in the light of the constitutional inhibitions and then supplant the written words and add to it and give 'force and life' to the intention and purpose of the legislature or the law making authority. A judge must not alter the material of which a law or an instrument is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases and if one may venture to say, make articulate the inarticulate premise but make articulate only that which follow from necessary compulsions of the situations and the constitutional position. See in this connection the observations of Lord Denning in "The Discipline of Law" at page 12.” 6. See in this connection the observations of Lord Denning in "The Discipline of Law" at page 12.” 6. Once we resort to the above methods of interpretation, bearing in mind the fundamental aspect that criminal courts cannot be denuded of the power to pass orders, unless specifically prohibited by statute, it will be clear that the 2 nd proviso to Section 232 of BNSS does not interdict the committal courts from considering applications filed by the accused or victim, while the matter is pending before the court but only makes it mandatory for the Magistrate to forward all pending applications to the Court of Session with the committal of the case. To be more precise, the applications to be forwarded along with the committal are those applications which are pending as on the date of committal and the committal court is not prevented from deciding applications while the proceeding is pending before that court. 7. In the result, the Crl.M.C is disposed of by making it clear that the Judicial Magistrate of First Class-II, Punalur is empowered to entertain and pass appropriate orders in the applications filed by the accused in C.P.No.21 of 2025. I place on record my appreciation of Dr.Kalam Pasha for the valuable assistance rendered.