JUDGMENT : A. BADHARUDEEN, J. This appeal is at the instance of the 2 nd accused in C.C.No.36 of 2002 on the files of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kozhikode. The appellant impugns conviction and sentence imposed against him in the said case dated 26.11.2009. The respondent herein is the State of Kerala represented by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau (`VACB’ for short). 2. Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/accused as well as the learned Special Public Prosecutor for VACB. 3. Perused the verdicts impugned as well as the records of the Special Court. 4. The prosecution case is that the 1 st accused while working as Village Officer, Thirunelly from 01.07.1992 to 30.04.1996 being a public servant abused his official position, hatched criminal conspiracy with the 2 nd accused, who is none other than his son, and in pursuance of the said conspiracy they filed a suo motu case to the Tahsildar (Land Tribunal), Mananthavady, with a view to assign 32 cents of land in Survey No.329 in Thirunelly Village in the name of the 2 nd accused by suppressing the original title of the said land in the name of third parties. Consequently, Tahsildar, Land Tribunal, Mananthavady, had issued a purchase certificate in the name of the 2 nd accused in respect of the above 32 cents of land. On this premise, the prosecution would allege that the 1 st accused, after hatching conspiracy with the 2 nd accused, committed criminal misconduct by falsifying records and thereby obtained illegal gratification for himself and to the 2 nd accused. On this premise, the prosecution alleged that the accused committed offences punishable under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (`PC Act, 1988’ for short hereinafter) as well as under Sections 409, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (`IPC’ for short). 5. The learned Senior Counsel, who argued to upset the verdict under challenge vehemently pointed out that the 2 nd accused was convicted and sentenced for the offence punishable under Section 120B of IPC alone even though the prosecution evidence are quite insufficient to find any conspiracy in between the 1 st and 2 nd accused though admittedly the 2 nd accused is the son of the 1 st accused. It is also pointed out that a purchase certificate was issued in favour of the 2 nd accused, in respect of 32 cents of property, as alleged by the prosecution, but later the same was cancelled and the said order was not at all challenged. Accordingly the property was reverted back to the landlord as per law. Since the offence under Section 120B of IPC alleged against the 2 nd accused is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, he would deserve acquittal, enlarging benefit of doubt. 6. Negating this contention, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that when proceedings for cancellation of the purchase certificate was issued, the appellant/2 nd accused opposed the same by filing objection and the same would show that the purchase certificate was issued in the name of the 2 nd accused at the outcome of conspiracy hatched between the 1 st and 2 nd accused. 7. Repelling this contention, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the 1 st accused not only recommended suo motu case against the 2 nd accused, but also initiated suo motu proceedings in favour of his relatives also in respect of the said revenue land. 8. Having appraised the rival arguments, the questions arise for consideration are: (i) Whether the Special Court went wrong in finding that the appellant/2 nd accused committed the offence punishable under Section 120B of IPC without support of sufficient evidence? (ii) Whether it is necessary to interfere with the verdict under challenge? (iii) The order to be passed? Point Nos.(i) to (iii) 9. This case emanated when PW1, a social worker residing at Kattikulam, Wayanad District, filed a complaint before the Petition Committee, Kerala Legislative Assembly pertaining to 32 cents of land comprised in Survey 329 at Thirunelly Village situated at Pothummoola alleging that the purchase certificate issued in the name of the 2 nd accused was illegally obtained at the behest of the 1 st accused, the Village Officer, Thirunelly, on registering a suo motu case by himself in respect of this property in the name of his son, the 2 nd accused. PW1 deposed about filing of this complaint and he also deposed that subsequently one Jayakrishnan filed a complaint before the Land Tribunal and in the said complaint, the purchase certificate issued in the name of the 2 nd accused was cancelled. 10. PW2 examined in this case is Jayakrishnan. PW1 deposed about filing of this complaint and he also deposed that subsequently one Jayakrishnan filed a complaint before the Land Tribunal and in the said complaint, the purchase certificate issued in the name of the 2 nd accused was cancelled. 10. PW2 examined in this case is Jayakrishnan. According to him, 2 acre 82 cents of property in Pothummoola were possessed by PW2 and his father Venkita Ramanan Chetty on the strength of a lease obtained by Venkita Ramanan Chetty, his father, from Uralan Vadakkan Muthannan, the landlord. 30 cents out of the total extent was given to one Jogy as per certificate of purchase. The remaining property coming to 23 acre 52 cents were in the possession of PW2 and his father and they paid tax in respect of the said property, including 32 cents assigned in favour of the 2 nd accused. His evidence further is that during 1995-96, when he had gone for payment of tax to the Village Office, the Village Officer Sri Kunhimuhammed told him that certificate of purchase in respect of this 32 cents of property was issued in the name of the 2 nd accused, who is the son of the 1 st accused, the Village Officer, Thirunelly, on the basis of a suo motu case initiated by the 1 st accused in respect of the said property. According to him, he had made a complaint in this regard to the Tahsildar (Land Tribunal), Collector, Wayanad and Assistant Collector. Subsequently the said purchase certificate was cancelled. Thereafter he had paid basic tax to the property as on 08.06.1993. Ext.P1 is the said tax receipt. Subsequently he had paid tax on 05.07.1997 and receipt for the same is Ext.P2. Ext.P3 is the copy of the order of the Land Tribunal tendered in evidence through PW2. Ext.P8 is the original possession certificate issued in the name of PW2 by the 1 st accused. 11. PW3 examined in this case is the Village Officer, Thirunelli village from June, 1996 to November, 1999. He deposed that there was a proceeding for the cancellation of Certificate of Purchase issued in the name of the 2 nd accused in respect of 32 cents of land in R.S.329 in Thirunelly Village. According to PW3, the said property was situated at Pothummoola and the same originally belonged to Thirunelly Devaswom. He deposed that there was a proceeding for the cancellation of Certificate of Purchase issued in the name of the 2 nd accused in respect of 32 cents of land in R.S.329 in Thirunelly Village. According to PW3, the said property was situated at Pothummoola and the same originally belonged to Thirunelly Devaswom. Since the Land Tribunal Tahasildar wrongly issued purchase certificate in the name of the 2 nd accused, the same was cancelled. The cancellation proceedings were initiated, based on a complaint filed by Jayakrishnan (PW-2). The file regarding the proceedings of cancellation of the Certificate of Purchase was forwarded to the Village Office, Thirunelly. He identified the said file as L.A.4/95/TNLY. In that file, one U.K. Muhammed, Tholppetty had filed an application for obtaining Certificate of Purchase in respect of 2 cents of property in R.S. 117/4B. A- 1 had forwarded this application to Tahsildar and recommended for the issuance of Certificate of Purchase in the name of U.K. Muhammed. Subsequently report from the Revenue Inspector was called for. The then Village Officer was himself, who filed a report to the Tahsildar (Land Tribunal) stating that there was no necessity for the issuance of Certificate of Purchase. Further, another L.A.14/95/TNLY file was also produced to the Vigilance Police, which was marked as Ext.P-6. That file was in the name of one Raju, brother-in-law of the 1 st accused. As per Ext.P6, there were 50 cents of property in R.S. 280 and 17 cents of property in R.S. 73. The 1 st accused Kunhiraman had recommended for issuance of Certificate of Purchase in respect of 69 cents of property in the name of P.Raju, who was none other than his brother-in-law. On 3-7-1996, the Revenue Inspector had returned the file for a further report to him and he had reported as, ‘that cannot be granted’. Likewise, another file No.A5/19752/97 in the name of A. Rajendran in respect of application for Certificate of Purchase for 12 cents of property in Rs.353/1A was produced and marked as Ext.P-7. In this case also, the 1 st accused recommended the issuance of Certificate of Purchase. He had made a report against that recommendation made by the 1 st accused. Based on that report, that Order was cancelled. In this case also, the 1 st accused recommended the issuance of Certificate of Purchase. He had made a report against that recommendation made by the 1 st accused. Based on that report, that Order was cancelled. Thus the evidence of PW3 would show that the 1 st accused had made recommendation for issuance of Certificate of Purchase to so many people including his relatives, brother-in-law and friends in respect of revenue lands. 12. PW4 was examined by the prosecution to prove that the 32 cents of property on which patta was issued in the name of the 2 nd accused was originally purchased from Venkita Ramana Chetty and as per the consent given by Venkita Ramana Chetty he had possessed the said property and constructed a shed therein and resided there for about 3½ decades. Once the 1 st accused had come to that property and had taken measurement of the said property. Further he deposed that the 1 st accused had enquired as to whether PW4 was willing to sell the property. According to PW4, he had informed the 1 st accused that the property belonged to Venkita Ramana Chetty. He deposed further that after the death of Venkita Ramana Chetty, PW2, Jayakrishnan, had possessed the property. 13. The case advanced by the accused herein is that he had obtained the property from one Sivaraman Nair, who had obtained possessory right from P.D.Sasidharan, who was a cultivating tenant. The further case of the accused is that the said property was originally belonged to Thirunelly Devaswom and Cheriya Thimmappan Chetty had taken the same on lease from the Uralan. Thereafter, P.D.Sasidharan had possessed the property. P.D.Sasidharan, who was examined as PW4, deposed that the property was originally belonged to Venkita Ramana Chetty and after his death the same was possessed by Jayakrishnan. As regards to obtaining of property by one Sivaraman Nair, as contended by the accused, the prosecution examined son of Sivaraman nair as PW5 and he had deposed that his father had no property extending to 32 cents, as contended by the accused and no documents were given to anybody by his father in relation to the said property. He also denied the purchase of the said property by his father from one Sasidharan, as contended by the accused. He also denied the purchase of the said property by his father from one Sasidharan, as contended by the accused. PW6, the Village Officer of Mananthavady in charge of Village Office, Thirunelly from 01.07.2000 onwards, deposed that Ext.P2 tax receipt dated 05.09.1997 was issued by him to one Jayakrishnan after collecting the tax. He also deposed about a dispute in between Jayakrishnan (PW2) and the 2 nd accused and cancellation of the purchase certificate in the name of the 2 nd accused. 14. PW8 examined in this case is the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Wayanad and as directed by him this crime was registered and Ext.P11 is the FIR marked through him. PW9, the then Inspector, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Wayanad had conducted investigation from 29.02.2000 to 01.09.2000; recorded statement of witnesses and seized Exts.P1, P2, P3 and P9 documents. PW10 and PW11 are the subsequent investigating officers, who had investigated this crime and they deposed about the investigation. It was through PW10 Ext.P5, the file regarding the Certificate of Purchase, Ext.P12 mahazar and Ext.P7 documents as per Ext.P13 mahazar were let in evidence. 15. PW7 deposed that he was the Head Ministerial Officer, Land Tribunal, Mananthavady from 25-11-1999 till 2000 December. He had produced 2 documents to the Vigilance Police in respect of this case. Police had seized those documents as per a Mahazar. The file regarding SMC 3/96 was marked as Ext.P-9. There is an Order in I.A.4/97 in SMC 3/96. Certified copy of the Order in I.A.4/97 was marked as Ext.P-3. The Mahazar is marked as Ext.P-10. In Ext.P-9 file, the then Village Officer, A.P. Kunhiraman had filed a report for initiating SMC proceedings. That was on 15-12-1995. As per that report, the property was in possession of tenant. In that, the Survey Number was 172/6, the extent was 32 cents (13.00 hectre), name of the tenant was shown as Sreekanth Pattayan (A-2), the name of the landlord was shown as Panamkolly Devi, Avva and others. It is also stated that Sreekanth (A2) had obtained this property as per an agreement dated 5-2-1993 from one Sivaraman Nair. The boundaries shown in the SMC report and the agreement are different. On 10-3-1996, Certificate of Purchase was issued in the name of Sreekanth by the Village Officer Kunhiraman (A-1). Ext.P-3, is the Order of Cancellation of that Certificate of Purchase. 16. The boundaries shown in the SMC report and the agreement are different. On 10-3-1996, Certificate of Purchase was issued in the name of Sreekanth by the Village Officer Kunhiraman (A-1). Ext.P-3, is the Order of Cancellation of that Certificate of Purchase. 16. The crucial point to be decided in this case is, whether the conspiracy alleged to be committed by the 2 nd accused, who is none other than the son of the 1 st accused, has been proved substantially beyond reasonable doubts with the necessary ingredients? 17. Criminal conspiracy in terms of section 120B of the IPC is an independent offence. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy, as laid down by the Apex Court are: (i) an agreement between two or more persons; (ii) the agreement must relate to doing or causing to be done either (a) an illegal act; (b) an act which is not illegal in itself but is done by illegal means. The most important ingredient of the offence being the agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act. In a case where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the court must inquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end, or they have come together to pursue the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators, but the latter does. For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient. A conspiracy is a continuing offence which continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded or frustrated by choice of necessity. During its subsistence whenever any one of the conspirators does an act or series of acts, he would be held guilty under section 120B of the IPC. 18. Thus the gist of the offence under section 120A is that the agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means subject to the proviso that the agreement does not except agreement to commit offence, amount to a conspiracy unless it is followed by an overt act done by one or more persons in pursuance of such an agreement. An agreement to do an illegal act which amounts to a conspiracy, will continue as long as the members of the conspiracy remain in agreement and as long as they are acting in accord and in furtherance of the object for which they entered into the agreement. 19. It is not necessary that conspirators should know each and every detail of the plot so long as they are conspirators in the main object. Participation of all the conspirators from the very inception of conspiracy is also not necessary. Unity of purpose and the participation of the conspirators at different stages are the determinative factors. 20. In this context, it is relevant to notice the Objects and Reasons of the said amendment to understand that the underlying purpose of introducing section 120A was to make a mere agreement to do an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means, punishable, the same are as follows: 21. The sections of the IPC which deal directly with the subject of conspiracy are those contained in Chapter V and section 121A of the IPC. Under the latter provision, it is an offence to conspire to commit any of the offences punishable by section 121 of the IPC or to conspire to deprive the King of sovereignty of British India or any part thereof or to overawe by means of criminal force or show of criminal force the Government of India or any Local Government and to constitute a conspiracy under this section. It is not necessary that any act or illegal omission should take place in pursuance thereof. Under section 107, abetment includes engaging with one or more person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of a thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing. In other words, except in respect of the offences particularised in section 121A conspiracy per se is not an offence under the IPC. 22. On the other hand, by the common law of England, if two or more persons agree together to do anything contrary to law, or to use unlawful means in the carrying out of an object not otherwise unlawful, the persons, who so agree, commit the offence of conspiracy. 22. On the other hand, by the common law of England, if two or more persons agree together to do anything contrary to law, or to use unlawful means in the carrying out of an object not otherwise unlawful, the persons, who so agree, commit the offence of conspiracy. In other words, conspiracy in England may be defined as an agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means, and the parties to such a conspiracy are liable to indictment. 23. Experience has shown that dangerous conspiracies have entered into India which have for their object aims other than the commission of the offences specified in section 121A of the IPC and that the existing law is inadequate to deal with modern conditions. The present Bill is designed to assimilate the provisions of the IPC to those of the English law with the additional safeguard that in the case of a conspiracy other than a conspiracy to commit an offence some overt act is necessary to bring the conspiracy within the purview of the criminal law. The Bill makes criminal conspiracy a substantive offence, and when such a conspiracy is to commit an offence punishable with death, or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, and no express provision is made in the Code, provides a punishment of the same nature as that which might be awarded for the abetment of such an offence. In all other cases of criminal conspiracy, the punishment contemplated is imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months or with fine, or with both. 24. Prior to the amendment of the Code and the introduction of sections 120A and B, the doctrine of agency was applicable to ascertain the liability of the conspirators, however, conspiracy in itself was not an offence (except for certain offences). The amendment had made conspiracy a substantive offence and rendered the mere agreement to commit an offence is punishable. Prior to the amendment, unless an overt act took place in furtherance of the conspiracy it was not indictable (it would become indictable by virtue of being abetment). 25. The amendment had made conspiracy a substantive offence and rendered the mere agreement to commit an offence is punishable. Prior to the amendment, unless an overt act took place in furtherance of the conspiracy it was not indictable (it would become indictable by virtue of being abetment). 25. In [ (1999) 5 SCC 253 : AIR 1999 SC 2640 : 1999 (3) SCR 1 ], State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini and Others , the Apex Court explained that conspiracy results in a joint responsibility and everything said written or done in furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been done by each of them. The Court held: 1. Under section 120A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offence of criminal conspiracy is committed when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act or legal act by illegal means. When it is a legal act by illegal means overt act is necessary. Offence of criminal conspiracy is an exception to the general law where intent alone does not constitute crime. It is intention to commit crime and joining hands with persons having the same intention. Not only the intention but there has to be agreement to carry out the object of the intention, which is an offence. The question for consideration in a case is did all the accused have the intention and did they agree that the crime be committed. It would not be enough for the offence of conspiracy when some of the accused merely entertained a wish, howsoever horrendous it may be, that offence be committed. 2. Acts subsequent to the achieving of the object of conspiracy may tend to prove that a particular accused was party to the conspiracy. Once the object of conspiracy has been achieved, any subsequent act, which may be unlawful, would not make the accused a part of the conspiracy like giving shelter to an absconder. 3. Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely possible to establish a conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually, both the existence of the conspiracy and its objects must be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused. 4. 3. Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely possible to establish a conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually, both the existence of the conspiracy and its objects must be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused. 4. Conspirators may for example, be enrolled in a chain- A enrolling B, B enrolling C, and so on; and all will be members of a single conspiracy if they so intend and agree, even though each member knows only the person who enrolled him and the person whom he enrols. There may be a kind of umbrella-spoke enrolment, where a single person at the centre does the enrolling and all the other members are unknown to each other, though they know that there are to be other members. These are theories and in practice it may be difficult to tell which conspiracy in a case falls into which category. It may however, even overlap. But then there must be present mutual interest. Persons may be members of single conspiracy even though each is ignorant of the identity of many others who may have diverse roles to play. It is not a part of the crime of conspiracy that all the conspirators need to agree to play the same or an active role. 5. When two or more persons agree to commit a crime of conspiracy, then regardless of making or considering any plans for its commission, and despite the fact that no step is taken by any such person to carry out their common purpose, a crime is committed by each and every one who joins in the agreement. There has thus to be two conspirators and there may be more than that. To prove the charge of conspiracy it is not necessary that intended crime was committed or not. If committed it may further help prosecution to prove the charge of conspiracy. 6. It is not necessary that all conspirators should agree to the common purpose at the same time. They may join with other conspirators at any time before the consummation of the intended objective, and all are equally responsible. What part each conspirator is to play may not be known to everyone or the fact as to when a conspirator joined the conspiracy and when he left. 7. They may join with other conspirators at any time before the consummation of the intended objective, and all are equally responsible. What part each conspirator is to play may not be known to everyone or the fact as to when a conspirator joined the conspiracy and when he left. 7. A charge of conspiracy may prejudice the accused because it forces them into a joint trial and the court may consider the entire mass of evidence against every accused. Prosecution must produce evidence not only to show that each of the accused has knowledge of the object of conspiracy but also of the agreement. In the charge of conspiracy, the court must guard itself against the danger of unfairness to the accused. Introduction of evidence against some may result in the conviction of all, which is to be avoided. By means of evidence in conspiracy, which is otherwise inadmissible in the trial of any other substantive offence prosecution tries to implicate the accused not only in the conspiracy itself but also in the substantive crime of the alleged conspirators. There is always difficulty in tracing the precise contribution of each member of the conspiracy but then there must be cogent and convincing evidence against each one of the accused charged with the offence of conspiracy. As observed by Judge Learned Hand "this distinction is important today when many prosecutors seek to sweep within the dragnet of conspiracy all those who have been associated in any degree whatever with the main offenders”. 8. As stated above it is the unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment, which is the gist of essence of the crime of conspiracy. Offence of criminal conspiracy is complete even though there is no agreement as to the means by which the purpose is to be accomplished. It is the unlawful agreement which is the gravamen of the crime of conspiracy. The unlawful agreement which amounts to a conspiracy need not be formal or express but may be inherent in and inferred from the circumstances, especially declarations, acts and conduct of the conspirators. The agreement need not be entered into by all the parties to it at the same time but may be reached by successive actions evidencing their joining of the conspiracy. 9. The agreement need not be entered into by all the parties to it at the same time but may be reached by successive actions evidencing their joining of the conspiracy. 9. It has been said that a criminal conspiracy is a partnership in crime, and that there is in each conspiracy a joint or mutual agency for the prosecution of a common plan. Thus, if two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefore. This means that everything said, written of done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done of written by each of them and this joint responsibility extends not only to what is done by any of the conspirators pursuant to the original agreement but also to collateral acts incidental to and growing out of the original purpose. A conspirator is not responsible, however, for acts done by a co-conspirator after termination of the conspiracy. The joinder of a conspiracy by a new member does not create a new conspiracy nor does it change the status of the other conspirators, and the mere fact that conspirators individually or in groups perform different tasks to a common end does not split up a conspiracy into several different conspiracies. 10. A man may join a conspiracy by word or by deed. However, criminal responsibility for a conspiracy requires more than a merely passive attitude towards an existing conspiracy. One who commits an overt act with knowledge of the conspiracy is guilty, and one who tacitly consents to the object of a conspiracy and goes along with other conspirators, standing by while the others put the conspiracy into effect, is guilty though he intends to take no active part in the crime. 26. The law on the issue emerges to the effect that conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means. The object behind the conspiracy is to achieve the aim of conspiracy. In order to achieve the ultimate object, parties may adopt many means. 26. The law on the issue emerges to the effect that conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means. The object behind the conspiracy is to achieve the aim of conspiracy. In order to achieve the ultimate object, parties may adopt many means. Such means may constitute different offences by themselves, but so long as they are adopted to achieve the ultimate object of the conspiracy, those are also acts of conspiracy. For an offence of conspiracy, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that conspirators expressly agreed to do an illegal act, the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. It is also not necessary that each member of the conspiracy should know all the details of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is a continuing offence. Thus, if any act or omission which constitutes an offence is done in India or outside its territory, the conspirators continue to be the parties to the conspiracy. The conspiracy may be a general one and a smaller one which may develop in successive stages. It is an unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment, which is the gist/essence of the crime of conspiracy. In order to determine whether the conspiracy was hatched, the court is required to view the entire agreement and to find out as in fact what the conspirators intended to do. 27. Offence of criminal conspiracy is an exception to the general law where intent alone does not constitute a crime. It is intention to commit crime and joining hands with persons having the same intention. Law making conspiracy a crime is designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief which is gained by a combination of the means. The encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to one another rendering enterprise possible which, if left to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. The conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design. Offence of criminal conspiracy has its foundation in an agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means. Offence of criminal conspiracy has its foundation in an agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means. A criminal conspiracy must be put to action because so long a crime is generated in the mind of an accused, it does not become punishable. What is necessary is not the thoughts, which may even be criminal in character, and often involuntary, but an offence would be said to have been committed thereunder only when that take concrete shape of an agreement to do or cause to be done an illegal act or an act which although not illegal by illegal means and then if nothing further is done, such an agreement would give rise to a criminal conspiracy. 28. The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by agreement. The agreement may be express or implied, or in part express and in part implied. The conspiracy arises and the offence is committed as soon as the agreement is made; and the offence continues to be committed so long as the combination persists. That is until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it may be. In a criminal conspiracy meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act is sine qua non but proving this by direct proof is not possible. Hence conspiracy and its objective can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the accused. 29. The law on conspiracy has been described as "the least systematic", the most irrational branch of English Penal Law. An agreement to commit the tort of trespass to land, if accompanied by an intention to inflict more than merely nominal damage, was held to be a criminal conspiracy. Certain persons agreed to rob the bank if it was safe to do so; their agreement will necessarily involve the commission of the offence of robbery if it is carried out in accordance with their intentions. 30. The Special Court has given reliance on Ext.P5 file regarding L.A.4/95/TNLY and found that the disputed purchase certificate generated in the name of the 2 nd accused, as alleged by the prosecution, had been received by the 2 nd accused. 30. The Special Court has given reliance on Ext.P5 file regarding L.A.4/95/TNLY and found that the disputed purchase certificate generated in the name of the 2 nd accused, as alleged by the prosecution, had been received by the 2 nd accused. Apart from that, the Special Court found that the 1 st accused had initiated SM proceedings in respect of the 2 cents of property comprised in Re survey No.117/4B in the name of one V.K.Muhammed 50 cents of property in Re-survey No.280 was recommended for issue of purchase certificate in the name of V.Raju, the brother in law of the 1 st accused, in respect of a property, which was originally belonged to Thirunelly Devaswom and possessed by PW2 and his father. It is argued by the learned Public Prosecutor that when cancellation of purchase certificate issued in the name of the 2 nd accused was considered, he had filed objection and had resisted the proceedings to substantiate that, the same also would show his role as part of his conspiracy in the matter of issuance of patta in his favour. 31. In this case, it is true that a property originally belonged to Thirunelly Devaswom in possession of Cheriya Thimmappan Chetty, subsequently possessed by P.D.Sasidharan (PW2), was the property for which certificate of purchase was issued in the name of the 2 nd accused in the suo motu proceedings initiated by the 1 st accused, who is the father of the 2 nd accused, knowing fully well that the property was not that of Sivaraman Nair, on the basis of a false agreement executed by Sivaraman Nair. However, the question to be considered is whether the 2 nd accused also involved in this crime by hatching conspiracy with the 1 st accused. 32. According to the learned counsel for the appellant/2 nd accused, the 2 nd accused was a young boy at the time when the 1 st accused, his father, had initiated suo motu proceedings, acting on an agreement executed by Sivaraman Nair to get the purchase certificate in the name of the appellant/2 nd accused. In fact, the appellant/2 nd accused had no knowledge or no intention to obtain the purchase certificate in his name for which he had no right, and he, in fact, was named by his father, though consequential thereto the purchase certificate was issued in the name of the appellant/2 nd accused. In fact, the appellant/2 nd accused had no knowledge or no intention to obtain the purchase certificate in his name for which he had no right, and he, in fact, was named by his father, though consequential thereto the purchase certificate was issued in the name of the appellant/2 nd accused. Thus the conspiracy element at the helm of the appellant/2 nd accused could not be found beyond any reasonable doubt, and by giving the benefit of doubt, the appellant/2 nd accused is liable to be acquitted. 33. Here, no doubt, the 1 st accused, who is the father of the appellant/2 nd accused recommended suo motu proceedings to obtain the purchase certificate in respect of 32 cents of land in the name of the appellant/2 nd accused. He also recommended suo motu proceedings in favour of his brother in law and relatives, as already discussed. It is true that at the time when the suo motu proceedings to issue purchase certificate in the name of the appellant/2 nd accused had been recommended, he was a young lad and he might have been obedient to the whims and fancies of his father. Therefore, whether he had any role in getting the purchase certificate in his favour, though subsequently it had been cancelled, hatching conspiracy, would require cogent evidence. Otherwise, for the wrong committed by his father, the appellant/2 nd accused could not be fastened with criminal culpability with the aid of Section 120B of IPC. Even though the appellant/2 nd accused had obtained the purchase certificate and later he had objected cancellation of the same strongly believing that the recommendation made by his father for getting the purchase certificate was based on legal documents, the same would not be sufficient to hold that there was meeting up of the minds between the appellant/2 nd accused and his father to commit the crime and some doubts subsist in this regard. The said doubts are to be adjudged in favour of the appellant/2 nd accused. In view of the matter, I am inclined to acquit the accused, enlarging the benefit of doubt, holding that the conspiracy alleged against him was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. 34. In the result, this appeal succeeds. The conviction and sentence imposed against the appellant/2 nd accused impugned herein stand set aside. Accordingly the Appeal is allowed. In view of the matter, I am inclined to acquit the accused, enlarging the benefit of doubt, holding that the conspiracy alleged against him was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. 34. In the result, this appeal succeeds. The conviction and sentence imposed against the appellant/2 nd accused impugned herein stand set aside. Accordingly the Appeal is allowed. The appellant is acquitted for the offences under Section 120B of the IPC and he is set at liberty forthwith. His bail bond stands cancelled. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kozhikode, for information and compliance.