ORDER : O.S.No.119 of 2006 is a suit filed for a direction to divide the suit property into ten equal shares by metes and bounds and allot 4 shares to the plaintiff. The plaint indicates that the suit property was purchased on 12.09.1980 jointly by one Govindasamy Chettiar, the grand father of the plaintiff, Alagammai and Ramanathan, the defendants 1 and 2. 2. According to the plaintiff, the sale consideration was contributed by one Govindasamy Chettiar, Alagammai and Ramanathan at the ratio of 40:30:30. His claim of 40% share is through the Will of Govindasamy dated 27.07.1994 registered as Doc.No.132 of 1994, wherein, the said Govindasamy has ascertained his share in the property as 40%. According to the plaintiff, he sought for division of the land from the co-sharers, so that, he can start an industry of his own. However, the division was delayed by the other co-sharers and hence after causing notice, the present suit is filed for partition. 3. The first and the second defendants have filed separate written statement, wherein both independently and individually had made claim of 40% in the property and denying the claim of 40% share by the plaintiff. 4. The trial Court on considering the rival contentions had framed the following issues: i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for division of the suit property with 10 shares and get 4 shares out of it? ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for separate possession of 4/10 shares in the suit property? iii) To what other relief? 5. The plaintiff has marked seven documents and has mounted the witness box to be examined as P.W.1. On the side of defendants, two documents were marked and three witnesses were examined. While the plaintiff claims 40% shares in the suit property. The title documents Ex.A1 dated 12.09.1980, recital indicates that the suit property was jointly purchased by Govindasamy Chettiar, Alagammai and Ramanathan without indicating their proportionate right in the property or the respective contribution made towards the sale consideration. The plaintiff relies upon the Will of Govindasamy marked as Ex.A2 dated 27.07.1994 and the death certificate of Govindasamy, wherein the recital in Ex.A2 indicates that the Govindasamy presumed to have holding 40% share in the property and bequeathed it to the plaintiff. The other exhibits relied by the plaintiff are the notice issued by the learned counsel on behalf of the plaintiff and the acknowledgement card. 6. The other exhibits relied by the plaintiff are the notice issued by the learned counsel on behalf of the plaintiff and the acknowledgement card. 6. Contrarily, the plaintiffs 1 and 2, both claiming each 40% in the property had relied upon Ex.B.1 named as Varthamanam Letter dated 16.09.1980 and an agreement of sale dated 06.04.1980. The trial Court after considering the exhibits, found that the Varthamanam Letter marked as Ex.B1 entered between seven persons in respect of the suit schedule property as well as the adjacent property of equal measurement whereas the suit is only in respect of property covered under Ex.A1 purchased by three persons, who are all parties to the suit. Varthamanam Letter Ex.B.1 and the sale agreement Ex.B2 in respect of the other portion of the property will not bind the plaintiff. Ultimately allowed the suit partly by holding that the plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 are entitled for 1/3 shares in the suit property going by the title document marked as Ex.A1. 7. Being aggrieved, the second defendant Ramanathan had preferred an appeal suit before this Court. This Court taking into consideration Section 45 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 had held that though these two documents are unregistered documents, it can be taken into consideration, since Govindasamy Chettiar, the predecessor in title to the plaintiff had consciously entered into the said agreement namely Varthamanam Letter Ex.B.1 restricting his share in the property to 4/10. Therefore plaintiff is entitled for 4 shares out of 10 shares. 8. The second respondent has come before this Court by way of Review Application stating that the learned Single Judge ought not to have relied upon Exs.B1 and B2 for fixing the shares of the parties, since these two unregistered documents are not only contrary to the registered sale deed Ex.A1, but also these documents are between parties who are not the party to the sale deed. Ex.A1 The contribution to the sale consideration fixed by the learned Single Judge is witshout any basis. 9. It is also stated that Exs.B1 and B2 which deals with the property other than the suit property, and between the persons who are not parties to the suit ought not to have been taken for consideration even for collateral purpose. Ex.A1 The contribution to the sale consideration fixed by the learned Single Judge is witshout any basis. 9. It is also stated that Exs.B1 and B2 which deals with the property other than the suit property, and between the persons who are not parties to the suit ought not to have been taken for consideration even for collateral purpose. The review application is stoutly opposed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the ground that the scope and ambit of review been well laid down by the Judgements of the Superior Court. The grounds raised in the review application does not fall within the general principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. For easy reference general principles regarding power of review in Sanjay Kumar Agarwal -Vs- State Tax Officer and Others in 2024(2) Section 362 as below: B. Constitution of India-Arts. 137 and 145-Power of review -General Principles for exercise of -Summarised (1) A Judgement is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record (2) A Judgement pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so (3) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the fact of record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review (4) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be '' reheard and corrected'' (5) A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be '' an appeal in disguise'' (6) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided (7) An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions (8) Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review- CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE , 1908-S.114 and Or.47-Supreme Court Rules, 2013 Or.XLVII (Para16) 10. This Court is take into consideration the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and relied by the counsels, and the principle laid therein, when there is an error on the face of the record that review of that erroneous judgements is warranted. In this case, the learned Judge had missed the main fulcrum of the plaint upon which the suit revolves. Hence, it is the duty of the Court to review the same and ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice. The learned Judge had dealt with the facts of the case and the documents at length in his order which is under review, this Court confines with pointing the error apparent on the faces of record which warrants review. 11. The plaintiff who had sought for division of the property rely on two documents; the first document is the sale deed of the suit property which is marked as Ex.A1. The recitals found in the documents clearly indicates that it has been jointly purchased by Govindasamy Chettiar, Alagammai and Ramanathan, the sale consideration of Rs.46,000/- is mentioned, but contribution of each purchaser is not mentioned. Likewise, the measurement of the property is mentioned in the schedule, but, there is no indication regarding the demarcation of share of each purchasers. 12. In such case, Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, states that “ where immovable property is transferred for consideration to two or more persons and such consideration is paid out of a fund belonging to them in common, they are, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, respectively entitled to interests in such property identical, as nearly as may be, with the interests to which they were respectively entitled in the fund; and, where such consideration is paid out of separate funds belonging to them respectively, they are, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, respectively entitled to interests in such property in proportion to the shares of the consideration which they respectively advanced. In the absence of evidence as to the interests in the fund to which they were respectively entitled, or as to the shares which they respectively advanced, such persons shall be presumed to be equally interested in the property” . 13. In the absence of evidence as to the interests in the fund to which they were respectively entitled, or as to the shares which they respectively advanced, such persons shall be presumed to be equally interested in the property” . 13. With great respect to the learned Single Judge, he had erroneously pressed into service Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act to admit and decide the disputed based on Exs.B1 and B2. Taking into account, the second part of the Section 45 of Transfer of property Act,1882, which says in the absence of the evidence as to the interests in the fund to which they were respectively entitled, or as to the shares which they respectively advanced, such persons shall be presumed to be equally interested in the property by relying upon Exs.B1 and B2. 14. The learned Single Judge had taken it as a evidence supplement to the content of the document Ex.A1 for ascertaining the shares of the parties as found in these two documents namely Exs.B1 and B2. The error in the interpretation and accepting Exs.B1 and B2 is that the suit property admittedly purchased only by three persons namely Govindasamy, Alagammai and Ramanathan, whereas Ex.B.2 is a sale agreement prior to this sale deed Ex.A.1 and it is between Kuppusamy in favour of seven intending purchasers, inclusive of Govindasamy and Ramanathan and one Sivanadiyan, husband of Alagammai is also a party. This is an unregistered sale agreement in respect of larger extend including the suit property. This document Ex.B2 is prior to Ex.A1. Therefore by executing sale of a part of the property through a registered sale deed, the agreement entered earlier has become unenforceable. Even otherwise if anybody intended to enforce it ought to have sought for its performance/ entirety within time permitted. This has not been done in this case. 15. While so, a superceded document heavily relied by the learned Single Judge by mistaken impression that this document will supplement the content of Ex.A.1, the registered sale deed which came into existence, subsequent to Ex.B2. This error of relying Ex.B2 has reflected through out the judgesment. 16. In so far as Ex.B1 is concerned, it is a letter of exchange termed as Varthamanam Letter, this letter is dated 16.09.1980, few days after purchase of suit property under A1. This error of relying Ex.B2 has reflected through out the judgesment. 16. In so far as Ex.B1 is concerned, it is a letter of exchange termed as Varthamanam Letter, this letter is dated 16.09.1980, few days after purchase of suit property under A1. A reading of Ex.B1 indicates that apart from the title holders of the suit property namely Govindasamy, Alagammai and Ramanathan, four others been included in that Varthamanam Letter. They are the owners of adjacent property measuring 46 cents. The parties have jointly decided to apportion the total extend of 92 cents in a particular manner wherein 4/10 shares been given to Govindasamy. 17. Carried away by the recitals found in Ex.B1, the learned Judge had interfered in the judgement of the trial court and modified the entitlement of plaintiff from 1/3 shares to 40%. 18. The fallacy in applying Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act to the facts of this case can easily demonstrated by plain reading of Section 45 of Transfer of Property Act which deals with property held by two or more persons jointly without apportioning their respective shares and the presumption that they hold the property equally. To prove the contrary there shall be agreement between the parties. Whereas in the case in had Ex.B1 is a letter of exchange/ agreement between the parties in respect of the property, which is not the subject matter of the suit alone get it includes other property also and parties includes those who are not litigants in the suit and not owners of the suit properties. 19. The trial Court while considering the point of non joinder of necessary party had made a reference that the property of the persons who are not party in the suit is not a subject matter of the suit and therefore the suit does not suffer non joinder of necessary party. It is not the non joinder of necessary party alone to be considered but whether the document entered between the parties who are not before this Court and including the properties of those third parties will have any effect on a registered sale deed to determine the share of the purchasers in a particular manner when the sale deed itself is silent about the respectable share. 20. 20. In the humble opinion of this Court if at all Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act to be put into service, the contract to contrary must be only between the parties upon whom the right is vested and not by including the parties unconnected to the document and title. This error apparent on record is found in the judgement, hence it has to be reviewed. 21. In view of the discussion made above, this Court holds that the trial Court has rightly held that the 3 purchasers of the suit property under Ex.A1 are entitled for 1/3 share each by applying Section 45 of Transfer of Property Act interpreting it in a proper sense. 22. As a result this Review application is allowed and A.S.No.25 of 2009 is dismissed. The Judgement and decree passed in O.S.No.119 of 2009 stands confirmed. 23. In view of allowing the review application and dismissal of A.S.No.25 of 2009, the decree dated 13.08.2012 in A.S.No.25 of 2009 gets set aside. Consequently, final decree passed in I.A.No.533 of 2013 in O.S.No.119 of 2006 stands set aside Therefore, A.S.No.63 of 2022 filed against the final decree stands disposed of. The parties shall proceed with the final decree passed by the trial court as confirmed by this Court in A.S.No.25 of 2009 pursuant to the order passed in Review Application.No.103 of 2013 in A.S.No.25 of 2009.