JUDGMENT : A. BADHARUDEEN, J. This Criminal Appeal has been filed under section 374(2) of code of criminal procedure at the instance of the accused in C.C.No.8/2009 on the files of the enquiry commissioner and special judge, Thrissur challenging conviction and sentence imposed against the accused as per judgment in this case dated 24.12.2016. The respondent is the State of Kerala represented by the learned Special Public Prosecutor. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/accused as well as the learned Special Public Prosecutor in detail. Perused the verdict under challenge also the records of the special court and the decisions placed by the learned Special Public Prosecutor. 3. In this matter, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 409 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘the IPC’ hereafter) as well as Section 13 (1)(c) r/w 13(2) of the the Prevention of Corruption Act , 1988 (for short, ‘the PC Act, 1988) by the appellant/accused. 4. The summary of the prosecution allegation is that the appellant/accused while working as Agricultural Officer, Krishi Bhavan, Agali misappropriated Rs.6,192/- granted in favour of one Mr.Gangadharan K.V, Kailas Gardens, Kottathara, Agali as compensation for the natural calamities he suffered, after forging and falsifying records thereof. 5. The special court proceeded with the trial after completing the pre-trial formalities. PW1 to PW11 were examined and Exts.P1 to P21 were marked on the side of the prosecution. No evidence recorded as that of the appellant/accused. The special court on appreciation of evidence found that the appellant/accused committed offences punishable under Section 409 and 465 of the IPC and Sections 13 (1)(c) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and accordingly the appellant/accused was convicted and sentenced as under:- “The Accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and shall also pay a fine of Rs.6,000/- (Rupees six thousand only) for offence u/s. 13(2), r/w 13(1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act , 1988. In case of default of payment of fine, the Accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one month. The Accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and shall also pay a fine of Rs.4,000/- (Rupees four thousand only) for offence u/s. 409 of the I.P.C. In case of default of payment of fine, the Accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one month. The Accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and shall also pay a fine of Rs.4,000/- (Rupees four thousand only) for offence u/s. 409 of the I.P.C. In case of default of payment of fine, the Accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one month. The Accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year for offence u/s. 465 of the I.P.C. The substantive sentences shall run concurrently.” 6. Two points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused to unsustain the verdict of the special court. 7. The first point argued is that in order to sustain a conviction for the offence punishable under Section 409 of the IPC, the entrustment of the property to the exclusive domain of the accused in his official capacity must be proved. It is pointed out that in this case, the evidence of PW3 who succeeded the appellant/accused as the Agricultural Officer, Agali, deposed during cross-examination, when he was asked whether, before he had taken charge, temporary hands from the Panchayat were deputed in connection with the disbursement of compensation for natural calamities, temporary staff from the Panchayat might have been sent to assist the Agricultural Officer and that it was something that occurred prior to his joining. Therefore the presence of other employees is evident from the testimony of PW3 and in such circumstances the crucial element in as much as exclusive entrustment of the misappropriated amount at the hands of the accused cannot be found. 8. Secondly, it is argued that according to the prosecution allegation, a total amount of Rs.48,42,208/-, as quantified in Ext.P1, was sanctioned for disbursement to 2045 farmers entitled to compensation for the natural calamities. However the prosecution does not have a case that anyone other than Mr. Gangadharan K.V. raised any grievance regarding non-receipt of the compensation. According to the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, based on the evidence of PW7, the son of Mr. Gangadharan, it can be gathered that Mr.Gangadharan was alive until 2010, and the investigation was completed prior to that. Despite this, no attempt was made by the Investigating Officer to obtain the specimen signatures or admitted signatures of Mr.Gangadharan for the purpose of getting an expert opinion regarding his signatures in Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1), the documents where the signatures of Gangadharan were denied. Despite this, no attempt was made by the Investigating Officer to obtain the specimen signatures or admitted signatures of Mr.Gangadharan for the purpose of getting an expert opinion regarding his signatures in Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1), the documents where the signatures of Gangadharan were denied. According to the learned counsel, the only evidence adduced by the prosecution to show that it was not the accused who signed Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1) was the testimony of PW7, who is none other than the son of Gangadharan. The learned counsel further submitted that failure on the part of the Investigating Officer to seek expert opinion is a circumstance creating doubt in the prosecution case, which should be adjudged in favour of the appellant/accused. Accordingly the learned counsel for the appellant/accused pressed for interference in the impugned verdict by enlarging benefit of doubt to the accused. 9. Dispelling this contention the learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that in view of the evidence of PW1 and PW3, it is crystal clear that the appellant/accused alone was the Agricultural Officer entrusted with custody of the money and was the only officer empowered to draw the cheque. In the instant case Ext.P3 is the cheque written in the name of Gangadharan duly signed by the appellant/accused, as the payer/drawer of the same. The person who obtained entrustment of money could only issue a cheque as the payer/drawer of the same. Therefore, the entrustment of the money at the hands of the appellant/accused is well established. Therefore relying on the evidence of PW3 that some other staff were deployed from the Panchayat to assist the Agricultural Officer by itself is insufficient to hold that the appellant/accused was not entrusted with the money. That apart, who were the staff so deputed also not forthcoming. The learned Special Public Prosecutor further pointed out that expert opinion is only opinion evidence and the prosecution case could not be disbelieved solely for want of expert evidence/opinion. It is submitted that the prosecution has sufficiently proved the signatures in Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1) through the evidence of PW7, the son of Gangadharan, in accordance with Section 47 of the Evidence Act, along with the explanation thereof. 10. It is submitted that the prosecution has sufficiently proved the signatures in Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1) through the evidence of PW7, the son of Gangadharan, in accordance with Section 47 of the Evidence Act, along with the explanation thereof. 10. According to the learned Special Public Prosecutor, insofar as expert opinion is concerned the Court must exercise caution while evaluating the same, as it is considered as a weak form of evidence and the same is not substantive in nature. It is further pointed out that expert evidence if relied upon solely to prove the prosecution allegation without the support of independent and reliable substantive evidence cannot by itself establish the offence. In support of this contention the learned public prosecutor produced decision of the Apex Court reported in 2019 KHC 6862 Chennadijalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Another and in Paragraph No.19 the Apex Court held that a reading of S.47 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that this provision is concerned with the relevance of the opinion of a person who is acquainted with the handwriting of another person. The Explanation to this Section goes on to enumerate the circumstances in which a person may be said to have such acquaintance. The learned Special Public Prosecutor also placed a decision of this Court reported in 2025 (1) KHC 70 James v. State of Kerala to contend that evidence of PW7 alone is sufficient to identify the signatures of Gangadharan in Exts.P3, P4 and P10(a-1) and it is pointed out further that in this case this Court held that the evidence of the biological brother of the deceased who was living at the same house could not be held as not familiar with the handwriting of his own deceased sister, while believing the said evidence. 11. On appraisal of the rival contentions, the following questions arise for consideration. 1. Whether the prosecution succeeded in proving that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 409 of IPC by the accused as found by the special court? 2. Whether the prosecution succeeded in proving that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 465 of IPC by the accused as found by the special court? 3. 1. Whether the prosecution succeeded in proving that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 409 of IPC by the accused as found by the special court? 2. Whether the prosecution succeeded in proving that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 465 of IPC by the accused as found by the special court? 3. Whether the prosecution succeeded in proving that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 13 (1)(c) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 by the accused as found by the special court? 4. Whether the verdict under challenge would require interference? 5. The order to be passed? Point Nos. 1 to 5:- 12. In response to the arguments tendered from both sides, evaluation of evidence is necessary. The evidence of PW1 is that as per Ext.P1 a total sum of Rs.48,42,208/- was allotted as compensation for the loss of crops assessed in Ext.P9(a). The prosecution case specifically pertains to the alleged forgery of records and misappropriation of Rs.6,192/- granted in favour of Gangadharan, who is now no more. According to the prosecution Ext.P3 cheque dated 13.09.2006 was drawn in the name of Gangadharan for the said sum and duly signed by the accused, being the drawing officer. On the reverse side of Ext.P3, two signatures of Gangadharan could be the same with an endorsement stating that ‘one signature is attestation of the other’. Ext.P4 is the receipt allegedly given by Gangadharan upon receiving Ext.P3. Ext.P10 is the register showing disbursement of financial assistance for crop loss due to natural calamity during May 2006 and in Serial No.1886, Rs.6,192/- in the name of Gangadharan was shown as disbursed to him. His signature was also found as the recipient of the same. The specific case of the prosecution is that contends that the signatures in Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1) were not put by Gangadharan and were forged and falsified by the accused who is the custodian of the amount as well as documents. In this regard PW7, the son of Gangadharan was examined and he testified that the signatures and handwriting in Ext.P9(a) the application submitted by Gangadharan for compensation, were that of Gangadharan. However when Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1) were shown to him, he deposed that those signatures were not that of Gangadharan specifying that Gangadharan had no habit of using a single stroke or underlining the signature as seen in those documents. However when Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1) were shown to him, he deposed that those signatures were not that of Gangadharan specifying that Gangadharan had no habit of using a single stroke or underlining the signature as seen in those documents. During cross-examination attempts were made to suggest that PW7 had been inimical to his father for the last fifteen years but PW7 categorically denied the same. In this connection the evidence of PW8 who was the Assistant Director in Alathur during April 2007 is relevant. He deposed that while working under instructions from the Vigilance authorities he conducted a surprise check at the Agricultural Office, Agaly and prepared a joint inventory marked as Ext.P17. Upon verifying Ext.P9 and P10, he noticed differences in the signatures of beneficiary Gangadharan. Similarly discrepancies were found in Ext.P4, the receipt alleged to have been issued by Gangadharan. During his inspection, Gangadharan was also present and when he was shown the signatures in Ext.P4 and P10, he denied them. It is true that no attempt was made by the Investigating Officer to obtain an expert opinion regarding the signatures in Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1) by securing specimen signatures of Gangadharan. However as rightly pointed out by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, expert opinion is only a weak piece of corroborative evidence and the same does not have an independent probative value unless supported by substantive evidence. Admittedly in the instant case no expert opinion was obtained as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused. 13. In this case insofar as the encashment of Ext.P3 and the release of the amount involved therein are concerned, PW6 the Senior Associate of SBI, Agaly Branch deposed that in September 2016 the bearer of the cheque was given the money and he had verified the specimen signature on the cheque against that of the drawer. Regarding the attested signature and the signatures alleged to be of Gangadharan, PW6 stated that he had no knowledge about the same. 14. Insofar as Ext.P7 the prosecution sanction order is concerned, the same has been proved through the evidence of PW2 and no contention has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused regarding its sufficiency. Thus prosecution sanction also proved by the prosecution. 15. 14. Insofar as Ext.P7 the prosecution sanction order is concerned, the same has been proved through the evidence of PW2 and no contention has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused regarding its sufficiency. Thus prosecution sanction also proved by the prosecution. 15. As regards expert opinion, no explanation was elicited from the Investigating Officer during cross-examination as to why such a course of action failed to be adopted. In the instant case the evidence of PW1 and PW3 indicates that the appellant/accused was the custodian of the total sum of Rs.48,42,208/-, a part of which, viz Rs.6,192/-, was due to Gangadharan. The first question for consideration is whether in view of the evidence of PW3 the presence of temporary staff deputed from the Panchayat negates the entrustment of the amount at the hands of the accused, thereby the prosecution case as to entrustment of the above sum is in the midst of doubts. 16. A perusal of the evidence of PW3 would show that during cross-examination, PW3 stated that he succeeded the appellant/accused and his version is that some staff from the Panchayat were deputed in connection with disbursement of amount of compensation for natural calamities when such a question was asked. In continuation of this question nothing was asked to PW3 regarding the details of the staff so deputed. Thus merely relying on this evidence given by PW3 without naming the officers so deputed and any order for such deputation it could not safely be concluded that any other staff worked in the office of the appellant/accused during the period of disbursement of compensation of natural calamities. If at all the evidence of PW3 is given emphasis to hold that some other staff were also deputed that by itself could not make any change as the entrustment of the misappropriated money at the hands of the accused is well established by the evidence of PW1 and PW3 as already discussed. That is to say, section 409 of the IPC provides that when a property is entrusted with the domain of a public servant in his capacity as a public servant when commit criminal breach of trust in respect of the property so entrusted he shall be liable for the offence punishable under section 409 of the IPC. 17. That is to say, section 409 of the IPC provides that when a property is entrusted with the domain of a public servant in his capacity as a public servant when commit criminal breach of trust in respect of the property so entrusted he shall be liable for the offence punishable under section 409 of the IPC. 17. Before conclusion it is relevant to consider what are the essentials to be proved to complete an offence under Section 409 of IPC. In the decision reported in [ (2012) 8 SCC 547 : AIR 2012 SC 3242 ] Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh , the Apex Court held that, in order to sustain a conviction under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code , 1860, two ingredients are to be proved: namely: (i) the accused, a public servant or a banker or agent was entrusted with the property of which he is duty bound to account for; and (ii) the accused has committed criminal breach of trust. What amounts to criminal breach of trust is provided under section 405 IPC. The basic requirement to bring home the accusations under section 405 IPC are the requirements to prove conjointly (i) entrustment and (ii) whether the accused was actuated by a dishonest intention or not, misappropriated it or converted it to his own use or to the detriment of the persons who entrusted it. 18. That apart, it is also the essential requirement that it should be shown that the accused has acted in the capacity of a public servant, banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, as held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in [ 2015 CrLJ 4040 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 724 : (2015) 8 Scale 95 ], Robert John D’Souza v. Stephen V Gomes . 19. It is equally the well settled law that once it is proved by the prosecution that there was entrustment of property and there was no proper accounting of the entrusted property, then the burden is on the accused to prove that there was no misappropriation and to explain what happened to the property so entrusted. When the accused fails to discharge his burden or failed to explain or account for the misappropriated property, the accused is said to have committed the offences of criminal breach of trust and misappropriation. When the accused fails to discharge his burden or failed to explain or account for the misappropriated property, the accused is said to have committed the offences of criminal breach of trust and misappropriation. The fraudulent intention of the accused could be inferred from the attending circumstances from the evidence adduced and the same could not always be proved by direct evidence. Thus, the law on the point is that prosecution has the duty to prove entrustment of property to the accused and then it is the duty of the accused to account for the same or to explain the same. The same ingredients of criminal breach of trust and misappropriation have to be proved by the prosecution for convicting the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 13 (1)(c) of the P.C. Act, 1988 as well. Decisions reported in Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai and Another v. State of Bombay, 1960 KHC 694: AIR 1960 SC 889 : 1960 (3) SCR 319 : 1960 CriLJ 1250, Krishan Kumar v. Union of India, 1959 KHC 635: AIR 1959 SC 1390 : 1960 (1) SCR 452 : 1959 CriLJ 1508 , State of Kerala v. Vasudevan Namboodiri,- 1987 KHC 518: 1987 (2) KLT 541 : 1987 KLJ 270 : 1987 (1) KLT SN 7, Bagga Singh v. State of Punjab,- 1996 KHC 3288: 1996 CriLJ 2883 (SC), Vishwa Nath v. State of J. & K, 1983 KHC 420: AIR 1983 SC 174 : 1983 (1) SCC 215 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 173: 1983 CriLJ 231, Om Nath Puri v. State of Rajasthan, 1972 KHC 414: AIR 1972 SC 1490 : 1972 (1) SCC 630 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 359: 1972 (3) SCR 497: 1972 CriLJ 897 , T. Ratnadas v. State of Kerala,- 1999 KHC 2074: 1999 CriLJ 1488, State of Rajasthan v. Kesar Singh ,1969 CriLJ 1595, Roshen Lal Raina v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, 1983 KHC 584: 1983 (2) SCC 429 : AIR 1983 SC 631 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 533: 1983 CriLJ) 975 and Raghavan K v. State of Kerala, 2012 KHC 420 are in support of this view. 20. In this matter the evidence available as that of PW1 would show that the amount quantified as per Ext.P1 to the tune of Rs.48,42,208/- was assessed by the accused who was the Agricultural Officer and the same was recommended by PW1. 20. In this matter the evidence available as that of PW1 would show that the amount quantified as per Ext.P1 to the tune of Rs.48,42,208/- was assessed by the accused who was the Agricultural Officer and the same was recommended by PW1. The Principal Agricultural Officer had signed below the endorsement to the effect that the amount was passed and in consequence thereof Ext.P2 proceedings was issued by the Principal Agricultural Officer, Palakkad as per which sanction was accorded for payment of the said sum. As per Ext.P2, it has been revealed that the amount to be disbursed by means of cheques as mandated in the Government order referred to in Ext.P2. PW1 deposed that Ext.P1(a) is the receipt issued by the accused while accepting the amount in his custody by way of entrustment as per cheque No.630312 dated 17.08.2006 and in Ext.P1(a) the accused had signed receipt of the said sum as per the said cheque to give assistance to 2045 farmers. Thus the evidence available as that of PW1 supported by Exts.P2 and P1(a) would show that the accused got entrustment of the above money being the Agricultural Officer empowered to disburse the same to the farmers 2045 in numbers. When entrustment is proved beyond reasonable doubt it is for the accused to account for or to explain what happened to the amount entrusted on already observed. In this case as already discussed, Ext.P3 cheque was issued in the name of Gangadharan and was encashed from the bank. Ext.P4 receipt alleged to be issued by Gangadharan and the signatures on the reverse side of Ext.P3 as well as in Ext.P10(a-1) were denied by Gangadharan when he was present along with PW8, when PW8 prepared inventory doubting the signatures of Gangadharan in Ext.P9 and P10. Thus PW8 deposed that Gangadharan who is now no more stated that he did not obtain any amount and he was not the signatory in the above documents. It is interesting to note that in order to prove the signatures in Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1) not that of the accused PW7 was examined and his evidence denying the signatures as that of Gangdharan was not at all shaken during cross-examination. As far as the mode of proof is concerned the same is governed under section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act. As far as the mode of proof is concerned the same is governed under section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 47 provides as under:- Section 47 — Opinion as to handwriting, when relevant. — When the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed, that it was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact. 21. In this regard the explanation to Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act is very relevant. The mode of proof of disputed handwritings as has been stated in the Explanation to Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act are threefold. A person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another person when: 1.He has seen that person write, or 2. He has received documents purporting to be written by that person in answer to documents written by himself or under his authority and addressed to that person. 3. He has, in the ordinary course of business, documents purporting to be written by that person have been habitually submitted to him. 22. Thus Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with proof of opinion as handwriting and the same would include signatures as well. When any person acquainted with the handwriting and signature of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed or was not written or signed by that person, was examined and he being a person acquainted with the handwriting of that person give evidence with the required essentials extracted herein above the same is sufficient for the court to form an opinion regarding the disputed handwriting and signature. Therefore the evidence of PW7 the son of Gangadharan can be relied on in this regard. Apart from the evidence of PW7, PW8 deposed that Gangadharan while alive also specifically denied having received the money and also specifically denied having signed in the above documents. Similarly PW7 categorically denied the signatures of Gangadharan in Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1). It is true that no expert opinion has been obtained by collecting the specimen signatures of Gangadharan as a corroborative piece of evidence to prove that Gangadharan was not the signatory to Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1). Similarly PW7 categorically denied the signatures of Gangadharan in Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1). It is true that no expert opinion has been obtained by collecting the specimen signatures of Gangadharan as a corroborative piece of evidence to prove that Gangadharan was not the signatory to Exts.P3, P4, and P10(a-1). It is a settled law that experts opinion is only a corroborative piece of evidence which has no independent existence unless the fact in issue is not proved with the aid of substantive evidence. It is also well settled that when there is sufficient substantive evidence to prove the fact is issue, absence of opinion evidence would not by itself weaken the substantive evidence. 23. Having appraised the evidence available it is held that the prosecution succeeded in proving that the accused was entrusted with Rs.6,192/-. Further as far as disbursement of Rs.6,192/- is concerned there was forgery on Exts.P3, P4 and P10(a) by putting false signatures of Gangadharan to show that the amount was received by Gangadharan. In such a case the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused to wipe out criminal culpability on the part of the accused for the grounds argued is found unsustainable. As a corollary thereof the finding of the special court that the prosecution succeed in proving that the accused committed offence punishable under sections 409 and 465 of the IPC as well as Section 13 (1)(c) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 by the accused is only to be confirmed. Therefore the conviction does not require any interference. 24. Coming to the sentence, the punishment imposed by the special court for the offence punishable under section 13(1)(c) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 is for one year in relation to an occurrence of the year 2006 and the same is the statutory minimum. The sentences imposed for the offences under Sections 409 and 465 of the IPC are also one year each. Since the special court imposed only the statutory minimum sentence for the offence punishable under section 13(1)(c) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 no reduction beyond the statutory minimum is permissible. Thus no reduction in sentence for the other offences under Sections 409 and 465 of the IPC is found necessary being reasonable. Therefore, the reduction in sentences also could not be considered. 25. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. 26. Thus no reduction in sentence for the other offences under Sections 409 and 465 of the IPC is found necessary being reasonable. Therefore, the reduction in sentences also could not be considered. 25. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. 26. The order suspending sentence and granting bail to the appellant/accused is cancelled and his bail bond also is cancelled. Accordingly, the appellant/accused is directed to surrender before the special court forthwith to undergo the sentence. If the appellant/accused fails to surrender as directed, the special court is directed to execute the sentence without fail. The Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the special court forthwith for information and compliance.