JUDGMENT : JOHNSON JOHN, J. The appellant is the accused in S.C. No. 1198 of 2008 on the file of the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Thrissur and he is challenging the conviction and sentence imposed on him for the offences under Sections 341 and 307 IPC as per the impugned judgment dated 18.07.2014. 2. The prosecution case is that the accused, due to animosity towards the victim, who declined the marriage proposal of the accused, with the intention and knowledge that his act would cause the death of the victim, he wrongfully restrained the victim girl on 20.11.2005, at about 9 a.m., on the road near Karappadam and tried to pour acid into her mouth from a can by holding her cheeks with force and when the victim resisted, he poured acid over her head causing acid burns on her head, left cheek, neck and back of her body and the accused is thereby alleged to have committed the offences as aforesaid. 3. On the basis of Exhibit P1, First Information Statement of PW1, Exhibit P15 FIR was registered by PW16 on 20.11.2005. PW18, Circle Inspector, completed the investigation and filed the final report. When the accused appeared before the trial court, after hearing both sides, charge was framed against him for the offences under Sections 341 and 307 IPC and when the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge, the prosecution examined PWs 1 to 18 and marked Exhibits P1 to P16 and MOs 1 to 3. No witness examined from the side of the accused; but, Exhibits D1 to D2(a) were marked. 4. After hearing both sides and considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months under Section 307 IPC and to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for seven days for the offence under Section 341 IPC. 5. Heard Sri. P. Vijaya Bhanu, the learned Senior counsel for the appellant, Sri. C.K. Suresh, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor and Sri. Tom Jose (Padinjarekkara), the learned counsel for the victim. 6. 5. Heard Sri. P. Vijaya Bhanu, the learned Senior counsel for the appellant, Sri. C.K. Suresh, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor and Sri. Tom Jose (Padinjarekkara), the learned counsel for the victim. 6. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant argued that the specific case of the accused is that he is falsely implicated in this case after PW1 attempted to commit suicide by consuming acid kept in a shed in the property adjacent to her house and that PWs 2, 3, 4 and 5, the independent witnesses examined from the side of the prosecution, turned hostile to the prosecution and that there are serious omissions and contradictions in the evidence of PW1 and therefore, the accused is entitled for the benefit of reasonable doubt. 7. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel appearing for the victim argued that the evidence of PW1 regarding the occurrence is supported by medical evidence and the evidence of PW6, the father of the victim, and the normal discrepancies and errors in their evidence not touching the core of the case cannot be accepted as grounds to reject the evidence of the injured and her father regarding the occurrence. 8. The victim was examined as PW1 and her evidence shows that she was aged 20 years at the time of occurrence. According to PW1, at about 9 a.m., on 20.11.2005, while she was going to church, the accused came in a motorcycle from behind and stopped the motorcycle in front of her and when she moved to the other side of the road, the accused took out a can from the box of the motorcycle and he held her cheek by force and by uttering to kill her, he tried to pour the contents of the can into her mouth and when she resisted, he poured the contents of the can over her head and thereafter, he threw the can into the nearby field. According to PW1, she felt irritation and burning and then she ran into the nearby house belonging to PW3, Sheema. According to PW1, PW3, Sheema, and her mother, PW4, poured water over her body and then their neighbour PW5, Ousephachan, came there. According to PW1, she felt irritation and burning and then she ran into the nearby house belonging to PW3, Sheema. According to PW1, PW3, Sheema, and her mother, PW4, poured water over her body and then their neighbour PW5, Ousephachan, came there. According to PW1, PW5, Ousephachan, informed her parents and her parents took her to the hospital in a car and on their way to the hospital, she also pointed out the place of occurrence to her father. 9. PW1 identified her signature in Exhibit P1, First Information Statement. According to PW1, earlier the accused had approached her and her family members with a proposal to marry her and then she rejected the proposal as she wanted to continue her studies. Subsequently, while PW1 was alone in her house, the accused again approached her and questioned her why she is not agreeing for the marriage. Then, the witness told the accused that she did not like the said marriage and that she is going to study Nursing. At that time, the accused threatened her that if she fails to give consent for the marriage before 20 th November, he will kill her or harm her in such a way that no one else will marry her. PW1 also stated that when she asked the accused to leave her house, he refused to do so and thereupon, she closed the door and went to the house of the elder brother of her father. 10. PW2 turned hostile to the prosecution stating that he has not witnessed the occurrence alleged in this case. The evidence of PW3 shows that the accused and PW1 are known to her; but, she would say that she was not in her house at 9.15 a.m. on 20.11.2005. According to PW3, at about 9.15 a.m., on that day, she went to the church along with her mother and returned only by 11 a.m. Even though PW3 denied making statement to the police as per Exhibits P3, P3(a) P3(b) P3(c) and P3(d), she admitted the suggestion of the learned Public Prosecutor that she is deposing falsely on the influence of the accused and his family members. 11. 11. PW4 is the mother of PW3 and in chief examination, initially she stated that she was in the church when a girl reached her house with acid burns; but, immediately she added that it is not known to her that such a girl reached her house. PW4 was also declared hostile to the prosecution. 12. The evidence of PW5 shows that the accused is his neighbour and he heard about the pouring of acid on the body of PW1; but, he cannot remember about the date or time of occurrence. The evidence of PW5 shows that the house of PW3, Sheema, is near to his house. According to PW5, he was not questioned by the police and he denied making statement to the police as per Exhibits P5, P5(a), P5(b) and P5(c). 13. PW6 is the father of PW1 and he deposed that the incident occurred on 20.11.2005. According to PW6, his neighbour Ousephachan reached his house and informed him that Kootatty Sunny poured acid over the head of Priya. PW6 deposed that on hearing the same, himself and his wife ran towards the place of occurrence and then they saw her daughter running towards their house from the house of Sheema. PW6 would say that her daughter told him that Sunny poured acid on her head and that while she was proceeding to the church, the accused came in a motorbike, wrongfully restrained her by holding on her cheek and attempted to pour acid into her mouth. According to PW6, he hired the car of Thomas and took PW1 to the hospital and on the way to the hospital, PW1 also pointed out the place of occurrence to him. According to PW6, on the next day, at about 5 p.m., he pointed out the place of occurrence to the police and the police recovered a white can and burnt grass and soil from the place of occurrence. PW6 deposed that he produced the dress worn by PW1 at the time of occurrence before the police and identified the same as MO1 series. The can recovered is identified as MO2 and the burnt grass as MO3. PW6 deposed that he produced the dress worn by PW1 at the time of occurrence before the police and identified the same as MO1 series. The can recovered is identified as MO2 and the burnt grass as MO3. He also deposed that when the accused proposed to marry his daughter, he discussed the matter with his wife and daughter and then his daughter informed him that she does not want to marry at that time and she wanted to study further and subsequently when the accused again approached him, he told the accused that his daughter is not interested in the marriage. According to PW6, subsequently the accused reached his house and threatened his daughter that he will kill her, if she fails to agree for marriage before 20 th November. 14. PW7 is the driver of the car in which the victim was taken to the hospital on the date of occurrence. The evidence of PW7 shows that the parents of PW1 also accompanied her to the hospital on the date of occurrence. PW8 is the grandmother of PW1. According to PW8, on 20.11.2005, their neighbour Ousephettan informed them about the incident and when she came out of the house, she saw PW1 coming along with her parents from the southern side and at that time, the dress of PW1 was wet with water and when she asked PW1 as to what happened, PW1 informed her that Kootatty Sunny poured acid on her body. According to PW8, she noticed burn injuries on the head, face, cheeks and back of PW1. PW8 also deposed that after changing the dress, PW1 was taken to hospital by her father and mother. 15. PW9 is an attester to Exhibit P6, scene mahazar, and he identified his signature in Exhibit P6 scene mahazar. 16. PW10 was the doctor who examined PW1 at 10.15 a.m. on 20.11.2005 and issued Exhibit P7, wound certificate. The evidence of PW10 and Exhibit P7 shows that PW1 sustained erythema over the left side of face, ear and cheek; and erythema over the back upto the buttocks. According to PW10, the alleged cause was pouring acid over the head by a known person. In cross examination, PW10 admitted that the patient was brought by her father and the name of the assailant is not recorded in Exhibit P7. The General Surgeon at St. According to PW10, the alleged cause was pouring acid over the head by a known person. In cross examination, PW10 admitted that the patient was brought by her father and the name of the assailant is not recorded in Exhibit P7. The General Surgeon at St. James Hospital, Chalakkudy who treated PW1 at 10.30 a.m. on 20.11.2005 was examined as PW11 and his evidence shows that the total extent of burns is 25% and she was treated as inpatient from 20 th to 25 th 17. The case sheet maintained in the hospital in connection with the treatment of PW1 is marked as Exhibit P8. In cross examination, PW11 stated that burns above 25% are grievous injuries. In answer to a suggestion, PW11 stated that if a person poured acid herself, those injuries may be caused; but injuries then mainly would be on the front side. 18. PW12 is a witness to Exhibit P9, seizure mahazar. PW13 was the Circle Inspector who conducted the investigation from 21.11.2005. The evidence of PW13 shows that he prepared Exhibit P7, scene mahazar, and recovered MO2, can, and MO3, burnt grass, from the place of occurrence. The evidence of PW13 shows that he recovered MO1 series, dress worn by the victim as per Exhibit P9, mahazar. Exhibit P10 is the copy of the forwarding note and Exhibits P11 and P12 are the property lists. In cross examination, PW13 stated that the burnt grass was recovered from the field from where the can was recovered. He would say that there is no rubber plantation near to the place of occurrence and he denied the suggestion that the house of PW3, Sheema, is not near to the place of occurrence. He also denied the suggestion of the defence that because of a quarrel in the house of PW1, in connection with her relationship with the accused, she committed the act herself. 19. PW14 is the Village Assistant who prepared Exhibit P14, sketch of the place of occurrence. PW15 is the Head Constable who recorded Exhibit P1, First Information Statement of PW1 while she was admitted in Chalakudy St. James Hospital on 20.11.2005. PW16 is the Assistant Sub Inspector who registered Exhibit P15 FIR on 20.11 2005 on the basis of Exhibit P1 FIS. PW15 is the Head Constable who recorded Exhibit P1, First Information Statement of PW1 while she was admitted in Chalakudy St. James Hospital on 20.11.2005. PW16 is the Assistant Sub Inspector who registered Exhibit P15 FIR on 20.11 2005 on the basis of Exhibit P1 FIS. PW17, Circle Inspector, conducted the investigation of this case from 03.12.2005 and PW18 is the Circle Inspector who completed the investigation and filed the final report. The evidence of PW18 and Exhibit P13, report of chemical analysis, shows that traces of formic acid was detected in item Nos. 1, 4 and 6. Items 1 and 4 are the dress of the victim and item No.6 is the dry grass and soil collected from the scene of occurrence. 20. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant argued that as per the prosecution case, immediately after the occurrence, PW1 ran into the house of PW3, Sheema, and it was PW3 who poured water over the body of PW1. But, the evidence of PW3 would show that no such incident occurred in her house at 9.15 a.m., on 20.11.2005. It is pertinent to note that PW3 has admitted that the accused is her neighbour. According to PW3, along with her mother, she went to the church at about 9.15 a.m. and returned only at 11 a.m. However, it is pertinent to note that she admitted the suggestion of the learned Public Prosecutor that she is deposing falsely on the influence of the accused and his family members. In spite of the said admission by PW3, there was no cross examination from the side of the accused. When PW3 has categorically admitted the suggestion of the Public Prosecutor that she falsely deposed before the court on the influence of the accused and his family members, the accused cannot take advantage of the fact that PW3 has not supported the prosecution case. 21. The learned Public Prosecutor argued that the evidence of PW1, injured witness, is supported by the evidence of her father, PW6, and grandmother, PW8, and further, the medical and scientific evidence also corroborates the evidence PW1 regarding the occurrence. 22. 21. The learned Public Prosecutor argued that the evidence of PW1, injured witness, is supported by the evidence of her father, PW6, and grandmother, PW8, and further, the medical and scientific evidence also corroborates the evidence PW1 regarding the occurrence. 22. In Balu Sudam Khalde and another v. State of Maharashtra [ 2023 Livelaw (SC) 279], the Honourable Supreme Court held that the following legal principles are required to be kept in mind, while appreciating the evidence of an injured witness: “(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. (b) Unless, it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. (c) The evidence of injured witness has greater evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. (d) The evidence of injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. (e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of injured, but not the whole evidence. (f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded.” 23. It is pertinent to note that PW1 strongly denied the suggestion of the defence that herself and the accused were in love and that her father warned her in that connection. She also denied the suggestion of the defence that when the family members of the accused proposed another marriage for the accused, she herself poured formic acid over her head by collecting the same from a shed in the adjacent property. 24. Even though the defence has a case that PW1 herself poured acid over her head and that she obtained acid from a shed adjacent to her property, there is no evidence in this case to indicate that the occurrence was in a rubber estate or shed adjacent to the house of PW1 as suggested by the defence. 24. Even though the defence has a case that PW1 herself poured acid over her head and that she obtained acid from a shed adjacent to her property, there is no evidence in this case to indicate that the occurrence was in a rubber estate or shed adjacent to the house of PW1 as suggested by the defence. The evidence of PW13, Circle Inspector, and Exhibit P6, scene mahazar, shows that he recovered MO2, can, and MO3, burnt grass from the field near the place of occurrence and Exhibit P10, forwarding note, and Exhibit, P13 report of the chemical analysis, clearly shows that traces of formic acid was detected in the dry grass collected from the scene of occurrence and therefore, I find that the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the place of occurrence is not the shed or rubber estate as suggested by the defence. 25. The evidence of PW1 regarding the occurrence is supported by the clear medical evidence of PWs 10 and 11, doctors who examined PW1 on the date of occurrence itself. PW10 examined PW1 at 10.15 a.m., on 20.11.2005 and PW11 examined PW1 at 10.30 a.m., on 20.11. 2005. It is pertinent to note that the occurrence was at about 9 a.m. on 20.11.2005. The fact that PW1 has not mentioned the name of the assailant to the doctor, cannot be taken as a ground to disbelieve the evidence of PW1, as normally the doctors will ascertain only the alleged cause of injury so as to provide immediate treatment to the victim and the doctor is not expected to question the victim regarding the identity of the assailant. 26. In Shrawan Bhadaji Bhirad and others v. State of Maharashtra [ 2002 KHC 1519], the Honourable Supreme Court observed thus: “Even if it is proved that he could not disclose the names of the assailants to Dr Bhagwat, it could not lead to an inference that at that stage he was not aware of the accused persons. It is pertinent to note that the victim was severely injured. His agony could be imagined and he was in a shock and strain, in that mental set up his immediately not disclosing to Dr Bhagwat the names of the assailants was quite natural and more probable in the condition in which the victim was placed. It is pertinent to note that the victim was severely injured. His agony could be imagined and he was in a shock and strain, in that mental set up his immediately not disclosing to Dr Bhagwat the names of the assailants was quite natural and more probable in the condition in which the victim was placed. We therefore, do not agree with the submission of Mrs Sirpurkar that the victim was not aware of the names of the assailant.” 27. The primary duty of a doctor is to treat the patient and not to investigate the cause of the injury. Therefore, the impact of the non- disclosure of the names of the assailants to the doctor depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, as held by this Court in Chandanapurath Rajeevan v. State of Kerala [2024 KLT OnLine 1595]. The evidence of PW11 and Exhibit P8 casesheet in connection with the treatment of PW1 would show that she sustained total 25% burn injury and therefore, considering her agony, mental shock and strain, non-disclosure of the name of the assailant to the doctor is only natural and more probable. 28. It is well settled that normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observations and normal errors of memory due to lapse of time and such discrepancies and errors will always be there, however honest and truthful a witness may be. It cannot be disputed that material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. M.K. Anthony [AIR 1983 SC 48], the Honourable Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. It is well settled that when material witness is examined at length, it is possible for him to make some discrepancies and no true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. 29. It is well settled that when material witness is examined at length, it is possible for him to make some discrepancies and no true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. 29. It is pertinent to note that the other material witnesses who supported the prosecution case regarding the occurrence are the father and grandmother of PW1 and their evidence clearly shows that immediately after the occurrence, PW1 reached their house and informed them that the accused poured acid over her head and I find merrit in the argument of the learned Senior Public Prosecutor that the said act on the part of PW1 is so connected with the fact in issue so as to form part of the same transaction and therefore, the evidence of PWs 6 and 8 in this regard is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act and the same corroborates the evidence of PW1 regarding the occurrence. 30. In this case, even though PW1 was seriously cross examined, the core spectrum of the case remained intact throughout the cross examination and I find that the evidence of PW1 regarding the occurrence is natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution and that the same is supported by clear medical evidence. The decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Brahma Swaroop v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 2011 SC 280 ) and State of U.P v. Kishan Chand [ (2004) 7 SCC 629 ], shows that the testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present at the time of occurrence. The testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. Such a witness comes with a built in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailants in order to falsely implicate someone. Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness. Thus, the evidence of an injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. 31. Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness. Thus, the evidence of an injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. 31. In assessing the value of the evidence of the eye witnesses, the main considerations are as to whether it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and as to whether there is anything inherently improbable or unbelievable in their evidence. 32. As noticed earlier, in this case, the defence has a case that PW1 herself poured acid over her head for the reason that the family of the accused made arrangements for his marriage with another girl. But, the evidence in this case clearly shows that PW1 has rejected the marriage proposal of the accused and then the accused threatened her with dire consequences, if she fails to give consent for her marriage with the accused before 20.11.2005. The accused has not adduced any evidence in support of the defence version and the findings in Exhibit P13, chemical analysis report, gives credence to the version of PW1 that she was attacked by the accused on the road near to a field from where MO2, can, and MO3, burnt grass, were recovered. Therefore, on a careful re-appreciation of the entire evidence, I find that the evidence of PW1 regarding the occurrence is natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution. The evidence of PW1 regarding the occurrence is also supported by the evidence of PWs 6 and 8 and the medical evidence of PWs 10 and 11 and therefore, I find no reason to interfere with the findings of the trial court in this regard. 33. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant also argued that the ingredients of the offence under Section 307 IPC is not attracted, in as much as there is no evidence to show that the accused committed the act with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. 33. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant also argued that the ingredients of the offence under Section 307 IPC is not attracted, in as much as there is no evidence to show that the accused committed the act with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. The learned counsel for the victim and the learned Senior Public Prosecutor argued that the accused poured formic acid over the head of the victim and further, the evidence of PW1 would show that he also uttered to kill her and attempted to pour acid into her mouth and therefore, it cannot be held that the accused was not having the intention or knowledge as contemplated under Section 307 IPC. Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case. The circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or minor will not, by itself, rule out application of Section 307 IPC. 34. In State of M.P v. Kashiram [ AIR 2009 SC 1642 ] , the Honourable Supreme Court held that for attracting conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted and that the Section makes a distinction between the acts of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. 35. In State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil [ (1983) 2 SCC 28 , it was held that whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a case. It was also held that the circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or minor will not, by itself, rule out application of Section 307 IPC and the determinative question is the intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and not the nature of the injury. 36. In R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka [ (2004) 9 SCC 27 ] , the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows: “9. 36. In R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka [ (2004) 9 SCC 27 ] , the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows: “9. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.” 37. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana [ (2015) 11 SCC 366 ] , it is held as follows: "12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc." 38. In State of M.P. v. Kanha [ (2019) 3 SCC 605 ], it is held as follows: "13. In State of M.P. v. Kanha [ (2019) 3 SCC 605 ], it is held as follows: "13. The above judgements of this Court lead us to the conclusion that proof of grievous or life - threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under S.307 of the Penal Code. The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent." 39. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem [ (2005) 5 SCC 554 ] , the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows: “ 12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. 13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. 13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.” 40. I have carefully considered the evidence of PW1 regarding the overt acts of the accused, especially the utterance made by him at the time of occurrence and forcefully holding the cheeks of PW1 and thereafter, pouring acid over her head and I find no reason to disagree with the finding of the trial court that the accused committed the act with the intention to kill PW1 and with the knowledge that death will be caused and therefore, I find that the trial court rightly convicted the accused for the offence under Section 341 and 307 IPC. 41. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant argued that the occurrence was in the year 2005 and considering the lapse of time, a lenient view is required in the matter of sentence. The learned counsel for the victim and the learned Senior Public Prosecutor pointed out that the minimum punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid as per Section 326A IPC, inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013 with effect from 03.02.2013, is imprisonment of either description for a term, which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine. The occurrence in this case was prior to the insertion of Section 326A IPC. 42. It is well settled that the court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim, but also the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment and merely on account of lapse of time, the sentence cannot be reduced without considering the nature of offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. It is well settled that the court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim, but also the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment and merely on account of lapse of time, the sentence cannot be reduced without considering the nature of offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. In Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar [ (2013) 9 SCC 516 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the cardinal principle of sentencing policy is that the sentence imposed on an offender should reflect the crime he has committed and it should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. 43. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B. [(1994) 2 SCC 220], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “14. In recent years, the rising crime rate — particularly violent crime against women has made the criminal sentencing by the courts a subject of concern. Today there are admitted disparities. Some criminals get very harsh sentences while many receive grossly different sentence for an essentially equivalent crime and a shockingly large number even go unpunished thereby encouraging the criminal and in the ultimate making justice suffer by weakening the system's credibility. Of course, it is not possible to lay down any cut and dry formula relating to imposition of sentence but the object of sentencing should be to see that the crime does not go unpunished and the victim of crime as also the society has the satisfaction that justice has been done to it. In imposing sentences in the absence of specific legislation, Judges must consider variety of factors and after considering all those factors and taking an overall view of the situation, impose sentence which they consider to be an appropriate one. Aggravating factors cannot be ignored and similarly mitigating circumstances have also to be taken into consideration. 15. In our opinion, the measure of punishment in a given case must depend upon the atrocity of the crime; the conduct of the criminal and the defenceless and unprotected state of the victim. Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the courts respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminals. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the courts respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminals. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The courts must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and the society at large while considering imposition of appropriate punishment.” 44. I have considered the facts and circumstances, seriousness and gravity of the offences committed by the accused and I find no reason to interfere with the sentence imposed by the trial court and therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court as against the accused for the offences under Section 341 and 307 of IPC are confirmed. 45. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The bail bond executed by the accused/appellant shall stand cancelled and he is directed to surrender before the trial court forthwith to undergo sentence, failing which the trial court is directed to execute the sentence without fail. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the jurisdictional court for compliance and further steps.