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2025 DIGILAW 27 (KAR)

Sanjana Raghunath, D/o Raghunath S. K. v. Karnataka Examination Authority

2025-05-02

K.V.ARAVIND, N.V.ANJARIA

body2025
JUDGMENT : K. V. ARAVIND, J. Heard learned advocate Mr. M. P. Srikanth for the petitioner, learned advocate Mr. N. K. Ramesh for respondent No.1, learned advocate Mr. N. Ketty for respondent No.3 and learned Government Advocate Mr. K. S. Harish for respondent Nos.4 and 5. 2. The petitioner in Writ Petition No.18327 of 2023 has preferred the present review petition seeking review of the judgment and order dated 01.10.2024. 3. The brief facts relevant to the matter are as follows: The petitioner is a Chess player who has participated in various State, National, and International Chess events. Aspiring to pursue a career in medicine, the petitioner appeared for the National Eligibility-Cum-Entrance Test (NEET) for the academic year 2022- 23, in which she secured a commendable rank. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an application seeking admission to a government medical college under the sports quota. The petitioner claims eligibility for consideration as a P-I or P-III candidate. However, she was erroneously classified as a P-V candidate and placed at Sl. No. 9 in the Provisional Eligibility List. It is further stated that due to the erroneous decision of the authorities, the petitioner was deprived of admission to a government seat under the sports quota and was compelled to seek admission to the MBBS course through a private seat. 4. This Court, after considering the Karnataka Selection of Candidates for Admission to Government Seats in Professional Educational Institutions Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules of 2006'), governing the admission of candidates, held that the petitioner, having represented India and won the Asian Youth Chess Championship 2018 in the Super-A Games, was eligible to be categorized as a P-I candidate, rather than being erroneously categorized as P-V. Subsequently, the petitioner, in pursuit of her aspiration to become a doctor, enrolled in a private seat and continued her MBBS course. As of the date of the order, the petitioner is still pursuing her MBBS studies. 5. The Court, considering that the process of selection and admission to the MBBS course had long been completed and the seats reserved for the sports quota were already filled, observed that any direction to admit the petitioner against the reserved sports quota seat would adversely affect the candidates who had already been admitted and were pursuing their course. 5. The Court, considering that the process of selection and admission to the MBBS course had long been completed and the seats reserved for the sports quota were already filled, observed that any direction to admit the petitioner against the reserved sports quota seat would adversely affect the candidates who had already been admitted and were pursuing their course. Therefore, while declaring the petitioner eligible to be categorized as P-I under the Rules of 2006, the Court directed that the petitioner be compensated. Accordingly, the petitioner was awarded a compensation of Rs.10 lakhs to be paid by the State. This order is now aggrieved in the present review petition. 6. Learned Advocate Mr. M. P. Srikanth, appearing for the petitioner, vehemently contends that once the petitioner is declared eligible to be categorized as a P-I candidate under the Rules of 2006, she would be entitled to admission to a government seat under the sports quota. Accordingly, the petitioner must be provided admission under the sports quota. It is further submitted that the compensation awarded cannot adequately compensate for, or justify, the injustice caused to the petitioner by the State's incorrect decision in categorizing her priority. Learned Advocate additionally submits that the respondent-State has failed to pay the compensation as directed by the Court. 7. Learned Advocate Mr. N. K. Ramesh, appearing for Respondent No. 1, submits that the issue pertains to the admission process for the Academic Year 2022-23, and that the entire selection process has already been completed. It is further submitted that accommodating the petitioner under the sports quota at this stage would disrupt the admission of candidates who are already pursuing their courses. Any interference in the selection process after two years would adversely affect not only the academic careers of other candidates but also that of the petitioner. It is contended that such interference, after the completion of the admission process and amidst the ongoing academic year, is impermissible. 8. Learned Advocate Mr. N. Ketty, appearing for Respondent No. 3, submits that once the selection process is complete and students are already pursuing their respective courses, any interference with their academic progress is impermissible. It is further submitted that the only remedy available is the migration of a candidate from one college to another, in accordance with the Rules governing such migration. N. Ketty, appearing for Respondent No. 3, submits that once the selection process is complete and students are already pursuing their respective courses, any interference with their academic progress is impermissible. It is further submitted that the only remedy available is the migration of a candidate from one college to another, in accordance with the Rules governing such migration. It is contended that if the petitioner were to be accommodated in the midst of the course, it would disrupt the entire selection process. 9. Learned Government Advocate Mr. K. S. Harish, appearing for Respondents Nos. 4 and 5, reiterating the submissions made by the learned advocates for Respondents Nos. 1 and 3, submits that any interference at this stage in the selection process is impermissible, both in the interest of the candidates already pursuing their courses under the sports quota and the petitioner. 10. In response to the contention of petitioner that the State has not paid the awarded compensation, learned Government Advocate submits that the compensation was not paid as the petitioner had sought admission rather than compensation in this petition. However, it is further submitted that the compensation will be paid as directed by this Court within a reasonable time. 11. Having considered the submissions of learned advocates for the parties, it is evident that the petitioner filed an application seeking admission to a Government seat under the sports quota. The Rules of 2006 provide classification and preferences for candidates based on the nature of the sport, their participation, and their performance, including the winning of medals. The petitioner was initially classified as a P-IV candidate under the Rules of 2006, which classification was found to be incorrect, and she was subsequently declared eligible as a P-I candidate. 12. In normal circumstances, this Court would have directed the authorities to admit the petitioner under the sports quota. However, such recourse was not permissible in view of the peculiar facts of the present case. The academic year in question was 2022-23, and the entire selection and admission process had already been completed. There were no vacant seats available under the sports quota. Moreover, the petitioner had already joined the MBBS course on a private seat and was pursuing her studies. The academic year in question was 2022-23, and the entire selection and admission process had already been completed. There were no vacant seats available under the sports quota. Moreover, the petitioner had already joined the MBBS course on a private seat and was pursuing her studies. At that stage, issuing a direction to admit the petitioner under the sports quota would necessitate a complete redo of the selection process, which would affect all candidates admitted under the sports quota, as well as other candidates, including the petitioner. It was further considered that such an action would disrupt the academic progress of other candidates who were in no way responsible for the error committed by the State in classifying the petitioner’s preference. 13. The review petition reiterates the very contentions that were duly considered and appropriately addressed by this Court in its order. The grounds raised in the review petition are merely a repetition of the submissions made in the writ petition, which have already been answered by the Court. 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Civil Appeal Nos. 5503- 04/2022 (S. Madhusudhan Reddy vs. V. Narayana Reddy and others), [2022 SCC Online SC 1034], held that the error to be considered in a review petition must be apparent on the face of the record and not one that requires detailed scrutiny or investigation. 15. In Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and Others [2013 (8) SCC 320] , Hon'ble Supreme Court held as, “12. ....the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. .... 14. Review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice..... 15. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error..... 17..... it is not open to the Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error..... 17..... it is not open to the Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto..... 18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications..... Summary of the principles 20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. .... 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 16. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 16. Applying the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court (supra), what is urged by the review petitioner amounts to a rehearing of the original matter. All the contentions raised in the review petition were duly considered in the writ petition, and such submissions have been explicitly negatived. 17. While affirming that the grounds and arguments raised in the review petition were duly considered in the writ petition, the Court reiterates its earlier decision and has already addressed the contention regarding the direction to the State to provide admission under the sports quota in a Government seat. 18. In S. Krishna Sradha v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others [ (2020) 17 SCC 465 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the action of the authorities is found to be arbitrary and in breach of the applicable rules, regulations, or prospectus, thereby affecting the rights of students, and where a meritorious candidate has approached the Court at the earliest without any delay, the Court may mould the relief and direct that admission be granted to such candidate in the next academic year by issuing appropriate directions. It was further held that the grant of compensation could be an additional remedy but not a substitute for restitutionary remedies. The Court also observed that, in appropriate cases, compensation may be awarded to a meritorious candidate who could not be granted the relief of admission in the same academic year. 19. In National Medical Commission v. Mothukuru Sriyah Koumudi and Others [ (2021) 14 SCC 805 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court disapproved of disturbing admissions that had already been granted. 20. In the present case, the course of action urged by the petitioner cannot be accepted, as it would result in disturbing the academic careers of several students, including those admitted under the sports quota. If a direction were to be issued to admit the petitioner against a seat reserved under the sports quota, the entire admission counseling process for the Academic Year 2022-23 would have to be reopened. Consequently, candidates who secured admission under the sports quota would be displaced. If a direction were to be issued to admit the petitioner against a seat reserved under the sports quota, the entire admission counseling process for the Academic Year 2022-23 would have to be reopened. Consequently, candidates who secured admission under the sports quota would be displaced. Furthermore, the last candidate admitted would stand displaced after nearly three years, and the possibility of such candidate securing admission under any other quota at this stage cannot be overlooked. Such an exercise has been expressly disapproved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments referred to supra. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner has not expressed willingness to rejoin the first year of the MBBS course in the current academic year against a seat reserved under the sports quota. 21. In the light of the aforesaid reasoning, the review petition is meritless. Accordingly dismissed. However, it is submitted that the State Government has not paid the compensation as directed by this Court. Learned Government Advocate submits that, in view of the review petition filed by the petitioner seeking admission under the sports quota, the compensation was not paid. In view of the dismissal of the review petition, the respondent-State is directed to pay the compensation to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of this order. In view of disposal of main appeal, pending interlocutory application, if any, stands disposed of.