JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. 1. For any judicial system to remain robust - as much as to be efficient and just - resolution of every lis is to be prioritized; and, concomitantly, intentional efforts to obstruct and delay this process, require to be met with strong disapproval and significant penalties. Such tactics, needless to say, undermine the administration of justice and cause, most often than not, irreparable harm to the opposite side. 2. The facts we notice in this case expose how some litigants misuse the fairness in processes and perceived magnanimity of the system, to control litigation to their favour and delay resolution by insalubrious innovation. This requires to be strongly put down, as we propose in this case. 3. We will, first, state the essential facts compendiously. 4. The appellant suffered an ex parte decree in O.S.No.63/2017, on the files of the Sub Court, Ernakulam. This decree was issued on 29.11.2019; and execution was subsequently levied by the respondent, by filing E.P.No.17/2020. 5. The appellants, thereupon, filed I.A.No.4/2024 - invoking the provisions of Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), praying that the ex parte decree be set aside; accompanied by I.A.No.3/2024, seeking that the delay of 829 days in filing the former application be condoned. 6. The learned Sub Court, however, dismissed both these applications through the impugned order; and the appellants are in appeal against it before us. 7. Sri.G.Sreekumar (Chelur), appearing for the appellants, argued that the learned Sub Court has acted unfairly in not allowing the applications in question because, his clients have now been burdened with a decree directing them to pay Rs.3,34,10,000/-, along with interest, without them obtaining an effective opportunity of contesting the matter. He argued that, since the suit was filed for return of money and since his clients had filed objections before the learned Trial Court, it was improper for it to have set them ex parte and to have then issued the judgment and decree. He predicated that, therefore, his client was fully justified in filing the applications in question; and consequently, that its dismissal is unlawful, thus enjoining this Court to intervene and set aside the decree. 8. He predicated that, therefore, his client was fully justified in filing the applications in question; and consequently, that its dismissal is unlawful, thus enjoining this Court to intervene and set aside the decree. 8. In refutation, Sri.Litto Varghese Palathinkal - appearing for the respondent, submitted that the facts are not as explained by Sri.G.Sreekumar (Chelur) because, the appellants were set ex parte for the first time in May 2017, and they also failed to appear on 01.07.2017, 26.07.2017 and 29.08.2017. He pointed out that, on their application - numbered as I.A.No.4212/2017, the said order was set aside and they filed their written statement on 15.09.2017. He imputed that, however, thereafter, the appellants refused to appear even for evidence and that an ex parte judgment was issued on 30.07.2018, decreeing a sum of Rs.3,34,10,000/- against them, along with interest. He further submitted that his client thereupon had filed E.P.No.195/2018 on 17.10.2018, in which the appellants appeared in February 2019; subsequent to which, they filed I.A.No.937/2019 seeking that the said ex parte decree be set aside, which was allowed, though his client had opposed it vehemently, by the order dated 10.10.2019. He showed us, from the order impugned, that the matter was then listed for evidence on 04.11.2019, on which day, the appellants did not appear; to be then listed to 07.11.2019, on which day also, they remained absent; with the case then being finally listed to 29.11.2019, on which day the ex parte judgment and decree in question were issued. 9. Sri.Litto Varghese Palathinkal asserted that, the sole intent of the appellants is to protract the proceedings – which is to their advantage, since they are obtaining the unfair benefits of retaining his client's money, which they had paid as advance qua an intended sale transaction; and that this is explicitly manifest from the fact that, though their learned Counsel had presented himself in the morning on 29.11.2019, he did not appear at the time when the matter was called. He argued that the attitude of the appellants shows the malafide and deliberately calculated manner in which they have been defending the matter; and reiterated that they are doing so, since they become the beneficiaries of every day of delay, they being in possession of the amount in question unfairly. He prayed that this appeal be, therefore, dismissed. 10. He argued that the attitude of the appellants shows the malafide and deliberately calculated manner in which they have been defending the matter; and reiterated that they are doing so, since they become the beneficiaries of every day of delay, they being in possession of the amount in question unfairly. He prayed that this appeal be, therefore, dismissed. 10. We have examined the impugned order and have evaluated the rival submissions of parties, on the touchstone of the pleadings, evidence and materials on record. 11. At the outset, we must record that it is conceded by even Sri.G.Sreekumar (Chelur), that the actual delay caused by the appellants in filing the application, to have the ex parte set aside, is 1546 days; but that it has been attenuated to 829 days solely since the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 stand deserving of being excluded on account of the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, issued adverting to the Covid 19 pandemic disruption. However, even this period is not a small one; and as has been cautioned by the Hon'ble Supreme Court recently in Guruswamy H. v. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased By Lrs [2025 SCC OnLine SC 54], courts cannot condone delay in a routine manner, particularly when vested interests and rights have been created in favour of the other side. 12. The facts and dates mentioned in the impugned order are not disputed by the appellants; and, in fact, Sri.G.Sreekumar (chelur) affirms that there are no mistakes in the same. 13. Going by the sequence of events, as rightly argued by Sri.Litto Varghese Palathinkal, the suit was filed by the respondent on 17.03.2017 and even on the very next posting, namely 01.04.2017, there was no appearance for the appellants; as was the case on the next posting date, namely 27.05.2017, when they were set ex parte. The original suit was thereafter, listed on 01.07.2017, 26.07.2017 and 29.08.2017; but the appellants failed to appear. However, they then filed I.A.No.4212/2017 to set aside the ex parte order, obviously invoking Order IX Rule 7 of the CPC, which was allowed; and consequently, the appellants filed their written statement on 15.09.2017. 14. The original suit was thereafter, listed on 01.07.2017, 26.07.2017 and 29.08.2017; but the appellants failed to appear. However, they then filed I.A.No.4212/2017 to set aside the ex parte order, obviously invoking Order IX Rule 7 of the CPC, which was allowed; and consequently, the appellants filed their written statement on 15.09.2017. 14. The learned Court then records that since the appellants refused to appear thereafter, thus refusing to lead evidence, an ex parte decree and judgment was issued on 30.07.2018, allowing the respondents to recover an amount of Rs.3,34,10,000/-, along with interest; and later, the respondent levied execution. However, the Execution Petition did not reach its culmination because, the appellants filed I.A.No.937/2019, to have the ex parte decree set aside, which was allowed through the order dated 10.10.2019. 15. The learned Sub Court further records that the suit was then listed for evidence on 04.11.2019, when the appellants again refused to appear; the matter being then listed on 07.11.2019 and eventually to 29.11.2019 - on both of which days also, there was no appearance on their behalf. It, in fact, records, as rightly pointed out by Sri. Litto Varghese Palathinkal, that there was representation on behalf of the appellants on 29.11.2019 during the roll call; but that they or their Counsel did not appear when the matter was taken for evidence, leading to the issuance of the judgment and decree in question. 16. It is thus ineluctable that it is not the first time that an ex parte decree and judgment has been issued against the appellants. The first one, dated 30.07.2018, was set aside through the order of the learned Court on 10.10.2019; but thereafter, again, they refused to appear, leading to the second judgment, also ex parte, to be issued on 29.11.2019. 17. Had the appellants filed an application to have the ex parte decree set aside immediately, perhaps, the scenario may have been slightly in their favour. However, they chose not to do so and waited for 1546 days; and then claimed the benefit of the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued during the COVID-19 pandemic period, to assert that the delay is only 829 days; and prayed it to be condoned, so that their application to have the ex parte decree set aside can be considered and allowed. 18. 18. Going by the narrative of the facts afore, we have little doubt that the learned Sub Court has not erred in any manner in having dismissed the applications of the appellants. We wonder what any Court can do differently, when litigants refuse to appear repeatedly, in spite of several opportunities being offered to them. 19. In this case, this is manifest from the fact that the initial order setting the appellants ex parte was set aside in the year 2017 itself; but still an ex parte judgment was issued against them in July 2018, on account of their willful non- appearance; but which was also then set aside. However, they still did not avail the opportunities offered to them, to thus virtually invite a judgment in November 2019. 20. Axiomatically, the impression that this was done deliberately, with a view to protract proceedings, becomes rather convincing and strong, particularly noting that, on 29.11.2019, the appellants and their Counsel were present during the roll call, but did not then appear when the case was taken up for evidence. Hence there was nothing else the learned Court could have done, but to have issued an ex parte decree and judgment. 21. There is one more reason for us to find no cause in favour of the appellants, namely, that the explanation given by them, in seeking condonation of delay of 829 days, is by placing the entire blame on their learned Counsel, even insinuating that he acted against their interests, since they were not allegedly informed by him that the decree and judgment had been issued against them. But then, in the same breath, they aver that their learned Counsel later informed them “that the suit had been decreed after a contest” (sic). 22. We are wholly at loss to understand what the appellants mean by the above because, as indicated above, they and their Counsel were available in Court in the morning at the roll call time on 29.11.2019, but refusing to appear thereafter. How the blame can be put on the learned Counsel in such scenario is anybody's guess. They nevertheless assert that, when they came to be aware that the suit was decreed against them, they requested their Counsel to file an appeal; but that the latter “deceived” them, advising that it will be better to attempt a settlement; and thus did not file it. They nevertheless assert that, when they came to be aware that the suit was decreed against them, they requested their Counsel to file an appeal; but that the latter “deceived” them, advising that it will be better to attempt a settlement; and thus did not file it. They add that, they engaged a new Counsel in the Execution Proceedings; and that they "suspect that their previous counsel acted against their interests and provided them with incorrect legal advice" (sic). 23. It is needless to say, and without requirement for any explication, that no reasonable mind can believe the afore explanation; and one can, therefore, never find fault with the learned Sub Court either. It is very easy for litigants to lay blame on their Counsel, when such person is not on record and to offer them as scapegoats for their own deliberate actions. If this Court is to grant any imprimatur to this, it would sound the death knell of the litigative system, particularly when the Original Suit was filed as early as in the year 2017. In summation, we obtain no reason to find in favour of the appellants in any manner; and therefore, dismiss this appeal, with costs to the respondent.