JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act , 2007 (‘Act’, for short) is a critical piece of legislation for seniors because it statutorily obligates children and heirs to provide for their maintenance, care and essential requirements. 2. One of the acme protections therein, available to senior citizens, is rendering property transfers conditional on care, safeguarding their life and property and penalising abandonment. However, under Section 23 of the ‘Act’, the option of the senior to seek the transfer of property, made by them in favour of another, is underpinned on certain specific conditions; and on a question arising - when such conditions are not specifically enumerated in the document - the senior citizen obtains the opportunity to establish it through evidence. There were, earlier, varied opinions on this issue; but through two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this aspect now stands luculently clarified. 3. This Appeal is against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P(C)No.25873/2022, which has granted imprimatur to Ext.P4 order of the Statutory Maintenance Tribunal, constituted under the provisions of the ‘Act’, through which, a Settlement Deed executed in her favour by her mother-in-law (senior citizen) has been declared void. 4. The facts involved in this case are not greatly in dispute. 5. The factum of the senior citizen, namely the 2 nd respondent herein (who will hereinafter be referred to as Smt.Indira Varasyar, for convenience), being the mother-in- law of the appellant - Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan (who will also be hereinafter referred to by name), is fully admitted. That the property in question was settled by Smt.Indira Varasyar in favour of Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan, through Ext.P1 document, is expressly conceded. 6. The controversy in this case has its genesis in Ext.P2 application, made by Smt.Indira Varasyar against Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan, alleging that, though she was under the ‘expectation’ and ‘belief’ that, the latter would take care of her and provide her basic necessities, while Ext.P1 document was executed, she failed to do so; and consequently, that the provisions of Section 23 of the ‘Act’ apply, thus entitling her to seek that Ext.P1 be declared void. 7. The Maintenance Tribunal, going by Ext.P4 order, appears to have heard the parties several times and to have recorded the versions of either side in detail. 7. The Maintenance Tribunal, going by Ext.P4 order, appears to have heard the parties several times and to have recorded the versions of either side in detail. Based on such, the Tribunal allowed the application and set aside Ext.P1, against which, Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan filed the Writ Petition. The learned Single Judge of this Court, however, dismissed the Writ Petition, constraining her to file this Appeal before us. 8. Smt.Arundhathi Nair – learned counsel for Smt.Indira Varasyar, argued that the findings of the learned Single Judge are wholly apposite in the given circumstances, especially because every necessary requisite under Section 23 of the ‘Act’ has been fully attracted. She explained that, her client had settled the property in favour of Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan - being her daughter-in-law, at a time when her son (the former’s husband) was not in station, in order to enable her to construct a house by availing a loan. She added that, however, as soon as the settlement was done in such manner, the attitude of Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan completely changed and she began to treat her client with gross indifference, neglecting and refusing to provide her any care, attention or succour, thus leaving her without any other option but to approach the Maintenance Tribunal, to have Ext.P1 set aside. She argued that the condition as mandated under Section 23 of the ‘Act’ is implicit from Ext.P1 document; and if not, from Ext.P2 application, as also the statements given by her before the Maintenance Tribunal. She relied on Sudesh Chhikara v.Ramti Devi and Another [(2024) 14 SCC 225] and Urmila Dixit v.Sunil Sharan Dixit [ (2025) 2 SCC 787 ], to argue that it has now been well settled, contrary to an earlier view of a learned Full Bench of this Court, that even if the document in question does not explicitly contain the condition as required under Section 23 of the ‘Act’, it can still be proved through pleadings and testimony, which has been done in this case. She prayed that this Appeal be, therefore, dismissed. 9. However, in refutation, Sri.Manzoorali – learned counsel for Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan, submitted that the real reasons that preceded the execution of Ext.P1 are suppressed by the 2 nd respondent; and that, in fact, it was the consequence of settlement of marital disputes between his client and her husband (the son of Smt.Indira Varasyar). 9. However, in refutation, Sri.Manzoorali – learned counsel for Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan, submitted that the real reasons that preceded the execution of Ext.P1 are suppressed by the 2 nd respondent; and that, in fact, it was the consequence of settlement of marital disputes between his client and her husband (the son of Smt.Indira Varasyar). He then added that, as has been stated by his client before the Maintenance Tribunal and in her objections, Ext.P1 was executed also because her estranged husband and Smt.Indira Varasyar had received certain amounts from her mother and brother, with which, the house was constructed; and that it is after paying a further eight lakhs rupees to her, that the document was executed by the 2 nd respondent. He argued that, in such circumstances, the imperative condition of Section 23 of the ‘Act’ is not attracted in this case in any manner; and hence that the learned Single Judge erred in having granted approval to Ext.P4 order. He then impelled an additional argument that, since the property has been settled in favour of the daughter-in-law of the senior citizen, Section 23 of the ‘Act’ would not apply. 10. We have considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties on the touchstone of the materials on record, as also the judgment of the learned Single Judge, and have also examined the materials on record with specific reference to Ext.P4 order of the Maintenance Tribunal. 11. It is rather unnecessary for us to restate that, Section 23 of the ‘Act’ applies in a case where any senior citizen transfers, by way of gift or otherwise, his or her property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide basic amenities and basic physical needs to him/her; and that when such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and needs, the transferor obtains the right to seek that the transfer be declared void. 12. As has been well settled already through various judgments of this Court and that of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Section 23 of the ‘Act’ would come to be attracted only if the aforementioned conditions are ingrained in the covenants of the document; or are established explicitly or implicitly through evidence. 13. 12. As has been well settled already through various judgments of this Court and that of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Section 23 of the ‘Act’ would come to be attracted only if the aforementioned conditions are ingrained in the covenants of the document; or are established explicitly or implicitly through evidence. 13. In the factual matrix of this case, no doubt, Ext.P1 document - which is the transfer document in question - only says that the senior citizen, Smt.Indira Varasyar, has transferred the property in favour of the appellant, Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan, out of love and affection and because the latter is dependent on the former. 14. In Sudesh Chhikara (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court took cognizance of the realities of life, particularly when parents settle properties in favour of children. It recognized that very often transfers are made out of love and affection, without any expectation to return; and therefore, that even where the conditions enumerated by Section 23 (1) of the ‘Act’ are not implicitly written into the deed, the senior citizen obtains the right to establish it before the Tribunal. The opinion of the Hon’ble Supreme Court require to be read in full, for which, we extract paragraph 15 of the said judgment as under: “When a senior citizen parts with his or her property by executing a gift or a release or otherwise in favour of his or her near and dear ones, a condition of looking after the senior citizen is not necessarily attached to it. On the contrary, very often, such transfers are made out of love and affection without any expectation in return. Therefore, when it is alleged that the conditions mentioned in sub- section (1) of Section 23 are attached to a transfer, existence of such conditions must be established before the Tribunal.” 15. Subsequently, in Urmila Dixit (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court again lucidly explained the forensic ambit of Section 23 of the ‘Act’, declaring that merely because the document may be silent with respect to the conditions postulated therein, it will not denude the rights of the senior citizen to have the document declared void, provided he/she is able to establish that the promise, as required under the Statutory Scheme, had been made to him/her by the transferee, either implicitly or explicitly; and that it had been violated. 16. 16. Therefore, our examination of the facts and evidence in this case require to be confined to the question whether the condition, as mandated under Section 23 of the ‘Act’, stands proved or otherwise. In other words, whether the undertaking/promise of the transferee, that she shall take care of the basic needs and amenities of the transferor is established; and, if so, whether it had been violated. 17. As rightly pointed out by Sri.Manzoorali, the document in question - namely Ext.P1, does not stipulate the condition explicitly. To reiterate, it only says that the transfer has been made on account of the love and affection of Smt.Indira Varasyar for Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan and because the latter is dependent upon the former. However, this, by itself, does not construe that Smt.Indira Varasyar cannot maintain a petition under Section 23 of the ‘Act’ solely for this reason, going by the afore cited precedent. 18. We, therefore, have closely examined Ext.P2 - which is the complaint preferred by Smt.Indira Varasyar; and notice that, in it also, she avers that she had transferred her property, covered by Ext.P1, in favour of Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan, under the “hope” and “expectation” that she will take care of her basic needs and amenities. There is not a whisper in the said complaint, that any promise as afore was made by Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan to Smt.Indira Varasyar, but solely that the latter was under the bona fide impression and belief that she would be taken care of by the former. 19. Even this, in our view, would not have stood in the way of Smt.Indira Varasyar obtaining benefits under Section 23 of the ‘Act’, provided it was at least her case in her statement before the Maintenance Tribunal, that she had obtained a promise or undertaking from Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan as required under the said section. 20. 19. Even this, in our view, would not have stood in the way of Smt.Indira Varasyar obtaining benefits under Section 23 of the ‘Act’, provided it was at least her case in her statement before the Maintenance Tribunal, that she had obtained a promise or undertaking from Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan as required under the said section. 20. However, when Ext.P4 is read, the Maintenance Tribunal records that the matter was considered by it 13 times in the years 2021 and 2022, it reproduces the version of Smt.Indira Varasyar, which is again to the effect that she executed Ext.P1 under the “belief” that Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan would take care of her; but that this “expectation” was completely belied by the fact that the latter took steps to sell the property, on which a mortgage had been created by her earlier, which establishes that her intent was not to take care of her, or to provide for her basic needs and amenities. 21. No doubt, Section 23 of the ‘Act’ does not explicitly say that the transferee, who is subject to a condition as mentioned therein, cannot sell the property; however, this will have to be a read into it implicitly because, if the property is to be sold - even though being under the burden of the undertaking/promise of the transferee - then the transferor/senior citizen would not obtain the right to have it voided, at his or her option. 22. Therefore, a close examination of Ext.P2 would persuade any reasonable mind to understand that Smt.Indira Varasyar approached the Maintenance Tribunal not on the allegation that her daughter-in-law did not take care of her or provide her basic needs or requirements, as she believed she would; but because she was making an attempt to sell the property and to liquidate the loan on it. 23. In the afore perspective, it becomes ineluctable that, unless the undertaking or promise of the transferee, as required under Section 23 of the ‘Act’, is established either through oral evidence, pleadings or otherwise, the Maintenance Tribunal could not have acted, to cancel Ext.P1, as it has done in Ext.P4. 24. 23. In the afore perspective, it becomes ineluctable that, unless the undertaking or promise of the transferee, as required under Section 23 of the ‘Act’, is established either through oral evidence, pleadings or otherwise, the Maintenance Tribunal could not have acted, to cancel Ext.P1, as it has done in Ext.P4. 24. We have also gone through the materials and evidence on record, and must further record that it is the specific case of Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan, while she is stated to have given her statement before the Maintenance Tribunal, that the house on the property in question was constructed by her mother-in-law and her estranged husband, obtaining financial assistance from her mother and brother; and a further Rupees Eight Lakhs had been paid to Smt.Indira Varasyar, at the time Ext.P1 was executed. These assertions stand unimpeached. 25. We digress at this time, to say that, on the application of Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan, the son of Smt.Indira Varasyar - namely her estranged husband, has been impleaded as additional 3 rd respondent; but that this was done solely for the purpose of facilitating settlement between the parties. 26. However, the learned counsel for the 3 rd respondent supported Smt.Indira Varasyar, reiterating that Ext.P1 was executed by his mother in favour of his estranged wife, not as a part of a settlement of the matrimonial disputes, but solely to enable the latter to obtain a loan on behalf of the family and construct the house. 27. It is needless to say that the version of the 3 rd respondent would certainly not aid the case of Smt.Indira Varasyar in any manner whatsoever, particularly when he had not been a party before the Maintenance Tribunal. 28. Having concluded as afore, we must, however, say that we are rather amazed by the argument of Sri.Manzoorali that Section 23 of the ‘Act’ cannot be used to invalidate a document executed by a senior citizen to his/her daughter-in-law. This is because Section 23 talks only about the “transferor” and “transferee” and not about “relative” or “children”, as available in other Sections of the ‘Act’. Obviously, therefore, if the transfer had been made in favour of even a daughter-in- law - much less, even to a non-relative - with a condition attached as required therein, the rigour of the said provision would certainly apply. We, consequently, repel this contention. 29. Obviously, therefore, if the transfer had been made in favour of even a daughter-in- law - much less, even to a non-relative - with a condition attached as required therein, the rigour of the said provision would certainly apply. We, consequently, repel this contention. 29. In conspectus, unless it had been established that the transfer of the property in favour of Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan by Smt.Indira Varasyar was done on the condition agreed to by the former, that she will take care of the basic needs and the amenities of the latter – which factum ought to have been proved either directly or indirectly through pleadings, depositions or the document itself – the Maintenance Tribunal could not have obtained jurisdiction under Section 23 of the ‘Act’. 30. As seen afore, Smt.Indira Varasyar had several opportunities to impel her case and to bring her complaint within the confines of Section 23 of the ‘Act’. However, she has not been able to do so because, as recorded above, in Ext.P1 such a condition is conspicuously absent; while in Ext.P2 complaint, she only says that she made the transfer under the “expectation” and “hope” that her needs and requirements would be met by her daughter-in- law. In the same line of the assertion, Smt.Indira Varasyar then said her version was recorded by the Maintenance Tribunal, that she “believed” that her daughter-in-law would take care of her, but that the same was belied when the latter tried to sell the property. Here again, there is not even a mention that Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan refused to take care of, or to provide basic amenities to Smt.Indira Varasyar. 31. That being said, pending this matter, Smt.Subha Jayakrishnan has filed an application, producing certain documents on record, asserting that they relate to other properties owned by Smt.Indira Varasyar, which she has now settled in favour of her other children, after filing Ext.P2 complaint. 32. Smt.Arundhathi Nair – learned counsel for Smt.Indira Varasyar, responded to this, acceding that her client did settle her other properties in favour of her children after Ext.P2 had been filed; but explained that this is because she is being taken care of by them and their families. She contended that this, by itself, would not disentitle her client to obtain relief under Section 23 of the ‘Act’. 33. She contended that this, by itself, would not disentitle her client to obtain relief under Section 23 of the ‘Act’. 33. Without doubt, we are in full agreement with Smt.Arundhathi Nair, when she contends that the factum of Smt.Indira Varasyar having settled all her other properties in favour of her children would not denude her of the statutory benefits under the ‘Act’, if it is available to her otherwise. But, in this case, we are constrained to find it against her for the singular reasons we have detailed above. 34. To paraphrase, when neither the document in question, nor the testimony or pleadings of Smt.Indira Varasyar indicates, much less establishes, that the transfer was subject to a condition that the transferee shall provide for her basic amenities and physical needs, we are left without doubt that the Maintenance Tribunal ought not to have intervened; and resultantly that the judgment of the learned Single Judge cannot be granted imprimatur. 35. The pleadings and documents on record indicate a situation where there may be civil disputes between the parties, but the question whether this would transmute to a right for the senior citizen to invoke Section 23 of the ‘Act’ is something which is wholly different. It is only if the mandatory criteria mentioned in Section 23 of the ‘Act’ are established, at least peripherally, that this court could have offered approval to the proceedings and order of the Maintenance Tribunal. When it is wholly lacking, as said above, we cannot find the impugned judgment to be deserving of approval. In the afore circumstances, this Appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside; and consequently, Ext.P4 order of the Maintenance Tribunal is quashed.