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2025 DIGILAW 273 (PAT)

Kamini Kumari v. State of Bihar

2025-03-07

ANJANI KUMAR SHARAN

body2025
Anjani Kumar Sharan, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. As the common question of fact and law involved in all these writ applications, with consent of all the parties, all these applications have been heard together for final disposal at this stage itself. 3. In all these writ applications, the petitioners seek quashing of the orders passed by the State Appellate Authority, Education Department, in various appeals, whereby the appointments of the petitioners in the present batch of writ applications have been cancelled with retrospective effect from the date of their respective appointments and to reinstate them with consequential benefits. The impugned orders direct the removal of the petitioners from service within a fortnight by the concerned Panchayat Secretary and to recover payments received by them in accordance with law. The details of the State Appellate Authority Appeal Case Numbers and the respective orders under challenge in these writ petitions are set out herein below in a tabular form:— Sl. Present CWJC No. (s) State Appellate Authority Order passed by the No. Appeal No. (s) State Appellate Authority 1. CWJC 17762/23 Appeal No. 922/2022 11.10.2023 2. CWJC 18315/23 Appeal No. 52/2022 16.10.2023 3. CWJC 7455/22 Appeal No. 104/2021 25.04.2022 4. CWJC 4554/23 Appeal No. 114/2021 25.04.2022 5. CWJC 436/24 Appeal No. T-92/2023 19/12/2023 6. CWJC 3883/24 Appeal No. 34/2022 29/08/2023 7. CWJC 11461/24 Appeal No. T-58/2022 16/06/2024 8. CWJC 12183/24 Appeal No. T-1017/2022 03/04/2024 9. CWJC 12528/24 Appeal No. T-57/2023 28/06/2024 10. CWJC 12608/24 Appeal No. T-924/2022 13/12/2023 11. CWJC 16458/23 Appeal No. 93/2021 04/05/2023 12. CWJC 17679/23 Appeal No. 32/2022 26/09/2023 13. CWJC 18173/23 Appeal No. T-40/2023 27/10/2023 14. CWJC 18362/23 Appeal No. T-1016/2022 06/10/2023 15. CWJC 18409/23 Appeal No. 2/2023 05/12/2023 16. CWJC 1001/24 Appeal No. T-76/2023 27/11/2023 17. CWJC 1280/24 Appeal No. 4/2023 11/12/2023 18. CWJC 3103/24 Appeal No. 35/2022 04/10/2023 19. CWJC 3718/24 Appeal No. 62/2022 15/01/2024 20. CWJC 4140/24 Appeal No. T-98/2023 07/12/2023 21. CWJC 4160/24 Appeal No. T-99/2023 02/01/2024 22. CWJC 4178/24 Appeal No. T-19/2023 01/02/2024 23. CWJC 4496/24 Appeal No. T-201/2023 13/02/2024 24. CWJC 5932/24 Appeal No. T-38/2023 21/02/2024 25. CWJC 8696/24 Appeal No. T-164/2023 24/04/2024 26. CWJC 9044/24 Appeal No. T-981/2022 09/05/2024 27. CWJC 9061/24 Appeal No. T-972/2022 05/04/2024 28. CWJC 9062/24 Appeal No. T-144/2023 15/05/2024 29. CWJC 10001/24 Appeal No. T-970/2022 13/05/2024 30. CWJC 10844/24 Appeal No. T-979/2022 30/05/2024 31. CWJC 4496/24 Appeal No. T-201/2023 13/02/2024 24. CWJC 5932/24 Appeal No. T-38/2023 21/02/2024 25. CWJC 8696/24 Appeal No. T-164/2023 24/04/2024 26. CWJC 9044/24 Appeal No. T-981/2022 09/05/2024 27. CWJC 9061/24 Appeal No. T-972/2022 05/04/2024 28. CWJC 9062/24 Appeal No. T-144/2023 15/05/2024 29. CWJC 10001/24 Appeal No. T-970/2022 13/05/2024 30. CWJC 10844/24 Appeal No. T-979/2022 30/05/2024 31. CWJC 11137/24 Appeal No. T-178/2023 18/03/2024 32. CWJC 11855/24 Appeal No. T-269/2023 26/06/2024 33. CWJC 11891/24 Appeal No. T-37/2023 27/06/2024 34. CWJC 12726/24 Appeal No. 38/2023 20/06/2024 35. CWJC 16170/22 Appeal No. 132/2021 30.09.2022 36. CWJC 335/22 Appeal No. 343/2019 29.11.2021 37. CWJC 7956/22 Appeal No. 128/2021 12.05.2022 38. CWJC 8092/22 Appeal No. 63/2021 14.03.2022 39. CWJC 10955/22 Appeal No. 113/2021 09.06.2022 40. CWJC 11380/22 Appeal No. 377/2019 19.05.2022 41. CWJC 12923/22 Appeal No. 127/2021 22.07.2022 42. CWJC 15093/22 Appeal No. 130/2021 22.07.2022 43. CWJC 15450/22 Appeal No. 73/2021 13.05.2022 44. CWJC 15766/22 Appeal No. 87/2021 12.08.2022 45. CWJC 16673/22 Appeal No. 145/2021 30.09.2022 46. CWJC 17728/22 Appeal No. 131/2021 10.10.2023 47. CWJC 18081/22 Appeal No. 129/2021 22.07.2022 48. CWJC 908/23 Appeal No. 86/2021 18.11.2022 49. CWJC 1037/23 Appeal No. 71/2021 06.12.2022 50. CWJC 1116/23 Appeal No. 62/2021 10.10.2022 51. CWJC 1120/23 Appeal No. 98/2021 30.09.2022 52. CWJC 1124/23 Appeal No. 80/2021 18.11.2022 53. CWJC 7405/23 OA No. 499/2022 05.12.2022 54. CWJC 9405/23 OA No. T-832/2022 & Appeal No. 39/2022 27.04.2023 55. CWJC 10139/23 Appeal No. 33/2022 25.05.2023 56. CWJC 10732/23 Appeal No. 31/2022 04.05.2023 57. CWJC 13526/23 Appeal No. 44/2022 11.08.2023 58. CWJC 12965/24 Appeal No.283/2023 26.06.2024 59. CWJC 17645/23 Appeal No.36/2022 29.09.2023 4. Shorn of unnecessary details, the petitioners’ case is that petitioners in these batch of cases had applied for the post of Panchayat Teacher in the year 2006 and year 2008 i.e. during the first and second phase of the appointment process. Upon being included in the merit list, they were called for counselling. However, after the final selection process, these petitioners were not appointed to the said post. 5. Further case of the petitioners is that subsequently, certain selected candidates either resigned or voluntarily vacated the post after serving for a few years. Upon acquiring knowledge of these vacancies, the petitioners approached the District Appellate Authorities seeking their appointment to the said post. However, after the final selection process, these petitioners were not appointed to the said post. 5. Further case of the petitioners is that subsequently, certain selected candidates either resigned or voluntarily vacated the post after serving for a few years. Upon acquiring knowledge of these vacancies, the petitioners approached the District Appellate Authorities seeking their appointment to the said post. After considering the grievances of the petitioners and the submissions made by the Panchayat Secretaries, the District Appellate Authorities allowed the appeals in favour of the petitioners considering the fact that their appointments were made under the 2006 and 2008 selection process. Pursuant to the aforesaid orders, the District Programme Officers (Establishment) directed the respective Block Education Officers to facilitate the joining of all the petitioners on the said post within their respective districts. 6. Furthermore, all the petitioners submitted their consent letters and assumed charge at the designated schools in their respective districts. However, despite joining the said post, their salaries were not disbursed. Consequently, the petitioners approached this Hon’ble Court by filing various analogous writ petitions. Upon adjudication of these matters, this Court allowed the writ petitions, directing the competent authorities to verify the claims of the petitioners and ensure the disbursement of their salaries accordingly. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondents in the present writ petitions subsequently approached the State Appellate Authority, challenging the order passed by the District Appellate Authorities. The State Appellate Authority, upon adjudication, allowed the appeals of the respondents, thereby setting aside the appointment of the petitioners with retrospective effect from their respective dates of appointment. Consequently, all the petitioners were removed from their respective posts, and the District Education Officers of the concerned districts were directed to recover all payments disbursed to the petitioners. 8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of the State Appellate Authority, the petitioners have preferred the present writ petitions before this Court. In some cases, the coordinate Bench of this court had stayed the orders of the State Appellate Authority. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioners approached the District Appellate Authorities after a lapse of five or six years from the conclusion of the first and second phase of the appointment process in the year 2007 and 2010. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioners approached the District Appellate Authorities after a lapse of five or six years from the conclusion of the first and second phase of the appointment process in the year 2007 and 2010. It is contended that the District Appellate Authorities, without due consideration of the applicable departmental guidelines and despite the completion of the selection process for the said post under both the first and second phases of recruitment, erroneously allowed the appeals of the petitioners. 10. Learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon the order dated 07.07.2015 passed by this court in C.W.J.C No. 6015 of 2015 (Md. Akil vs State of Bihar and Ors.) wherein this court held that “no appointment can be made at this belated stage on the post which was advertised and exercise was completed in the year 2008. In addition to that since then rules have changed the qualification and eligibility for appointment has changed. Any appointment now will be governed by the present rules in play.” 11. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the State Appellate Authority, after a detailed examination of the matter, rightly allowed the appeals preferred by the respondents. Consequently, it is asserted that the grievances raised by the petitioners in the present batch of writ petitions are devoid of merit and warrant outright rejection. 12. It is an undisputed fact that no cases or complaints are pending before any competent authority. Consequently, the District Appellate Authority would have considered any vacancy arising due to resignation or an unfilled seat for the said post in the recruitment process of the first and second phases. 13. In view of the aforesaid submissions and pleadings of the parties, I think it proper and appropriate to frame following points for consideration for deciding the case properly, effectively and assistively. I. Whether the District Appellate Authorities have the power to pass an order regarding appointments against the vacancies from the first phase held in 2006, which were later carried forward to the second phase in 2008 and concluded in December 2010, and if so, whether an appointment made by the authorities after the closure of the first and second phase appointments remains valid? II. II. Whether the delay in filing of case by the petitioners before the District Appellate Authorities, as well as the delay by the District Programme Officers in appealing against the order of the District Appellate Authorities without providing a satisfactory reason before the District Appellate Authorities and the State Appellate Authority, respectively, can be condoned? III. Whether the District Appellate Authorities, while passing its order, failed to appreciate and consider Letter No. 465 dated 09.07.2012 issued by the Principal Secretary of the Education Department? 14. For the first issue, I would like to mention here that the State or its instrumentalities play a crucial role in society, and it is the legitimate expectation of citizens that they act fairly, reasonably and in accordance with the principles of justice in all spheres of governance. The sustenance and growth of democracy fundamentally depend on the practice of good governance in reality. The legal maxim Salus Populi Suprema Lex—which translates to "the welfare of the people is the supreme law"—is deeply embedded in the foundation of good governance. It signifies the unwavering commitment of the State to upholding citizens' rights, ensuring due respect for fundamental and statutory rights in all governmental actions. It further conveys that decisions by competent authorities must be taken with utmost sincerity, and policies must be framed with the overarching objective of public welfare, ensuring inclusivity and uniformity in their application. The credibility of governance significantly hinges upon the efficiency and integrity of regulatory bodies. Consequently, their functioning must strictly adhere to prescribed guidelines, statutory provisions, and established legal principles to inspire public confidence and facilitate the systematic growth of the economy. True progress is realized when governance is effective, and the effectiveness of governance, in turn, is contingent upon the proper implementation of the law. 15. In the present batch of writ petitions, it is an undisputed fact that all the petitioners approached the District Appellate Authorities of their respective districts, seeking appointment under the 2006 and 2008 recruitment process after vacancies arose due to the voluntary resignation of candidates who were initially appointed during the first phase and second phase of recruitment in 2006 and 2008 respectively. However, the respondents have brought the attention of this Hon’ble Court on a crucial fact that the first phase of the 2006 recruitment process was concluded in 2007, and all unfilled vacancies were subsequently carried forward to the second phase in 2008. The second phase of recruitment was ultimately concluded in December 2010, with a categorical directive from the higher authorities that no further appointments were to be made after 31.12.2010 and that any remaining vacancies were to be carried forward to the next phase of recruitment. Consequently, all further appointments for the post of Panchayat Teacher were discontinued. Furthermore, Letter No. 465, dated 09.07.2012, issued by the Principal Secretary, Education Department, explicitly directed that the remaining vacancies from the second phase be merged with the vacancies of the third phase of recruitment. 16. Upon bare perusal of the records, it is evidently clear that the first phase of recruitment was concluded in the year 2007, while the second phase was concluded in 2010. In light of this, it is indisputable that the petitioners approached the District Appellate Authorities only after the closure of both the first and second phases of the recruitment process. Furthermore, it is an admitted fact that the petitioners were not appointed to the said post by December 2010. Moreover, any vacancies that arose in February 2012 would be categorized as future vacancies and could not be considered under the concluded phases of the recruitment process as it is a well settled principle of law and upheld by the Hon’ble apex court in the case of State of Orissa vs. Rajkishore Nanda, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 777 and in particular in para-11, what has been stated, is being reproduced herein below:— 11. It is a settled legal proposition that vacancies cannot be filled up over and above the number of vacancies advertised as “the recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution”, of those persons who acquired eligibility for the post in question in accordance with the statutory rules subsequent to the date of notification of vacancies. Filling up the vacancies over the notified vacancies is neither permissible nor desirable, for the reason, that it amounts to “improper exercise of power and only in a rare and exceptional circumstance and in emergent situation, such a rule can be deviated and such a deviation is permissible only after adopting policy decision based on some rational”, otherwise the exercise would be arbitrary. Filling up of vacancies over the notified vacancies amounts to filling up of future vacancies and thus, not permissible in law. (Emphasis supplied) 17. Thus, based on the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is pertinent to mention here that no appointment can be made on future vacancy because it will be in contravention of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The same has also been clarified by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Raghbir Chand Sharma, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 113 , especially in Para 4, which is quoted herein below:— 4. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel on either side. In our view, the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court cannot be sustained. As rightly contended for the appellant State, the notification issued inviting applications was in respect of one post and the first candidate in the select panel was not only offered but on his acceptance of offer came to be appointed and it was only subsequently that he came to resign. With the appointment of the first candidate for the only post in respect of which the consideration came to be made and select panel prepared, the panel ceased to exist and has outlived its utility and, at any rate , no one else in the panel can legitimately contend that he should have been offered appointment either in the vacancy arising on account of the subsequent resignation of the person appointed from the panel or any other vacancies arising subsequently. The circular order dated 22.3.1957, in our view, relates to select panels prepared by the Public Service Commission and not a panel of the nature under consideration. That apart, even as per the circular orders as also the decision relied upon for the first respondent, no claim can be asserted and countenanced for appointment after the expiry of six months. The circular order dated 22.3.1957, in our view, relates to select panels prepared by the Public Service Commission and not a panel of the nature under consideration. That apart, even as per the circular orders as also the decision relied upon for the first respondent, no claim can be asserted and countenanced for appointment after the expiry of six months. We find no rhyme or reason for such a claim to be enforced before courts, leave alone there being any legally protected right in the first respondent to get appointed to any vacancy arising subsequently, when somebody else was appointed by the process of promotion taking into account his experience and needs as well as administrative exigencies. (Emphasis supplied) 18. Further, a similar sort of order has even been passed by this court in LPA No. 1398 of 2013, which is quoted below:— …….here is a vacancy subsisting because of resignation of one of the selected candidates now is of no avail because law is well settled in this regard even by the Apex Court that any vacancy caused after joining and resignation cannot be used for the same to be filled up by any candidate from the panel as the panel life comes to an end after the appointment process is over. (Emphasis supplied) 19. Also, in an order passed by this court vide CWJC No. 7481 of 2014, which clearly demarcates that any future vacancy will have to be filled in future exercise for appointment and according to future rules and regulations.— “In addition to that, no appointment is required to be made on any post now after the cut-off date, which was indicated by the State Government and which is reflected even from the communication contained in Anenxure-3. Such vacancies now will be required to be filled up against future exercise for appointment. In addition to that, no person can be appointed as a Panchayat Teacher unless he or she qualifies the Teacher Eligibility Test, which is mandatory.” 20. Thus, in light of the aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court, and upon due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the present writ petitions, I am of the considered view that the recruitment process for the first phase and second phase of the 2006 and 2008 appointment was conclusively completed by the year 2010. Thus, in light of the aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court, and upon due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the present writ petitions, I am of the considered view that the recruitment process for the first phase and second phase of the 2006 and 2008 appointment was conclusively completed by the year 2010. The petitioners in the present case were applicants under the first and second phase of recruitment for the said post. It is, therefore, evident from the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court that the impugned orders passed by the District Appellate Authorities on various dates, allowing the petitioners' claims, are in direct contravention of the settled legal principles laid down through the precedents. The impugned orders are in clear violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, rendering them legally unsustainable.” 21. Furthermore, had the District Appellate Authorities deemed it appropriate to fill up the vacancies from the 2006 and 2008 appointment panel, the principles of fairness and equality would have necessitated the consideration of all candidates from the first and second phase of the 2006 and 2008 recruitment process. The authorities could not have arbitrarily excluded other eligible candidates based on a mere presumption that they were either disinterested in employment or had forfeited their rights by not approaching the District Appellate Authorities. Such an approach would be manifestly unjust and in violation of the principles enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 22. Furthermore, in the present case, if the District Appellate Authorities had found merit in the petitioners’ claims for appointment, the matter ought to have been referred to the Appointment Committee/Employment Committee, which is the competent authority vested with the power to make such appointments. The failure to adhere to this procedural requirement renders the decision of the District Appellate Authorities legally unsustainable. In this regard, it is a well-settled principle of law, as consistently reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions, that actions prohibited directly cannot be effectuated indirectly, as encapsulated in the Latin maxim “quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum,” meaning “that which is prohibited directly cannot be achieved indirectly.” 23. In this regard, it is a well-settled principle of law, as consistently reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions, that actions prohibited directly cannot be effectuated indirectly, as encapsulated in the Latin maxim “quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum,” meaning “that which is prohibited directly cannot be achieved indirectly.” 23. With respect to the jurisdiction of the District Appellate Authorities, it is imperative to underscore that the Learned District Appellate Authorities lacked the jurisdiction to entertain claims arising from the first and second phase of the 2006 and 2008 recruitment process respectively. During that phase, the competent authority to adjudicate complaints was the Block Development Officer (BDO), as the District Appellate Authorities had not yet been duly constituted at that time. This jurisdictional limitation is further reinforced by the judgment in LPA No. 984 of 2014, wherein this Court categorically held that:— The learned Single Judge further held, keeping in view the scheme of the rules and the manner in which the forum of appellate authority, the B.D.O., was replaced by the Tribunal and the time when it was done would show that the interference by the B.D.O. was in respect of first phase of the appointment process. When second phase appointment process started, the power of B.D.O. was taken away and vested in the Tribunal. All pending matters before the B.D.O. were then transferred to the Tribunal. Therefore, the scheme rightly appreciated by the learned Single Judge was that the Tribunal was to interfere only with matters of second phase appointments and matters pending in relation to the first phase of appointments. In other words, Tribunal was not competent to entertain grievances for the first time in respect of the first phase of appointments which had been completed before the Tribunal was constituted. At that time, it was the B.D.O. who was the competent authority. This reason appeals to us and we accept that this ground for holding in favour of the writ Petitioners and as against the appellant in this appeal can also be supported by another reason i.e. the selection process and the appointment took place in the year 2007 and the challenge to it was made before the Tribunal only in the year 2011, though the appellants pleads that he had immediately represented or protested before the B.D.O., the Collector and others. There are no materials contemporaneous to substantiate such submissions. If there was any matter pending before the B.D.O., then it would have been transferred to the Tribunal. (Emphasis supplied) 24. Henceforth, under these circumstances, the District Appellate Authorities ought not to have adjudicated the matter or directly appointed the petitioners solely on the basis of an appeal filed before them. The said authority was not the appropriate forum vested with the jurisdiction to make appointments to the post in question. Any grievance pertaining to the first phase of the 2006 appointment process was required to be adjudicated first by the Block Development Officer (BDO), followed by the appropriate appellate authority, in accordance with the prescribed legal framework. Consequently, the action of the District Appellate Authorities in bypassing the due process and usurping the jurisdiction of the competent appointing authority is ultra vires and legally unsustainable. The impugned action is, therefore, bad in law and is liable to be declared void ab initio. Thus, Issue No.I is decided against the petitioners. 25. Now, coming to the Issue No.II. From perusal of the pleadings, it is evident that the appointment process for the first phase of 2006 and second phase of 2008 was concluded in the year 2007 and 2010 respectively. However, the petitioners inexplicably delayed the filing of their appeals before the District Appellate Authorities for a period exceeding six or eight years. Notably, the present case is not one where the petitioners were overlooked in favor of another candidate; rather, it pertains to appointments on posts that became vacant in 2012. Despite the occurrence of vacancies in 2012, the petitioners further delayed approaching the District Appellate Authorities for an additional three to four years. It is significant to underscore that the petitioners have failed to provide any justification for such an inordinate delay or to demonstrate any compelling circumstances that prevented them from promptly seeking redressal. 26. Furthermore, in their appeal before the District Appellate Authorities, the petitioners deliberately omitted to implead the District Programme Officer, District Education Officer, and other relevant officials of the Education Department as necessary parties. This calculated omission resulted in a failure to present a comprehensive and accurate account of the matter before the adjudicating authority. Under these circumstances, the respondents, being directly affected by the impugned orders, had every right to challenge the same before the State Appellate Authority as aggrieved parties. This calculated omission resulted in a failure to present a comprehensive and accurate account of the matter before the adjudicating authority. Under these circumstances, the respondents, being directly affected by the impugned orders, had every right to challenge the same before the State Appellate Authority as aggrieved parties. The fact that they were not made parties in the proceedings before the District Appellate Authorities further underscores the deliberate attempt by the petitioners to suppress pertinent policies, rules, and directives issued by the respondent authorities. Such concealment of material facts and circumvention of due process cannot be countenanced under law. 27. Thereafter, it is imperative to refer to the observations made by the State Appellate Authority in one of the cases, specifically Appeal No. 132/2021, which meticulously delineates the state of affairs and prevailing circumstances following the closure of the first phase of appointment in the year 2007. The findings of the State Appellate Authority provided the critical insights into the procedural and legal framework governing the appointment process, thereby reinforcing the factual and legal position in the present matter. In this connection, this Authority is also tempted to consider letter no. 1385 dated 21.12.2018 written by Director, Primary Education to Arun Kumar Sinha, Presiding Officer of District Appellate Authority, Gopalganj. This letter mentions that more than 100 orders have been passed by that Presiding Officer against departmental rules. A number of cases of 2015 and 2016 have been quoted next, in which the department had found that such orders had been passed. In particular it has been stated that orders are being passed regarding appointment on post falling vacant due to resignation of a selected candidates in complete violation of orders of Hon'ble High Court and Supreme Court of India. This Authority has considered this letter to show the state of affairs that was reported to be prevailing in this respect at that point of time. It may be noted that the present impugned order also relates to appointment on a post falling vacant due to resignation of a selected teacher and this order has been passed by the same Presiding Officer to which the above said letter was addressed. Also, it relates to the same period. It may be noted that the present impugned order also relates to appointment on a post falling vacant due to resignation of a selected teacher and this order has been passed by the same Presiding Officer to which the above said letter was addressed. Also, it relates to the same period. This Authority feels that in deciding the maintainability of this appeal, it is the most important point to be considered that it is the duty of any court of law to ensure that no benefit goes to anyone involved in such racket of illegal appointment. Obviously, it is a case of concealment and misrepresentation by the applicants, concealment and misrepresentation by Panchayat Secretary and Mukhiya and an equally inappropriate act of the District Authority. It is a massive fraud played upon the society. 28. In light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is my considered opinion that the appeal preferred by the Petitioners before the District Appellate Authorities is barred by limitation as they have failed to provide any cogent justification or plausible explanation for the inordinate delay in approaching the District Appellate Authorities. In the absence of any satisfactory reasoning for such a prolonged lapse, the appeal is rendered unsustainable in law. 29. Now, with respect to the issue of condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the State Appellate Authority by the Respondents, I am of the considered view that the same has been extensively discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Collector (Land Acquisition) vs. Katiji, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 at page 108. The observations made therein are significant in determining the approach towards condonation of delay, wherein the Hon’ble Court has underscored that substantial justice must prevail over technical considerations, and that a pragmatic and just approach should be adopted while dealing with delay in filing the appeals. Accordingly, the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgment shall govern the present matter. For the sake of reference, I may quote the relevant extracts of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court.— 3. Accordingly, the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgment shall govern the present matter. For the sake of reference, I may quote the relevant extracts of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court.— 3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 [Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ”merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: “1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the “State” is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, filepushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. So also, the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. (Emphasis supplied) 30. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. (Emphasis supplied) 30. As, far as an appeal by the “State” is concerned before the State Appellate Authority this court takes the reference of the guidelines given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 at page 138.— 11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court — be it by private party or the State — are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the notemaking, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay. (Emphasis supplied) 31. In another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeal no. 2474 of 2012, wherein the Hon’ble Court’s observation mentioned in para 12 and 13 is reiterated below herein in the words of Hon’ble Apex Court— (12) ….. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. (13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 32. Thereafter, this Court seeks recourse to another judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 8183-8184 of 2013. In this judgment, various precedents set by the Hon’ble Apex Court have been referred to, and based on those, a comprehensive list of broad principles governing the law of limitation has been enumerated in paragraph 15 of the judgment. Notably, points (xi) to (xiii) of these principles hold overriding significance, as they establish the supremacy of substantive justice over technicalities and emphasize a liberal approach in matters concerning condonation of delay. Following are notable points mentioned by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case— 15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. (Emphasis supplied) 33. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. (Emphasis supplied) 33. The eminent jurist Salmond, in his treatise Jurisprudence, has aptly stated that “the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.” Further the law of limitation, being a fundamental principle of legal discipline, applies uniformly to all, including the Government and its various instruments. However, it is evident that the principle of adopting a justifiably liberal approach in certain cases has not effectively percolated down to the administrative mechanisms. Thus, in light of the aforementioned legal precedents, I find that the order in question unequivocally establishes that, while appeals filed by the State may be dismissed on grounds of delay attributable to the default of an officer or employee, the ultimate casualty in such instances is public interest. Public interest, being a paramount consideration in the exercise of judicial discretion conferred by relevant statutes, necessitates that some reasonable latitude be extended to the State in matters where the delay is neither mala fide nor indicative of gross negligence. 34. Henceforth, as previously observed, the present case is one among several instances wherein concealment, misrepresentation, and fraudulent conduct have been perpetrated by the Petitioners in collusion with the Panchayat authorities. Therefore, in view of the well-established principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as cited hereinabove, this Court finds that the State Appellate Authority has rightly exercised its discretion in condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the Respondent Authorities. The said Appellate authority has appropriately adjudicated the matter on its merits, ensuring that justice is not defeated by procedural technicalities, particularly in cases where fraud and misrepresentation vitiate the claims of the Petitioners. Thus, Issue No.II is also decided against the petitioners. 35. Now, coming to the last issue i.e. Issue No.III. As elaborately discussed herein above, this Court is of the considered view that Letter No. 465, dated 09.07.2012, was issued by the Principal Secretary of the Education Department well before the Petitioners filed their appeals before the District Appellate Authorities. Thus, Issue No.II is also decided against the petitioners. 35. Now, coming to the last issue i.e. Issue No.III. As elaborately discussed herein above, this Court is of the considered view that Letter No. 465, dated 09.07.2012, was issued by the Principal Secretary of the Education Department well before the Petitioners filed their appeals before the District Appellate Authorities. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of law that “No one stands above the law,” and the term “Law” has been inclusively defined under Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution of India as— (a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law; And, the Article 13(3)(b) of the Constitution specifically provides the meaning of “Laws in force” as mentioned below— (b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas. Moreover, according to the Black Law Dictionary – the term “Rule of Law” defined as “A legal principle, of general application, sanctioned by the recognition of authorities, and usually expressed in the form of a maxim or logical proposition.” 36. Thereafter, in the present facts and circumstances of the case, once a letter has been issued by a competent authority, it assumes binding force upon all concerned, as the overarching principle that “no one is above the law” comes into immediate effect. Moreover, the issuance of such a letter by a competent authority brings it within the ambit of "law" as defined under Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution of India, thereby reinforcing its character as an instrument of the rule of law. In light of this constitutional mandate, any action or claim that runs contrary to the established legal framework is legally untenable and cannot be sustained. Furthermore, upon the issuance of the said letter, the District Appellate Authorities were legally obligated to adhere to its directives. However, in the instant case, the District Appellate Authorities failed to consider and apply the directives contained therein while adjudicating the appeals filed by the Petitioners. This glaring omission has been extensively examined and critiqued by the State Appellate Authority in its impugned order. However, in the instant case, the District Appellate Authorities failed to consider and apply the directives contained therein while adjudicating the appeals filed by the Petitioners. This glaring omission has been extensively examined and critiqued by the State Appellate Authority in its impugned order. Consequently, it is evident that the District Appellate Authorities committed a grave legal error by disregarding and failing to accord due consideration to Letter No. 465, dated 09.07.2012, while rendering its decision. 37. Thereafter, I find it relevant herein to make a reference of another case, bearing CWJC No. 12593 of 2018, wherein the order dated 30.08.2022, dealing with a similar subject matter, assumes significance. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is pertinent to be quoted herein. The question whether the vacancy would relate to the year 2008 is required to be examined. If a person obtains appointment by fraudulent means and continues on the post years together like in the present case, the said teachers were terminated in the year 2015 or so, whether the vacancy can be treated to have fallen vacant in 2008. In the opinion of this court, the vacancy would not relate back to the year of recruitment. The selections are made by a direct recruitment. A person who holds post and illegally occupies it, therefore, as and when he is removed or resigns voluntarily, the post falls vacant on that particular day and would be available for direct recruitment for subsequent years. 38. In view thereof, since the new recruitment rules came into force after 2012, any vacancy arising in the year 2015 due to voluntary resignation of an individual who had secured appointment through legal means, would be deemed to have fallen vacant at that point in time. Consequently, such vacancies must be filled strictly in accordance with the 2012 recruitment rules or any other rules prevailing at the time the vacancy arises. As a result, the claims of individuals who had applied during the initial appointment process would not subsist, as the selection process must conform to the legal framework in force at the time of the vacancy rather than the rules that existed at the time of the initial appointment. Thus, Issue No.III is decided against the petitioners. 39. As a result, the claims of individuals who had applied during the initial appointment process would not subsist, as the selection process must conform to the legal framework in force at the time of the vacancy rather than the rules that existed at the time of the initial appointment. Thus, Issue No.III is decided against the petitioners. 39. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the precedents as discussed herein above, I found that the State Appellate Authority has rightly allowed all the appeals preferred by the respondents and the same are upheld. In the result, all these writ petitions are dismissed. 40. Interlocutory Applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.