JUDGMENT : P. Krishna Kumar, J. 1. The suit for partition of various items of properties was decreed only with regard to two items in the plaint A schedule. The plaintiffs are in appeal. The third defendant has also preferred a separate appeal challenging the said decree. 2. The parties will hereinafter be referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. The plaint schedule properties originally belonged to late K.S. Krishnan, the husband of the second defendant and the father of the plaintiffs as well as defendants 1, 3, and 4. Krishnan died on 12.08.1994. Upon his death, the rights over the plaint schedule properties devolved upon the plaintiffs and the defendants. Later, on 25.11.1994, Ext.A1/B1 partition deed bearing Registration No.2987/1994 of Palakkad SRO was purportedly executed by the plaintiffs and defendants in respect of the plaint A schedule properties. 3. It is contended by the plaintiffs that their elder brother, the first defendant, obtained their signatures in the said registered deed by making them believe that it was a Power of Attorney authorising him to manage the business run by their father. Believing him, they signed it without reading its contents, and thereby Ext.A1 came to be registered. The plaintiffs assert that all the plaint schedule properties continued to remain in their joint possession and ownership notwithstanding the creation of the said document. On 12.06.2012, when the plaintiffs demanded partition of their shares, the first defendant declared that the properties had already been divided under a partition deed. Upon enquiry, it was revealed that the document registered as a Power of Attorney was in fact a partition deed, which, according to the plaintiffs, was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. 4. The plaintiffs further contended that the properties owned by late K.S. Krishnan were never actually partitioned and that there was not even a discussion among the parties for separation of their joint ownership or possession. Consequently, Ext.A1 is null and void. It is also contended that though the plaint schedule properties are worth several crores of rupees, the share allotted to the plaintiffs under the said document was valued at only Rs. 2,50,000/- which itself demonstrates the magnitude of the deception, misrepresentation, and fraud perpetrated by the first defendant. 5. The third defendant, the appellant in R.F.A. No. 320/2019, filed a written statement supporting the contentions of the plaintiffs. 2,50,000/- which itself demonstrates the magnitude of the deception, misrepresentation, and fraud perpetrated by the first defendant. 5. The third defendant, the appellant in R.F.A. No. 320/2019, filed a written statement supporting the contentions of the plaintiffs. Defendants 1, 2, and 4 filed separate written statements contending that the suit is vexatious and speculative, and that the plaintiffs intended only to harass the first defendant. The suit was filed nearly two decades after the execution of the registered partition deed. According to them, Ext.A1 was executed voluntarily and with full knowledge and understanding of its contents and nature, and is therefore valid and binding on all parties. It was further contended that except for plaint item Nos. 8 and 9, all other properties are not partible, and that the first defendant is agreeable for partitioning of item Nos. 8 and 9 alone. As per the partition deed, the third defendant was allotted B schedule properties, which she subsequently sold to the first defendant for valuable consideration. The A schedule property was allotted to the first and second defendants, and the second defendant (mother) later released her rights in favour of the first defendant. Thereafter, defendants 2 and 4 also released their shares over item Nos. 8 and 9 to the first defendant through separate registered documents. All signatories to the deed were capable of understanding its contents, being educated, experienced, and married individuals, it is pleaded. 6. The evidence in the case consists of the oral testimony of PW1 and DW1, and documentary evidence marked as Exts.A1 to A7 and B1 to B22. The trial court framed the following issues for consideration: 1.Whether the consent for execution of document No.2987/1994 was obtained by fraud as alleged in the plaint? 2.Whether the suit properties are available for partition? If so, what is the quantum of shares to be allotted to the sharers? After considering the oral and documentary evidence, the trial court found that plaint A schedule item Nos. 1 to 7 and 10 and 11, as well as plaint B schedule properties, are not partible. The suit was decreed only in respect of plaint A schedule item Nos. 8 and 9, which were directed to be divided into six equal shares. The court further held that the plaintiffs and the third defendant are each entitled to 1/6 share, and the first defendant is entitled to 3/6 share in those items. The suit was decreed only in respect of plaint A schedule item Nos. 8 and 9, which were directed to be divided into six equal shares. The court further held that the plaintiffs and the third defendant are each entitled to 1/6 share, and the first defendant is entitled to 3/6 share in those items. 7. We have heard Sri T. Krishnanunni, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs, assisted by Smt. A. Meena; Sri Mohan C. Menon, learned counsel for the third defendant; and Sri P.B. Subramanyan, learned counsel for defendants 1, 2, and 4. 8. Having considered the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, and the submissions made by counsel on either side, the question that arises for determination is whether Ext.A1 is null and void. 9. Sri T. Krishnanunni, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs, projected the following circumstances as vitiating factors undermining the credibility of Ext.A1: (a) That while the bereaved family members, including the plaintiffs, were mourning the death of K.S. Krishnan, the first defendant obtained their signatures on the document by misrepresenting it as a Power of Attorney; (b) That the plaintiffs reposed complete faith and reverence in the first defendant, their elder brother, treating him as a father figure in managing family affairs; (c) That being women of an aristocratic family, the plaintiffs were socially and traditionally placed in a subordinate position vis-à-vis male members, thereby suffering an inherent disadvantage in negotiating equitable terms; and (d) That the value of assets allotted to the first defendant is shockingly disproportionate. 10. Relying on various precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court, the learned Senior Counsel contended that when fraud or misrepresentation goes to the very nature or character of a deed, the document becomes void ab initio, not merely voidable. Reliance was placed on C.V. Suresh v. Tobin and Ors. MANU/KE/2174/2011, N. Divakaran and Ors. v. David Livingston and Ors. MANU/KE/2545/2024 and Ponnu v. Taluk Land Board, 1981 KHC 392, to assert that mere admission of execution of a document does not constitute admission of its contents. 11. Sri Mohan C. Menon, learned counsel for the third defendant, adopted similar arguments and relied upon Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) through LRs. Goran v. Jagan Devi, 2025 KHC OnLine 6790, Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar and Others, 1968 KHC 638 and Ramathal v. K. Rajamani (Dead) through LRs. 11. Sri Mohan C. Menon, learned counsel for the third defendant, adopted similar arguments and relied upon Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) through LRs. Goran v. Jagan Devi, 2025 KHC OnLine 6790, Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar and Others, 1968 KHC 638 and Ramathal v. K. Rajamani (Dead) through LRs. 2023 KHC 6788 to support his contention that misrepresentation as to the character of the document would make it void. 12. In reply, Sri P.B. Subramanyan, learned counsel for defendants 1, 2, and 4, relying on Biji Pothen v. Thankamma John and Ors. 2012 (3) KLT 658 , contended that a plea of this nature cannot be availed by literate persons who had an opportunity to read and understand the contents of a document. Since the plaintiffs themselves admitted that they did not read Ext.A1 despite having the opportunity to do so, the plea of non est factum cannot be sustained. Referring to the cross-examination of PW1, the learned counsel submitted that the evidence clearly establishes that the document was executed voluntarily and willingly, and that the present plea was raised only to harass the first defendant. 13. Upon evaluation of the entire evidence, we find considerable force in the submissions advanced by Sri P.B. Subramanyan. The suit was admittedly instituted after nineteen years of the execution of Ext.A1. In the plaint, they had alleged that they were receiving usufructs jointly, until the cause of action arose, which, if proved, would explain the delay in raising any claim earlier. However, no evidence was adduced to substantiate that claim. Pertinently, according to plaintiffs, several of the scheduled properties generated substantial annual income. Paragraph 6 of the proof affidavit of PW1, the first plaintiff, reads as follows: If the above allegation were true, the annual income derived from the said properties would be nearly Rs.25 lakhs, from which each of the plaintiffs would have been entitled to at least one-sixth share annually. There should have been some reliable evidence, had the said contention been true. 14. In these circumstances, the institution of the suit almost two decades after the death of late K.S. Krishnan casts some doubt upon the bona fides of the challenge. The contention that the plaintiffs, being members of an aristocratic family, were unable to question the authority of their elder brother while mourning their father’s death also appears misplaced. 14. In these circumstances, the institution of the suit almost two decades after the death of late K.S. Krishnan casts some doubt upon the bona fides of the challenge. The contention that the plaintiffs, being members of an aristocratic family, were unable to question the authority of their elder brother while mourning their father’s death also appears misplaced. The document was executed nearly three and a half months after the demise of K.S. Krishnan. Further, the 1 st defendant was only 24 years old at that time and the 3 rd and 4 th defendants, his sisters, were older to him. Hence, the contention that he held a fatherly command over them also seems improbable. 15. Notably, the mother (second defendant) of the plaintiffs and the first defendant supports the case advanced by the first defendant. She was also a signatory to Ext.A1. The properties were originally allotted to defendants 1 and 2, and the second defendant later transferred her rights to the first defendant. 16. Similarly, the third defendant had also transferred the share allotted to her under the partition deed to the first defendant. Ext.B18 is a copy of the plaint filed by the third defendant before the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Palakkad, wherein she had challenged both the partition deed and the subsequent transfer. That suit was later withdrawn. Certain portions of PW1’s cross-examination are relevant here: PW1 further admitted: She also admitted that the first defendant had informed their husbands about the execution of the document and that there was no compulsion in signing it, as shown below: 17. In cross-examination, PW1 admitted that the plaintiffs and the third defendant had studied up to the 10 th standard, and that their husbands were engaged in business. One of the attesting witnesses to Ext.A1 is none other than the husband of the third defendant, who has filed one of the appeals herein. 18. From the above facts, it is reasonable to conclude that the plaintiffs executed Ext.A1 voluntarily and with full knowledge of its contents. Although it was argued that the value of the properties allotted to the first defendant was disproportionately higher, no evidence was adduced to establish the same. Even if the properties allotted to the first defendant were of higher value, that fact alone is insufficient to invalidate a partition deed executed with open eyes. Although it was argued that the value of the properties allotted to the first defendant was disproportionately higher, no evidence was adduced to establish the same. Even if the properties allotted to the first defendant were of higher value, that fact alone is insufficient to invalidate a partition deed executed with open eyes. It is well settled that inequality in shares is not a ground to set aside a partition executed by all sharers. [Ratnam Chettiar v. Kuppuswami Chettiar, 1975 KHC 273] 19. This Court, in Mathu v. Cherchi, 1990 (1) KLT 416 held that pleas of the above nature should not ordinarily be entertained by the court unless the parties are blind or illiterate. Allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, or deception must be proved by clear and cogent evidence. The plaintiffs in this case have failed to establish such allegations. Therefore, it is to be concluded that the finding of the trial court that the plaintiffs failed prove that Ext. A1 is void, is only to be affirmed. No other substantial contentions were raised during the hearing. In the result, the appeals are dismissed affirming the judgment under challenge.