ORDER 1. This appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by the defendant being aggrieved by the judgement and decree dated 31.1.2004 passed in Civil Appeal No.68-A/2003 by the 13th Additional District Judge, Indore affirming the judgement and decree dated 2.8.2003 passed in Civil Suit No.20-A/2002 by the IInd Civil Judge Class I, District Indore, whereby the claim of plaintiff for his eviction from the suuit premises had been decreed on grounds enumerated under section 12 (1)(a)(c)(m) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act 1961'). 2. The plaintiff had instituted an action against the defendant for his eviction from the suit premises on 25.10.1978 on grounds enumerated under section 12 (1)(a)(c)(m) of the Act, 1961 submitting that it is the owner of House No.236, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Indore in which defendant is a tenant since the time of his father at Rs.7.50/- per month. He has been irregular in the matter of payment of monthly rent. He has illegally taken possession of two rooms besides the tenanted premises. He has also denied plaintiff's title to the suit premises. 3. The defendant contested the plaintiff's claim by filing his written statement denying all the grounds as raised in the plaint for seeking his eviction from the suit premises. During pendency of the suit, the plaintiff was registered as a Public Trust under the provisions of M.P. Public Trusts Act, 1951. Thereafter, an application under Order 6 rule 17 of the CPC was preferred by plaintiff seeking amendment of the plaint to claim exemption from the operation of the Act, 1961 by virtue of notification issued under section 3 (2) of the Act, 1961. 4. By judgment and decree dated 2.8.2003, the trial Court decreed the plaintiff's claim on grounds enumerated under section 12 (1)(a)(c) and (m) of the Act, 1961 and further held that it is entitled for exemption from operation of the provisions of the Act, 1961 by virtue of notification issued by the State Government dated 7.9.1989 under section 3 (2) of the Act. 5. 5. In appeal preferred by the defendant, the lower appellate Court has held that since the suit was instituted by plaintiff at the time when it was registered as a society and has been registered as a public trust only during pendency of the suit, it is not entitled for claiming exemption from operation of the provisions of the Act, 1961 by virtue of notification issued under section 3 (2) thereof. The finding of the trial Court in this regard has been set aside. However, the findings in respect of grounds under section 12 (1)(a)(c) and (m) of the Act, 1961 have been maintained as a result of which the appeal has been dismissed. 6. By order dated 30.7.2004, the appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law:- " Has the first appellate Court erred in that after holding that the respondent is not a religious trust and not exempted under section 3 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 from application of the same decided a case of eviction on the grounds under section 12 (1)(a)(c)(m) of the Act, 1961 though on these grounds, there were no pleadings, no issues were framed by the Court below and the trial Court has not recorded any finding on these grounds?" 7. Learned counsel for the defendant has submitted that the Courts below have erred in decreeing the claim of plaintiff on grounds under section 12 (1) of the Act, 1961. Though the suit was filed by the plaintiff when it was a society, but during pendency of the suit, it was registered as a Public Trust under the provisions of M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951. It had itself sought exemption from operation of the provisions of the Act, 1961 by virtue of notification issued under section 3(2) thereof. The suit was hence required to be instituted by all the trustees of the trust and the same instituted only by the President and Secretary of the society was not maintainable and ought to have been dismissed. It has also not been brought on record by the plaintiff that all the trustees of the trust have consented for the President and the Secretary to institute the suit. It has also not been brought on record by the plaintiff that all the trustees of the trust have consented for the President and the Secretary to institute the suit. It is also submitted that once the finding as regards exemption under section 3(2) of the Act, 1961 as recorded by the trial Court was set aside, the matter ought to have been remanded back to the trial Court for giving findings on merits on grounds raised under section 12(1) of the Act, 1961 which has not been done. It is hence submitted that the judgement and decree passed by the Courts below be set aside. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the defendant on the decision of the apex Court in Mangilal v. Shree Chuturbhuja Mandir, 1998 (5) SCC 597 , Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sau. Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar and Others, Civil Appeal No.6070 of 2023 decided on 21.9.2023, Panchugopal Barua and Others v. Umesh Chandra Goswami and Others, 1997 (4) SCC 713 of this Court in Shri Shri 1008 Kunwar Raj Rajeshwai Hindayla Darbar v. State of M.P., W.P. No.12194/2020 decided by order dated 27.8.2020, Rajaram Baijnath and Others v. Nandkishore Sheobux Rai and Others, 1975 MPLJ 419 , of the Madras High Court in v. Chandrasekaran and Others v. Venkatanaicker Trust and Others, 2017 (173) AIC 417 and of the Bombay High Court in Shri Cutchi Visa Oswal Derawasi Jain Pathshala v. Cutchi Visha Oswal Derawasi Jain Mahajan and Others, 2005 (1) ALLMR 484 . 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff has pointed out that both the Courts below have concurrently recorded findings on all the grounds raised by the plaintiff under section 12 (1)(a)(c) and (m) of the Act, 1961. The contention that no finding on these issues has been recorded by the trial Court is apparently contrary to the record. The suit was instituted by the plaintiff at the time when it was a society and by its President and Secretary. Only because the plaintiff got registered as a trust under the provisions of M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951 during pendency of the suit, it could not have been required to implead all the trustees as parties to the suit. The suit was instituted by the plaintiff at the time when it was a society and by its President and Secretary. Only because the plaintiff got registered as a trust under the provisions of M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951 during pendency of the suit, it could not have been required to implead all the trustees as parties to the suit. In any case, the exemption under section 3(2) of the Act, 1961 has not been given by the lower appellate Court to the plaintiff hence the contention in this regard is not required to be considered in view of which the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 10. In the plaint, the plaintiff had pleaded the grounds of eviction under section 12 (1)(a)(c) and (m) of the Act, 1961 in paragraph Nos. 5, 6 and 7. The grounds were specifically denied by the defendant in its written statement. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed by the trial Court. Issue No.3 and 4 were regarding ground of eviction under section 12 (1) (a) and issue No. 5 and 6 were regarding ground under section 12 (1)(m) of the Act, 1961. The finding in respect of ground under section 12(1)(a) was recorded by the trial Court in paragraph No.11 of its judgement while the finding under section 12 (1)(m) was recorded in paragraph No.13. The said findings have been affirmed by the lower appellate Court in its judgement. The finding in respect of ground under section 12 (1)(a) is in paragraph No.11, the finding in respect of section 12 (1)(m) is in paragraph No.13 and the finding in respect of section 13 (12)(1) (c) is in paragraph No.15. Thus, it cannot be said that the Courts below have recorded findings on grounds under section 12 (1)(a)(c) and (m) without there being pleading of the parties in that regard or without framing of issues. The trial Court had specifically on the basis of pleadings of the parties framed issues on aforesaid grounds and had recorded categoric findings on each and everyone of them which findings have been affirmed by the lower appellate Court. Thus, the substantial question of law as framed is answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 11. The trial Court had specifically on the basis of pleadings of the parties framed issues on aforesaid grounds and had recorded categoric findings on each and everyone of them which findings have been affirmed by the lower appellate Court. Thus, the substantial question of law as framed is answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 11. Though it has been contented by the learned counsel for the defendant that plaintiff is a registered public trust hence the suit ought to have been instituted by all the trustees of the trust whereas the same has been instituted by the President and Secretary only hence is not maintainable but the said contention is not liable to be accepted. The suit was instituted by the plaintiff in the year 1978. At that time, it was registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act, 1926 as is evident from its certificate of registration (Exhibit P/2C). There is no provision in the said Act that any suit to be instituted by any society registered under the same has to be instituted by all its members. On the contrary, in the bye laws of the society (Exhibit P/2), there is a specific clause No.7(v) which provides that any suit in respect of property of the society in the Court shall be instituted by the President and Secretary of the Society, who shall have exclusive right in that regard. The suit was instituted by the plaintiff when it was registered as a society under the Act, 1926 hence as per the bye laws of the society, the suit was validly instituted by its President and Secretary. 12. During pendency of the suit, the plaintiff was registered as a Public Trust under the provisions of M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951. Thereafter, amendment was made in the plaint for seeking exemption from operation of the provisions of the Act, 1961 by virtue of notification issued under section 3(2) thereof. The said benefit though was granted by the trial Court, but finding in that regard has been specifically reversed by the lower appellate Court in paragraph No.14 of its judgement. Thus, plaintiff seeking exemption from operation of the provisions of the Act, 1961 has not been found to be available to it. The said benefit though was granted by the trial Court, but finding in that regard has been specifically reversed by the lower appellate Court in paragraph No.14 of its judgement. Thus, plaintiff seeking exemption from operation of the provisions of the Act, 1961 has not been found to be available to it. When on account of registration of plaintiff as a Public Trust, it has not been granted any benefit, then it cannot be contended that the suit ought to have been instituted by all the trustees of the Trust. 13. Moreover, at the time when the suit was instituted, the plaintiff was a society registered under the provisions of the Act, 1926. The same was validly instituted by it. It was not instituted by a public trust. Only for the reason that during pendency of the suit, plaintiff was registered as a Public Trust, it could not have been legally required to implead all the trustees as plaintiffs to the suit. For the plaintiff not doing so, the suit having been validly instituted cannot be said to have been rendered not maintainable particularly when benefit on account of being registered as a Public Trust has not been granted to the plaintiff. In such circumstances, the judgements relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant are not required to be gone into.It may also be mentioned that no substantial question of law has been framed by this Court as regards maintainability of the suit on ground of non-impleadment of all the trustees of plaintiff trust as plaintiffs to the suit. Even the defendant has not filed any application under Section 100(5) of the CPC for framing any additional question of law in that regard. Only oral submissions were advanced and towards the end of arguments, it was contended by learned counsel for the defendant that this Court may itself frame additional substantial question of law in that regard. Though no such prayer was made before start of hearing of the appeal, but in order to do complete justice between the parties, this ground as raised by the defendant has also been considered and answered as above. 14. Though no such prayer was made before start of hearing of the appeal, but in order to do complete justice between the parties, this ground as raised by the defendant has also been considered and answered as above. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion and particularly since the substantial question of law as framed has been answered against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff, the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below deserve to be and are accordingly affirmed as a result of which the appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to cost.