JUDGMENT : Jobin Sebastian, J. 1. The petitioner herein is the brother of one Suhail Khani ('detenu' for the sake of brevity) and his challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P2 order of detention dated 31.07.2025 passed by the 3rd respondent under Section 3 (1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The said order stands confirmed by the Government, vide order dated 21.09.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months with effect from the date of detention. 2. The records reveal that on 11.07.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Thiruvananthapuram Rural, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 3rd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act. 3. Altogether, six cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the order of detention. Out of the said cases considered, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.599/2025 of Kadinamkulam Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 3 32(c) and 309(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “ BNS ”). 4. We heard Sri. Shajin S. Hameed, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader. 5. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another , [ 1991 (1) SCC 128 ] , the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, though in Ext.P2 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it is nowhere mentioned that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity. Moreover, the learned counsel urged that although the detention order was approved by the Government as required under Section 3 (3) of the KAA(P) Act, a copy of the order approving the detention was not served on the detenu. Consequently, the detenu was unable to verify whether the said approval had been made within twelve days from the date of detention. On these premises, it was argued that Ext.P2 order is liable to be set aside. 6. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext.P2 order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after complying with all the procedural formalities and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the Government Pleader, the detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that the same is the only way to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. It was further contended that the jurisdictional authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, and it was on being satisfied that there is every chance that the detenu be released on bail, and if so released, he would in all probability indulge in criminal activities further, the order of detenion was passed. According to him, therefore, the order of detention will legally sustain irrespective of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity while the impugned order was passed. The learned Government Pleader further submitted that the Ext.P2 order was duly approved by the Government on 12.08.2025, well within twelve days, the time limit prescribed under Section 3 (3) of the KAA(P) Act, and the contention of the petitioner in the above regard will not sustain. 7. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3 (1) of the KAA(P) Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. 7. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3 (1) of the KAA(P) Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. However, an order of detention against a person who is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity cannot be passed in a causal manner. Undisputedly, an order of detention under the KAA(P) Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts his personal as well as his fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible. When a detenu is in jail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy itself that there is a real possibility that the detenu is on bail, and further, if released on bail, the material on record reveals that he will indulge in prejudicial activity if not detained. The circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself. 8. In Kamarunnissa’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid. 9. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [ 1994 (2) SCC 337 ] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [ 2003 (8) SCC 342 ] . 10. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.599/2025 of Kadinamkulam Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 332 (c) and 309(4) of BNS . The detenu, who was arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case, was arrested on 19.06.2025, and since then, he has been under judicial custody. The impugned order was passed on 31.07.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody. 11. In Ext.P2 detention order, it is specifically stated that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity. Therefore, it is decipherable that the detaining authority was fully cognizant of the fact that the detenu was in custody at the time when it passed Ext.P2 order. 12. Similarly, in Ext. P2 order, it is clearly mentioned that although the detenu has not moved for bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, there is every possibility of him approaching the court seeking and securing bail. Therefore, it is clear that the order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, upon release, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities. Moreover, in the order, it is mentioned that the antecedents of the detenu suggest that if he is released on bail, he will repeat criminal activities, and hence, an order of detention under the KAA(P) Act is highly warranted to deter him from repeating criminal activities. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the jurisdictional authority passed the detention order after being satisfied of the triple test mentioned in Kamarunnissa’s case, which we have detailed above. 13. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the jurisdictional authority passed the detention order after being satisfied of the triple test mentioned in Kamarunnissa’s case, which we have detailed above. 13. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that although the detention order was approved by the Government as required under Section 3 (3) of the KAA(P) Act, a copy of the order approving the detention was not served on the detenu. Consequently, the detenu was unable to verify whether the said approval had been made within twelve days from the date of detention. While considering the said contention, it is pertinent to note that there is no requirement of law that the copy of the order approving the detention order shall be served on the detenu. But what is provided under Section 3 (3) of the KAA(P) Act is that the detention order shall be approved by the Government or the Secretary to the Home Department within twelve days, excluding public holidays from the date of detention of the detenu, and otherwise, the order shall not remain in force. Keeping in mind the above, from the submission made by the learned Government Pleader, it is discernible that Ext.P2 order of detention was approved by the Government on 12.08.2025 i.e., well within twelve days from the date of detention. Therefore, the petitioner could not be heard to say that the procedure mentioned under Section 3 (3) of the KAA(P) Act was not complied with within the time stipulated under the said provision. In view of the discussion above, we hold that the detenu has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.