ORDER : (J.C. DOSHI, J.) 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned APP waives service of rule for respondent No.1 – State and learned advocate Ms. Ratna Vora waives service of rule for respondent No.2. 2. Proposed draft amendment is allowed. To be carried out forthwith. 3. By way of this petition, the petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs:- “(A) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to admit and allow the present petition; (B) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned FIR dated 16.07.2018 registered vide C.R. No. I -159/2018 for the offences alleged to have been committed and punishable under sections 143, 147, 452, 323, 506 and 294(b) of IPC read with sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of The Schedule Castes and Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 with Manjalpur Police Station, District: Vadodara City and all consequent proceedings arising there from against the petitioners in the interest of justice; (C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the present petition, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to stay the investigation or further proceedings in FIR dated 16.07.2018 registered vide C.R. No. I - 159/2018 for the offences alleged to have been committed and punishable under sections 143, 147, 452, 323, 506 and 294(b) of IPC read with sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of The Schedule Castes and Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 with Manjalpur Police Station, District: Vadodara City against the petitioners in the interest of justice; (D) Ad-interim relief in terms of para 8(C) may kindly be granted;” 4. Brief facts of the case are as under:- 4.1 The complainant, a tuition teacher residing in a rented premises, lodged an FIR on 16.07.2018 at Manjalpur Police Station, Vadodara, alleging that the petitioner no.1, the owner of the rented premises, along with other petitioners, forced her to vacate the house citing her Scheduled Caste (Vankar) identity. It was further alleged that on 03.07.2018 and 07.07.2018, the petitioners came to her house, verbally abused her using caste-based derogatory remarks, and physically assaulted her father, who consequently left the house. On 16.07.2018, the petitioners allegedly entered the house and physically assaulted the complainant and her siblings. 4.2. The petitioners, aggrieved by the FIR No. I-159/2018, have challenged its registration before the Hon’ble High Court under Section 482 of CrPC, asserting that the allegations are false and fabricated. On 16.07.2018, the petitioners allegedly entered the house and physically assaulted the complainant and her siblings. 4.2. The petitioners, aggrieved by the FIR No. I-159/2018, have challenged its registration before the Hon’ble High Court under Section 482 of CrPC, asserting that the allegations are false and fabricated. They contended that an earlier police complaint was lodged against the complainant’s father for threatening his previous landlord, and that local residents of Pramukh Swami Tirth Society submitted a representation to the authorities on 20.07.2018, stating that no such caste-based incident took place. 4.3 The FIR was registered under Sections 143, 147, 452, 323, 506, and 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “the IPC”), along with Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, “the Act”). The petitioners seek quashing of the FIR, arguing that it was lodged with malafide intention and lacks prima facie evidence to substantiate the charges. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Seth, appearing for the petitioners, submits that the petitioners are landlords, and their family members are falsely implicated in the FIR. It is further submitted that, as per instructions he has received, the tenant has vacated the premises and is not living in the questioned premises as of now. It is further submitted that the FIR has been lodged with malafide intent and ulterior motives to harass the petitioners. It is further submitted that the alleged words, claimed to be derogatory or casteist slur, were not uttered within public view so as to attract offence under the Act. He further submitted that the multiple instances stated in the FIR, if taken as they are, do not establish the necessary ingredients of the offence under the IPC or of the offence under the Act. Lastly, learned advocate Mr. Seth prayed to allow the present application by setting aside the impugned FIR. 6. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Ratna Vora for respondent No.2 submitted that the necessary ingredients of offence under the IPC and the Act prima facie are made out, and derogatory words were spoken to the first informant as she belongs to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Therefore, she prayed that, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the present FIR may not be quashed and set aside. 7. Learned APP Mr. Therefore, she prayed that, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the present FIR may not be quashed and set aside. 7. Learned APP Mr. Rohan H. Raval, appearing for the respondent- State, submitted that the FIR discloses a cognizable offense, and the allegations leveled by the complainant constitute an offense under the relevant provisions of the IPC and the Act. Therefore, he prayed not to allow the present petition. 8. I have heard the learned advocate for both sides and perused the record. Essentially, the FIR is filed for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 452, 323, and 294(b) of the IPC, read with Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), and 3(2)(va) of the Act. 8.1. What is undisputed is that the first informant was the tenant and the accused is the landlord. Accusation of several offences is alleged against the petitioner. In nutshell, it is alleged that the petitioner being landlord has taken law in his hand and threatened to vacate tenanted premises, meanwhile knowing the case of the tenant he was abused which was to lower him on being person of Scheduled Caste and and Scheduled Tribes. 8.2 Section 452 of the IPC deals with house trespass with the motive to hurt someone, assault any person, restrain someone wrongfully, or put someone in fear of hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint. Section 442 of the IPC states that whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in any building, tent, or vessel used as a human dwelling, a place of worship, or a place for the custody of property is said to commit “house-trespass.” According to Section 442, a person is said to have committed house trespass if they unlawfully enter or remain in a building, tent, or vessel used as a human dwelling, a place of worship, or a place for the custody of property. 8.3. Criminal trespass is defined under Section 441 of the IPC. According to Section 441, criminal trespass is the act of entering or remaining on someone else's property with the intent to commit an offense or to intimidate, insult, or annoy the person in possession. 8.4. According to the FIR, the landlord entered into the premises of the tenant. In the opinion of this Court, looking at the peculiar facts of the case, Section 452 of the IPC is not attracted in the present case. 8.4. According to the FIR, the landlord entered into the premises of the tenant. In the opinion of this Court, looking at the peculiar facts of the case, Section 452 of the IPC is not attracted in the present case. The allegations leveled in the FIR indicate that the landlord and his family members asked the tenant to vacate the premises. This act of the landlord or his family members cannot be termed as criminal house trespass. Learned advocate Ms. Vora as well as learned APP failed to point out that asking tenant to vacate possession of tenanted premises, how it attracts offence of criminal trespass. 8.5. In the present case, it was alleged that on a particular day, the landlord and his family members entered the premises and gave a kick and a fist blow. The learned APP appearing for the State could not point out a single piece of documentary evidence on record indicating that the accused, by such an alleged act, inflicted a fist blow on any person from the first informant’s family. Therefore, Section 322 of the IPC is also not attracted. 8.6. In absence of essential elements, Sections 506 and 294(b) are not attracted upon reading the impugned FIR. Offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act are also alleged in the petition, which are as under:- “Section 3(1)(r): intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; Section 3(1)(s): abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;” 9. In the present case, a reading of the FIR indicates that the words alleged to have been spoken by the petitioners were uttered within the four walls of the house. They are failed to meet phrase “within public view” employed in the aforesaid both the Sections. The learned APP failed to establish that all the derogatory and casteist remarks were made within public view. 9.1. This Court, in the case of Ishwarbhai Versibhai Desai and Another v. State of Gujarat and Another in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 20269 of 2017, has addressed this issue. Paragraphs 13 to 16 are as follows: “13. In Swaran Singh vs. State - 2008 (8) SCC 435 , the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 28 held as under : “28. This Court, in the case of Ishwarbhai Versibhai Desai and Another v. State of Gujarat and Another in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 20269 of 2017, has addressed this issue. Paragraphs 13 to 16 are as follows: “13. In Swaran Singh vs. State - 2008 (8) SCC 435 , the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 28 held as under : “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a `Chamar') when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression `place within public view' with the expression 'public place'. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” 14. A place can be private place but yet within the public view could be treated as place within public view. Ordinarily public place means a place which is owned or leased by the Government or municipality or local body. In context to the FIR, it is stated that when first informant attended the office of the accused, he was scolded by certain words and some filthy words were used within the premises of the office of the petitioner. 15. Ordinarily public place means a place which is owned or leased by the Government or municipality or local body. In context to the FIR, it is stated that when first informant attended the office of the accused, he was scolded by certain words and some filthy words were used within the premises of the office of the petitioner. 15. I may refer to the case of Dinesh @ Buddha v. State of Rajasthan - (2006) 3 SCC 771 , wherein the Supreme Court observed in paras-14 and 15 as under; “14. At this juncture it is necessary to take note of Section 3 of the Atrocities Act. As the Preamble to the Act provides 'the Act has been enacted to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The expression 'atrocities' is defined in Section 2 of the Atrocities Act to mean an offence punishable under Section 3. The said provision so far relevant reads as follows: "3(2)(v): Punishments for offences of atrocities - (2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, - xxx xxx xxx (v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine; xxx xxx xxx" 15. Sine qua non for application of Section 3(2)(v) is that an offence must have been committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the instant case no evidence has been led to establish this requirement. It is not case of the prosecution that the rape was committed on the victim since she was a member of Scheduled Caste. In the absence of evidence to that effect, Section 3(2)(v) has no application. Had Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act been applicable then by operation of law, the sentence would have been imprisonment for life and fine.” 16. In the case of Gorige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. - (2008) 12 SCC 531 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under : “6. Had Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act been applicable then by operation of law, the sentence would have been imprisonment for life and fine.” 16. In the case of Gorige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. - (2008) 12 SCC 531 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under : “6. In the instant case, the allegation of respondent No.3 in the entire complaint is that on 27.5.2004, the appellant abused them with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (respondent No. 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate respondent No. 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law.” 10. The place where the alleged remarks were spoken was not within public view but within the four walls of the rented premises. Given these circumstances, the FIR appears to be malafide, vexatious, and filed with an oblique motive against the petitioners. Such an FIR deserves to be quashed, as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein, in Paragraph 102, it is held as under: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Ch. XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Art. 226 or the inherent powers under sec. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Ch. XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Art. 226 or the inherent powers under sec. 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under sec. 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of sec. 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under sec. 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 11. In view of the above, the present petition deserves to be allowed, and it is accordingly allowed. The FIR, being C.R. No. I-159 of 2018, registered with Manjalpur Police Station, District: Vadodara City, along with all subsequent proceedings arising from it, is hereby quashed and set aside qua the petitioners herein. The rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted.