JUDGMENT : (V. SRISHANANDA, J.) Heard Sri Subhash Mallapur, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the appellant – Lokayukta and Sri Ravi K. Anoor learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Karnataka Lokayukta, Kalaburagi has filed the present appeal challenging the order of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge in Special Case No.1/2016 (Lokayukta) by judgment dated 05.10.2020. 3. Facts in the nutshell for disposal of the present appeal are as under: T. Bhimalingaiah S/o. T. Ramanajaneyalu, lodged a complaint with the Lokayukta Police, Kalaburagi, contending that he got a promotion as an Associate Professor in the year 2013 and it has to be given effect in the year 2000 itself. For the promoted post, he was entitled to salary including the arrears of salary to the extent of Rs.26,00,000/-. In that connection, he had sent the bills to Joint Director, Collegiate Education, Kalaburagi. Case workers, who are the persons to process the bill, demanded a sum of Rs.17,500/- as bribe on 07.03.2014 and the same was paid by the complainant. On 18.03.2014, when he enquired accused No.2, again both the accused persons demanded a sum of Rs.22,500/- as bribe and the same should be paid on 19.03.2014. Since the complainant was not interested in parting away the bribe amount, he lodged a complaint with Lokayukta Police on 19.03.2014. 4. Based on the complaint, the Lokayukta Inspector formed a raid team comprising of himself, two independent Government servants as punch witnesses and secured the intended bribe money from the hands of the complainant, registered a case in Crime No.1/2014 and conducted the raid. 5. In the raid, tainted currency was recovered from the table drawer of accused No. 1. The colour test was conducted, tainted currency was seized under trap mahazar. Later on, both the accused persons were arrested and they were sent to judicial custody. After thorough investigation, charge sheet came to be filed. 6. Learned Trial Judge secured the presence of the accused persons and framed charges for the offences punishable under Sections 7 , 13 (1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short ‘the P.C.Act’). Both the accused persons pleaded not guilty and therefore, trial was held. 7. 6. Learned Trial Judge secured the presence of the accused persons and framed charges for the offences punishable under Sections 7 , 13 (1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short ‘the P.C.Act’). Both the accused persons pleaded not guilty and therefore, trial was held. 7. In order to prove the case of the prosecution, in all 9 witnesses were examined as PW.1 to PW.9 and as many as 51 documentary evidence were placed on record, which were exhibited and marked as Exs.P1 to 51. 17 material objects were also placed on record, which comprised of the samples, cash of Rs.22,500/-(tainted currency), cover wherein tainted currency was kept, compact disk etc. 8. During the course of examination of the prosecution witnesses, eight documents were marked, which were exhibited and marked as Exs.D1 to D8 comprising of order copy, proceedings of the Managing Committee, copy of the complaint by the students, copy of forwarding letter by the Principal, letter of PW.1 seeking permission to attend the conference, attendance certificate of PW.1, copy of the attendance register and portion of the statement of PW.1 given before the Investigation Agency. 9. On conclusion of recording of evidence, learned Trial Judge heard the arguments of the parties in detail and on cumulative consideration of the oral and documentary evidence placed on record, acquitted the accused persons inter alia assigning reasons in the judgment at paragraph Nos.33 to 40. These paragraphs are extracted hereunder for ready reference: “33. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the arguments put-forth by the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned defence counsels. I find legal strength in the contention of the learned counsel for defence. Demand of illegal gratification is a sine quo non for constituting the offence under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. For arriving the conclusion as to whether all the ingredients of an offence viz., demand, acceptance and recovery of the amount of illegal gratification have been satisfied or not, the Court must taken into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record in their entirety. For the said purpose, undisputably, the presumptive evidence, laid down in section 20 of the Act, must also be taken into consideration but then the standard of burden of proof on the accused vis-a-vis that on the prosecution would differ. For the said purpose, undisputably, the presumptive evidence, laid down in section 20 of the Act, must also be taken into consideration but then the standard of burden of proof on the accused vis-a-vis that on the prosecution would differ. Before, however, the accused is called upon to explain as to how the amount in question was found in his possession, the fundamental facts must be established by the prosecution. Even while invoking the provisions of Section 20 , the Court is required to consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any, only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. It is crystal clear that mere recovery of money from the table drawer of the accused itself is not enough in the absence of substantive evidence of demand and acceptance. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the demand and acceptance. Hence question to drawing presumption under section 20 of the Act does not arise. 34. It is well settled law that when considering the probabilities of the case, the recovery of the money is not of significance. What is significance is in what connection the money was being paid and in that respect the statement of independent witnesses would have been of value. To cast on the prosecution the burden of proving that the amount was accepted by the accused otherwise that by way of legal remuneration is to ask the prosecution to prove that the amount was paid and accepted by way of bribe. If this be the true and nature of the burden resting on the prosecution, no presumption at all need to be raised because apart from the presumption the prosecution would have to prove that the money was accepted by the accused and that it was accepted as a bribe. If the prosecution proves the acceptance of the amount by the accused and the amount does not represent legal remuneration in any form or of any kind, the accused must establish that the amount was not accepted by him as a motive or reward. 35. I have carefully perused the evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW 6 and PW 9 did not speak about the demand and acceptance. PW 9 TLO James Minejas, the then Lokayukta Police Inspector spoken about the recovery of money. 35. I have carefully perused the evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW 6 and PW 9 did not speak about the demand and acceptance. PW 9 TLO James Minejas, the then Lokayukta Police Inspector spoken about the recovery of money. There are variances in the evidence of PW 9. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am declined to act upon the evidence of PW 9 and PW 3 without corroboration. It is no doubt true that the Court may unhesitatingly accept the evidence of such officer. Except recovery of money, no evidence is placed by the prosecution. 36. The learned Special Public Prosecutor vehemently contended that the presumption available under section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and it is burden on the accused to rebut the presumption. Per contra, the learned defence counsels have contended that the presumption is not available to the prosecution because demand and acceptance itself is not proved and in the absence of proof of demand and acceptance, question of raising presumption never arise. I bestowed my attention to the arguments of the learned Special Public Prosecutor and the learned defence counsels. 37. Now let me advert to Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act to know whether presumption is available to the prosecution. Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides for raising of a presumption only if a demand is proved. It reads as under:- "20. 37. Now let me advert to Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act to know whether presumption is available to the prosecution. Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides for raising of a presumption only if a demand is proved. It reads as under:- "20. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration-(1) Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under section 7 of Section 11 or Clause (a) or Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as it is mentioned in section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate." Furthermore, even in such a case the burden on an accused does not have to meet the same standard of proof, as is required to be made by the prosecution. 38. We must not forget that in a trap case, the duty of the officer to prove the allegations made against a Government Officer for taking bribe is serious and therefore, the officers functioning in the Vigilance Department must seriously endeavor to secure really independent and respectable witnesses so that the evidence in regard to raid inspires confidence in the mind of the Court and the Court is not left in any doubt whether or not any money was paid to the public servant by way of bribe. It is also the duty of the officers in the Vigilance Department to safeguard for the protection of public servants against whom a trap case may have been laid. 39. It is also the duty of the officers in the Vigilance Department to safeguard for the protection of public servants against whom a trap case may have been laid. 39. In order to raise the presumption under section 20 of Prevention of Corruption Act, what the prosecution has to prove is that the accused person has received 'gratification' other than the legal remuneration and when it is shown that he has received a certain sum of money which has not a legal remuneration, then the condition prescribed by this section is satisfied and the presumption there under must be raised. 40. Whereas under section 114 of the Evidence Act, it is open to the Court to draw or not to draw a presumption as to the existence of one fact from the proof of another fact and it is not obligatory upon the Court to draw such presumption, under sus-section (1) of Prevention of Corruption Act, however, if a certain fact is proved, that is, where any gratification other than legal remuneration or any valuable thing is proved to have been received by an accued person, the Court is required to draw a presumption that the person received that thing as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 161 Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the Court has no choice in the matter, once it is established that the accused person has received a sum of money, which was not due to him as a legal remuneration. Of course, it is open to that person to show that though that money was not due to him as a legal remuneration it was legally due to him in some other manner or that he had received it under a transaction or an arrangement which was lawful. The burden resting on the accused person in such a case would not be as light as it is where a presumption is raised under section 114 of the Evidence Act and cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason and probable. It must further be show that the explanation is a true one. The words "unless the contrary is proved" which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by proof and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. It must further be show that the explanation is a true one. The words "unless the contrary is proved" which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by proof and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its evidence is directly established or when upon the material before it the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by the provision cannot be said be said to be rebutted.” 10. Being aggrieved by the order of acquittal, the Lokayukta has preferred the present appeal on following grounds: a) “That the judgment passed by the Trial Court is contrary to the facts of the case besides being erroneous, hence the impugned judgment is unsustainable in the eye of law. b) That the Trial Court without proper appreciation of the facts of the case and the evidence led by the prosecution has passed the order of acquittal, which has led into gross miscarriage of justice. c) That the Prosecution has examined 09 witnesses and got marked 51 documents to prove the case which has been discarded by the trial court without proper appreciation which has led into gross miscarriage of justice. d) That the Trial Court has failed to appreciate the fact that P.W.-1 and P.W.-3 who are complainant and the shadow witnesses have clearly established the case Prosecution on demand and accepted of the gratification from the complainant and has not properly appreciated material witnesses which has led into gross miscarriage of justice. e) the Trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence of P.W.-1 who has specifically stated regarding the acceptance of the gratification, which has been corroborated by the P.W.-3 the shadow witnesses, instead has gone into minor discrepancies and has come to wrong presumption of its own about the payment of Rs.17,500/- on 07-03-2014 which has no relevancy with the demands and acceptance of bribe amount on 18-03-2014. The Trial Court has misguided itself and has erred in holding that the prosecution has not proved the demand and acceptance instead of the rebuttal evidence of the accused U/s. 20 of P.C. Act. The Trial Court has misguided itself and has erred in holding that the prosecution has not proved the demand and acceptance instead of the rebuttal evidence of the accused U/s. 20 of P.C. Act. f) The Trial Court under a wrong assumption that when the P.W.-1 was attending the function at Tumkur district on 07-03-2014, the payment of Rs.17,50/- on the said day to the accused is impossible, whereas the Trial Court totally overlooked the fact that the prosecution has successfully trapped the accused on 19-03-2014 for the illegal demand by the persons on 18-04- 2014 for a sum of Rs.22,500/-. The accused are to rebut the case of prosecution as the presumption U/s.20 of P. C. Act would be on the accused having accepted the illegal gratification of Rs.22,500/-. Therefore the finding of the court wit regard to the acceptance of Rs.17,500/- on 07-03-2014 has no binding over the acceptance and demand made on 18-03-2014. g) That the Trial court has not properly appreciated the evidence of PW-who is the Managing Trustee on who initiated the case in motion and he h specifically stated the demand for illegal gratification. Therefore the impugn judgment is unreasonable illogical and deserves to be aside. h) Viewed from any angle the judgment & order impugned is erroneous, unreasonable and against the well-established principles of law, hence same deserves to be interfered with.” 11. The learned counsel for appellant – Lokayukta, reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal memorandum, vehemently contended that the impugned judgment is suffering from serious legal infirmities besides improper appreciation of material evidence on record and thus, sought for allowing the appeal. 12. He would further contend that the approach of the learned Trial Judge is in the nature of Lokayukta being expected to explain as to the failure of the colour test, which is impermissible and sought for allowing the appeal. 13. He would also contend that reasons assigned by the learned Trial Judge for acquitting the accused is suffering from serious legal infirmities inasmuch as, the presumption available to the Lokayukta is not properly taken into consideration by the learned Trial Judge and expected proof from Lokayukta for the presumptive material on record and sought for allowing the appeal. 14. 13. He would also contend that reasons assigned by the learned Trial Judge for acquitting the accused is suffering from serious legal infirmities inasmuch as, the presumption available to the Lokayukta is not properly taken into consideration by the learned Trial Judge and expected proof from Lokayukta for the presumptive material on record and sought for allowing the appeal. 14. Per contra, learned counsel representing the respondents/accused contended that in the case on hand, it is elicited in the oral testimony of PW.1 and the head of the raid party that complainant is a seasoned complainant, inasmuch as, he has filed 19 such cases. 15. He would further point out that complainant being the habitual in filing false complaints, his evidence cannot be accepted as gospel truth in establishing the case of the prosecution. Further, the colour test in the case on hand stood negative, inasmuch as, both the accused persons did not handle the tainted currency and taking false evidence, temporary absence of accused No.1 in his chamber, complainant somehow thrusted the tainted currency that too in a cover in the table drawer of accused No. 1 and later on, there is a mock raid conducted and money is recovered from the table drawer, which clearly shows that the trap is nothing but a motivated trap in order to malign the petty respondents, which has been rightly appreciated by the learned Trial Judge and thus sought for dismissal of the appeal. 16. Having heard the arguments of both sides, this Court perused the material on record meticulously. On such perusal of the material on record, the following points would arise for consideration: 1) Whether the prosecution evidence placed on record is sufficient enough to record the order of acquittal for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C.Act? 2) Whether the impugned judgment is suffering from legal infirmity? 3) If point No.1 is answered in the affirmative, what is the sentence? 4) What order? 17. Regarding point Nos.1 and 2: - In order to appreciate whether there was demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by accused Nos.1 and 2. It is just and necessary to find out the conversation said to have been taken place at the time of trap marked at Ex.P23. 4) What order? 17. Regarding point Nos.1 and 2: - In order to appreciate whether there was demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by accused Nos.1 and 2. It is just and necessary to find out the conversation said to have been taken place at the time of trap marked at Ex.P23. The transcription of said conversation would go to show that it is accused No.2 – Dattu, who had demanded the bribe money. Admittedly, Dattu was not found at the time of trap in the office. The conversation would also go to show that the “DgÉÆæ” that has been mentioned in Ex.P3 is accused No.1 – Abdul Khadar. The said conversation in comparison with the trap mahazar marked at Ex.P39, is suffering from many contradictions. 18. In Ex.P39, it has been recorded that complainant and shadow witness went inside the office of the accused persons and contacted accused No.1. In the complaint and the oral testimony of PW.1, it is the specific allegation that accused No.1 is working as Office Superintendent and accused No.2 is working as Second Division Clerk. It is also alleged that accused persons had demanded 3% of the balance amount as the bribe amount. 19. This is the specific case of the complainant that a sum Rs.17,500/- was paid as the bribe amount on 18.03.2014 and on 18.03.2014 when complainant enquired about his pending bill, a sum of Rs.22,500/- was again demanded by the accused persons. 20. It is pertinent to note that if the complainant is not interested in parting away with the bribe amount, why did he part away a sum of Rs.17,500/- on 07.03.2014, is a question that remains unanswered. What prevented a college professor to part away a sum of Rs.17,500/- on 07.03.2014 for processing his bill, is a question that needs to be answered by the prosecution. Nothing prevented the complainant to approach the Lokayukta Police on 07.03.2014 itself or a day later. 21. Further, it is elicited in the cross-examination of PW.1 and the Investigation Officer that complainant knew as to the proceedings that would take place before the Lokayukta Police and he has lodged several such complaints against several other Government Officials. 22. In other words, this is not the first occasion that he has lodged the complaint with the Lokayukta Police. Further, it is elicited in the cross-examination of PW.1 and the Investigation Officer that complainant knew as to the proceedings that would take place before the Lokayukta Police and he has lodged several such complaints against several other Government Officials. 22. In other words, this is not the first occasion that he has lodged the complaint with the Lokayukta Police. It is also elicited in the cross-examination of PW.1 that on 07.03.2014, he had been to Thumkur for attending a conference and document in this regard is admitted by him, marked at Ex.D5 – Attendance Certificate, would also go to show that the complainant was not present in Kalaburagi and he remained absent for his duties on 07.03.2014. As such, it is crystal clear that on 07.03.2014 if he is at Tumkur, he could not have handed over a sum of Rs.17,500/- to the hands of the accused persons as bribe money in Kalaburagi. 23. Further, in his cross-examination, he also admits that accused No.1 refused to receive illegal gratification offered by the complainant and thereafter, he kept the money in the table drawer of accused No.1 voluntarily. These factors would make it clear that there was no demand for illegal gratification by the accused persons for processing the pending bill of the complainant, nor there was any acceptance by accused No.1 or accused No.2. 24. Under such circumstances, when the prosecution is unable to place on record cogent evidence as to the offer and acceptance of the bribe money, there is no question of this Court looking into the other aspects of the matter. Further, PW.1 in his cross-examination also admits that as on 19.03.2014, there was already a favourable note of approving the bill of the complainant recorded by accused No.1. Therefore, the material evidence available on record is properly appreciated by the learned Trial Judge while recording an order of acquittal. 25. It is settled principles of law and requires no emphasis that when a duly constituted Court records an order of acquittal, it would serve as double insulation for the accused. In a matter of this nature, if two views are permissible, it is settled principles of law that the view that favours the accused must be preferred. 26. 25. It is settled principles of law and requires no emphasis that when a duly constituted Court records an order of acquittal, it would serve as double insulation for the accused. In a matter of this nature, if two views are permissible, it is settled principles of law that the view that favours the accused must be preferred. 26. Applying these celebrated principles of criminal jurisprudence to the case on hand, since the prosecution has failed to establish that there was a demand nor acceptance of the tainted currency by accused Nos.1 and 2 who were not at all present at the time of the alleged trap, this court is of the considered opinion that material on record do not warrant any interfere with the well reasoned order of the Trial Court in acquitting the accused. Accordingly point Nos.1 and 2 are answered in the negative. 27. Regarding point No.3: - In view of the finding of this Court on point Nos.1 and 2 as above, this point would not arise for consideration. 28. Regarding point No.4: - In view of the finding of this Court on point Nos.1 to 3 as above, following: ORDER Appeal grounds are meritless. Accordingly, appeal stands dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, stands cancelled.