JUDGMENT : T. MALLIKARJUNA RAOAPPEAL, J. 1. The Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'C.P.C.'), is filed by the Appellant/Defendant challenging the decree and judgment dated 13.04.2017 in O.S.No.15 of 2012 passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, East Godavari, Rajamahendravaram (for short, ‘the Trial Court’). 2. Respondent is the plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S.No.15 of 2012 for a preliminary decree against the defendant to affect the partition of the plaint schedule property into two equal shares and to allot one such share to the plaintiff with good and bad qualities and mesne profits. 3. Referring to the parties as arrayed in the suit is expedient to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case. 4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: Plaintiff and Defendant are members of a Hindu undivided family, children of late Pitchika Sambasivarao and Kota Veerabhadramma. Both parents died intestate, leaving behind the Plaintiff and Defendant as their legal heirs. The plaintiff's father acquired properties through a registered partition deed dated 24.09.1980 (document No.4416/1980), executed between him and his brothers. Per the partition deed, the B- marked share, namely Item Nos. 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule, was allotted to the plaintiff's father's share. These properties are ancestral, and the plaintiff has a birthright to them. Plaintiff's mother also purchased property through a registered sale deed dated 15.6.1970 (document No.2179/1970), which constitutes Item No.3 in the plaint schedule, with equal rights shared by Plaintiff and Defendant. The plaintiff's father managed these properties as the head of the joint family, and after his death, the Plaintiff and the Defendant acquired equal rights to them. The defendant, however, is creating false documents to avoid partition and deprive the plaintiff of her share. Any document created by the defendant cannot affect the plaintiff's right to her half-share. The plaintiff also learned that the defendant demolished a house on Item No.3 of the plaint schedule property in Rajahmundry and is attempting to alienate the property without partitioning it with the plaintiff. The plaintiff issued a legal notice on 15.11.2011 to divide the properties equally. In response, the defendant claimed the existence of a Kararunama (06.11.1998) and an unregistered will (20.07.1989) but failed to provide these documents despite a subsequent request from the plaintiff. The plaintiff issued a legal notice on 15.11.2011 to divide the properties equally. In response, the defendant claimed the existence of a Kararunama (06.11.1998) and an unregistered will (20.07.1989) but failed to provide these documents despite a subsequent request from the plaintiff. As the defendant is acting against the plaintiff's interest, the plaintiff has been compelled to file this suit. 5. The defendant has filed a written statement refuting several claims made by the plaintiff, resisting the suit and contended as follows: (a) While acknowledging their sibling relationship and their status as children of late Sambasivarao and Kota Veerabhadramma, the defendant admits that Sambasivarao acquired Item Nos. 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties through a partition deed dated 24.09.1980. However, the defendant denies that these properties are ancestral or that the plaintiff has a birthright. The defendant also disputes the claim that the plaintiff's mother purchased Item No.3 of the plaint schedule property in 1970, asserting that it was self- acquired by Sambasivarao. The defendant further asserts that Sambasivarao purchased the property in his wife's name to avoid claims from his siblings and later constructed a two-storied building on it. Following the death of Kota Veerabhadramma, the defendant states she executed an unregistered Will in 1989, bequeathing Item No.3 to Sambasivarao, who then became the sole owner. (b) Additionally, the defendant claims that Sambasivarao executed a Will on 08.02.2006, bequeathing Item Nos. 1 and 3 to the Defendant and Item No.2 to the Plaintiff. This Will came into effect upon Sambasivarao's death on 20.04.2010. The defendant asserts that both parties were aware of the Wills and the acquisition of the properties. Knowing of the Will, the plaintiff began collecting rent from Item No.2, while the defendant, as the rightful owner of Item No.3, began developing the property into an apartment complex. The plaintiff attempted to halt construction and make financial demands, forcing the defendant to file caveats. (c) Additionally, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff did not care for their ailing parents and that their relationship was strained, as reflected in the plaintiff's correspondence. Asserting sole ownership of Item No.3, the defendant claims full rights to manage the property and denies any claims by the plaintiff. The defendant refutes the allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint, stating there is no cause of action, and requests the dismissal of the suit. 6. Asserting sole ownership of Item No.3, the defendant claims full rights to manage the property and denies any claims by the plaintiff. The defendant refutes the allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint, stating there is no cause of action, and requests the dismissal of the suit. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the item Nos.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties are ancestral properties? (2) Whether the plaintiff's mother purchased item No.3 of the plaint schedule property? (3) Whether the plaint schedule properties are liable to be divided into two equal shares and the plaintiff is entitled to one such share? (4) Whether plaintiff is entitled for future profits? (5) Whether item Nos.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties are the separate and self-acquired properties of late Sambasivarao, father of the defendant? (6) Whether item No.3 of the plaint schedule property was purchased by late Sambasivarao with his money in the name of his wife late Smt. Veerabhadramma with an intention not to benefit her? (7) Whether the Khararunama dated 06.11.1988 is true? (8) Whether the Will dated 20.07.1989 is true? (9) Whether the Will dated 08.02.2006 is true? (10) To what relief? 7. During the trial, PWs.1 and 2 were examined on behalf of the plaintiff and marked Exs.A.1 to A.14. On behalf of the Defendant, DWs.1 to 7 were examined, and Exs.B.1 to B.20, Exs.X.1 to X.6 and Ex.C.1 documents were marked. 8. Initially, the suit was filed before the Principal District Judge, East Godavari, Rajahmundry, and was posted for arguments in that Court.However, on 15.07.2016, the Principal District Judge, after recording reasons, suo motu transferred the suit to the Trial Court. 9. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the Trial Court preliminarily decreed the suit with costs directing that item Nos.1, 2 and 3 of the plaint schedule properties shall be divided into two equal shares, and one such equal share shall be allotted to Plaintiff and Defendant respectively by taking into consideration the equity principles of good and bad qualities and by holding that the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits from the date of suit till the realization of her share and that if the parties fail to effect the partition amicably, they are at liberty to approach the Court seeking to pass a final decree. 10. The Trial Court, after considering the material on record, answered Issues No.1 and 5, concluding that Items No.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties are not ancestral properties but are separate and self-acquired properties of the late Sambasivarao, the father of the parties. The Trial Court expressly rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the plaint schedule properties were ancestral, which had fallen to the share of her father after a partition. The defendant did not challenge the correctness of these findings through cross- objections or a cross-appeal. The Trial Court also answered Issues No.2, 6, 7, and 8, concluding that the defendant failed to prove that Item No.3 of the plaint schedule property was purchased by the late Sambasivarao with his own funds in the name of his wife, the late Veerabhadramma, with the intent to deprive her of any benefit. Instead, the Trial Court found that Item No.3 was the self-acquired property of the plaintiff's mother. Moreover, the defendant failed to establish the authenticity and validity of the Ex.B.11 Khararunama dated 06.11.1988 and Ex.B.12 Will dated 20.07.1989. The Trial Court further concluded that the defendant did not prove the execution of Ex.B.17, the Will dated 08.02.2006. 11. I have heard learned counsel appear on behalf of the respective parties at length and have gone through the judgment and findings recorded by the learned Trial Court while decreeing the suit. I have also re-appreciated all the evidence on record, including the depositions of witnesses examined. 12. Sri Gulipali Suraj, learned counsel for the Appellant/Defendant, asserts that items No.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties fell to the share of the defendant's father. Initially, those properties are self-acquired properties of the defendant's grandfather. He executed a Will dated 14.07.1966 to his children and then they partitioned their properties through their father's Will and the partition deed, dated 20.04.1990. Thus, items 1 and 2 are the self-acquired properties of the defendant's father. He further asserts that the Trial Court, having recognized the self-acquired nature of the plaint schedule properties, should have upheld the validity of Ex.B.17 (Sambasivarao's Will). The Trial Court wrongly questioned its authenticity without any supporting evidence or pleadings, and the allegations of coercion were baseless. Exs.B.11 and B.12 (Khararunama and Veerabhadramma’s Will) should not have been discarded solely for not being mentioned in Ex.B.17. The Trial Court wrongly questioned its authenticity without any supporting evidence or pleadings, and the allegations of coercion were baseless. Exs.B.11 and B.12 (Khararunama and Veerabhadramma’s Will) should not have been discarded solely for not being mentioned in Ex.B.17. Sambasiva Rao’s continued good health for four years post-Will execution refutes any claim of mental incapacity. Additionally, PW.1's knowledge of the Will and failure to challenge it further affirm its validity. Ex.B.18 (draft Wills) supports the intent of Ex.B.17. The property distribution in Ex.B.17 reflects natural bequests and should not have been disputed. The Trial Court incorrectly classified item No.3 as Veerabhadramma's self-acquired property. Evidence from Exs.B.13 to B.15 and the Kharaurnama proves it was bought with Sambasivarao’s funds. The Trial Court failed to recognize that Veerabhadramma couldn’t have independently acquired the property. Ex.B.12 (Veerabhadramma’s Will) was unjustly disregarded, despite no evidence discrediting it. The Trial Court’s reasoning that Ex.B.12’s non-reference in Ex.B.17 invalidates it is flawed. The plaintiff never questioned the validity of Exs.B.11 and B.12 in her pleadings. If Ex.B.17 is upheld, the plaintiff is entitled to one-third of the property, not half. 13. Per contra, Sri M. Sri Atchyut, learned counsel representing Sri E.V.V.S. Ravi Kumar, learned counsel representing the Respondent / Plaintiff, asserts that items No.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties are ancestral properties which fell to the share of plaintiff's father, after the partition between her father and his siblings through a partition deed dated 24.09.1980 and her father died intestate on 20.04.2010 and thereby the plaintiff entitled to a half share and item No.3 of the plaint schedule property is the self-acquired property of plaintiff's mother, who purchased the property vide registered sale deed dated 15.06.1970 and she died intestate on 14.04.1998 and thus, the plaintiff is entitled to half share in the property as that of her brother. He further asserts that the Trial Court appreciated the case facts and reached a correct conclusion. The reasons given by the Trial Court do not require any interference. 14. Concerning the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the Trial Court and in light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: 1. The reasons given by the Trial Court do not require any interference. 14. Concerning the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the Trial Court and in light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: 1. Is the Trial Court justified in holding that the item Nos.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties are not ancestral properties, but rather separate and self-acquired properties of the late Sambasivarao, the father of the parties? 2. Is the Trial Court justified in holding that the plaintiff's mother purchased item No.3 of the plaint schedule property but not by late Sambasivarao in the name of his wife, intending to avoid not benefiting her? 3. Is the Trial Court justified in holding that the defendant failed to prove the due execution of Ex.B.17 and also was unable to dispel several suspicious circumstances covering Ex.B.17? 4. Is the Trial Court justified in holding that the Plaintiff and the Defendant are each entitled to a half share in items No.1 to 3 of the plaint schedule properties? Furthermore, is the plaintiff entitled to mesne profits from the date of the suit until her share in the properties is realised? 5. Does the judgment passed by the Trial Court need any interference? POINT NO.1: 15. The First Appellate Court, the final Court of fact, has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the Trial Court's findings. Considering the nature and scope of the First Appellate Court in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar , [MANU/SC/0946/2014] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 15. Again, in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, MANU/SC/0768/2010 this Court, taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court, reiterated the principle as mentioned above with these words: 3. How the regular first Appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate Court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 Code of Civil Procedure deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the different rules, Rule 31 mandates that the Judgment of the appellate Court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision, and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the Appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the trial court's findings. 4. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the trial court's findings. The first Appeal is a valuable right of the parties, and unless restricted by Law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and Law. The Judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for the decision of the appellate Court. Sitting as a court of first Appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first Appeal is a valuable right, and the parties have a right to be heard on questions of Law and facts. The judgment in the first Appeal must address all the issues of Law and fact and decide on them by giving reasons supporting the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By L.Rs. MANU/SC/0091/2001 and Madhukar and Ors. v. Sangram and Ors. MANU/SC/0302/2001 The Court of First Appeal has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. When the Court of First Appeal takes a different view, the Judgment of the first appellate Court must show the conscious application of mind and record its findings based on the evidence adduced by the parties. The judgment must record why the first appellate Court differs from the Judgment of the trial Court. 16. Normally, appreciation of the evidence by the Trial Court is only interfered with by the Appellate Court if such appreciation of evidence appears to be absurd or there has been a serious challenge to such exercise. This proposition of Law has been so firmly settled that it does not require any reiteration by citing any authority. 17. Given the settled legal position outlined above, I now re-appreciate the evidence on record, taking into account the evidence adduced by both parties, to assess the correctness of the findings recorded by the Trial Court. 18. This proposition of Law has been so firmly settled that it does not require any reiteration by citing any authority. 17. Given the settled legal position outlined above, I now re-appreciate the evidence on record, taking into account the evidence adduced by both parties, to assess the correctness of the findings recorded by the Trial Court. 18. Although the plaintiff has not filed a cross-objection or Appeal against the Trial Court's findings on Issues No.1 and 5, wherein it was determined that the schedule properties are not ancestral but are instead separate and self- acquired properties of the late Sambasivarao, the father of the parties, this Court references the pleadings and the evidence adduced concerning these issues in order to gain a clearer understanding of the case. 19. The defendant, in the written statement, acknowledged the relationship with the plaintiff as siblings, both being children of the late Sambasivarao and Kota Veerabhadramma. The plaintiff testified as PW.1, and the defendant testified as DW.1, each reiterating the claims made in the plaint and written statement. Item No.1 of the schedule property is an RCC roofed building bearing D.No.31/135B. Item No.2 consists of three sub-items (A to C), while Item No.3 is a layout situated in R.S.No.258/1 and 260, plot No.54, covering 456.10 sq. yards, which includes a basement, a thatched hut, a water connection, and borewells. The plaintiff seeks a half share in the schedule properties. 20. Plaintiff asserts that Items 1 and 2 of the schedule properties are ancestral properties, which late Sambasivarao inherited during a partition with his brothers, mother, and sister. In support of the same, Ex.A.2, a registered extract of the partition deed executed between P. Sambasivarao and his brothers, as well as Ex.B.5, the triplicate copy of the partition deed dated 24.09.1980, is relied on. On the other hand, the defendant contends that these properties constitute the separate estate of the late Sambasivarao, as he, along with his brothers, mother, and sister, inherited them from their father, late Pitchika Narasimham, under the Will dated 14.07.1996 (marked Ex.B.7). According to Ex.B.7, late P. Narasimham acquired the house and land properties through his efforts and bequeathed them to his children and mother while being of sound and disposing mind. 21. It is undisputed that Items No.1 and 2 of the B Schedule, shown in Ex.B.5, are part of the properties mentioned in Ex.B.7. According to Ex.B.7, late P. Narasimham acquired the house and land properties through his efforts and bequeathed them to his children and mother while being of sound and disposing mind. 21. It is undisputed that Items No.1 and 2 of the B Schedule, shown in Ex.B.5, are part of the properties mentioned in Ex.B.7. The Will's recitals confirm that a plot of land measuring Ac.3.07 cents in Gudala village was purchased by P. Narasimham under a sale deed dated 03.11.1947, as evidenced by Ex.B.7 registration extract. However, Ex.B.5 indicates that the joint family acquired a terraced house property and land in Gudala, referred to as Joint Kutumba Asthulu. Consequently, the defendant maintains that Items No.1 and 2 of the schedule properties were allocated to Sambasivarao in the partition and thus constitute his separate property. The defendant argues that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has any birthright claim over these properties. 22. The testimony of PW.2, Pitchika Satyanarayanamurthy, son of Surya Rao, shows that the plaintiff is the daughter of her junior paternal uncle. In his evidence, he confirms the execution of a partition deed dated 24.09.1980, which involved his father, Suryarao, Sambasivarao (the father of both the Plaintiff and Defendant), Ramarao, Satyavathi, and Kotamma. The partition deed, which bears his father's signatures, pertains to properties that were self- acquired by the late P. Narasimham. Additionally, he testified that the late P purchased the land in Gudala village. Narasimham through a registered sale deed dated 03.11.1947. While the defendant contends that late P. Narasimham executed a Will, but the original document was not produced before the Court; Ex.B.7, a registration extract of the Will, was relied on. It is noteworthy that the defendant did not dispute the partition of the properties,. Items No.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties fell to the share of late Sambasivarao, as evidenced by Ex.A.2 and Ex.B.5. 23. Considering the material on record, the Trial Court noted that the original of Ex.B.7, the Will, was not presented before the Court and was not proven per the requirements of the Law. The Trial Court relied on the decision reported in (2009) 3 SCC 687 , wherein it was held that, concerning proving a Will, the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked. Instead, the Will must be proved per Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The Trial Court relied on the decision reported in (2009) 3 SCC 687 , wherein it was held that, concerning proving a Will, the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked. Instead, the Will must be proved per Section 68 of the Evidence Act. Considering the arguments from both parties, the Trial Court observed that the defendant's failure to establish the execution of Ex.B.7 Will was of limited significance, as both parties had relied upon Ex.A.2, the registered extract of the partition deed / Ex.B.5, the registered extract of the partition. 24. The testimony of PW.1 reveals that her grandfather, by the name of Narasimham, was a tailor by profession and earned a livelihood by practising tailoring, supporting his family, which consisted of himself, his wife, three sons, and a daughter. The Trial Court observed that neither PW.1 nor PW.2 provided evidence to suggest that the late P. Narasimham had any joint family nucleus from which he purchased Items No.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties. During cross-examination, the plaintiff, as PW.1, testified that she was unaware of how late P. Narasimham had acquired the properties covered by Ex.A.2. She further stated that she did not know the contents of Ex.A.2. She admitted that the land, measuring Ac.3.07 cents, covered by Ex.A.2, was acquired by her grandfather through a registered sale deed. It was self- acquired property of late P. Narasimham. Additionally, she admitted that the properties covered by Ex.A.2 were initially vacant sites, which her grandfather later converted into a building. 25. The admission made by PW.1 during cross-examination reveals that the late P. Narasimham acquired Items No.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties. Furthermore, PW.1 acknowledged that there is no document of title concerning Item No.1. However, Ex.B.6, the registration extract of the sale deed dated 03.11.1947, pertains specifically to Item No.2 of the plaint schedule property. 26. Though the Respondent has not preferred Cross Objections or Cross- Appeal against the findings recorded by the Trial Court, during the hearing, he made submissions questioning the correctness of the findings on issues No.1 and 5 by relying on specific citations. 27. Learned counsel for the Respondent relied on the decision in Gurupad Khandappa Magdum V. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum and Ors. , [MANU/SC/0407/1978] , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 8. 27. Learned counsel for the Respondent relied on the decision in Gurupad Khandappa Magdum V. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum and Ors. , [MANU/SC/0407/1978] , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 8. Before considering the implications of Explanation 1, it is necessary to remember that what Section 6 deals with is devolution of a male Hindu's interest in a Mitakshare coparcenary property at the time of his death. Since Explanation 1 is intended to be explanatory of the provisions contained in the section, what it provides has to be correlated to the subject matter that the section deals with. In the instant case, the plaintiff's suit, based on the provisions of Section 6, is essentially a claim to obtain a share in the interest her husband had at the time of his death in the coparcenary property. Two things become necessary to determine to give relief to the plaintiff. One, her share in her husband's share and two, her husband's share in the coparcenary property. The proviso to Section 6 contains the formula for fixing the claimant's share, while Explanation 1 contains a formula for deducing the deceased's share. The plaintiff's share, by the application of the proviso, has to be determined according to the terms of the testamentary instrument, if any, made by the deceased and since there is none in the instant case, by the application of the rules of intestate succession contained in Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Hindu Succession Act. The deceased Khandappa died, leaving behind him two sons, three daughters and a widow. The son, daughter and widow are mentioned as heirs in class I of the Schedule and therefore, by reason of the provisions of Section 8(a) read with the 1st clause of Section 9, they take simultaneously and to the exclusion of other heirs. As between them, the two sons, the three daughters, and the widow will take equally, each having one share in the deceased's property Under Section 10, read with Rules 1 and 2 of that section. Thus, whatever be the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, since there are six sharers in that property each having an equal share, the plaintiff's share therein will be 1/6th. 28. Thus, whatever be the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, since there are six sharers in that property each having an equal share, the plaintiff's share therein will be 1/6th. 28. The Trial Court, while addressing Issues No.3 and 4, concluded that Items No.1 and 2 of the schedule properties are self-acquired properties of the father, while Item No.3 is the self-acquired property of the mother. The Trial Court determined that the plaint schedule properties are not coparcenary properties. After considering the evidence, the Trial Court observed that Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act does not apply, as the properties are not ancestral, and succession should be governed by Section 8 of the Act. 29. After carefully evaluating the evidence adduced, the Trial Court concluded that since the plaint schedule properties, namely Items No.1 and 2, were not derived from coparcenary property and were divided upon the death of the father, late P. Narasimham, through a partition among the legal heirs, vide Ex.A.2/Ex.B.5, dated 24.09.1980, should be considered his self-acquired properties. Merely because a person happens to be a coparcener, he cannot lay his claim on all the properties that belonged to the family. The father of the parties got the schedule properties as a legal heir of his father, late P.Narasimham, under the rule of succession provided in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and not as a coparcener, the same shall be his separate property. During his life, his children would not have a right to share by birth under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Trial Court correctly observed that the plaintiff's argument of a joint family nucleus was untenable, as there were no ancestral properties linked to the grandfather of the parties. Moreover, the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a joint family nucleus or any ancestral properties belonging to the grandfather. 30. In Gundala Doraswamy Naidu V. Gundala Jayachandra Naidu , [2020 0 Supreme(AP) 75] , this Court observed as follows: 56. ……………... Moreover, the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a joint family nucleus or any ancestral properties belonging to the grandfather. 30. In Gundala Doraswamy Naidu V. Gundala Jayachandra Naidu , [2020 0 Supreme(AP) 75] , this Court observed as follows: 56. ……………... While considering whether the grandson has a right by birth in the property of his grandfather and whether he can file a Suit for partition during the lifetime of his father, the Supreme Court in the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants-defendants in the case of Uttam v. Saubhag Singh, AIR 2016 SC 1169 held that grandson has no right by birth in the property of grandfather. He cannot file a Suit for partition during his father's lifetime. The trial Court missed its attention to the said legal aspect. The learned trial Judge rightly recorded a finding that plaint A-Schedule property is a separate and exclusive property of the late Venkatappa Naidu. So, it is not a joint family property. So, the plaintiff, being the grandson of the late Venkatappa Naidu, cannot claim any share in the exclusive property of the late Venkatappa Naidu and file a Suit for partition of the said property during the lifetime of his father, who is defendant No.1. ……………... 31. In light of the observations made in the foregoing decision, and after careful consideration of the available material, this Court is of the opinion that the property in question cannot be classified as coparcener property, but instead constitutes the self-acquired property of the defendant's father. Ultimately, after a thorough appreciation of the evidence on record, this Court concurs with the finding of the Trial Court that Items No.1 and 2 of the schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of the late P. Narasimham, and were allocated to the share of Sambasiva Rao as per Ex.B.5, and the same shall be treated as separate and self-acquired properties of Sambasiva Rao. Accordingly, the Point is answered. POINT NO.2: 32. Concerning Item No.3 of the plaint schedule property, the Trial Court framed Issues No.2, 6, 7, and 8. Defendant contends that his father purchased Item No.3 of the schedule property in his mother's name with the intention of not benefiting her. Subsequently, his mother executed Ex.B.11, Khararunama on 06.11.1988 and Ex.B.12, Will on 20.07.1989 concerning Item No.3 of the plaint schedule property. Defendant contends that his father purchased Item No.3 of the schedule property in his mother's name with the intention of not benefiting her. Subsequently, his mother executed Ex.B.11, Khararunama on 06.11.1988 and Ex.B.12, Will on 20.07.1989 concerning Item No.3 of the plaint schedule property. On the other hand, the plaintiff relied on Ex.A.1, the registered extract of the sale deed, which was in the name of the parties' mother, for Item No.3 of the schedule property. To substantiate his claim, the defendant examined DW.2 (B. Murali Krishna) and DW.3 (L.Suryanarayana), who testified that the defendant's mother executed Ex.B.12 Will, and both witnesses attested to the document. In response, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had fabricated Ex.B.11 Khararunama and Ex.B.12 Will. It is undisputed that before the filing of the suit, the parties exchanged notices, and the stand taken in the notices and in the suit are mainly consistent. The plaintiff contends that her mother, Veerabhadramma, acquired Item No.3 of the plaint schedule property and constitutes her streedhana property. 33. The plaintiff contended in the suit that she acquired the properties which stood in the name of her mother with her funds and that her husband had nothing to do with her properties. The learned Trial Judge accepted the plaintiff's contention. Section 3 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, would show that in the first instance, property acquired in the name of the wife is not deemed to be benami property [Section 3 (2)], but - yet there is a statutory presumption in Law that the property is for the benefit of the wife. The expression "unless the contrary is proved" clearly places the onus of proving that this property was acquired not for the wife's benefit but upon the husband. 34. The expression "unless the contrary is proved" clearly places the onus of proving that this property was acquired not for the wife's benefit but upon the husband. 34. It has to be made clear that when a suit is filed or defence is taken in respect of such benami transaction involving the purchase of property by any person in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter, he cannot succeed in such suit or defence unless he proves that the property although purchased in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter, the same had not been purchased for the benefit of either the wife or the unmarried daughter, as the case may be, because of the statutory presumption contained in sub-section (2) of Section 3 that unless contrary is proved that the purchase of property by the person in the name of his wife or his unmarried daughter, as the case may be, was for her benefit. 35. Ex.A.1 pertains to item No.3 of the schedule property. The contents of this document indicate that Veerabhadramma paid the consideration amount for the property. According to PW.1, Veerabhadramma sold gold and silver items to finance the construction of a building; however, no evidence has been presented to substantiate the sale of these items. It is admitted that Veerabhadramma was a housewife and, notably, was stone deaf, having lost her hearing between 1970 and 1972. 36. The defendant is to prove that his father purchased item No.3 of the schedule property in his mother's name. The Trial Court correctly observed that oral evidence cannot be used to override a registered document. The contents of Ex.A.1 support the plaintiff's claim that her mother purchased item No.3 of the plaint schedule property. Still, it does not demonstrate that Veerabhadramma's husband paid the consideration amount. 37. Defendant relied on Exs.B.13 to B.15, which consists of the account books maintained by Veerabhadramma. According to the Defendant, these documents detail the amounts she received from her husband. During cross- examination, DW.1 testified that his mother was accustomed to maintaining account records, and he submitted Exs.B.13 to B.15, to establish that Veerabhadramma purchased item No.3 of the plaint schedule property with savings accumulated from amounts given by her husband. Ex.B.13 is an account book, and an entry in Ex.B.14, on page 360, reflects an expense of Rs. 12,100/- for purchasing the house site, including registration charges. Ex.B.13 is an account book, and an entry in Ex.B.14, on page 360, reflects an expense of Rs. 12,100/- for purchasing the house site, including registration charges. Upon careful examination of the entries in Exs.B.14 and B.15, the Trial Court noted that the entries suggest that the person recording them frequently lent money, recovered the amounts, and deposited them in a bank, from which they were later withdrawn. 38. The Trial Court specifically highlighted in paragraph 37 that DW.1 testified that his mother recorded in the account books that she purchased item No.3 of the plaint schedule property. However, the Trial Court pointed out that there is no mention in the entirety of Exs.B.13 to B.15 suggesting that the plaintiff's father provided any amounts to his wife to purchase item No.3 of the plaint schedule property. The entries in these documents do not support the defendant's claim. Furthermore, the Trial Court observed that Exs.B.14 and B.15 entries indicate that the parties' mother was managing the finances, making entries in the account book, and remitting amounts. This suggests that she had the financial capacity to purchase the property independently. Additionally, the Trial Court noted that DW.1, in his testimony, admitted he had no personal knowledge of whether his father purchased item No.3 of the plaint schedule property in his mother’s name, rendering his testimony improbable. 39. Based on the evidence adduced, the Trial Court concluded that DW.1's testimony and Exs.B.13 to B.15 were not convincing. As a result, the Court determined that the contents of Ex.A.1 could not be disregarded. 40. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides that "any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner." Under the Explanation of that section, it is stated that the property includes, amongst other things, property acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance. So, even if the case made by the Appellant be true, that is to say, even if it be held that the property really belonged to her husband and she inherited it as an heir to her husband she would become the absolute owner of the property under the main provision of that section. So, even if the case made by the Appellant be true, that is to say, even if it be held that the property really belonged to her husband and she inherited it as an heir to her husband she would become the absolute owner of the property under the main provision of that section. There can be no doubt on a plain construction of Section 14 (1), Hindu Succession Act, 1956, that it confers a right of absolute ownership upon a female Hindu regarding the properties described in the Explanation to Sub-section (1 ). It is, therefore, immaterial for this suit and this Appeal whether Plaintiff’s mother acquired the properties in dispute with her funds or she was merely a Benamdar of her husband. In either view of the matter, she will be the absolute owner of the properties. For these reasons, it is not necessary to go into the question of whether the case made by the plaintiff in his plaint is true or false. 41. The burden of proving a transfer as a benami transaction lies with the party asserting it. In Indian society, when a husband provides the consideration money for acquiring property in his wife’s name, this fact alone does not necessarily indicate a benami transaction. While the source of the funds is essential, it is not determinative. The critical factor to be proven is the intention of the individual providing the consideration money, which must be demonstrated by the party alleging the benami nature of the transaction. In other words, even if it is established that Sambasiva Rao, the husband, paid the consideration money, the defendant must further prove that Sambasiva Rao intended to enjoy the full benefit of the title exclusively in his name. 42. The defendant failed to adduce any convincing evidence regarding the amount of consideration money, how it was paid, or the process through which the suit property was acquired. Furthermore, the defendant did not establish who had paid the consideration money. No evidence was placed on record to enable a reasonable person to infer that the defendant's father had any motive to create a benami transaction in his wife’s name, nor could the defendant demonstrate that his father intended to retain exclusive enjoyment of the full benefit of the title. 43. No evidence was placed on record to enable a reasonable person to infer that the defendant's father had any motive to create a benami transaction in his wife’s name, nor could the defendant demonstrate that his father intended to retain exclusive enjoyment of the full benefit of the title. 43. The Trial Court observed that the plaintiff's father was employed as an Engineer in the Panchayat Department and, as such, was subject to the Civil Services Conduct Rules. If he had indeed intended to purchase item No.3 of the plaint schedule property in the name of his wife using his personal income, it would have been necessary for him to seek permission from the head of his department. However, the defendant failed to produce any document evidencing such permission. 44. Furthermore, the defendant failed to establish that Item No.3 of the schedule property was purchased by the late Sambasiva Rao with his funds, in the name of his wife, Veerabhadramma, with the intent to avoid benefiting her. After reviewing the evidence, this Court finds that the defendant did not prove that item No.3 of the schedule property was purchased in Veerabhadramma's name by her husband, nor that it was intended for her benefit, but for the benefit of her husband. 45. Defendant relied on Ex.B.11, a Khararunama, to substantiate the claim that Veerabhadramma admitted her husband's purchase of item No.3 from the plaint schedule property using his funds and that he had developed the property. According to the Defendant, this assertion was reiterated by Veerabhadramma in the execution of Ex.B.12, Will. G.Satyanarayana, who was the second attestor to Ex.B.11, also served as the third attesting witness to Ex.B.12. Following Satyanarayana's death, the defendant examined Satyanarayana's son, G.Lokesh, as DW.4 to provide testimony. Additionally, DWs.2 and 3 were examined to prove the Will allegedly executed by Veerabhadramma. 46. It is the testimony of DWs.2 and 3 that Sambasivarao was present at the time of the execution of the Will (Ex.B.12), and that both Veerabhadramma and Sambasivarao engaged in a discussion regarding the Will. Based on the evidence provided by DWs.2 and 3, the Trial Court observed that the propounder of Ex.B.12 played an active role in executing the alleged Will and was granted the entirety of the benefits under it, even according to the defendant's case. Based on the evidence provided by DWs.2 and 3, the Trial Court observed that the propounder of Ex.B.12 played an active role in executing the alleged Will and was granted the entirety of the benefits under it, even according to the defendant's case. The Trial Court considered this as one of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of Ex.B.12. 47. Although DWs.1 to 3 testified regarding the execution of Ex.B.12, they were unaware of the scribe's identity. Ex.B.12 itself does not indicate who scribed the Will. According to the evidence provided by DWs.2 and 3, it was stated that the neighbour of Sambasivarao had written the Will, although they were unable to recall his name. The record further reveals that Veerabhadramma, the executant, was deaf and unable to hear, though she could understand signs. Based on the oral testimony adduced, the Trial Court found that the executant was deaf, did not communicate verbally, and relied on her husband to convey information. The Trial Court also noted that the executant did not participate in giving instructions to the scribe. Consequently, the Trial Court concluded that Ex.B.12 could not be considered a voluntary document, as the propounder, who was physically present, provided instructions to the scribe. The Trial Court determined that Ex.B.12 did not reflect the true intentions of the executant. 48. The Trial Court also observed that the handwriting in Exs.B.11 and B.12 appeared recent, with the contents seemingly newly written on old paper. The Trial Court noted that although the stamp papers used for Exs.B.11 and B.12 were old, the contents of the documents themselves appeared to have been written recently, which raised suspicions. The Trial Court remarked that while individuals may lie, the circumstances surrounding these documents could not be overlooked. Ex.B.11, the Khararunama, was purportedly executed to confirm that the executant's husband held full rights. As rightly observed by the Trial Court that if the executant had indeed executed Ex.B.11 on 06.11.1988, there would have been no need to execute Ex.B.12 on 20.07.1989. The Trial Court also pointed out that if Ex.B.11 were genuinely executed in good faith, it should have been referenced in Ex.B.12. Additionally, the Trial Court noted the absence of any mention of Exs.B.11 and B.12 in Ex.B.17, the registered Will purportedly executed by Sambasivarao. 49. The Trial Court also pointed out that if Ex.B.11 were genuinely executed in good faith, it should have been referenced in Ex.B.12. Additionally, the Trial Court noted the absence of any mention of Exs.B.11 and B.12 in Ex.B.17, the registered Will purportedly executed by Sambasivarao. 49. After carefully considering the evidence adduced, the Trial Court made a clear and categorical finding that the defendant failed to prove the authenticity and validity of Ex.B.11, the Khararunama dated 06.11.1988, and Ex.B.12, the Will dated 20.07.1989. 50. The Trial Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of the pleadings and evidence adduced by both parties. After a careful and methodical evaluation, the Trial Court rightly appreciated and assessed the evidence following the legal standards. The findings reached by the Trial Court are well- founded, supported by the available evidence, and are consistent with the legal principles that apply to the matter at hand. Given this careful consideration, there is no compelling reason for this Court to depart from the conclusions drawn by the Trial Court. The reasoning and findings of the Trial Court stand as accurate and well-reasoned, and the Appellant/Defendant has failed to present any justifiable grounds or sufficient evidence to warrant a different conclusion. Therefore, I fully concur with the conclusion reached by the Trial Court and see no reason to alter or overturn its findings. I affirmed the findings of the Trial Court on issues No.2, 6, 7, and 8. Accordingly, the Point is answered. POINT NO. 3: 51. The defendant asserts that his father executed a will, Ex.B.17, on 08.02.2006, at a time when he was in a sound and disposing state of mind. Accordingly, the defendant claims to have become the absolute owner of Item No.3 of the schedule property. In contrast, the plaintiff contends that Ex.B.17 is a fabricated document created to deprive the plaintiff of her rightful share in the property outlined in the plaint schedule. 52. The burden of proof that the Will has been validly executed and is a genuine document is on the propounder. The propounder is also required to prove that the testator has signed the Will and put his signature out of his own free Will, having a sound disposition of mind and understanding the nature and effect thereof. If sufficient evidence on this behalf is brought on record, the onus of the propounder may be held to have been discharged. The propounder is also required to prove that the testator has signed the Will and put his signature out of his own free Will, having a sound disposition of mind and understanding the nature and effect thereof. If sufficient evidence on this behalf is brought on record, the onus of the propounder may be held to have been discharged. However, the onus would be on the applicant to remove the suspicion by leading sufficient and cogent evidence if any exists. In the case of proof of Will, the signature of a testator alone would not prove the execution thereof if his mind appeared to be very feeble and debilitated. However, if a defence of fraud, coercion or undue influence is raised, the burden would be on the caveator. [See Madhukar D. Shende V. Tarabai Shedage , [ (2002) 2 SCC 85 ] and Sridevi and Ors. V. Jayaraja Shetty and Ors. , [(2005) 8 SCC 784] ]. 53. In Beni Chand (Since Dead) now by L. Rs., V. Smt. Kamla Kunwar and others , [1977 0 AIR(SC) 63] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 9. ……………………It is well-settled that the onus probandi lies in every case upon the party propounding a will, and he must satisfy the conscience of the Court that the instrument so propounded is the last Will of a free and capable testator. See Jarman on Wills (8th Ed., p. 50) and H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma, (1959) Supp 1 SCR 426. By "free and capable testator" is generally meant that the testator at the time when he made the Will had a sound and disposing state of mind and memory. Ordinarily, the burden of proving the due execution of the Will is discharged if the propounder leads evidence to show that the Will bears the signature of mark of the testator and that the Will is duly attested. For proving attestation, the best evidence would naturally be of an attesting witness, and indeed, the Will cannot be used as evidence unless at least one attesting witness, depending on availability, has been called to prove its execution as required by Sec. of the Evidence Act. But where, as in the instant case, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will are shrouded in suspicion, it is the propounder's duty and function to remove that suspicion by leading satisfactory evidence. ………………………….. 54. But where, as in the instant case, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will are shrouded in suspicion, it is the propounder's duty and function to remove that suspicion by leading satisfactory evidence. ………………………….. 54. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kak V. Kumari Sharada Raje & ors. , [ (2008) 7 SCC 695 ] opined that the Court is required to adopt a rational approach and is furthermore required to satisfy its conscience as the existence of suspicious circumstances plays an important role in holding. 55. The Law is well settled that the conscience of the Court must be satisfied that the Will in question was not only executed and attested in the manner required under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, but it should also be found that the said Will was the product of the free volition of the executant who had voluntarily executed the same after knowing and understanding the contents of the Will. Therefore, whenever there is any suspicious circumstance, the obligation is cast on the propounder of the Will to dispel suspicious circumstance. 56. In accordance with the defendant's case, it is asserted that his father executed the Will, marked as Ex.B.17, on 08.02.2006, bequeathing Item No.3 of the schedule property to him and that he executed a Will in a sound and disposing state of mind. To substantiate the execution of Ex.B.17, the defendant examined DW.5, K. Narayana Rao, who claimed to have attested the Will and supported the defendant's case. Additionally, the defendant examined DW.6, Neelam Veerabhadra Rao, the younger brother of N. Veera Raghavarao of Amalapuram, who served as a court staff member and retired before passing away in 2012, identified the signature of his late brother on Ex.B.17. He further submitted Ex.X.4, a Xerox copy of the award dated 31.07.2004, passed by the Lok Adalat of Amalapuram in LAC.No.27 of 2004, which bears his brother’s signature. Furthermore, Ex.X.5 was produced, a certified copy of a settlement deed dated 19.08.2008, also bearing his brother’s signature, and Ex.X.6, the ID proof of DW.6. 57. At the defendant's instance and pursuant to the orders of the Trial Court, Ex.B.17, the Will dated 08.02.2006, was referred to a handwriting expert for examination. To authenticate the report, the defendant examined DW.7, N. Krishna Prasad, a scientific officer employed with APSFL, Hyderabad, since 2002. 57. At the defendant's instance and pursuant to the orders of the Trial Court, Ex.B.17, the Will dated 08.02.2006, was referred to a handwriting expert for examination. To authenticate the report, the defendant examined DW.7, N. Krishna Prasad, a scientific officer employed with APSFL, Hyderabad, since 2002. DW.7 testified that he had received a requisition from the Court, which included one set of the Will (Ex.B.17), containing questioned signatures marked Q1 to Q6, as well as a Survey Division document from Kadapa (Ex.B.20) and a registered partition deed dated 24.09.1980 (Ex.B.5). The standard signatures for comparison, labelled S1 to S18, were also provided. DW.7 explained that he had meticulously examined the original documents in O.S.No.15 of 2012, utilizing sophisticated tools such as magnifiers, a stereo microscope, and a video spectral comparator, to assess handwriting identification and detect potential forgery. His testimony further confirmed that, based on his scientific investigation, the questioned signatures (Q1 to Q6) and the standard signatures (S1 to S18) exhibited identical movement, line quality, speed, and skill characteristics. In his expert opinion, the individual who authored the signatures marked S1 to S18 also wrote those marked Q1 to Q6. His detailed opinion, accompanied by supporting reasons, was recorded in two sheets dated 11.09.2015 and was submitted as Ex.C.1. 58. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant forcibly took his father to Amalapuram and fabricated Ex.B.17, the Will. However, the Trial Court noted that the defendant's father was a government employee and was alleged to have personally written three Wills, vide Ex.B.18. The Plaintiff contends that her father was not in good health at the time of his death and had been subjected to abuse by the defendant over family property matters for five years before his demise. PW.2 testified that the plaintiff's father passed away alone in his home, starving without assistance and that his death went unrecognized for three days. The plaintiff further claims that the defendant's father had no intention of executing any Will. In contrast, the drafted Wills presented by the defendant contradict this claim. It seems implausible to suggest that her father was coerced into preparing these documents. A careful examination of the Wills indicates that the father intended to bequeath the schedule properties, except item No.2 of the land to the defendant. In contrast, the drafted Wills presented by the defendant contradict this claim. It seems implausible to suggest that her father was coerced into preparing these documents. A careful examination of the Wills indicates that the father intended to bequeath the schedule properties, except item No.2 of the land to the defendant. As per Ex.B.17, the plaintiff is to get item No.2, while defendant is to get items No.1 and 3 of the schedule properties. 59. The defendant submitted a notarized affidavit to the Municipal Commissioner, which purportedly contained the signature of the plaintiff. In response, the plaintiff obtained Ex.A.9 and Ex.A.12 from the Municipal Corporation and denied the authenticity of the signatures, claiming they were deliberately falsified. According to the defendant's case, the plaintiff executed a joint affidavit expressing no objection to issuing the Municipal house tax receipt in the defendant's name following a mutation in the municipal records. However, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant forged documents to effectuate the mutation of his name in the municipal records. The defendant's counsel contends that if the khararunama (Ex.B.11) and the Will (Ex.B.12) are not proved, the plaintiff's father owned a 1/3rd share in item No.3 of the schedule property, which could have been conveyed to the defendant. Conversely, the plaintiff's counsel argues that this contention is untenable, as the defendant has failed to prove the validity of Ex.B.17, the Will. Additionally, as a coparcener under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, the plaintiff is entitled to a half share in the schedule property. 60. The testimony of DW.5 reveals that he identified his signature as the second attestor and his signature on the photo form 32A attached to the Will. DW.5 was examined through commission due to his advanced age of approximately 82 years. He stated that Ex.B.17 was read over to the Advocate by Sambasivarao and confirmed Veera Raghavarao's presence during the execution of the Will. In contrast, PW.1 testified that her father was in good health until his death, capable of visiting her home independently without any assistance, and was not confined to his bed. During the cross-examination of DW.1, he asserted that his father provided him with Ex.B.17 along with Exs.B.11 and B.12. In contrast, PW.1 testified that her father was in good health until his death, capable of visiting her home independently without any assistance, and was not confined to his bed. During the cross-examination of DW.1, he asserted that his father provided him with Ex.B.17 along with Exs.B.11 and B.12. However, it was suggested to him that he had dictated the contents of Ex.B.17 and that he had coerced his father into signing it by withholding food from him for four or five days. 61. As previously noted, the other attestor, N. Veera Raghavarao, could not be examined due to his death. To identify the signatures of Veera Raghavarao on Ex.B.17, DW.6 was called to testify. In assessing the evidence of DW.5, the Trial Court referenced his testimony, stating that he, N. Veera Raghavarao, and Sambasivarao (the executant) had been childhood friends. According to DW.5, he visited the office of Advocate, Md.Iqbal in Amalapuram, where Sambasivarao provided instructions to the Advocate, who then prepared the computerized Will. The executant had gone through the contents of the Will, expressed his satisfaction, and signed it in the presence of DW.5 and Veera Raghavarao. DW.5 further testified that after witnessing the executant's signature, Sambasivarao also instructed him to sign the document. Consequently, DW.5 and Veera Raghavarao both signed the Will. 62. Additionally, the Trial Court assumed that DW.5 should have been familiar with every detail regarding the testator's family and property. However, it is important to note that the plaintiff did not contend that DW.5 had no connection or acquaintance with the testator. At his advanced age of 82, it is reasonable to expect that DW.5 might not recall every detail surrounding the circumstances of the Will’s execution. Memory, especially in the elderly, can be affected by age, and it is natural for certain aspects to become less clear over time. Furthermore, at his advanced age, there is no apparent reason for DW.5 to intentionally support the defendant's case and contradict the plaintiff's interests. Given his age and relationship with the testator, it is improbable that DW.5 had any motive to fabricate or manipulate his testimony. This makes it more plausible that he was recounting the events as he remembered them without any ulterior motive. Upon carefully reviewing the discrepancies in DW.5's testimony, this Court concludes that the Trial Court's finding to disregard his evidence was unjustified. This makes it more plausible that he was recounting the events as he remembered them without any ulterior motive. Upon carefully reviewing the discrepancies in DW.5's testimony, this Court concludes that the Trial Court's finding to disregard his evidence was unjustified. The inconsistency regarding the preparation of the chief affidavit in Rajahmundry, which was questioned during cross-examination, does not undermine DW.5's overall recollection of the events surrounding the execution of Ex.B.17. It is a minor discrepancy. It is important to consider that DW.5’s ability to recall the more significant and primary details of the Will’s execution outweigh this inconsistency. In cases concerning a will, the matter must be approached with the mindset of a Court of Conscience. The Court must determine whether the document presented is the last Will and testament of Sambasivarao. If the testator's wishes are likely to be frustrated or thwarted solely due to a technicality, the Court of Conscience will not allow such an outcome. Therefore, this Court holds that the Trial Court’s observation to reject DW.5’s testimony based primarily on this minor inconsistency was not well-founded. The recollection of the key events surrounding the execution of Ex.B.17 remains credible, and it should not be rejected merely due to a slight lapse in memory regarding other unrelated details. The fact that DW.5 was able to provide clear testimony on the central aspects of the case demonstrates that his evidence is still valuable and reliable, even considering the minor discrepancies. 63. To fully appreciate the opposing contentions put forth by both parties, I have thoroughly examined Ex.B.17, the Will in question. In this document, the parties' father asserts that he purchased the vacant site and built a dhaba house upon it. Furthermore, he claims that following the death of his wife, the property was inherited solely by him. 64. The Trial Court correctly observed that there is no reference to Exhibits B.11 (Khararunama) and B.12 (Will dated 20.04.1989) in Exhibit B.17 (Will dated 08.02.2006), and thus, did not accept the defendant's stand regarding these documents. While Exhibit B.17 does not specify how the testator acquired the property, he claims it was inherited from his wife. The Defendant failed to prove that his father obtained Item No.3 of the schedule property through Exs.B.11 and B.12. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the defendant’s father was not entitled to bequeath his share of the property. 65. While Exhibit B.17 does not specify how the testator acquired the property, he claims it was inherited from his wife. The Defendant failed to prove that his father obtained Item No.3 of the schedule property through Exs.B.11 and B.12. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the defendant’s father was not entitled to bequeath his share of the property. 65. Generally, a Will is executed to alter the mode of succession and by the very nature of things it is bound to result in either reducing or depriving the share of a natural heir. If a person intends his property to pass to his natural heirs, there is no necessity at all to execute a Will. In PPK Gopalan Nambiar V. PPK Balakrishnan Nambiar & Ors. , [ AIR 1995 SC 1852 ] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the propounder of the Will must remove all the suspected features, but there must be real, germane and valid suspicious features and not fantasy of the doubting mind. In this case, the fact that the whole estate was given to the son under the Will depriving two daughters was held to be not a suspicious circumstance, and the finding to the contrary, which was recorded by the District Court and the High Court, was reversed. 66. In Rabindra Nath Mukherjee & Anr. v. Panchanan Banerjee (dead) by L.R.s. & Ors. , [ (1995) 4 SCC 459 ] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the deprivation of natural heirs should not raise any suspicion because the whole idea behind the execution of the Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession. So, natural heirs would be debarred in every case of Will. 67. As evidenced by the contents of Ex.B.17 Will, the testator has explicitly mentioned that, at the time of his daughter's (Plaintiff's) marriage, he had provided gold and cash as pasupukumkuma. Despite this, he has chosen to bequeath immovable property to the extent of Ac.0.76 ¾ cents of land to his daughter. This indicates that the testator did not allocate his entire estate to his son. However, he has provided specific justifications for granting his daughter a smaller share than her brother's inheritance. 68. The draft Wills, marked as Ex.B.18(a), (b), and (c), are purported to have been prepared by the testator and are claimed to be in his handwriting. This indicates that the testator did not allocate his entire estate to his son. However, he has provided specific justifications for granting his daughter a smaller share than her brother's inheritance. 68. The draft Wills, marked as Ex.B.18(a), (b), and (c), are purported to have been prepared by the testator and are claimed to be in his handwriting. Although the plaintiff has contested this version of the defendant, after reviewing the documents, I find it difficult to believe that the plaintiff could have forged both the handwriting and signature of the testator. The drafts suggest that the testator thoroughly exercised before executing the Will. Ex.B.17, the Will was executed on 08.02.2006, when the testator was approximately 74 years old and suffering from diabetes and high blood pressure. The evidence on record indicates that his wife passed away on 14.04.1998, and the testator died on 20.04.2010. It is noteworthy that the plaintiff has not claimed that, following the testator's wife's death, he lived with her. 69. The Trial Court noted that the testator affixed his signature before the Sub-Registrar in connection with the registration of the document. DW.6 confirmed his brother's signature on the reverse side of page No.1, where he had acted as the first identifying witness before the Registrar. The suggestions made to the defendant's witnesses imply that the plaintiff has not contested the signature of the attestor in Ex.B.17. Furthermore, as previously stated, the expert has also affirmed that the signature on Ex.B.17 is indeed that of the testator. The Trial Court noted that the defendant has only established that Ex.B.17 bears his father's signature. The Trial Court rejected the evidence of DW.5, citing minor discrepancies, but without providing substantial reasoning. Additionally, the Trial Court observed that the testimony of DW.7, the handwriting expert, who provided an opinion based on Ex.B.5 and the signature recorded under Ex.B.20, could not be faulted. 70. The Trial Court rejected the defendant's case due to minor discrepancies in DW.1's testimony regarding when he first became aware of Ex.B.17. However, the failure to specify the exact date of possession should not be deemed suspicious, especially since Ex.B.17 is a registered document. The Trial Court wrongly assumed that, because the testator could prepare documents, there was no need for him to instruct the preparation of Ex.B.17. Notably, Ex.B.17 differs from the draft Wills, which likely prompted the testator to seek legal assistance. The Trial Court wrongly assumed that, because the testator could prepare documents, there was no need for him to instruct the preparation of Ex.B.17. Notably, Ex.B.17 differs from the draft Wills, which likely prompted the testator to seek legal assistance. Therefore, the Trial Court’s conclusion that DW.1 failed to explain the necessity for a typed Will is unsubstantiated. The decision to prepare a typed Will is a matter for the testator to explain, not the propounder. This Court finds no grounds to treat this circumstance as suspicious. 71. Per the evidence on record, the testator served as an Engineer in the Panchayat Department and personally visited the Sub Registrar's office to register the Will. While the mere act of registration may not eliminate all suspicions regarding the execution and attestation of the Will, it remains a significant factor in favour of the Will's authenticity. The evidence of registration demonstrates that the testator acknowledged the execution of the Will, being fully aware that he was admitted to the execution of a valid legal document. 72. The material on record reveals that the testator was aware he was executing a will when he signed it at the bottom of the document in the presence of the attestors, as evidenced by the registration. This confirms that the testator knowingly acknowledged the execution of the Will. 73. In Daulat Ram and others V. Sodha and others , [ (2005) 1 SCC 40 ] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: "13....The burden to prove that the Will dated 08.05.1983 executed by Prati in favour of his daughter was forged or was obtained by undue influence or by playing a fraud was on the appellants which they have failed to discharge. No evidence was led by them on either of these points. 74. In C.Saradambal V. Padmavathi and 16 others , [2008 (6) CTC 324] , the High Court of Madras held that: "7.. The above provision would clearly show that it is enough if one attesting witness has been called for the purpose of proving the execution of a document. 75. In this case, one of the attestors to Ex.B.17, Will, DW.5, was examined, and he testified that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of execution and that he, along with the other attesting witness, witnessed the testator sign the Will. 75. In this case, one of the attestors to Ex.B.17, Will, DW.5, was examined, and he testified that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of execution and that he, along with the other attesting witness, witnessed the testator sign the Will. Unfortunately, the other attesting witness had passed away and could not be examined to corroborate the Will's authenticity. However, since the genuineness of the Will has been established through DW.5's testimony, it is unnecessary to examine the other attesting witness, even if he were alive. The examination of the second witness is only required if the first attesting witness fails to prove the due execution of the Will. As noted, the Will has been adequately proved through DW.5's evidence. 76. According to DW.5's testimony, he witnessed the testator signing all pages of the Will, and the testator saw the subscription of signatures by the attesting witnesses. I find no shortcomings in DW.5's evidence regarding the execution of the Will and its attestation. DW.5 also confirmed that the document was presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar, which the Trial Court accepted. The Appellant has discharged the burden of proving the due execution of the Will. DW.5, the attesting witness, unequivocally testified that Sambasivarao was of sound and disposing mind when executing the Will. 77. Furthermore, the Will was read over to him in their presence, and both witnesses signed it in the presence of the testator and each other. No evidence on record suggests that DW.5's testimony was false. The onus to demonstrate that the Will executed by Sambasivarao was coerced, the result of undue influence, or obtained through fraud rested with the Respondent/Plaintiff. However, she has failed to meet this burden. The plaintiff failed to produce evidence to suggest that the testator was not in a sound and disposing state of mind during the execution or registration of the Will. 78. The evidence on record shows that the testator was in good health during the execution and lived for four years thereafter. In these circumstances, I conclude that the testator executed the Will in a sound and disposing state of mind, with free and genuine consent. The Trial Court also observed in paragraph No.63 that the deceased did not protest against Ex.B.17, and he survived for four years after Ex.B.17. In these circumstances, I conclude that the testator executed the Will in a sound and disposing state of mind, with free and genuine consent. The Trial Court also observed in paragraph No.63 that the deceased did not protest against Ex.B.17, and he survived for four years after Ex.B.17. The plaintiff has failed to prove that the testator's consent was obtained through undue influence, coercion, or fraud. I am of the considered opinion that Ex.B.17, the Will, was executed by the testator in a sound and disposing state of mind, in the presence of attesting witnesses, and without any undue influence or coercion. 79. As held by the Supreme Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee V. Subodh Kumar Banerjee , [1964 AIR(SC) 529] , where the caveator alleges fraud or undue influence, the onus is on the caveator to prove the same. In the absence of any independent and satisfactory evidence, this Court cannot agree with the findings of the Trial Court, which concluded that the defendant failed to establish the due execution of Ex.B.17 Will and failed to dispel the numerous suspicious circumstances surrounding it. 80. The plaintiff has adduced no evidence to establish that, at the time of executing the Will, the testator was suffering from any ailment that would have impaired his mental faculties to the extent that he could not comprehend the true nature of the document he was executing. As the evidence adduced in support of the Will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the testator's sound and disposing state of mind and his signature as required by Law, it would discharge the onus on the propounder to establish the essential fact. Consequently, this Court is of the opinion that the finding reached by the learned Trial Judge is not based on a correct application of the legal principles governing the proof and acceptance of a Will and is, therefore, entirely perverse. Accordingly, the finding as mentioned above is hereby set aside, and the Point is answered. POINT NO.4: 81. In addressing the points mentioned above, this Court holds that Items No.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties are to be regarded as self- acquired properties of the father of the parties. At the same time, Item No.3 is the self-acquired property of the mother of the parties. The Trial Court had recorded these findings, which this Court duly upheld. At the same time, Item No.3 is the self-acquired property of the mother of the parties. The Trial Court had recorded these findings, which this Court duly upheld. However, while answering Point No.3, this Court differs from the findings of the Trial Court. The Trial Court noted that Sambasivarao had a 1/3 rd share in Item No.3 due to the death of his wife, and at most, he could convey that 1/3 rd share to anyone. However, as the defendant failed to prove the execution of Ex.B.17, the Trial Court held that Sambasivarao’s 1/3 rd share could not be allotted to the defendant under the terms of Ex.B.17. This Court concludes that the defendant has successfully established that his father executed Ex.B.17, a Will, while in a sound and disposing state of mind, bequeathing Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property to the Defendant and Item No.2 to the plaintiff. In upholding the genuineness and validity of Ex.B.17, this Court finds that Item No.1 of the schedule property should be allotted to the defendant, and Item No.2 should be allotted to the plaintiff. 82. In light of the above findings, the plaintiff and the defendant are entitled to a 1/3 rd share each in Item No.3 of the plaint schedule property. As this Court accepts the plaintiff's claim that her mother died intestate, the defendant's father would be entitled to a 1/3 rd share in Item No.3 of the schedule property. Although the testator may not have had the absolute right to bequeath his wife's entire property, this Court concludes that the defendant is entitled to a 1/3 rd share of Item No.3, which the testator inherited following his wife’s death. As such, the defendant is entitled to a 2/3 rd share in Item No.3, while the plaintiff is entitled to a 1/3 rd share. Accordingly, the Point is answered. POINT NO.5: 83. As a result, the Appeal is partly allowed without costs. As such, the defendant is entitled to a 2/3 rd share in Item No.3, while the plaintiff is entitled to a 1/3 rd share. Accordingly, the Point is answered. POINT NO.5: 83. As a result, the Appeal is partly allowed without costs. The preliminary decree and judgment, dated 13.04.2017 in O.S.No.15 of 2012 passed by the I Additional District Judge, East Godavari, Rajamahendravaram, is modified to the effect that Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property shall be allotted to the defendant; Item No.2 shall be allotted to the plaintiff, and further, the plaintiff is entitled to a 1/3 rd share in Item No.3 of the plaint schedule property; the defendant is entitled to a 2/3 rd share; by considering the principles of equity, weighing both the good and bad qualities. Furthermore, the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits from the date of the suit until the realization of her share. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any in this Appeal, shall stand closed.