ORDER : Muralee Krishna, J. The preliminary point we have to decide by this order is as to whether the court fee to be paid in this writ appeal is at the revised rate notified with effect from 01.04.2025, as per the Kerala Finance Act, 2025 amending the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (the ‘Court Fees Act’ in short), or at the pre-revised rate, since the writ petition from which the appeal arose was instituted prior to the amendment? 2. The petitioner in W.P.(C)No.34972 of 2024 filed this writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 13.05.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition. The appellant paid the court fee of Rs.200/- under Schedule II Article 1(A)(2)(c) of the Court Fees Act. The appeal was filed on 26.08.2025. W.P.(C)No.34972 of 2024 was filed by the appellant on 04.10.2024 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Exts.P7 and P12 orders and other consequential reliefs. 3. The appeal was filed with a delay of 73 days. As per the order dated 18.09.2025 in C.M.Appl.No.1 of 2025, we condoned the delay and listed the appeal for admission. 4. On 23.10.2025, when the 5th respondent raised the issue of the sufficiency of the court fee paid in the appeal, we directed the Registry to get a report of the Registrar (Judicial) on the question of payment of court fee, in view of the provisions under the Kerala Finance Act, 2025. Pursuant to that order, a report dated 23.10.2025 of the Registrar (Judicial) is placed on record, which reads thus: “The instant Writ Appeal has been filed on 26.8.2025, challenging the judgment dated 13.05.2025 in W.P.(C) 34972 of 2024. The said W.P(C) was filed on 4.10.2024. The Writ Appeal was filed by the sole appellant therein paying the court fee of Rs 200/- under Schedule II, Article 1(A)(2)(c) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1959. In this connection, kind attention is invited to the Government Notification No.16/Leg.A2/2025/Law dated 28.03.2025 (Flag A) whereby the court fees payable in various cases have been revised with effect from 01.04.2025. As per the amended Court Fees Act, 2025, the court fee payable for Writ Appeal has been enhanced from Rs.200/- per person to Rs.1000/- per person under Schedule II, Article 1(2)(c) therein. As per the amended Court Fees Act, 2025, the court fee payable for Writ Appeal has been enhanced from Rs.200/- per person to Rs.1000/- per person under Schedule II, Article 1(2)(c) therein. In this connection, kind attention is invited to the decision dated 06.06.1996 of a Division Bench of this Honourable Court in Usha v. Food Corporation of India reported in 1997 KHC 47 ( 1997 (1) KLT 264 ) (Flag B) wherein the Honourable Court following the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Limited (1960 KHC 336) (Flag C)held that the court fee as per the un-amended provision alone need be paid in the proceedings instituted before the amendment. Since the instant Writ Appeal originates from the judgment in W.P.(C) No. 34972 of 2024, which was filed on 04.10.2024 i.e., prior to 01.04.2025, the court fee of Rs. 200/- alone was paid. It is submitted that in view of the above decisions, it seems that the court fee paid in W.A. 2205 of 2025 is sufficient.” 5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Special Government Pleader, the learned counsel for the 5 th respondent and the learned counsel for the 7 th respondent. 6. When the appellant maintained the stand that appeal is the continuation of the original proceedings, and therefore the court fee to be paid in the appeal is at the rate that existed at the time of initiation of the original proceedings, the learned Special Government Pleader and learned counsel for respondents 5 and 7 contended that as far as the writ appeal is concerned, the court fee to be paid is at the rate as on the date of filing of the appeal. 7. Till 01.04.2025, the court fee to be paid in the case of an appeal filed under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, as per Schedule II, Article 1(A)(2)(c) of the Court Fees Act was Rs.200/- per appellant. With effect from 01.04.2025, by the Kerala Finance Act, 2025, the said amount has been enhanced to Rs.1000/ per appellant. The provision under which the court fee has to be paid in the instant case is not in dispute between the parties. With effect from 01.04.2025, by the Kerala Finance Act, 2025, the said amount has been enhanced to Rs.1000/ per appellant. The provision under which the court fee has to be paid in the instant case is not in dispute between the parties. The issue is whether the court fee has to be paid at the rate that existed on the date of initiation of the original proceedings or at the rate that is in existence as on the date of filing of the appeal. 8. After the notification of the Kerala Finance Act, 2025, this Court issued an official memorandum dated 02.04.2024, which is extracted hereunder: “OFFICIAL MEMORANDUM Sub:- The Kerala Finance Bill, 2024 - Amendments to the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 - Reg. Ref:-1) The Kerala Finance Bill, 2024 (copy attached) 2) Sections 3 and 4 of the Kerala Provisional Collection of Revenues Act, 1985. The Government, vide reference cited first above, proposed certain amendments to the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 with respect to change in court fees in certain category of cases filed under the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1985 and the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Paragraph 3 of Chapter II in the Kerala Finance Bill, 2024). Even though the Kerala Finance Bill, 2024, is yet to be passed in the Legislative Assembly, the tax proposals in the Kerala Finance Bill, 2024, will have effect from 01.04.2024 in accordance with the provisions under the Kerala Provisional Collection of Revenues Act, 1985. A declaration to that effect is also made in the Kerala Finance Bill, 2024. Hence, the Courts concerned shall collect the revised court fees in such category of cases, as are applicable, in accordance with the amendments proposed to the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, in the Kerala Finance Bill, 2024, with effect from 01.04.2024. (By Order) Sd/- P.Krishna Kumar Registrar General 9. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the 5 th respondent invited our attention to several judgments of the Apex Court and this Court; relevant as well as irrelevant to the issue under consideration. The judgments on which the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance are the judgments of the Apex Court in State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. [ AIR 1960 SC 980 ] Diwan Bros. The judgments on which the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance are the judgments of the Apex Court in State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. [ AIR 1960 SC 980 ] Diwan Bros. v. Central Bank of India, Bombay [(1976) 3 SCC 800] , K. Raveendranathan Nair v. Commissioner of Income Tax [ (2017) 9 SCC 355 ] , ECGC Ltd. v. Mokul Shriram EPC JV [ 2022 (2) KLT 187 ] , and that of this Court in Usha v. Food Corporation of India [ 1997 (1) KLT 264 ] . The learned counsel argued that appeal is the continuation of the original proceedings and the right of a litigant cannot be curtailed by imposing a more onerous condition subsequent to the initiation of the original proceedings. 10. Similarly, the learned counsel for the 5 th respondent relied on the judgments of this Court in Discharged Servicemen’s Association v. State of Kerala [ 2000 (1) KLT 281 ] , P.V. Devasia v. State of Kerala [ILR 1965 (1) Ker.388] Somanathan v. State of Kerala [ 2003 (3) KLT 1148 ] Narayana Shetty v. Krishnamma [ 2004 (3) KLT 596 ] Pankajakshy v. State Bank of Travancore [ILR 2004 (3) Ker. 306] , M. Leonard Ashok v. Commercial Tax Officer-I [2007 (1) KHC 67] , and Maradu Market Traders’ Association v. State of Kerala [ 2018 (3) KLT 212 ] in support of his arguments. 11. In Supreme General Films [ AIR 1960 SC 980 ] after referring a long line of decisions it has been held by the Apex Court that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. The question that was considered by the Apex Court in the judgment is whether in the absence of provisions giving retrospective effect to certain amendment made in the Court Fees Act, 1870, as applied to Bombay by the Court Fees (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1954 which amendments came in force on 01.04.1954, the court fee payable on two memoranda of appeals were payable according to the law in force at the date of filing of the suits which was prior to the relevant dates or according to the law in force at the date of the filing of the memoranda of appeal, which was after the relevant date. 12. In Diwan Bros [ (1976) 3 SCC 800 ] , the Apex Court was seisin of an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court deciding a court fee matter in connection with the memorandum of appeal filed by the appellants against the decree passed by the Tribunal appointed under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951. In that judgment, the Apex Court held thus: “20. Secondly, as pointed out, the object of the Act is to benefit displaced persons by providing them a cheap and expeditious remedy. The argument of Mr. Sanghi for the respondents that the Legislature wanted the claimants to pay heavy court fees if they lost before the Tribunal is totally inconsistent with the aim and object of the Act. If the displaced claimants were given the right to have their claims determined on a nominal court fees and if only one right of appeal was provided, it surpasses one's comprehension why the Legislature should have intended that even if wrong orders were passed by the Tribunal, the claimants should have to pay heavy court fees if they wanted to file an appeal to the High Court. If the intention of the Legislature was to provide a cheap and expeditious remedy to the claimants, then the remedy would be incomplete if it was given only at the original stage and not at the appellate stage”. (underline supplied) 13. In K. Raveendranathan Nair [ (2017) 9 SCC 355 ] , the issue considered by the Apex Court was payment of fee on a statutory appeal filed under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. (underline supplied) 13. In K. Raveendranathan Nair [ (2017) 9 SCC 355 ] , the issue considered by the Apex Court was payment of fee on a statutory appeal filed under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. By the Amendment Act of 2003, Section 52-A was inserted in the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, with effect from 02.10.2002, which was passed on 06.03.2003. In that judgment, the Apex Court held thus: “15. We, therefore, are not able to subscribe to the aforesaid view of the High Court and set aside the same. In fine, we hold as under: (i) Wherever assessee is in appeal in the High Court which is filed under S.260A of the IT Act, if the date of assessment is prior to March 06, 2003, S.52A of the 1959 Act shall not apply and the court fee payable shall be the one which was payable on the date of such assessment order. (ii) In those cases where the Department files appeal in the High Court under S.260A of the IT Act, the date on which the appellate authority set aside the judgment of the Assessing Officer would be the relevant date for payment of court fee. If that happens to be before March 06, 2003, then the court fee shall not be payable as per S.260A of the IT Act on such appeals”. (underline supplied) 14. In Mokul Shriram [ 2022 (2) KLT 187 ] , the question that came up before the Apex Court is as to whether the appeal would be governed under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, or under the erstwhile 1986 Act. In that judgment, the Apex Court held thus: “32. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in M/s. Dream Castle and Another v. Union of India and Others, W.P. No. 13431 of 2015 etc. decided on 18/04/2016 dealing with amended S.35 of the Central Excise Act by Finance Act No. 2 of 2014 held that when the unamended condition gave only a chance or hope for an assessee to get a total waiver at the discretion of the Appellate Authority, the same cannot be equated to a vested right or stated to be retrospective, unless it is definitely shown that the amended condition is more onerous than the unamended condition. It was held as under: "54. It was held as under: "54. Therefore, it is well settled that the right of appeal is a creature of Statute and the Legislature is well within its competence to impose conditions for the exercise of such a right, subject only to the restriction that the conditions so imposed are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost illusory. xxxx xxxx xxxx 59. Therefore, if one condition that was already available in the Statute for the exercise of a right of appeal is merely replaced by another condition, the same cannot be said to be retrospective, unless it is definitely shown that the amended condition is more onerous than the unamended condition. When the unamended condition gave only a chance or hope for an assessee to get a total waiver at the discretion of the Appellate Authority, the same cannot be equated to a vested right. A mere chance of convincing the Appellate Authority to exercise the discretion for the grant of a total waiver is no vested right. The amendment, in our considered view, did not take away a right vested, but merely made a chance divested. What has now gone is not the right, but the chance or hope. Therefore, the first contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected." 33. There is another line of judgments taking a view that right of appeal is a creation of Statute and the Legislature is competent to determine the conditions on which an appeal would lie. These are not the cases of amending or repeal of a Statute, therefore, such judgments are not applicable to the questions arising in the present application. 34. In view of the binding precedents of the Constitution Bench judgments referred to above, we hold that onerous condition of payment of 50% of the amount awarded will not be applicable to the complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act. Therefore, the I.A. is allowed”. (underline supplied) 15. 34. In view of the binding precedents of the Constitution Bench judgments referred to above, we hold that onerous condition of payment of 50% of the amount awarded will not be applicable to the complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act. Therefore, the I.A. is allowed”. (underline supplied) 15. In Usha [ 1997 (1) KLT 264 ] , a Division Bench of this Court reiterated the principles laid down in Supreme General Films [ AIR 1960 SC 980 ] and held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. 16. In Discharged Servicemen’s Association [2000 (1) KLT 281] the issue came up for consideration before this Court was the legality of requirement to pay court fee of Rs. 100/- for filing the writ appeals. In paragraph 4 of the said judgment, this Court held that right of appeal is a creation of statute. But in exercise of such right, there is no inherent or constitutional right to file an appeal. While granting right, legislature can impose any condition. This Court further held that the right to appeal is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure. But such right is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice. It must be conferred by statute and can be exercised only as permitted by statute. There is no fetter in imposing conditions about deposit of fees etc. Condition of deposit of court fee merely regulates exercise of right of appeal. It is open to the legislature to impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for exercise of right. 17. The issue considered by the Division Bench of this Court in P.V. Devasia [ILR 1965 (1) Ker. 388] , is as to whether the fee payable in a writ appeal is as provided under Article 3(iii)(A)(2)(c) of Schedule II or under Section 52 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. In that judgment, this Court held thus: “5A Two approaches, and two approaches alone, are possible. 388] , is as to whether the fee payable in a writ appeal is as provided under Article 3(iii)(A)(2)(c) of Schedule II or under Section 52 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. In that judgment, this Court held thus: “5A Two approaches, and two approaches alone, are possible. One is the approach made in Ediga Muniyya v. The State of Andhra Pradesh 1961 (II) An. WR 113; and Messrs. Chemicals Ltd., Nidadavole v. Messrs. Raka Corporation (Private) Ltd., 1963 (II) An. WR 124 which followed the earlier decision. According to those decisions the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant is attracted in cases like this and S.52, a general provision for all appeals, will not prevail as against Art.3(iii)(A)(2), a special provision for a specified class of appeals, namely, appeals under S.5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. 6A There can be no doubt that the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant embodies a healthy rule of construction. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1961 SC 1170 ) the rule that general provisions should yield to special provisions is not an arbitrary rule made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions, one covering a large number of matters in general, and the other covering only some of them, his intention is that the latter should prevail as regards those matters, and that the general direction should have effect only as regards matters uncovered by the special direction. 7A The approach indicated above is based on the assumption that S.52 is a general provision applying to all appeals. This is controversial. In the context in which S.52 appears, it may be that it has application only to appeals from the suits specified in S.22 to 50. If this view is correct, no question of applying the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant will arise and the only provision applicable will be Art.3(iii)(A)(2) of Schedule II. 8A In either view the fee payable in this case will be Rs. 100/- and not Rs. 25/-. If this view is correct, no question of applying the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant will arise and the only provision applicable will be Art.3(iii)(A)(2) of Schedule II. 8A In either view the fee payable in this case will be Rs. 100/- and not Rs. 25/-. It only remains to point out that there is no magic in a Schedule, that no paramountcy is conferred by the mere fact of a matter being incorporated in a Schedule, and that a combination of Act and Schedule does not attract anything other than the ordinary canons of statutory construction.” (underline supplied) 18. In Narayana Shetty [ 2004 (3) KLT 596 ] , this Court, while considering the court fee payable in a petition to condone the delay and set aside the abatement after the Amendment Act, 2003, held thus: “5. We are of the view that so far as the petitions are concerned, it cannot be given the same status as the court fee payable on appeal. In the present case, S.87(2) does not apply because, S.87(2) was introduced when Act 10 of 1950 came into force repealing the Acts in the Travancore - Cochin and Malabar area. According to us, the argument that in an appeal court fee will be paid to the petitions only on the basis of the Law that stood at the time of filing the suit cannot be accepted. So far as the petitions and other matters are concerned, they are different from the memorandum of appeal. According to us, in the above matters, the court fee has to be paid on the basis of which the Law stands at the time of filing of the petitions. In this case, at the time of filing of the petitions, the court fee has to be paid at Rs.10/-. Hence, we answer the question. (underline supplied) 19. In Pankajakshy [ILR 2004 (3) Ker. 306] , a learned Single Judge of this Court, while considering the question of payment of court fee in a CRP, held thus: “9. It is a well accepted principle of law that right of first appeal is a vested right. It is true that revisional jurisdiction is a part of general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. [See Shankar v. Krishna ( AIR 1970 SC 1 )]. It is a well accepted principle of law that right of first appeal is a vested right. It is true that revisional jurisdiction is a part of general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. [See Shankar v. Krishna ( AIR 1970 SC 1 )]. But it cannot be equated with that of full fledged appeal as held in Chandrika Prasad v. Umesh Kumar Verma ( 2002 (1) SCC 531 ) It is to be noted that drastic amendments were made to the provisions of S.115 C.P.C. with effect from 1 st July 2002. In Sivasakthi Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers ( 2003 (2) KLT 503 (SC)) the Apex Court held that no person has a vested right in the course of procedure. It was held as follows: "S.115 is essentially a source of power for the High Court to supervise the subordinate courts. It does not in any way confer a right on a litigant aggrieved by any order of the subordinate court to approach the High Court for relief. The scope for making a revision under S.115 is not linked with a substantive right." So no litigant can claim a vested right of revision. Since the right of revision is not a vested right, the principle laid down in Procurator, R.C. Diocese of Calicut's case (supra) can have no application to the facts of this case. I am of the view that the principles laid down in State of Kerala v. Joy (supra) apply to the facts of this case. So I hold that the relevant date for payment of court fee is the date on which the C.R.P. comes up for admission and the petitioners are liable to pay court fee leviable and payable under the amended provision. One month's time given to the petitioners to pay the court fee”. (underline supplied) 20. In M. Leonard Ashok [ 2007 (1) KHC 67 ] , a Full Bench of this Court held thus: “5. The Kerala High Court Act 1958 was enacted to make provision regulating the business and exercise of the powers of the High Court of the State of Kerala. Rules of the High Court of Kerala 1971 were framed in exercise of the powers conferred under Art.225 of the Constitution of India, Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the High Court. Rules of the High Court of Kerala 1971 were framed in exercise of the powers conferred under Art.225 of the Constitution of India, Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the High Court. Rule 146 deals with the contents of an original petition which reads as follows: 146. Contents of the applications.-- Every application shall set out the provision of law under which it is made, the name and description of the petitioner and the respondent, a clear and concise statement of facts, the grounds on which the relief is sought and shall be signed by petitioner and by his Advocate, if he has appointed one, as in Form No.10. Provided that no petition shall be entertained by the Registry unless it contains a statement as to whether the petitioner had filed any petition seeking similar reliefs in respect of the same subject matter earlier and if so, the result thereof.' R.147 A permits more than one petitioner to join in a single writ petition on condition that each petitioner should pay the court fee as prescribed under Schedule II of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959. The Rule reads as follows: '147A. More persons than one may join in one Writ Petition as petitioners in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if such persons present separate Writ Petitions, any common question of law or fact would arise provided that each person joining in such Writ Petition shall pay the court fee payable under Art.11(4) of Schedule II of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, as if each of them had filed a separate Writ Petition.' 6. The learned Special Government Pleader contends that in view of Section 6 of the Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, when an original petition embraces two or more distinct or different causes of action and separate reliefs are sought based on them, Court fee should be paid in respect of each cause of action. The Section reads as follows: '6. The learned Special Government Pleader contends that in view of Section 6 of the Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, when an original petition embraces two or more distinct or different causes of action and separate reliefs are sought based on them, Court fee should be paid in respect of each cause of action. The Section reads as follows: '6. Multifarious suits.-- (1) In any suit in which separate and distinct reliefs are sought based on the same cause of action, the plaint shall be chargeable with a fee on the aggregate value of the reliefs: Provided that, if a relief is sought only as ancillary too the main relief, the plaint shall be chargeable only on the value of the main reliefs. (2) Where more reliefs than one based on the same cause of action are sought in the alternative in any suit, the plaint shall be chargeable with the highest of the fees leviable in respect of any one of the reliefs. (3) Where a suit embraces two or more distinct and different causes of action and separate reliefs are sought based on them, either alternatively or cumulatively, the plaint shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees with which plaints would be chargeable under this Act if separate suits were instituted in respect of the several causes of action: Provided that, where the causes of action in respect of reliefs claimed alternatively against the same person arise out of the same transaction, the plaint shall be chargeable only with the highest of the fees chargeable on them. Nothing in the sub- section shall be deemed to affect any power conferred upon a Court under R.6 of O.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908). (4) The provisions of this section shall apply mutatis mutandis to memoranda of appeals, applications, petitions and written statements. Explanation.-- For the purpose of this section, a suit for possession of immovable property and for mesne profits shall be deemed to be based on the same cause of action.' At the outset it has to be noted that the provision deals with only suits and not original petitions in the High Court. The expression 'petition' under Section 6(4) is intended to provide for petitions filed in the suit and not an original petition. The expression 'petition' under Section 6(4) is intended to provide for petitions filed in the suit and not an original petition. The learned Government Pleader invited our attention to the interpretation given to the section under the provisions of the Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. Section 6 herein is identically worded. A learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in R. Sethupathi v. State [ AIR 1957 Mad. 570 ], observed that the petitioner referred to in Section 6(4) would include writ petitions also. We are afraid the interpretation does not reflect the correct position in law. It has to be noted that the Court fee payable in a suit is ad valorem. Hence only it is stipulated in Section 6(3) that where a suit embraces two or more different and distinct causes of action and separate reliefs are sought based on them, the plaint should be valued on the aggregate amount of plaint claim for the purpose of Court fees. It is also to be noted that under the Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, the Court fee prescribed under Appendix II, Article 11(l)(iii) in respect of original petitions not otherwise provided for is only Rs.20/- at the relevant time. There is no stipulation in the Schedule regarding the fees to be paid by each petitioner when more than one person join in a writ petition. Under the Kerala Act the scheme is different. In the matter of payment of Court fee in a writ petition the same is to be computed in terms of the number of petitioners in a writ petition. There is no stipulation in the Schedule or in the High Court Rules with regard to payment of Court fee in respect of each cause of action. That does not mean that a writ petitioner can consolidate all his grievances in a bundle of facts and file one writ petition. It would only mean that in a writ petition based on the same set of facts and on the very same question of law a writ petitioner need pay only one set of Court fee, namely Rs.100/-. That does not mean that a writ petitioner can consolidate all his grievances in a bundle of facts and file one writ petition. It would only mean that in a writ petition based on the same set of facts and on the very same question of law a writ petitioner need pay only one set of Court fee, namely Rs.100/-. The facts in the instant case are almost identical to that of the case considered by the Supreme Court in Chandra Bhan Gosain v. State of Orissa [ 1963 KLT 1063 : AIR 1967 SC 767 ] wherein it has been held that in a petition under Art.226 challenging the validity of various assessment orders there was only one proceeding and hence in the appeal to the Supreme Court there need only be one set of Court fee.” (underline supplied) 21. In Maradu Market Traders’ Association [2018 (3) KLT 212] a Division Bench of this Court considered the preliminary question whether the petitioner therein being an Association representing traders and seeking relief for 138 persons should pay court fee as per Schedule II, Article 11(l) (iii) of the Court Fees Act, at the rate of Rs.100/- per person? After considering the various provisions and the judgments governing the field, the Division Bench held that the petitioner Association therein has to pay court fee at the rate of Rs.100/- per person as required under Schedule II, Article 11(l) (iii) of the Court Fees Act. 22. Though the learned counsel on both sides addressed extensive arguments, the crux of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the right to file an appeal is an indefeasible right accrued to the litigant on the date of filing of the original proceedings, whether it be a suit or original proceedings in the form of a writ petition. Therefore, an onerous condition of payment of court fee in an enhanced rate that came into effect after the filing of the writ petition cannot be insisted by making the amendment retrospective, unless the same is specified in the Act itself. 23. On the other hand, the contention of the contesting respondents is that in the case of writ appeals, the court fee to be paid is not the ad valorem court fee, but it is based on the number of appellants. 23. On the other hand, the contention of the contesting respondents is that in the case of writ appeals, the court fee to be paid is not the ad valorem court fee, but it is based on the number of appellants. Therefore, the principles binding the calculation of ad valorem court fee, as in the case of suit and civil appeal is not applicable to the case of a writ appeal. 24. The learned Counsel for the 5 th respondent invited our attention to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12 th edition, wherein it is stated as under: “Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just and expedient: words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded. The duty of the court is to expound the law as it stands, and to "leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others.” 25. The perusal of Article 1A(2)(c) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act would show that the court fee prescribed in the case of a writ appeal by virtue of that provision is Rs.1000/- per appellant. But the reading of Section 52 of the Court Fees Act would make it clear that the court fee to be paid under Section 52 of the Court Fees Act is the same as that paid in the suit, that is ad valorem court fee. The relevant portions of the said Section read thus: “52. Appeals.—The fee payable in an appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the subject-matter of the appeal: xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx Explanation (1).—Whether the appeal is against the refusal of a relief or against the grant of the relief, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable on the relief in the Court of first instance. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx Explanation (4).—Where the relief prayed for in the appeal is different from the relief prayed for or refused in the Court of first instance, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the relief prayed for in the appeal. Explanation (5).—Where the market value of the subject- matter of the appeal has to be ascertained for the purpose of computing or determining the fee payable, such market value shall be ascertained as on the date of presentation of the plaint”. 26. In all the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, such as Supreme General Films Exchange [AIR 1960 SC 980] , Diwan Bros [ (1976) 3 SCC 800 ] , K. Raveendranathan Nair[ (2017) 9 SCC 355 ] , Mokul Shriram [ 2022 (2) KLT 187 ] and in Usha [ 1997 (1) KLT 264 ] , the right of appeal was considered by the Apex Court as well as this Court. The principle that can be deduced from these judgments is that the right of appeal accrues to a litigant against an illegal decision, or in other words, a decision which he considers as illegal or perverse, against which an appeal is provided in a statute, the moment he files the original proceedings, whether it be in the form of a civil appeal or a writ appeal. The said right cannot be curtailed by imposing more onerous conditions, such as the enhancement of court fees. A differentiation based on the mode of assessment of court fees, whether it be based on the subject matter or parties, is not possible, so as to say that in one case the court fee has to be paid in the appeal as it existed on the date of filing of the original proceedings and in the other case as on the date of filing of the appeal. 27. In P.V. Devasia [ILR 1965 (1) Ker. 388] relied by the 5 th respondent the issue considered was the difference between the court fee to be paid in a civil appeal under Section 52 of the Court Fees Act, as well as that to be paid in the case of a writ petition or writ appeal. 27. In P.V. Devasia [ILR 1965 (1) Ker. 388] relied by the 5 th respondent the issue considered was the difference between the court fee to be paid in a civil appeal under Section 52 of the Court Fees Act, as well as that to be paid in the case of a writ petition or writ appeal. Similarly, the issues dealt in the remaining judgments such as Discharged Servicemen’s Association [2000 (1) KLT 281] , Narayana Shetty [ 2004 (3) KLT 596 ] , Pankajakshy [ILR 2004 (3) Ker. 306], M. Leonard Ashok [ 2007 (1) KHC 67 ] and Maradu Market Traders’ Association [ 2018 (3) KLT 212 ] deal with issues unconnected to the point under consideration herein. The interpretation of statutes by Maxwell pointed out by the learned counsel for the 5 th respondent also will not aid the contentions of the respondents, since there is nothing to be interpreted in this case, contrary to the wordings in the amended Court Fees Act. 28. At this juncture, it is worth to note that in Azeez v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. [ 2020 (2) KLT 523 ] the issue relating to payment of court fee, in view of the amended provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, which came into force with effect from 16.01.2015, was came up for consideration before this Court. In paragraphs 10 and 11 of that judgment this Court held thus: “10. In Sivadasan C. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Others [( 2011 (2) KHC 284 : ILR 2011 (2) Ker. 248 : 2011 (2) KLT SN 85 : 2011 (2) KLJ 694 ] a Division Bench of this Court held that appeal being a continuation of the suit, the Court Fee payable will have to be determined as on the date of filing of the suit. Unless the amendment brought to the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 is specifically stated to have retrospective effect, it can only have prospective effect. However, if the amendment reduce the Court Fee, the appellant is entitled to take the benefit of reduced Court Fee as per the amended provision. 11. Unless the amendment brought to the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 is specifically stated to have retrospective effect, it can only have prospective effect. However, if the amendment reduce the Court Fee, the appellant is entitled to take the benefit of reduced Court Fee as per the amended provision. 11. In view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Sivadasan's case (supra) the enhanced fees provided under the amended provisions of sub-rule (3) of R.397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, for an appeal filed under S.173 of the Act, cannot be levied in an appeal arising out of an award passed by the Claims Tribunal in a Claim Petition filed before 16.01.2015.” (underline supplied) The upshot of the above discussion is that the right of appeal is an indefeasible right accrues to a litigant on the date of filing of the original proceedings, if such appeal is statutorily provided, and that right cannot be curtailed by imposing a more onerous condition in the later stage, such as payment of enhanced court fee. Therefore we hold that the court fee to be paid in the case of a writ appeal is at the rate that existed as on the date of filing of the writ petition and not at the enhanced rate, as on the date of filing of the writ appeal.