JUDGMENT : A. Badharudeen, J. 1. This appeal is at the instance of the sole accused in C.C.No.05/2010 on the files of the Enquiry Commissioner and the Special Judge, Kottayam. The appellant herein is the accused in the said case. The State of Kerala, represented by the learned Public Prosecutor, for the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, is the respondent herein. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/accused and the learned Public Prosecutor.Perused the records of the Special Court. 3. The prosecution allegation is that, the accused committed offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the PC Act, 1988’ hereinafter). The prosecution case is that one Smt.Geetha Santhoshkumar, the sister of PW3, purchased property within the limits of Alappuzha Municipality and she had filed Ext.P6 application before the Municipal Office along with the relevant documents on 18.01.2008, seeking change of ownership and issuance of a Jama Certificate/Ownership Certificate in respect of the building situated in the said property. Thereafter, she left abroad and PW1 was instructed to enquire about the same. The prosecution case is that, when PW1 contacted the accused for obtaining the ownership certificate in terms of Ext.P6 application, the accused, on 04.04.2008, demanded Rs.2,000/- as bribe for discharging his official duty to issue the certificate. Thereafter, PW1 lodged Ext.P1 complaint before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, on the basis of which, FIR was registered and a trap was arranged. On the date of the trap, i.e., on 05.04.2008, the accused again demanded Rs.2,000/-, and accepted the same, soon he was caught red-handed along with the bribe money. On this premise, the prosecution alleges commission of the above offences by the accused. 4. The Special Court took cognizance of the matter. PW1 to PW9 were examined and Exts.P1 to P18 and MO1 series to MO8 were marked on the side of the prosecution. DW1 and DW2 were examined and Exts.D1 to D7 were marked on the side of the defence. 5. 4. The Special Court took cognizance of the matter. PW1 to PW9 were examined and Exts.P1 to P18 and MO1 series to MO8 were marked on the side of the prosecution. DW1 and DW2 were examined and Exts.D1 to D7 were marked on the side of the defence. 5. Thereafter, the learned Special Judge, on appreciation of the evidence, found that the accused committed offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988 and sentenced the accused as under: “In the result, the accused is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only), in default to undergo additional simple imprisonment for a period of three months u/S.7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 . He is also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only), in default to undergo additional simple imprisonment for a period of six months u/S.13(1)(d) r/w.S.13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 . The substantive sentences will run concurrently.” 6. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused zealously argued that the prosecution evidence is insufficient to fasten criminal culpability on the accused finding that he had committed offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988. According to him, though it is an admitted fact from the evidence of PW1 as well as PW9, the Trap Laying Officer, that a digital voice recorder was entrusted to PW1 to record the proceedings on the date of the trap, the same was not produced before the Court, and during cross-examination, both PW1 and PW9 deposed that PW1 failed to switch on the same at the relevant time of trap. According to the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, PW1 is a stranger and he had no necessity to approach the accused for the purpose of obtaining the ownership certificate in the name of Smt.Geetha Santhoshkumar, who is the sister of PW3. It is also pointed out that as per Ext.D6, it could be seen that as on 05.04.2008, i.e., on the date of trap, the accused recommended for issuance of possession certificate, though it was ultimately issued on 18.07.2008, much after the trap. It is also pointed out that as per Ext.D6, it could be seen that as on 05.04.2008, i.e., on the date of trap, the accused recommended for issuance of possession certificate, though it was ultimately issued on 18.07.2008, much after the trap. He would also submit that the demand for bribe was raised by PW1 only on 04.04.2008, even though Ext.P6 application had reached the hands of the accused on 22.01.2008, and he retained the same till 05.04.2008. According to the learned counsel, the fact that there was no demand prior to 04.04.2008, is a reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW1 with respect to the alleged demand and acceptance. It is further submitted that, in the statement filed under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, ‘the Cr.P.C.’ hereinafter), the accused had narrated the events, which led to the trap, stating that it was at the intervention of Smt.Valsala Ramachandran, the Ward Councilor, who had insisted on speedy action on Ext.P6 application. It is pointed out that, as per the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., he had categorically stated that he did not receive any amount from PW1, as contended by the prosecution, and the specific case of the accused is that when he was in the room of the Vice Chairman on the date of the trap, PW1 entered his room and placed Rs.2,000/-, smeared with phenolphthalein powder, in the drawer of his table, in his absence in the office room. At the same time, when this Court specifically asked, the learned counsel fairly conceded that no explanation was given by the accused regarding the recovery of the bribe money from the purse that was found in his pocket. The sum and substance of the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, as regards the twin ingredients of demand and acceptance is that the prosecution has failed to adduce cogent and convincing evidence to prove the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused beyond reasonable doubts, and therefore, the conviction and sentence are liable to be set aside. 7. 7. Repelling the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, the learned Public Prosecutor would submit that the categorical evidence of PW1, showing the demand of bribe money on 04.04.2008 and again on 05.04.2008, along with the consequential acceptance and recovery of the same, marked as MO1 series, clearly established the twin ingredients of demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that, even though a digital voice recorder was entrusted to PW1, the specific case of the prosecution is that the said recorder was failed to be switched on by PW1 during the trap and therefore, nothing was recorded therein. Therefore, the same was not produced. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the same by itself is not a reason to disbelieve the prosecution case otherwise proved beyond reasonable doubts. 8. Having considered the rival submissions, the points arise for consideration are: (i) Whether the Special Court was right in holding that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988? (ii) Whether the Special Court was right in holding that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 13 (1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988? (iii) Whether the verdict would require interference? (iv) The order to be passed? 9. Point Nos.(i) to (iv) The prosecution relied on the evidence of PW1 to prove the demand and acceptance of the MO1 series notes by the accused on 05.04.2008. Apart from the evidence of PW1, the prosecution also relied on the evidence of PW2 and PW9 to prove the pre and post-trap proceedings to prove the prosecution case. According to PW1, he had acquaintance with the accused. He met the accused for the purpose of obtaining the ownership certificate in the name of Smt.Geetha Santhoshkumar, the sister of PW3 who is his friend, as Smt.Geetha Santhoshkumar had submitted an application on 18.01.2008 to obtain ownership certificate in respect of the building she purchased. According to him, he met the accused two or three times, and the accused agreed to issue the certificate. On 04.04.2008, when he met the accused, the accused demanded Rs.2,000/- for issuing the certificate and directed PW1 to meet him along with the money on the next day, i.e., 05.04.2008. According to PW1, he met the Dy.S.P. and lodged Ext.P1 complaint, narrating the occurrence and demand of bribe by the accused. On 04.04.2008, when he met the accused, the accused demanded Rs.2,000/- for issuing the certificate and directed PW1 to meet him along with the money on the next day, i.e., 05.04.2008. According to PW1, he met the Dy.S.P. and lodged Ext.P1 complaint, narrating the occurrence and demand of bribe by the accused. He deposed about the presence of two Gazetted Officers on the date of the trap and also about the phenolphthalein test carried out on the notes. His further evidence was that, when the Vigilance party along with him reached the office of the accused, he found that there were other visitors present to meet the accused. He then waited outside and entered the room of the accused only after the visitors had left. Thereafter, the accused brought the file and wrote something in it. He then called PW1 inside and asked whether the money had been brought. When PW1 replied that he had brought the money, the accused demanded that he hand it over. At that time, a staff member met the accused, and he hurriedly moved towards the upper floor. Later, the accused came back to the office and called him. When he asked whether the certificate would be issued at the earliest, the accused demanded money, and accordingly, PW1 entrusted Rs.2,000/- to him. The accused counted the notes and after ensuring its accuracy, he put the notes into his purse. Thereafter, the Dy.S.P., two Gazetted Officers who were waiting outside, entered the office. During cross- examination, it was suggested that the digital voice recorder was placed with PW1, and PW1 admitted the same, while adding that he failed to switch on the same. Though he was subjected to cross-examination, in fact, nothing was extracted to disbelieve him as regards to demand and acceptance of the bribe. 10. PW2 examined in this case is the decoy witness, who accompanied the trap team. He deposed about his appearance before the Dy.S.P. and preparation of Ext.P3 proceedings and presence of another Gazetted Officer. According to him, four currency notes of Rs.500 each were produced by PW1 before the Dy.S.P., which were smeared with phenolphthalein powder and placed in the pocket of PW1. When the hands of the police officer, who handled the phenolphthalein powder were dipped in sodium carbonate solution, the solution turned pink colour. According to him, four currency notes of Rs.500 each were produced by PW1 before the Dy.S.P., which were smeared with phenolphthalein powder and placed in the pocket of PW1. When the hands of the police officer, who handled the phenolphthalein powder were dipped in sodium carbonate solution, the solution turned pink colour. He also deposed that Ext.P4 pre-trap mahazar was prepared regarding these aspects, and thereafter, they moved towards the office of the accused at 12.15 p.m. and he along with the Vigilance party reached the office of the accused. It is further deposed that at about 01.15 p.m., he had given the signal intimating demand and acceptance of bribe money by the accused. He also deposed about introduction of the Dy.S.P. who displayed his identity. When the accused was asked about receipt of MO1 series notes, he stated that it was given by PW1, on compulsion. He deposed that the phenolphthalein test was conducted in the presence of the officers and the accused, and that a colour change was observed on the hands of the accused. He identified MO4 as the bottle showing the pink colour change when the right hand of the accused was dipped in the sodium carbonate solution. Similarly, when the left hand of the accused was also put in sodium carbonate solution and the same also showed pink colour change and the liquid collected thereof was MO5. He also deposed that, on searching the shirt’s pocket of the accused, a purse was found, which was identified as MO6, and the photo of the accused also was found therein. Thereafter, five five-rupee currency notes, in addition of another five-hundred-rupee currency note, one fifty-rupee note, and ten ten-rupee notes were recovered from the purse of the accused. Out of these, four five- hundred-rupee notes showed pink colour change, and the remaining notes were also identified as MO7 series. He also deposed about colour change to the four five-hundred rupee (MO1 series) notes, when the same were dipped into sodium carbonate solution and he identified MO8 as the solution got colour change on dipping MO1 decoy notes. 11. Apart from the evidence of PW1, PW2, the decoy witness and PW9, the Investigating Officer, also supported the prosecution case. He also deposed about colour change to the four five-hundred rupee (MO1 series) notes, when the same were dipped into sodium carbonate solution and he identified MO8 as the solution got colour change on dipping MO1 decoy notes. 11. Apart from the evidence of PW1, PW2, the decoy witness and PW9, the Investigating Officer, also supported the prosecution case. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused would submit that Ext.D6, would show the recommendation and issuance of the ownership certificate made by the accused as on 05.04.2008, and therefore, without receiving any bribe, the accused recommended the issuance of the certificate. In such circumstances, the demand of bribe by the accused, as stated by PW1, is not believable. In this connection, it is relevant to note that the evidence of PW1 is very specific to the fact that when he met the accused on the date of the trap, the accused brought the concerned file and wrote something therein, and later demanded and accepted the money. This would go to show that the accused recommended the issuance of the ownership certificate only after PW1 informed him that he had brought the money and was ready to hand it over, even though the application had been filed on 18.01.2008 and received by the accused on 22.01.2008. Therefore, the recommendation for issuance of ownership certificate by the accused was on the date of trap just before acceptance of the bribe after ensuring that PW1 brought the money that the accused demanded. Therefore, this argument, at the instance of the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, found to be a futile exercise. 12. In the 313 statement filed by the accused and during cross-examination of PW1, the case advanced by the accused was that in his absence, PW1 placed MO1 series notes on the drawer of his table without his consent. But, even a remote suggestion not made how the entire notes reached in the purse of the accused and in turn to his pocket. In fact, the evidence of PW1 supported by PW2 and PW9 would show that MO1 series notes were recovered from the purse placed in the pocket of the accused. But, even a remote suggestion not made how the entire notes reached in the purse of the accused and in turn to his pocket. In fact, the evidence of PW1 supported by PW2 and PW9 would show that MO1 series notes were recovered from the purse placed in the pocket of the accused. The evidence of PW2 and PW9 supported by the phenolphthalein test on MO1 series notes, both hands of the accused, the purse and his pocket showed pink colour change to corroborate the acceptance and recovery of MO1 from the purse of the accused found in his pocket. Thus, the story stated by the accused in his 313 statement, claiming absolute innocence, cannot be believed for a moment. 13. Now, it is necessary to address the ingredients required to attract the offences under Section 7 and Section 13 (1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988. The same are extracted as under:— Section 7 :- Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. – Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government Company referred to in clause (C) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 13 :- Criminal misconduct by a public servant. Section 13 :- Criminal misconduct by a public servant. – (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct - a) xxxxx (b) xxxxx (c) xxxxxx (d) If he,- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest. xxxxx (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than four years but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. 14. In this connection, it is relevant to refer a 5 Bench decision of the Apex Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State, AIR 2023 SC 330 where the Apex Court considered when the demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the P.C.Act to be said to be proved along with ingredients for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and in paragraph No.68, it has been held as under: "68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) and (ii) of the Act. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” 15. Thus, the legal position as regards to the essentials under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act, 1988, is extracted above. Regarding the mode of proof of demand of bribe, if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. The mode of proof of demand and acceptance is either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. Insofar as Section 7 of the PC Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. 16. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. 16. PW3 examined in this case is the friend of PW1 and he deposed about entrustment of enquiry by PW1 by him on the application filed by her sister Smt.Geetha Santhoshkumar. 17. Ext.P7 sanction to prosecute the accused was proved through PW4, the author thereof and no challenge raised as regards to its authenticity. 18. On re-appreciation of the evidence as discussed hereinabove, the same would suggest that when PW1 met the accused in connection with issuance of ownership certificate in the name of Smt.Geetha Santhoshkumar, the sister of his friend on 04.04.2008, the accused demanded Rs.2,000/- as bribe for the issuance of the same. Thereafter, on the day of trap, i.e. on 05.04.2008, he again demanded the said sum, marked as MO1 series notes and accepted the same. The notes were recovered from the purse kept in the pocket of the accused in consequence of the demand and acceptance. The evidence of PW1 as regards to demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused is fully convincing and the same is not attended with any elements of doubts. The other witnesses also supported the pre as well as post-trap proceedings. Even though DW1, the Public Information Officer of the Municipality, Alappuzha, was examined and Exts.D4 and D4(a) were marked, the same, in fact, have no relevance to the fact in issue. The examination of DW2 also did not serve any purpose, as the details sought in Ext.D5(a) were not available with the Under Secretary of the Vigilance Department, Government Secretariat, though Ext.D6, the copy of the Jama Certificate dated 18.07.2008 issued as per Ext.P6 application, was produced. Another challenge raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused is that PW1 is a stranger and therefore, he had no necessity to meet the accused and therefore, the entire prosecution case is a fallacy. Adverting to this challenge, when the prosecution case is evaluated, it is decipherable that Smt.Geetha Santhoshkumar is the applicant in Ext.P6 application for getting the ownership certificate. When she went abroad soon after the purchase of property, after putting Ext.P6 application, she had entrusted PW3, his brother, to follow Ext.P6, and when PW3 found the follow-up inconvenient, he authorized PW1 to follow up Ext.P6. When she went abroad soon after the purchase of property, after putting Ext.P6 application, she had entrusted PW3, his brother, to follow Ext.P6, and when PW3 found the follow-up inconvenient, he authorized PW1 to follow up Ext.P6. Thus, the question in the said circumstances is whether PW1 is a total stranger as regards Ext.P6, and if at all PW1 is a stranger who, on behalf of the applicant, met the accused, then the prosecution case is to be read as a fallacy followed with improbableness. In this connection, it is held that when PW1 or a third person on behalf of the applicant met the accused, who was to proceed with Ext.P6 application, and the accused entertained PW1 as the representative of Smt.Geetha Santhoshkumar, PW1 could not be held as a total stranger insofar as Ext.P6 application is concerned, and he, in fact, acted as a representative of Smt. Geetha Santhoshkumar. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant/accused that PW1 is a stranger, found to be untenable. As regards to non production of the digital voice recorder admittedly given to PW1 by PW9, the case of the prosecution is that the same was not produced, since nothing recorded therein because of failure on the part of PW1 to switch on the same when he met the accused on the date of trap. But, this aspect is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused as the sole reason to disbelieve the prosecution case. In this connection, it is observed that when the prosecution case is that the voice recorder failed to be switched on, its non-production by itself is not a reason to disbelieve the prosecution case, when ample substantive evidence has been adduced by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, as discussed. Therefore, this contention also must fail. 19. The above discussion would lead to the conclusion that the defence case put up by the accused, stating that the intervention of Smt.Valsala Ramachandran, the Ward Councilor, led to trap of the accused without any justification is not acceptable. The further contention that there was no demand prior to 04.04.2008 also stands rejected, as law does not provide that there must be multiple number of demands to prove the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988. 20. The further contention that there was no demand prior to 04.04.2008 also stands rejected, as law does not provide that there must be multiple number of demands to prove the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988. 20. In light of the above observations, the conviction imposed by the Special Court does not require any interference. 21. Coming to sentence, it is to be noticed that the Special Court imposed only the statutory minimum sentence, and therefore, further reduction in sentence is not at all possible. Therefore, the sentence also stands confirmed. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed by confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Court. Consequently, the order suspending sentence and granting bail to the appellant/accused stands cancelled and his bail bond also stands cancelled. The appellant/accused is directed to surrender before the Special Court to undergo the sentence, forthwith, failing which, the Special Court is directed to execute the sentence, without fail. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Special Court, for information and compliance.