JUDGMENT : A. Badharudeen, J. 1. This criminal appeal has been filed under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.' for short), by the sole accused in C.C.No.27/2005 on the files of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. 2. Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant/accused as well as the learned Special Public Prosecutor in detail. Perused the trial court records. 3. In this case, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w Section 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention and Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'PC Act, 1988' for short) by the accused. The specific allegation is that the accused, who was working as Assistant Public Prosecutor attached to Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Varkkala, and as such a public servant conducted prosecution in C.C.No.536/1999 of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Varkkala which was a case charged sheeted alleging commission of offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC' for short) by the accused therein, where the mother of the defacto complainant – PW1 was the injured. It is alleged that for proper conduct of the prosecution, the accused demanded an amount of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) as gratification other than legal remuneration from PW1, the defacto complainant, on 20.09.2002 at her office in Varkkala. The said amount was demanded as a motive or reward for performing an official act relating to the proper conduct of the prosecution. PW1 immediately complained the said matter to the Inspector General of Police, which was forwarded to the Superintendent of Police and subsequently to PW7, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti- Corruption Bureau, Thiruvananthapuram Unit. A trap was arranged by PW7 in the presence of PW2 and CW3, the two Tahsildars of the said Department. In pursuance of the said demand on 20.09.2002, accused again made demand and accepted an amount of Rs.500/- (Rupees five hundred only) at 10.30 am on 27.09.2002 at her office towards the part payment of the above amount demanded. Thus, by corrupt or illegal means, the accused, for herself, by abusing her position as public servant, obtained pecuniary advantage to the extent of Rs.500/- and thereby committed the above offences. 4. On getting the final report filed after investigation, the Special Court took cognizance of the offences and proceeded with the matter. Thus, by corrupt or illegal means, the accused, for herself, by abusing her position as public servant, obtained pecuniary advantage to the extent of Rs.500/- and thereby committed the above offences. 4. On getting the final report filed after investigation, the Special Court took cognizance of the offences and proceeded with the matter. During trial, PW1 to PW7 were examined, Exhibits P1 to P14 and MO1 to MO5 were marked on the side of the prosecution. On the side of the defence, DW1 was examined and Exts.D1 to D6 were marked. 5. On evaluation of the evidence after hearing both sides, the learned Special Judge found that the accused committed offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988 and accordingly, she was convicted and sentenced as under: “For the conviction entered against the accused for the offence under S.7 of the PC Act, 1988, she is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and in addition, she shall pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand only) and in default of payment of fine, she shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of four months and for conviction entered against the accused for the offence under S.13(2)r/w 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988, she is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and fine of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees Three thousand only) with a default clause of rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months. The substantive sentence shall run concurrently. The accused shall be given set off for the period from 27.09.2002 to 04.10.2002 as provided by S.428 of Crl.P.C. The bail bond executed by the accused is cancelled.” 6. The learned senior counsel for the appellant/accused, who argued the matter in open court, raised threefold contentions to unsustain the verdict of the learned Special Judge. The first point raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant/accused is that, in this case, Ext.P7 sanction order to prosecute the accused/appellant was issued by the Principal Secretary, the competent officer. However, she was not examined, instead, PW3, the Joint Secretary of the Transport Department, was examined to prove Ext.P7 sanction. The first point raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant/accused is that, in this case, Ext.P7 sanction order to prosecute the accused/appellant was issued by the Principal Secretary, the competent officer. However, she was not examined, instead, PW3, the Joint Secretary of the Transport Department, was examined to prove Ext.P7 sanction. According to the learned senior counsel for the accused/appellant, in this matter, Ext.P7 sanction was not properly proved, though it is fairly conceded by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that examination of the author of the sanction is not mandatory. It is submitted that examination of the author of sanction becomes mandatory when the sanction order would not speak of application of mind by the author thereof. Therefore, the said aspect shall be adjudged in favour of the accused. Secondly, it is argued that even though PW1 deposed about the demand and acceptance of bribe, in Ext.P1 complaint, his case is that, the Assistant Public Prosecutor demanded bribe for arguing the case on 20.09.2002. On that date, even 313 Cr.P.C. questioning of the accused was not complete. It is pointed out further that, insofar as the evidence of PW1 as to the demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused are concerned, no independent witnesses supported the evidence. According to him, PW2, the decoy witness, examined by the prosecution, is not believable since his evidence was that there was no curtain in the office of the accused and he could very well see what was happening inside the office. In this connection, the learned senior counsel for the appellant/accused brought attention of this Court to the evidence of PW4 who was examined by the prosecution to prove Ext.P6 attendance register, which would show that, as on the date of trap, the accused was present in the office. According to the learned senior counsel for the appellant/accused, during cross- examination, PW4 deposed that there were curtains on the two windows. Thus, the evidence of PW2 is contradictory to the evidence of PW4 as far as the availability of curtains. Similarly, whether PW1 involved in political cases also is of no serious significance. The evidence of PW4 in this regard could not be believed without declaring PW4 as hostile on this point. Thus, the evidence of PW2 is contradictory to the evidence of PW4 as far as the availability of curtains. Similarly, whether PW1 involved in political cases also is of no serious significance. The evidence of PW4 in this regard could not be believed without declaring PW4 as hostile on this point. He also argued that, on the above grounds, the prosecution case is in the midst of doubts and the same will be adjudged in favour of the appellant/accused. 7. Later, a short notes of argument also submitted by the learned senior counsel for the accused/appellant, reiterating the contentions and also specifically raising a contention that, initially a complaint was lodged by the complainant on 23.09.2002 as Ext.P1 and thereafter, an oral statement as Ext.P2 also was recorded by PW7 on 25.09.2002. But on reading Ext.P1 and Ext.P2, demand and payment divulged are conflicting. Another aspect pointed out is that, since PW1 engaged a private lawyer to assist the Assistant Public Prosecutor, as could be seen from Ext.D1 Vakalatnama, signed by PW1's mother, engaging Adv.Priyadarshini as her counsel as prosecution aid, there is no necessity for PW1 or the mother of PW1 to meet the accused with demand to conduct the case properly. Another contention is that, Exts.D2 to D4 documents viz., charge sheet in crime No.596/2002, FIR and Final Report in crime No.588/2002 respectively, wherein PW1 was the first informant. According to PW1, those cases are political cases and at the same time, PW1 deposed that he had no politics. Extracting certain portions of the version given by PW1 in the above line, it is submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that, the evidence of PW1 is not reliable to act upon. That apart, an illegality, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, on the part of PW7 in not registering the FIR based on Ext.P1 also is pointed out with reference to the decision of the Apex Court in Vinod Kumar Pandey Vs. Sees Ram Saini, 2025 KHC Online 6782 : 2025 SCC Online SC 1951 : AIR 2025 SC 4186. “Since it is the duty of the police to register an FIR if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out, the Police is not required to go into the genuineness and credibility of the said information. Sees Ram Saini, 2025 KHC Online 6782 : 2025 SCC Online SC 1951 : AIR 2025 SC 4186. “Since it is the duty of the police to register an FIR if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out, the Police is not required to go into the genuineness and credibility of the said information. It has been so laid down very clearly in Ramesh Kumari (supra) that the genuineness or credibility of the information is not the condition precedent for registration of an FIR” 8. The learned Special Public Prosecutor zealously repelled all the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant. As regards the non- examination of the author of Ext.P7, it is submitted by the learned Special Public Prosecutor that non-examination of the author is of least consequences when the sanction order itself will speak application of mind. It is also pointed out that during cross-examination of PW2, nothing asked so as to challenge his evidence with respect to Ext.P7. In this regard, the learned Special Public Prosecutor placed decision of this Court in Nujum P.A. v. State of Kerala, 2025 KHC 1031, with reference to paragraph No.6, which reads as under: “6. Repelling this contention the learned Special Public Prosecutor would submit that examination of the author of the person who issued sanction is not at all necessary and in order to buttress this contention she placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Jiyalal, (2009) 15 SCC 72 wherein paragraph 8 the Apex Court held as under:- "8. It was also not justified for the learned Single Judge to hold that the District Magistrate who had passed the sanction order should have been subsequently examined as a witness by the prosecution in order to prove the same. The sanction order was clearly passed in discharge of routine official functions and hence there is a presumption that the same was done in a bona fide manner. It was of course open to the respondent to question the genuineness or validity of the sanction order before the learned Special Judge but there was no requirement for the District Magistrate to be examined as a witness by the prosecution.” 9. It was of course open to the respondent to question the genuineness or validity of the sanction order before the learned Special Judge but there was no requirement for the District Magistrate to be examined as a witness by the prosecution.” 9. It is also pointed out by the learned Special Public Prosecutor that the evidence of PW1 alone is sufficient to prove the demand and acceptance of bribe as alleged by the prosecution and therefore, merely because the decoy witnesses, PW2 and CW3, did not speak about the demand, that by itself is not a reason to disbelieve the demand and acceptance of bribe proved by the evidence of PW1. The evidence of PW4 as regards to availability of curtains on the windows in the the office of the accused is concerned, the learned Special Public Prosecutor would submit that during re- examination, PW4 given evidence that he did not remember as to whether curtains were available on the date of trap. Therefore, the evidence of PW4 could not be treated as gospel of truth as regards to the availability of curtains as he was uncertain on this point. On these grounds, the learned Special Public Prosecutor argued that the verdict of the Special Court is only to be sustained. 10. On appraisal of the rival contentions, the following questions arise for consideration: 1 Whether the Special Court went wrong in finding that the appellant/accused committed offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988? 2. Whether the Special Court went wrong in finding that the appellant/accused committed offence punishable under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988? 3. Whether the verdict under challenge would require interference? 4. The order to be passed. 11 . Point Nos.1 to 4 In this case, as pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the appellant/accused, Ext.P7 sanction order was issued by the Principal Secretary, Transport Department, and he was not examined, instead, PW3 who was working as Joint Secretary in Transport Department was examined to prove Ext.P7 sanction. During cross-examination, no challenge was raised in the matter of proving Ext.P7 through PW3. During cross-examination, the suggestion made was that PW3 had given statement to the police based on the file from which Ext.P7 was originated and it was also suggested that the Principal Secretary had issued sanction after satisfying the materials and circumstances. During cross-examination, no challenge was raised in the matter of proving Ext.P7 through PW3. During cross-examination, the suggestion made was that PW3 had given statement to the police based on the file from which Ext.P7 was originated and it was also suggested that the Principal Secretary had issued sanction after satisfying the materials and circumstances. Thus on reading the evidence of PW3 extracted during cross-examination on par with Ext.P7, the same would suggest that it was issued by its author after thorough verification of the prosecution records, that too, after applying the mind of the author. When the sanction order speaks of verification of the prosecution records and application of mind by the sanctioning authority while granting sanction, examination of the author thereof is not mandatory and the same would not vitiate the sanction as held in paragraph No.6 of Nujum P.A.’s case (supra), relying on the decision of the Apex Court referred therein. Therefore, this contention would necessarily fail. 12. In this case, the learned Special Public Prosecutor argued that, the twin ingredients required to prove the demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused are satisfied by the evidence of PW1. Therefore, it has become necessary to read the evidence of PW1. 13. PW1, the defacto complainant, deposed that his mother was attacked by one Sushama and she suffered fractare, for which C.C.No.536/99 was pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Varkkala. According to him, after examination of some witnesses, the accused took charge as the Assistant Public Prosecutor and it was the accused who was prosecuting the case from that date onwards. He further deposed that for examination of the remaining witnesses, his mother had to pay Rs.100/- per posting to the accused. PW1 testified that after examination of the witnesses, his mother was told by the accused that the matter had to be argued and the accused demanded Rs.5,000/- as bribe money. The said demand, according to PW1, was made on 20.9.2002. Since it was a huge amount, it was difficult to pay the said sum. Thereafter, PW1 attempted to meet the Vigilance Inspector General and since the said officer was on leave on 21.9.2002 and 22.9.2002, he met the officer on 23.9.2002. The Inspector General of Police (Vigilance) forwarded the complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance. Since it was a huge amount, it was difficult to pay the said sum. Thereafter, PW1 attempted to meet the Vigilance Inspector General and since the said officer was on leave on 21.9.2002 and 22.9.2002, he met the officer on 23.9.2002. The Inspector General of Police (Vigilance) forwarded the complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance. He met the S.P. and he was directed to approach the Dy.S.P by the S.P. Accordingly, he approached the Dy.S.P. who is PW7 in this case. PW1 deposed further that he reached the office of PW7 at about 7 a.m on 25.9.2002 and PW7 recorded his statement as Ext.P2 and registered Ext.P2(a) FIR. 14. PW1 stated that he entered the said room, where the accused was sitting on the eastern side behind a table, studying the case records. He stated that the accused was alone inside the said room. He talked with the accused regarding the case details. The accused asked whether he had brought the money. He informed the accused that he could only bring some money. The accused directed him to hand over the money. Immediately, PW1 added that he took MO1 series, five notes of Rs.100/-, from his pocket and handed over to the accused which were accepted by the accused using her right hand. He further stated that the accused kept the money inside the drawer after opening it. 15. PW7 also supported the statement of PW1 and deposed that the complaint filed by PW1 before the Inspector General of Police was forwarded to him for necessary action. The said complaint was identified by both witnesses as Ex.P1. PW7 stated that since false complaints and false allegations were common against Government Officials, he informed PW1 that he would conduct a secret enquiry and directed PW1 to approach him after one day, i.e., at 7 am on 25.9.2002. PW7 further stated that he conducted a secret enquiry and he was convinced about the truthfulness of the allegations. According to him, he sent a request to the Deputy Collector to get the assistance of two independent official witnesses. Accordingly, the assistance of PW2 and CW3, two Tahsildars in the Revenue Department were ensured. 16. PW2 deposed that he himself and CW3 reached the office of PW7 and by then PW1 was present there. According to him, he sent a request to the Deputy Collector to get the assistance of two independent official witnesses. Accordingly, the assistance of PW2 and CW3, two Tahsildars in the Revenue Department were ensured. 16. PW2 deposed that he himself and CW3 reached the office of PW7 and by then PW1 was present there. PW1, PW2 and PW7 stated that PW1 produced an amount of Rs.500/-, i.e., five 100 rupee notes before the Dy.S.P. The said notes were identified by these witnesses as MO1 series. PW7 demonstrated the action of phenolphthalein powder in lime water by taking a 10/- rupee note by a constable and smearing the same with phenolphthalein powder and handing over the same to another police constable. The hands of the police constable who received the 10 rupee note was dipped in lime water and the hands of the constable and the lime water showed pink colour change. Thereafter, the amount of Rs.500/-, that is, MO1 series, was also smeared with phenolphthalein powder through a constable and the constable placed the said notes inside the pocket of PW1 with direction not to handle the same before to be handed over to the accused. PW7 further directed PW1 to hand over the same to the accused as and demanded by her. A mahazar was prepared showing these details as well as showing the number of currency notes MO1 series which got marked as Ext.P3. PW2 identified his signature in Ext.P3 and also identified the signature of CW3, the other decoy witness. The lime water used for demonstration was taken in a bottle, sealed and marked as MO2 which was identified by PW1, PW2 and PW7. PW7 instructed PW1 that as and when the money would be accepted by the accused he should give signal to PW7 by holding his colour close to the neck. Thereafter, the trap team started at about 9.30 a.m and reached the office of the accused at about 10.30 a.m, that was a Wednesday and the accused was not present in her office and they waited there till 12 p.m. All of them deposed further that by that time, they were told that the accused will be absent on that day, that being a non A.P.P. day. PW7 deposed that he made other persons wait near the office of the accused and he went in search of the residential address of the accused and he also has to conduct enquiry in some other cases. By about 10 a.m, they reached the office of PW7. MO1 series notes were taken from the pocket of PW1 with the assistance of Head Constable and kept in safe custody at the police station. PW7 stated that the said fact was noted in the G.D. 26.9.2002 being a Harthal day, they postponed the trap to 27.9.2002. PW7 directed PW1, PW2 and CW3 to CW5 to keep the matter as secret and also directed them to come to the office of PW7 on 27.9.2002 early morning. PW1 and PW2, CW3 and other persons reached the office of PW7 at about 9 am on 27.9.2002. PW1, PW2 and PW7 stated that MO1 series currency notes were taken from the safe custody with the assistance of Head constable and again it was smeared with phenolphthalein powder and kept inside the pocket of PW1 by the said constable. Thereafter, the trap team, headed by PW7 including PW1, PW2 and CW3, reached the office of the APP at Varkkala at about 10.15 am PW7 deposed that the office was facing west and there was window on the western and southern sides of the office of the APP. The accused was sitting facing west wards on the eastern side of the said room. PW7 directed PW2 and CW3 to wait near the windows on the western and southern sides and to watch the incident that would occur inside the room of the accused. He instructed PW1 and CW3 and CW4 the woman police constable to wait near the front half door of the room of the accused. PW1 was directed to enter the said room and, on demand, hand over the money to the accused. It was further directed to give signal to PW7 who would await on the southern side of the compound, after the money was accepted by the accused. 17. PW2 deposed that he had waited at the southern window of the room of the accused pretending that he was reading news paper, so that he could see the events inside the room of the accused. 18. PW2 deposed that he had also watched the entire episode. 17. PW2 deposed that he had waited at the southern window of the room of the accused pretending that he was reading news paper, so that he could see the events inside the room of the accused. 18. PW2 deposed that he had also watched the entire episode. According to PW2, though he could not hear the conversation between the accused and PW1, he had witnessed PW1 handing over MO1 series notes to the accused and the accused accepting the same using her right hand and keeping the same inside the drawer of her table. PW2 deposed further that he could not say whether the drawer was lying opened or whether the drawer was opened by the accused and kept inside it. Since the said portion was not visible to him while standing by the side of the window. Immediately PW1 went outside the room and gave signal to PW7. PW7, two WPCs, CW4 and CW5 and PW2 and CW3 immediately entered the said room. PW7 disclosed the identity of himself as that of other witnesses. 19. PW2 and PW7 stated that accused started crying. According to PW3 and PW7 on questioning by PW7, accused admitted the acceptance of bribe money. Immediately PW7 stated that he started the procedural matters and also started preparing Ext.P5 running mahazar. His further version is that when the hands of himself and the official witnesses were dipped in lime water, there was no colour change and the same was brought to the notice of the accused. The said lime water was taken in a bottle, sealed the same, and it was identified by PW2 and PW7, as MO3. Again, lime water was taken in another glass with the assistance of CW4, the WPC, and the right hand of the accused was dipped in lime water, then the same showed pink colour change. According to PW2 and PW7, when the right hand index finger, middle finger and thump of the accused were dipped in lime water, the liquid showed pink colour change. The said lime water was taken in a bottle, sealed and labelled as 'C' and it was identified by these witnesses as MO4. This MO4 along with other material objects were produced by the Investigating Officer before Court. The said lime water was taken in a bottle, sealed and labelled as 'C' and it was identified by these witnesses as MO4. This MO4 along with other material objects were produced by the Investigating Officer before Court. As per Ext.P13, the 151-A form, the same was seen received by the Court and in the note prepared it was seen noted by the Section Clerk that the bottle 'C' contains liquid of slight pink in colour. The then predecessor in office also verified same and noted that the bottle 'C' contains liquid of very slight pink in colour. PW2 and PW7 stated that the left hand of the accused was dipped in same lime water. But no colour change was noted. PW2 and PW7 stated that when PW7 asked the accused about the bribe money and Ext.F5(a) statement to the effect that money was kept inside the drawer of the table was given by the accused. Accordingly, the MO1 series notes were taken from the drawer of the table by the accused and handed over to PW7. It was verified with Ext.P3 mahazar and the numbers of the notes noted therein tallied. Those notes were then dipped in lime water and the lime water turned pink in colour. The same was taken in a bottle, sealed and labelled with letter 'D' and this was MO5. The labels M.O2 to MO5 were seen signed by the witnesses. 20. PW7 given evidence further that he arrested the accused at 12.20 p.m and seized Ext.P6 attendance register. Ext.P5 mahazar was completed and the same was signed by PW2 and CW3. PW2 identified the signature of himself and CW3 in Ext.P5 mahazar. Ext.P11 is the arrest inspection memo prepared by PW7. As per Ext.P12 remand application, the accused was produced before predecessor. The case records in crime No.176/99 under Section 326 IPC was taken as per Ext.P8 inventory. Ext.P9 is the said case records. The certified copies of the statement of witnesses and other records in CC.536/99 was taken from JFCM, Varkkala and Ext.P4 is the file containing the same. 21. PW4 was the Peon attached to the office of the accused on the date of alleged occurrence. He deposed that the accused was arrested on the said date and he was present in the office on the aforesaid day. The same would reveal from Ext.P6(a) attendance register. 21. PW4 was the Peon attached to the office of the accused on the date of alleged occurrence. He deposed that the accused was arrested on the said date and he was present in the office on the aforesaid day. The same would reveal from Ext.P6(a) attendance register. He stated that on 30.9.2002, he had produced Ext.P9 file before PW7 and he was a witness in Ext.P8 inventory. According to PW4, the posting details of CC.536/99 was mentioned in Ext.P9 and the said case was posted on 20.9.2009, 25.9.2002 and 27.9.2002. Ext.P6(a) attendance would go to show the presence of the accused and himself at the office on 27.9.2002. During cross- examination, he stated that there was one table, three chairs, one bench, one wooden almirah and rack inside the room of the accused. He deposed that the accused was sitting facing westwards and there are two windows to the said room, one on the western side and the other on the southern side. According to him, there were curtains on those windows. But during re-examination, he stated that he could not say whether there were curtains on that particular day. But according to PW2 and 7, there were no curtains on the said windows on 27.9.2002. PW5 was a Village Officer of Varkkala who prepared Ext.P10 scene plan on the basis of Ext.P5 mahazar. In Ext.P10 scene plan, he had shown the location of the office room of the accused. He had shown that there were two windows to the said room, one on southern side and other on the western side and the entrance of the said room was on the northern side. He stated during cross-examination also that there were windows on the western and southern sides of the room of the accused. The room was having a width of 3 meter and length of 3.6 meter. PW7 questioned the witnesses and completed the investigation. 22. PW6 examined in thsi case is the Investigating Officer, who laid charge after getting sanction and recording statements of teh witnesses and he support his part of investigation. 23. Here, Ext.P1 complaint filed by PW1 before the Inspector General of Police was forwarded to the Superintendent of Police which in turn was sent to PW7 the Dy.S.P. of VACB, Thiruvananthapuram Unit. It is true that without registering the FIR, immediately PW7 conducted some enquiry. 23. Here, Ext.P1 complaint filed by PW1 before the Inspector General of Police was forwarded to the Superintendent of Police which in turn was sent to PW7 the Dy.S.P. of VACB, Thiruvananthapuram Unit. It is true that without registering the FIR, immediately PW7 conducted some enquiry. PW7 deposed that Ext.P1 complaint was forwarded to him in his name cover by the Superintendent of Police and immediately, PW1 appeared before him. On going through the complaint, according to him, he felt that since there were false allegations against prudent officers, he should conduct a quick preliminary enquiry before registering the FIR. It is pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the accused that the above said conduct of the Investigating Officer is not a correct procedure to be adopted. To substantiate his contention, he relied on the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala, AIR 2001 SC 2637 . In that case, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that there can be no second FIR in respect of same cognizable offence, same incident or occurrence. In this case, it is true that after receiving Ext.P1, PW7 proceeded to conduct some preliminary enquiry before registering the FIR. In Biju Purushothaman Vs. State of Kerala and others, 2008 (3) KHC 24 i t was held by the Hon'ble High Court thus: "A public servant is bound to displease one party or the other. If disgruntled elements who were not able to curry favours from the public servant were to prosecute him on false and vaxatious allegations, no public servant can perform his duties with peace of mind. That explains the desirability, if not necessity, for a preliminary enquiry so that frivolous complaints could be eliminated and the public servant protected from unnecessary harrassment. If after such preliminary enquiry it is established that the complaint was ill motivated, then the police are absolved from registering a crime and commencing a futile investigation." 24. As regards to the availability of curtains spoken by PW4, in fact, during cross-examination of PW4, he was, in fact, uncertain about the presence of curtains. Therefore, the absence of curtains as deposed by PW2 and PW7 need not be disbelieved merely relying on the evidence of PW4, who is inconsistent about the availability or non- availability of the curtain. As regards to the availability of curtains spoken by PW4, in fact, during cross-examination of PW4, he was, in fact, uncertain about the presence of curtains. Therefore, the absence of curtains as deposed by PW2 and PW7 need not be disbelieved merely relying on the evidence of PW4, who is inconsistent about the availability or non- availability of the curtain. Whether the accused, as a matter of fact, involved in Exts.D1 to D3 cases also is of no serious consequences even though the same has been pointed out by the learned senior counsel. As regards the contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the accused in the argument note that, there are divergent versions in Ext.P1 and Ext.P2, this Court could not be consider this argument since no such contradictions extracted during examination of PW1 by the mode provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the contention in this regard at the instance of the learned senior counsel for the accused/appellant found to be unsustainable in the eye of law. In this connection, it could be gathered that if at all there was failure on the part of PW7 to register an FIR based on Ext.P1, he had satisfactorily explained that in order to avoid false implication of persons in trap cases, he reasonably made a preliminary enquiry and on satisfying that the allegation in Ext.P1 were correct, he recorded Ext.P2 statement and thereafter, the FIR was registered. This procedure could not be held as illegal as preliminary enquiry on the factum of allegation in trap cases has been following as a convention to avoid false registration of FIR against public servants without looking into the truthfulness of the allegations, though such a preliminary enquiry is not mandatory, purely directory in nature. Therefore, this contention also would fail. It is true that, in Vinod Kumar Pandey ’s case (supra), it has been held by the Apex Court that once a prima facie case of cognizable offences is made out, the police officer is not required to go into the genuineness and credibility of the said information and genuineness or credibility of the information is not a condition precedent for registering an FIR. In this connection, it is relevant to refer the landmark judgment of the Apex Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2014) 2 SCC 1 , wherein the Apex Court classified six categories of cases where preliminary enquiry to be made and item No.4 referred in the judgment is 'corruption cases'. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that the learned senior counsel for the appellant conveniently ignored this judgment, which would permit preliminary enquiry in corruption cases. Similarly, the learned senior counsel for the accused also cleverly ignored the ratio in Mir Mustafa Alil Hasmi v. State of A.P. , 2024 KHC 6354, regularly cited by the learned senior counsel in many other cases argued by him, highlighting the necessity of verification of factum of demand by the public servant as convention before registration of FIR in trap cases. Thus it is held that there is no illegality committed by PW7 in conducting a pre-verification acting on Ext.P1. Further, recording of Ext.P2 statement by PW7 also could not be held as registering a second FIR. 25. It is true that, a private counsel was engaged by PW1's mother and the same also is legally permissible. However, merely because a prosecution aid was appointed by an injured or an aggrieved person, the prosecution aid could not directly participate in the trial and the role of the prosecution aid is to suggest something to the Public Prosecutor which can be either considered or refused by the Prosecutor and ultimately, the entire prosecution is at the helm of the Public Prosecutor. Therefore, the argument advanced by the learned senior counsel for the accused, that when PW1's mother appointed a lawyer of her choice as prosecution aid, either PW1 or his mother did not have any necessity to meet the accused found to be untenable. In such situations also, in order to effectuate meaningful prosecution, the aggrieved person would have the necessity to meet the Public Prosecutor. On the contrary, appointment of a Prosecution aid by PW1 and his mother by spending money from their pockets would show that the Public Prosecutor would not conduct the prosecution case properly and a check measure by providing a prosecution aid was absolutely necessary to address the grievance of PW1's mother. Therefore, this challenge also could not be countenanced. 26. On the contrary, appointment of a Prosecution aid by PW1 and his mother by spending money from their pockets would show that the Public Prosecutor would not conduct the prosecution case properly and a check measure by providing a prosecution aid was absolutely necessary to address the grievance of PW1's mother. Therefore, this challenge also could not be countenanced. 26. Now, it is necessary to address the ingredients required to attract the offences under Section 7 and Section 13 (1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988. The same are extracted as under: “ Section 7 :- Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. – Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government Company referred to in clause (C) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 13 :- Criminal misconduct by a public servant. – (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,- a) xxxxx (b) xxxxx (c) xxxxxx (d) If he,- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest. xxxxx (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than four years but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine”. 27. In this connection, it is relevant to refer a 5 Bench decision of the Apex Court in Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) , AIR 2023 SC 330 , where the Apex Court considered when the demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988 to be said to be proved along with ingredients for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and in paragraph 68 it has been held as under : "68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” 28. Thus the legal position as regards to the essentials under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the P.C Act, 1988 is extracted above. Regarding the mode of proof of demand of bribe, if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. The mode of proof of demand and acceptance is either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. 29. In this connection, it is relevant to refer the latest decision of this Court in Sunil Kumar K. Vs. State of Kerala, 2025 KHC 983 . In paragraph No.12 of the judgment, this Court observed the ingredients as under: “12. Indubitably in Neeraj Dutta’s case (supra) the Apex Court held in paragraph No.69 that there is no conflict in the three judge Bench decisions of this Court in B.Jayaraj and P.Satyanarayana Murthy with the three judge Bench decision in M. Narasinga Rao, with regard to the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for offences under Section 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, when the direct evidence of the complainant or “primary evidence” of the complainant is unavailable owing to his death or any other reason. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above would accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above would accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. In view of the aforesaid discussion there is no conflict between the judgments in the aforesaid three cases. Further in Paragraph No.70 the Apex Court held that in the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary,oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. In paragraph No.68 the Apex Court summarized the discussion. That apart, in State by Lokayuktha Police’s case (supra) placed by the learned counsel for the accused also the Apex Court considered the ingredients for the offences punishable under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act,1988 and held that demand and acceptance of bribe are necessary to constitute the said offences. Similarly as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Aman Bhatia’s case (supra) the Apex court reiterated the same principles. Thus the legal position as regards to the essentials to be established to fasten criminal culpability on an accused are demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. To put it otherwise, proof of demand is sine qua non for the offences to be established under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and dehors the proof of demand the offences under the two Sections could not be established. Therefore mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of bribe or as undue pecuniary advantage or illegal gratification or the recovery of the same would not be sufficient to prove the offences under the two Sections in the absence of evidence to prove the demand.” 30. Here is a case, wherein the specific allegation of the prosecution, as stated by PW1, is that, after registering FIR and preparing pre-trap mahazar, the Vigilance team reached the office of the accused. Then PW1 informed the accused that he could bring only some money and then the accused directed him to hand over the same. Thus on demand, PW1 handed over Rs.100/- kept at his pocket, marked as MO1 series and the accused accepted the same using her right hand. Then PW1 informed the accused that he could bring only some money and then the accused directed him to hand over the same. Thus on demand, PW1 handed over Rs.100/- kept at his pocket, marked as MO1 series and the accused accepted the same using her right hand. PW1 deposed further that thereafter, the accused kept the money inside the drawer after opening it. PW2, the decoy witness, supported the evidence that he had watched the proceedings inside the office of the accused, though he could not hear the conversation between the accused and PW1. He also given evidence that he had seen handing over the money to the accused by PW1 and the accused receiving the same using her right hand and keeping the same inside the drawer of the table. 31. It is true that PW1's case is that, the accused demanded bribe for arguing the matter. According to the learned senior counsel for the accused , the case was not ripe for arguing and the same did not even reach the stage of 313 Cr.P.C. questioning. It is true that as per Ext.D5, as on 25.09.2002, 313 Cr.P.C. Statement was recorded and the case posted for defence evidence to 27.09.2002. In fact, this posting was referred by PW1 as hearing date of the case. In this connection, it is observed that this aspect is of least consequence when stated by a party litigant, who is not aware of the implication of the legal terms, such as trial, argument or hearing, or any other different stages of trial. To put it more explicit, a person, who does not have much knowledge about the legal practice and procedure, would commonly say ‘hearing’ when a case is posted in a court on a particular day, without understanding the exact purpose of the posting. In such view of the matter, when PW1 stated that the accused demanded bribe for arguing the case, the inference is that she demanded bribe to conduct the case properly and PW1 had stated further that, on earlier occasions also, on demand, PW1's mother had paid small amounts. 32. Thus, the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant/ accused to unsustain the verdict of the special court found to be bereft of merits and are accordingly, repelled. 33. 32. Thus, the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant/ accused to unsustain the verdict of the special court found to be bereft of merits and are accordingly, repelled. 33. On evaluation of the evidence adduced, it is decipherable that the prosecution succeeded in proving the required ingredients for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988, viz., the demand and the acceptance, in a convincing manner and the arguments by highlighting certain anomalies which could not be found from the prosecution records by itself would not be sufficient to disbelieve the consistent and unassailed evidence given by PW1, PW2, PW7 and the other witnesses in support of the prosecution case. In such view of the matter, the special court is right in holding that the accused committed offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988 and the said conviction does not require any interference. Coming to the sentence, I am inclined to modify the sentence in consideration of the arguments tendered by the learned senior counsel for the appellant/accused. 34. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part.Conviction imposed by the special court for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 is confirmed. The sentence is interfered and modified as under: 1. The appellant/accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand only) for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988, and in default of payment of fine, the accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three weeks. 2. The appellant/accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees Three thousand only) for the offence punishable under Section 13 (2) r/w.13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988, and in default of fine, the accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month. 35. The substantive sentence shall run concurrently and the default sentence shall run separately. The accused shall be given set off for the period from 27.09.2002 to 04.10.2002 as provided by Section 428 of Cr.P.C 36. 35. The substantive sentence shall run concurrently and the default sentence shall run separately. The accused shall be given set off for the period from 27.09.2002 to 04.10.2002 as provided by Section 428 of Cr.P.C 36. The order suspending sentence and granting bail to the accused stands vacated, with direction to the accused to appear before the special court forthwith to undergo the modified sentence, failing which, the Special Court is directed to execute the sentence, without fail. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Special Court, forthwith for information and compliance.