JUDGMENT : Easwaran S., J. 1. These appeals raise intricate questions regarding the applicability of Articles 92 and 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . The facts presented before this Court requires this Court to address multifaceted questions regarding the entitlement of the respondent/plaintiff– Pandi Samooham to maintain a suit for recovery of possession against the appellants. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeals are as follows: 2.1. Six suits were presented before the Munsiff Court, Kodungallur, by the Pandi Samooham, which is a religious institution registered under the provisions of Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 . According to the plaint averments, the plaintiff – Pandi Samooham was formed for the benefit of Tamil Brahmans, who were residing in Kodungallur and also for conducting religious ceremonies for their community. The Cochin Devaswom Board is the Supervisory Authority of the Samooham. The plaint ‘A’ schedule property consisting of 53 cents was purchased for the benefit of the Samooham by Document No.1100 of 1087 M.E. and was in the possession of one Viswalingayyan. Later, one Thaiparambu Madathil Rama Subramania Iyyer was continuing as the Managing Trustee of the Samooham. Later, on the death of Rama Subramania Iyyer, his son, Hariharan, on his own took over the status of the Managing Trustee and continued therein. During his life time, Rama Subramania Iyyer had transferred certain portions of plaint ‘A’ schedule property by executing a sale deed and also created a lease in respect of the properties other than what was sold. It is thus contended that the aforesaid transfers were done in breach of trust and therefore, the same is void-ab-initio and not binding upon the plaintiff – Samooham. 2.2. Subsequent to the transfer, O.S.No.144/1995 was instituted by the said Hariharan, seeking for an injunction against the plaintiff - Samooham. The above suit was tried along with O.S.No.358/1995 and later the suits were dismissed by holding that Hariharan has no right, title and interest over the property. The decision was affirmed by the High Court as well as by the Supreme Court. Thus, the property held by the defendants in these cases were scheduled as B schedule and it was further contended that the defendants in these suits had no right, title and interest over the B schedule property and were thus liable to be evicted by an order of recovery of possession. Thus, the property held by the defendants in these cases were scheduled as B schedule and it was further contended that the defendants in these suits had no right, title and interest over the B schedule property and were thus liable to be evicted by an order of recovery of possession. The 1 st defendant in these suits are the assignees from late Rama Subramania Iyyer and they contended that, the property was transferred by Rama Subramania Iyyer as a true owner for a valuable consideration. To plead otherwise is against the law of estoppel. From 1972 onwards, it is contended that the assignees are in possession of the property. In one case, it was contended that the lease was executed in the year 1964 and that the present claim is clearly hit by law of limitation. The Cochin Devaswom Board also filed a separate written statement supporting the plea of the plaintiff - Samooham. 2.3. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Exts.A1 to A36 documents were marked and PW1 and PW2 were examined and on behalf of the defendants, Exts.B1 to B16 were marked and DW1 to DW4 were examined. Ext.C1 is the report of the Advocate Commissioner and Ext.C1(a) is the plan. The Trial Court, on the basis of issues framed in the suits, concluded that the plaintiff - Samooham is entitled to succeed and that the continuation of the defendants in the plaint schedule property is without any authority of law. Accordingly, decreed the suit by allowing the plaintiffs to recover possession of the plaint schedule property. Aggrieved, the defendants in O.S.Nos.251/2009, 252/2009, 246/2009, & 254/2009 preferred A.S.Nos.70/2014, 75/2014, 87/2014, 111/2015 and 73/2019. By common judgment dated 29.05.2020, A.S.Nos.70/2014, 75/2014, 87/2014 and 111/2015 were dismissed. As regards OS No 253 of 2009, it was initially decreed exparte. An application to set aside the ex parte decree was disallowed. Aggrieved, the defendant filed an appeal and the ex parte decree was set aside and the suit was restored. By Judgment dated 25.06.2019, the suit was partly decreed and an appeal was preferred as A.S.No73/2019 and by judgment dated 03.01.2022, the appeal was dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Aggrieved, the defendants are before this Court in these appeals. 3. By Judgment dated 25.06.2019, the suit was partly decreed and an appeal was preferred as A.S.No73/2019 and by judgment dated 03.01.2022, the appeal was dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Aggrieved, the defendants are before this Court in these appeals. 3. On 25.09.2020, this Court framed the following substantial question of law in RSA Nos.535/2020, 536/2020, 562/2020 and 563/2020: 1) Is the findings of the Lower Appellate Court that the transaction of Ramasubramania Iyyer is hit by Section 86 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act that the beneficiaries of those documents are not entitled to the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Properties Act is sustainable in law ? On 24.08.2022, this Court framed the following substantial questions of law in RSA No.386/2022: (a) Whether the office bearers of an institution which has been vested in Cochin Devaswom Board as per section 72 of the Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act have got power to sue and be sued on behalf of the institution? (b) Whether the Cochin Devaswom Board is entitled to grant permission to an institution vested in it to file litigation on behalf of the institution? (c) Whether a suit for recovery of possession filed by the plaintiff without stating the date of dispossession is to be treated as one filed without any cause of action, barred by limitation and not maintainable? 4. Heard, Adv.P.B.Krishnan - learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Adv.R.Sreehari, appearing for the appellants in R.S.A.Nos.535, 536, 562 & 563 of 2020 and Adv.K.S.Rajesh - learned counsel appearing for the appellants in RSA No.386 of 2022 and Adv.K.G.Balasubramanian – learned counsel appearing for the respondents. Submissions on behalf of the appellants. 5. Adv.P.B.Krishnan - learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in R.S.A.Nos.535, 536, 562 & 563 of 2020 raised the following submissions: a] The finding of the courts below that the suit is not barred by limitation is unsustainable for more reasons than one. It is an admitted fact that late Rama Subramania Iyyer was continuing as the Managing Trustee of the Pandi Samooham. It is equally indisputable that the documents by which the right, title and interest over the properties were assigned in favour of the respective appellants were supported by valuable consideration. It is an admitted fact that late Rama Subramania Iyyer was continuing as the Managing Trustee of the Pandi Samooham. It is equally indisputable that the documents by which the right, title and interest over the properties were assigned in favour of the respective appellants were supported by valuable consideration. If that be so, it cannot be said that these documents are hit by Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , warranting an assumption that in a suit of the present nature, there cannot be any period of limitation. b] The finding of the First Appellate Court as regards the application of Article 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , cannot be sustained, inasmuch as the correct article that applies is Article 92 of the said Act. c] Asserting from the statements made in the plaint, learned Senior counsel pointed out that it is beyond dispute that the father of Hariharan, late Rama Subramania Iyyer, was indeed a Managing Trustee of Pandi Samooham and had executed the lease deed in the year 1964 and also the respective sale deeds in the year 1972. The reading of the document of titles would show that the same is for a valuable consideration. d] It is further pointed out that, in a case where the property is held under lease, the period for recovery would be governed by Article 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . The lease deed was admittedly for a period of 5 years from 1964 and the same expired in the year 1969 and therefore, the suit filed in the year 2004 is beyond the period of limitation. e] The finding of the First Appellate Court that the transactions done by late Rama Subramania Iyyer is hit by Section 86 of Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 , cannot be sustained, since it is only in the year 1977 that the institution got notified by the Cochin Devaswom Board and therefore, it cannot have any retrospective operation. Even assuming for argument sake that Section 86 applies, it is the specific case of the learned Senior Counsel that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. In support of his contention, he relied on the following decisions: Nand Ram (D) through LRs. and Others v. Jagdish Prasad (D) through LRs . In support of his contention, he relied on the following decisions: Nand Ram (D) through LRs. and Others v. Jagdish Prasad (D) through LRs . 2020 KHC 6302, Chintamani Sahoo (Deceased by LRs.) and Others v. Commissioner of Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa and Others , 1983 SCC OnLine Ori 24, Cherooty alias Kuttappan and Others v. Sarada Amma and Others. 1972 KHC 280 , Chinna Jeeyangar Mutt, Tirupath v. C.V. Purushotham and Others, 1973 SCC OnLine AP 154 and Khadi Khan S/o Saadullah Khan and Others v. Murad Khan S/o Mohd. Akbar Khan and Others, AIR (29) 1942 Peshawar 39. 6. Adv.K.S.Rajesh - learned Counsel for the appellant in R.S.A No.386/2022, adopted the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in the above connected cases. Pertinently, no argument on the first and second substantial questions of law as framed by this Court at the time of admission was addressed and therefore, this Court is not required to pronounce its views on the same. Submissions on behalf of 1 s t Respondent. 7. Adv.K.G.Balasubramanian – learned counsel appearing for the 1 st respondent, countered the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and contended that, the appreciation of the evidence and the law by the courts below are perfectly correct and that the concurrent finding does not call for any interference by this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). According to the learned counsel, it is neither Article 92 nor Article 96 which applies, but it is Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , which applies. The right, title and interest over the plaint schedule property was disputed by late Rama Subramania Iyyer’s son by filing O.S.No.144/1995, which was dismissed by the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, on 19.02.1998 and that the said judgment was carried forward in appeal before this Court in A.S.Nos.926/1998 and 259/1998, which were decided by this Court only on 10.03.2004. The judgment of this Court was challenged before the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.16478 - 16479/2004 and the same was dismissed on 27.08.2004. It is only thereafter that the plaintiffs could have preferred the suit for getting back the possession of the plaint schedule property. It is asserted before this Court by the learned counsel that, an alienation of the property without sanction of the members is clearly void. It is only thereafter that the plaintiffs could have preferred the suit for getting back the possession of the plaint schedule property. It is asserted before this Court by the learned counsel that, an alienation of the property without sanction of the members is clearly void. He would further submit that, the statement of the plaintiffs that late Rama Subramania Iyyer was the Managing Trustee of the plaintiff - Samooham has no much significance inasmuch as the Managing Trustee can only be denoted as a person who manages the affairs of the plaintiff - Samooham. He further drew the attention of this Court to the definition of ‘trustee’ under the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 and would contend that the word ‘trustee’ cannot be a person who is in wrongful possession and title of the property. In support of his contentions, he relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in State Wakf Board, Madras v. Subramanyam and Others, 1977 KHC 2012 and also the Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Tamil Nadu Wakf Board v. Khader Badsha Saheb, AIR 1982 Madras 376. Lastly, it is submitted that, at any rate, going by the provisions of Article 65, the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the suit under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . He further relied on the decisions of the Orissa High Court in Chintamani Sahoo (Deceased by LRs.) and Others v. Commissioner of Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa and Others , AIR 1983 Ori 205 and Madras High Court in Raghavendra Swami Mutt v. Panchapakesa Iyer , AIR 2005 Madras 129. Submission of appellants in reply. 8. In response, Adv.P.B.Krishnan – learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in R.S.A.Nos.535, 536, 562 & 563 of 2020, would contend that, it is too late for the plaintiffs to contend that late Rama Subramania Iyyer was not the Managing Trustee of the Pandi Samooham. As a matter of fact, the evidence adduced by PW1 would categorically show that late Rama Subramania Iyyer was managing the affairs of Pandi Samooham and also there is a categoric admission that the members of the Samooham had ratified the transactions done by late Rama Subramania Iyyer, which is disowned in the present suit. As a matter of fact, the evidence adduced by PW1 would categorically show that late Rama Subramania Iyyer was managing the affairs of Pandi Samooham and also there is a categoric admission that the members of the Samooham had ratified the transactions done by late Rama Subramania Iyyer, which is disowned in the present suit. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the plaintiffs cannot resile from the averments in the plaint and therefore, it has to be construed that the transactions are not hit by Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . In short, the learned counsel would point out that the correct article which should apply to the present case is Article 92 and not 96, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. Judicial evaluation and findings 9. Based on the extensive arguments made before this Court, this Court found that the plea of limitation was not an issue raised before the Trial Court, but then, it was at large before the First Appellate Court and a decision was rendered by the First Appellate Court based on the pleadings of the parties. But, however, when the substantial questions of law were framed by this Court, no substantial question of law touching on the applicability of the Limitation Act was framed and accordingly, by consent this court by order dated 23.10.2025, framed the following additional substantial question of law: Whether the suit instituted by the 1 st respondent/plainti barred by limitation and which is the relevant article that applies to the suit in the present nature? 10. Both sides have addressed extensively on the questions of law and are at serious variance as regards which Article should apply to the present case. But both are in unison as far as the execution of various assignment deeds, either in the form of a lease deed or in the form of a sale deed by late Rama Subramania Iyyer in favour of the appellants. 11. Before going into the intricate questions as raised above, one must remember that the assignment deeds are supported by considerations. This Court is not called upon to decide as to whether the consideration is lawful or unlawful. Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , provides that in a suit against trustees and their representatives, no suits shall be barred by any length of time except for assignments for valuable consideration. This Court is not called upon to decide as to whether the consideration is lawful or unlawful. Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , provides that in a suit against trustees and their representatives, no suits shall be barred by any length of time except for assignments for valuable consideration. Section 10 of the said Act reads as under: 10. Suits against trustees and their representatives. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time. Explanation: For the purpose of this section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof. 12. If the documents are supported by consideration, the applicability of Section 10 of the Limitation Act is completely ruled out and therefore, it must be concluded that the suit of the present nature, is certainly governed by the law of limitation. Keeping in mind the above fact, this Court proceeds to consider the issues raised before it. a Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 13. The two substantial questions of law which this Court is called upon to decide are intertwined with each other. However, this Court feels that it will be expedient to decide first, which article of the Limitation Act, 1963 , applies. The decision on the validity of assignment for want of sanction from the Devaswom Board is a pertinent issue, since the power of late Rama Subramania Iyyer to execute the deeds is seriously under cloud in this appeal. 14. As stated above, both sides have their own version regarding the applicability of the relevant article under the Limitation Act. The relevant articles which fall for consideration are Articles 92 and 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , which speaks about suits relating to trusts and trust property. 14. As stated above, both sides have their own version regarding the applicability of the relevant article under the Limitation Act. The relevant articles which fall for consideration are Articles 92 and 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , which speaks about suits relating to trusts and trust property. Articles 92 and 96 are extracted as under: Article No. Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 92. To recover possession of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust and afterwards transferred by the trustee for a valuable consideration Twelve years. When the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff.** ** ** ** ** 96. By the manager of Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment to recover possession of movable or immovable properly comprised in the endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration. Twelve years The date of death, resignation or removal of the transferor or the date of appointment of the plaintiff as manager of the endowment, whichever is later 15. Incidentally, it may be expedient to refer to two more articles, Articles 65 and 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , which reads as under: Article No. Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. Explanation.—For the purposes of this article— (a)where the suit is by a remainderman, a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the estate of the remainderman, reversioner or devisee, as the case may be, falls into possession; (b) where the suit is by a Hindu or Muslim entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu or Muslim female, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the female dies; (c)where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgment - debtor was out of possession at the date of the sale, the purchaser shall be deemed to be a representative of the judgment-debtor who was out of possession. Twelve years. When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. ** ** ** ** 67. By a landlord to recover possession from a tenant. Twelve years. Twelve years. When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. ** ** ** ** 67. By a landlord to recover possession from a tenant. Twelve years. When the tenancy is determined. 16. The thrust of the argument of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants is based on the decision of the Madras High Court in Gopalakrishnaswamy Picture Trust Represented by G. Pakkirisamy, Kumbakonam v. Nathaswaram Govindasamy Pillai and Others, 2002 SCC Online Madras 632. The argument basically hinges upon the fact that, late Rama Subramania Iyyer was the Managing Trustee of Pandi Samooham and that plaintiff itself has admitted to the said fact. Therefore, the appellants’ case is built on the fact that, late Rama Subramania Iyyer was holding the property in trust, and therefore, the relevant article applicable is Article 92, especially since going by the statement made by PW1 during his cross-examination, he was aware of the transfer in the year 1978 itself. The argument proceeds further based on the assumption that the lease deed executed by late Rama Subramania Iyyer is a valid one and hence Article 67 will apply to such cases and the present suit is clearly hit by limitation. 17. At first blush, the said argument may appear to be appealing. But on a close exploration of the contention and testing the same with certain indisputable facts presented before this Court, this Court is unable to subscribe to the arguments made by the Adv.P.B.Krishnan - learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants. It is indisputable that, late Hariharan, S/o late Rama Subramania Iyyer, instituted O.S.No.144/1995 for declaration of title, stating that the 53 cents of land exclusively belongs to him through his father and the same was purchased for and on behalf of Pandi Samooham by three persons, including his father and that the property was being held by his father as a tenant and that a purchase certificate was obtained in the year 1976. The plea now raised on behalf of the appellants will have to be tested in the light of the categoric findings rendered by the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, in O.S.No.144/1995, which was affirmed by this Court in A.S.No.926/1998 and connected cases. When Ext.A2 judgment is carefully scrutinised, one could decipher that an exclusive right was claimed by Rama Subramania Iyyer. The plea now raised on behalf of the appellants will have to be tested in the light of the categoric findings rendered by the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, in O.S.No.144/1995, which was affirmed by this Court in A.S.No.926/1998 and connected cases. When Ext.A2 judgment is carefully scrutinised, one could decipher that an exclusive right was claimed by Rama Subramania Iyyer. Therefore, if, as a matter of fact, a litigation between the plaintiff - Pandi Samooham and Rama Subramania Iyyer was continuing on the question of title, it was not possible for the plaintiffs to have instituted the suit for recovery of possession, either within the framework of Article 92 or within the framework of Article 96 without the litigation coming to an end. The litigation ended only in the year 2004. 18. It is pertinent to mention that in its judgment dated 10.03.2004 in A.S.No.926/1998 and connected cases, this Court found that the purchase certificate obtained by late Rama Subramania Iyyer was without impleading the Pandi Samooham and that, late Rama Subramania Iyyer described himself as the Manager or Manager-cum-Treasurer of Pandi Samooham. 19. Before moving further, it will be expedient to test the precedential value of the decisions cited at the bar by both parties. In Tamil Nadu Wakf Board v. Khader Badsha Saheb, AIR 1982 Madras 376, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that, in a case, unless the alienors under whom, the defendants claim title to wakf property are Mutavallis or their legal representatives, the Wakf Board cannot fall back on Article 96 of Limitation Act, 1963 . The plea to apply Article 96 was rejected, since the plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence to attract invocation of Article 96. 20. In Khadi Khan S/o Saadullah Khan and Others v. Murad Khan S/o Mohd. Akbar Khan and Others, AIR (29) 1942 Peshawar 39, question arose as to when is the starting point of limitation under Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Division Bench of the High Court of Peshawar held that, the starting point of limitation under Article 134( now Article 92) is the date on which the transfer is known to the plaintiff and that the burden to prove the date of knowledge is on the plaintiff. 21. In Chinna Jeeyangar Mutt, Thirupath Vs. C.V. Purushotham and others , 1973 SCC Online AP 154, it was held under para 23 as follows….. 21. In Chinna Jeeyangar Mutt, Thirupath Vs. C.V. Purushotham and others , 1973 SCC Online AP 154, it was held under para 23 as follows….. “A Mahant of a Mutt is incompetent to create any interest in respect of mutt property to ensure beyond his life time. He can alienate the property permanently only for legal necessity or benefit to the estate. In case of an alienation made by him, which was not for legal necessity or benefit the said alienation becomes voidable at the instance of his successor. The right to question the alienation accrues to the successor only on the alienor’s death. The adverse possession of the alienee also begins to run from the date of his death and not until then. A permanent lease of temple lands is also an alienation of this nature. If it was not for legal necessity or benefit it is not binding on the mutt. The cause of action which accrues continues. The right of the mutt would be extinguished in regard to that property at the end of period prescribed by the law of limitation. Each succeeding mahant does not get a revival of the cause of action in his favour. The appointment of successor was never considered to give a fresh start of limitation, under the law as it stood prior to 1963. Whether it was an alienation made for legal necessity or not was a question depending upon facts and circumstances of each case”. 22. The learned Senior Counsel – Adv.P.B. Krishan, made a valiant attempt to support his case by placing reliance on the above paragraph to substantiate his argument that Article 92 will apply to the facts of the case. But this Court is unable to agree with the learned Senior Counsel. It must be borne in mind that difficulty or an injustice created by Article 92 was sought to be rectified by the Parliament by introducing Article 96 in the Limitation Act, 1963 . Therefore, this Court is inclined to think that a right which is extinguished otherwise by Article 92 stands revived on introduction of Article 96. 23. A Division bench of the Orissa High Court in Chintamani Sahoo (Deceased by LRs.) and others v. Commissioner of Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa and others , AIR 1983 Ori 205 , considered the question of interplay of Article 92 , Article 96 and Article 65. 23. A Division bench of the Orissa High Court in Chintamani Sahoo (Deceased by LRs.) and others v. Commissioner of Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa and others , AIR 1983 Ori 205 , considered the question of interplay of Article 92 , Article 96 and Article 65. The plaintiff therein was in possession based on leases of which the respective dates were 26.07.1943, 08.01.1944 and 15.07.1944. The proceedings under Section 25 of Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951, were allowed on 30.10.1969 and direction was issued to the Collector for delivery of the possession. The Bench was called upon to decide whether the limitation would expire on 12 years from the date of lease or from the date of removal of the Mahant. On analysis of the various statutory provisions, it was held that an alienation made contrary to the statutory provision is void ab initio and the relevant article that applies is Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . 24. In State Wakf Board, Madras v. Subramanyam and others , AIR 1977 Mad 79 , it was held that the word “Manager” denotes the person who is in charge of the administration of the endowment or manages the property or supervises the performance of charity. The Single Bench of the Madras High Court held that as soon as the Wakf Board was constituted, a suit for eviction under Article 96 is maintainable. 25. In Raghavendra Swami Mutt v. Panchapakesa Iyer, AIR 2005 Mad 129 , it was held that a suit for eviction by the Matadhipati based on a void alienation by the earlier Matadhipati is maintainable under Article 96. It was further held that in such cases it is for the alienee to prove that the transfer was for the benefit of the Mutt. 26. In Gopalakrishnaswamy Picture Trust Represented by G. Pakkirisamy Kumbakonam v. Nathaswaram Govindasamy Pillai and others, (2002) SCC Online Madras 632, it was held that even a worshipper was entitled to file a suit for eviction and therefore such suit in the nature is governed by Article 92 of the Limitation Act 1963. 27. On a cumulative reading of the decisions cited at the bar, it becomes clear that Article 92 and Article 96 cater to different situations. 27. On a cumulative reading of the decisions cited at the bar, it becomes clear that Article 92 and Article 96 cater to different situations. Article 92 enables the trustee to sue for recovery of possession within the period of limitation and calculated from the date of knowledge of transfer, whereas Article 96 enables the new trustee to file a suit for recovery of possession within the period of limitation which starts to run from the date of removal of the earlier trustee. The appellants’ argument that when PW1 had admitted that he was aware of the transaction done by late Rama Subramania Iyyer, in the year 1978 and hence the present suit by the Pandi Samooham is not maintainable, does not stand the scrutiny of law since the litigation ended only in 2004 and therefore, the suit for eviction can only be the conclusion of the said litigation. 28. Once the suit, O.S.No.144/1995 was dismissed and the judgment being affirmed by this Court and the Special Leave Petition being dismissed, the irresistible conclusion is that, the property was being handled by late Rama Subramania Iyyer without any authority of law. It is not possible to pick out a stray sentence from the oral testimony of PW1 and hold that the plaintiff - Samooham knew about the transactions done by late Rama Subramania Iyyer in the year 1964 onwards till 1972. This Court cannot remain oblivious of the fact that the committee of the Samooha Madhom came into existence only pursuant to the order of this Court in O.P.No.13397/1993, wherein this Court directed a committee to be formed and accordingly, a general body of the community members were convened and a Pandi Samooham Jeernodharana Committee was elected and was submitted to the High Court. At that point of time, the son of late Rama Subramania Iyyer, Hariharan, had locked the Samooha Madhom and it was only at the intervention of the police and as well as the board officials, it was opened and then inventories were taken and thereafter, the possession was entrusted on 02.01.1995 and then onwards the committee came into possession of the property. This finding has become final. One could easily conclude that an orderly effect was given to the affairs of the plaintiff - Samooham only after 02.01.1995 or thereafter. This finding has become final. One could easily conclude that an orderly effect was given to the affairs of the plaintiff - Samooham only after 02.01.1995 or thereafter. Therefore, it passes one’s comprehension as to how the provisions of Article 92 could apply to the facts of the present case. Therefore, this Court is inclined to think that Article 92 cannot not have any application to the facts of the case. 29. Another argument raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that, the respondent/plaintiff cannot disown the acts done by late Rama Subramania Iyyer. According to him, it is beyond dispute that he was managing affairs of the samooha madom and the same is also admitted in the plaint. However, learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the word ‘Managing Trustee’ would mean that a person who is empowered to act as a trustee. However, in the nature of contention raised in the appeal it does not appear to this Court that the said issue has any significance. However, for sake of completion, the same is discussed. 30. Section 61(9) of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 , defines a ‘trustee’ which reads as under: “61. Definitions.- In part II of this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context- *** (9) “trustee” shall mean a person by whatever designation known in whom the administration of an institution is vested or having control over any institution or holding any property in trust therefor and includes any person who is liable as if he were a trustee .” 31. But then, should the word ‘trustee’ under Article 92 or 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , be assigned the same meaning as contained under the provisions of Section 61(9) of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 . It is worthwhile to mention that, the word ‘trustee’ as defined under Section 2(n) of the Limitation Act, 1963 gives a different perspective to the issue. The definition clause excludes a person who is in wrongful possession without title. Section 2(n) of the Limitation Act, 1963 , reads as under: 2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— *** (n) “trustee” does not include a benamidar, a mortgagee remaining in possession after the mortgage has been satisfied or a person in wrongful possession without title. 32. Section 2(n) of the Limitation Act, 1963 , reads as under: 2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— *** (n) “trustee” does not include a benamidar, a mortgagee remaining in possession after the mortgage has been satisfied or a person in wrongful possession without title. 32. This Court while rendering the Judgment in A.S.No.926/1998 and connected cases found that, when late Rama Subramania Iyyer had filed an application before the Land Tribunal and in O.S.No.228/75 before the Munsiff Court on 06.08.1975 and also in a sale deed marked as Ext.B12 in O.S.No.144/1995, he described himself as the Manager or Manager-cum-Treasurer of Pandi Samooham. Therefore, when the word “trustee’’ is applied to the context of the definition clause under Section 2(n) of the Limitation Act 1963, and juxtaposed with the definition clause under Section 61(9) of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 , it means a ‘person who is lawfully in possession of the property of the religious institution’. So, when a suit of the present nature is filed, necessarily, the true purport and meaning of the trustee should be governed by the definition under Section 2(n) of the Limitation Act 1963. It is more so because, when the provisions of Limitation Act 1963 are required to be applied in the context of a management of the religious institution, it will be wholly impermissible to import a different meaning of the word “trustee” and hold even if a person is in possession of the property of a religious institution and despite the possession being unlawful, still his actions must be given a legal colour because he was managing the affairs of the religious institution. If such an interpretation is given, the whole intention behind the enactment be rendered 33. Even assuming for argument’s sake, the definition under the Travancore Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, should be applied because the plaintiff institution is governed by the said Act, even then on an harmonious construction of the provisions of the both Acts, it must be concluded that definition of trustee as under the Travancore Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, can only be a ‘trustee’ who is in lawful possession of the property of the religious institution. Still further, in view of the findings rendered by this Court in A.S.No.926/1998 and connected cases, this Court is inclined to hold that late Rama Subramania Iyyer had no right, title and interest in the property and if he had held the property, the said holding must be construed as unlawful qua the plaintiff institution and consequently, all transactions done by him should be regarded as one without authority of law. That be so, the relevant Article which will apply is Article 96 as well Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . This is more so when, the entitlement of the plaintiff to seek recovery of possession arose only after the litigation concluded on the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 27.08.2004 in SLP (Civil) 16478-16479 of 2004. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the additional substantial question of law framed by this court is to be answered in favour of the respondent/plaintiff and it is thus concluded that the present suit is not barred by limitation and that the finding of the First Appellate Court is perfectly correct and does not call for any interference. b Whether the transactions in question if hit by Section 86 of the Travancore Hindu Religious Institutions Act 1950 if so, whether the appellants can claim bene of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882? 34. This question though incidental assumes significance in the context of the case since the appellants contend that the plaintiff institution was notified under Section 86 only in the year 1977 and therefore the restrictions under Section 86 will not apply. The contention will have to be examined by this court in the context of the findings rendered by this court in A.S.No.926/1998 and connected cases: Section 86 (1) of Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 , reads as under: 86. The contention will have to be examined by this court in the context of the findings rendered by this court in A.S.No.926/1998 and connected cases: Section 86 (1) of Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 , reads as under: 86. Alienation of property without sanction of Board void.- (1) Any exchange, sale, mortgage, pledge, lease or other alienation of the property of an institution executed or made or any debt contracted on its behalf, shall be void unless it is executed or made or contracted with the previous sanction of the Board or with the previous sanction of the Civil Court when in any suit, appeal or other proceedings in relation to the institution a Receiver has been appointed by the Civil Court for the management of the properties of the institution: Provided that the Court shall before granting or refusing such sanction give notice to the Board and hear the objections, if any, of the Board. 35. While answering the said question, this Court also must decide as to whether the transfers in the present case are protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 . One must notice that the appellants have got a case that the plaintiff - Samooham was designated as a religious institution under the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 , only by proceedings dated 11.07.1977 and therefore, the transactions which took place prior to 1977 are saved from the purview of Section 86 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 . But it must be remembered that the Act came into effect from 16.04.1950. It is not brought to the notice of this Court by the appellants that, to attract the rigour of Section 86 , a notification designating the plaintiff as a religious institution under the Act is mandatory. Still further, a perusal of Ext.A26 notification issued by the Cochin Devaswom Board reveals that the same is issued under Section 114 of the Act which in turn confers the power to the board to decide whether an institution is a religious institution or not. Therefore, one can easily conclude that Ext.A26 notification at best could reaffirm the fact that plaintiff is a religious institution coming within the definition of 61(6) of the Act. 36. Therefore, one can easily conclude that Ext.A26 notification at best could reaffirm the fact that plaintiff is a religious institution coming within the definition of 61(6) of the Act. 36. The larger question would be dehors the sanction of the Board under Section 86 , whether the transfers could be sustained in view of the mandate under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 . It is difficult to envisage a situation, despite this Court finding in A.S.No.926/1998 and connected cases that late Ramasubramania Iyyer had no title to the property, and the findings being affirmed by the Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) 16478-16479 of 2004, the transfer done by late Rama Subramania Iyyer could be upheld by applying the principles governing Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. Accepting the plea of appellants, would be necessarily mean conferring an authority on late Rama Subramania Iyyer to transfer the interest over the plaint schedule property in favour of the appellants herein, which he did not have under law. Therefore, this Court need not deliberate any further on this issue and is thus inclined to conclude the second substantial question and holds that the transfers made by late Rama Subramania Iyyer in favour of the appellants cannot be given any legal colour and is hit by provisions of Section 86 of the Travancore Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 and cannot be saved by Section 41 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882. In view of the discussions as above, wherein this court having answered the two substantial questions of law framed as above against the appellants, the result is that judgments of the courts below do not require any interference at the hands of this Court. The appeals lack merit and accordingly are dismissed with costs.