ORDER : T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J. 1. Since these Interlocutory Applications pertain to the same schedule property and arise from a common judgment and decree, dated 04.10.2024 passed by the X Additional District Judge’s Court, Krishna, Machilipatnam (for short, ‘the Trial Court’), this Court is inclined to dispose of these Interlocutory Applications through a common order. 2. I.A.No.1 of 2025 in A.S.No.15 of 2025 has been filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of C.P.C., seeking to grant temporary injunction restraining the Respondents from interfering with the Petitioners’ peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property in O.S.No.77 of 2013 on the file of the Trial Court. 3. I.A.No.2 of 2025 in A.S.No.15 of 2025 has been filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of C.P.C., seeking to grant temporary injunction restraining the Respondents from alienating or creating any 3 rd party interest in the suit schedule property in O.S.No.77 of 2013 on the file of the Trial Court. 4. I.A.No.2 of 2025 in A.S.No.18 of 2025 has been filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C., seeking to grant temporary injunction restraining the Respondents from interfering with the petitioners’ peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property in O.S.No.09 of 2018 on the file of the Trial Court. 5. Brief averments of the affidavits filed by the Petitioners/Appellants accompanied with both the petitions, are as follows: (a) The Petitioners filed O.S.No.77/2013 before the X Additional District Judge’s Court, Krishna, Machilipatnam, seeking specific performance of a sale agreement dated 19.08.2008 or, alternatively, a refund of Rs.19,00,000/- with 12% interest per annum. (b) The Respondents/Defendants, who are brothers and the absolute owners of the suit property (Ac.5-59 ½ cents in Kosuru Village, Krishna District), had agreed to sell the property to the Petitioners' parents for Rs.21,40,000/- @ Rs.3,82,000/- per acre. Payments were made as advances, including Rs. 15,00,000/- on 19.08.2008, with an agreement to pay the balance within a year. The Petitioners have paid Rs. 19,00,000/- and have been in possession of the property as part performance. The Respondents have not executed the sale deed despite the Petitioners' willingness to pay the remaining balance of Rs. 2,40,000/-. The Respondents have attempted to change the revenue records. 15,00,000/- on 19.08.2008, with an agreement to pay the balance within a year. The Petitioners have paid Rs. 19,00,000/- and have been in possession of the property as part performance. The Respondents have not executed the sale deed despite the Petitioners' willingness to pay the remaining balance of Rs. 2,40,000/-. The Respondents have attempted to change the revenue records. On 13.07.2014, while working on the property, the Petitioners were obstructed and threatened by the Respondents, prompting them to file a complaint, but no police action was taken. The Respondents contested the suit, alleging no landlord-tenant relationship, claiming the agreement and payments were forged, and asserting that the suit agreement is subject to stamp duty. They also stated that no possession was delivered to the Petitioners under the agreement. Despite the substantial consideration received by the Respondents, they filed a separate suit (O.S.No.10/2018) for an injunction. The Petitioners also filed a suit (O.S.No.9/2018), seeking a permanent injunction. (c) All suits were consolidated, and common evidence was recorded in O.S.No.77/2013. The Trial Court partially decreed O.S.No.77/2013, granting alternative relief for a refund of Rs.19,00,000/- but denying specific performance. It also passed a decree for the Respondents' permanent injunction in O.S.No.10/2018 and dismissed the Petitioners' injunction suit in O.S.No.9/2018. The Petitioners are appealing the denial of specific performance and other judgments. The Trial Court erred in rejecting specific performance based on delayed filing, which was not argued by the Respondents. The agreement terms and the Respondents' actions show that time was not of the essence. The Petitioners paid a significant portion of the consideration and filed the suit within the limitation period. The Trial Court's denial of specific performance should be overturned, considering the doctrine of part performance. The Respondents failed to prove possession and should not benefit from an injunction. The Respondents' interference with the Petitioners' possession, after the rejection of specific performance, will cause irreparable harm. 6. The 1 st Respondent/1 st Defendant has filed counter affidavits on behalf of both himself and the 2 nd Respondent, denying the claims in these applications, asserted as follows: (a) They filed Suit O.S.No.10 of 2018 (formerly O.S.No.21 of 2014) against the Appellants in the main Appeal and Petitioners in this I.A., seeking a perpetual injunction concerning the same suit schedule property. A common judgment was delivered in all three suits: O.S.No.77 of 2013 was partly allowed, granting a refund instead of specific performance. A common judgment was delivered in all three suits: O.S.No.77 of 2013 was partly allowed, granting a refund instead of specific performance. O.S.No.9 of 2018, filed by the Appellants, was dismissed. O.S.No.10 of 2018, filed by the Respondents, was allowed, granting a perpetual injunction in their favor against the Petitioners. (b) The Respondents filed A.S.No.621 of 2024 against the judgment in O.S.No.77 of 2013, which partially allowed the suit for a refund. This Court granted an interim stay on proceedings, which is still pending. In response to the common judgment dated 04.10.2024, the Appellants filed Appeals (A.S.Nos.15, 18 & 32 of 2025) after receiving caveats from the Respondents on 28.10.2024. Certified copies were delivered on 24.10.2024, suggesting the Appeals were filed with malafide intent to disrupt the Respondents' possession of the property, which they have held for years. The Appellants have never possessed the property at any time. (c) The Trial Court concluded that the Appellants failed to file their suit for specific performance in a reasonable time and did not prove readiness or willingness to perform their part of the contract. As a result, specific performance was denied, though O.S.No.77 of 2013 was partly decreed, granting a refund of Rs.19,00,000 with 12% annual interest. This matter is under appeal in A.S.No.621 of 2024. Since O.S.No.9 of 2018 (Appellants’ suit) was dismissed and O.S.No.10 of 2018 (Respondents’ suit) was decreed after a thorough trial, the interlocutory applications in these suits are irrelevant and cannot be entertained. (d) The Respondents are the owners of the suit schedule property, and therefore, an injunction cannot be granted against them. The Appellants have failed to prove they are in possession of the property as tenants or leaseholders. They claim their late father and husband oversaw the cultivation on their behalf but not as a cultivating tenant. There is no written lease or tenancy agreement, and the Appellants have provided no substantial evidence, such as neighbour testimonies or documentation, to support their claim. PWs.3 to 6 did not testify to the Appellants' possession, and aside from the Appellants' own statements, no reliable evidence has been presented. The Appellants have admitted they did not apply for the mutation of their names in the revenue records. However, it is unclear how the names of the 2 nd Appellant and her husband were included in the Adangals. The Appellants have admitted they did not apply for the mutation of their names in the revenue records. However, it is unclear how the names of the 2 nd Appellant and her husband were included in the Adangals. No revenue officials were examined to clarify this, raising concerns that the Appellants may have influenced revenue officials to alter or create these records. (e) The Respondents relied on Ex.A42, an endorsement from the Tahsildar, confirming that the Appellants are enjoydars, while they are the property owners. The Respondents also relied on certified Pattadar Passbooks, Title Deeds, and land revenue receipts (Exs.B4-B9) and testimonies from workers confirming they are cultivating the land, including sugarcane. In contrast, the appellants have not proven settled possession as tenants. The respondents have established their ownership and cultivation of the property. The appellants' claim for specific performance of the sale agreement has failed, and they are not entitled to an injunction. Consequently, these petitions must be dismissed. 7. Heard Sri P.Rajasekhar, learned counsel for the Petitioners / Appellants and Sri K. Jyothi Prasad, learned Counsel for the Respondents/Respondents. 8. Now, the point for determination is: Whether the Petitioners/Appellants are entitled for the relief of injunction order as prayed for? 9. Before considering the submissions made on behalf of both sides, I shall briefly refer to the admitted facts as borne out from the record, as outlined below: (i) The suit in O.S.No.77 of 2013 was partly decreed, granting an alternative relief that orders the Defendants to refund the sale consideration they received. However, the relief for specific performance of the agreement was dismissed. Aggrieved by the judgment in O.S.No.77 of 2013, the Plaintiffs appealed in A.S.No.15 of 2025, specifically challenging the denial of the specific performance claim. In A.S.No.15 of 2025, the Appellants filed applications I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2025, seeking an injunction relief as referenced. (ii) The suit in O.S.No.9 of 2018 filed by the Plaintiffs for perpetual injunction against the Defendants for schedule property was dismissed by the Trial Court. Aggrieved by the judgment in O.S.No.9 of 2018, the Plaintiffs appealed in A.S.No.18 of 2025, challenging the denial of the permanent injuntion. In A.S.No.18 of 2025, the Appellants filed applications I.A.No.2 of 2025, seeking an injunction relief as referenced. 10. The Petitioners assert that the Respondents, who are brothers, are the absolute owners of the schedule property, and this fact is not in dispute. In A.S.No.18 of 2025, the Appellants filed applications I.A.No.2 of 2025, seeking an injunction relief as referenced. 10. The Petitioners assert that the Respondents, who are brothers, are the absolute owners of the schedule property, and this fact is not in dispute. The Petitioners claim that since the year 2000, the 1st Petitioner’s father and the 2 nd Petitioner have been the cultivating tenants of the schedule property, with an agreed annual rental of Rs.14,00,000/-. It is further stated that the Respondents intended to sell the property to the 1st Petitioner’s parents, and the sale price was settled at Rs.21,40,000/- at the rate of Rs.3,82,000/- per acre. On 04.03.2006, the 1st Petitioner’s parents paid an advance of Rs.50,000/- to the 1st Respondent, and at his request, his wife Varalakshmi issued a hand letter. Subsequently, on 19.08.2008, the 1st Petitioner’s parents paid Rs.15,00,000/- as part of the sale consideration, and the Respondents executed the suit agreement of sale in the presence of attestors. On 10.06.2011, the 1 st Petitioner’s parents paid an additional Rs.2,00,000/-, which was endorsed on the back of the first page of the agreement of sale. In total, they paid Rs.19,00,000/- out of the agreed Rs.21,40,000/- as part of the sale consideration. 11. The Trial Court’s judgment shows that it accepted the Plaintiffs' claim regarding the payment of Rs.19,00,000/- to the Defendants and consequently ordered the refund of the sale consideration amount. When addressing Issue No.1, the Trial Court concluded that the evidence clearly demonstrated the Plaintiffs' capacity to pay the Rs.19,00,000/-, as reflected in Exs.A.1 and A.50. The Trial Court noted that the testimony of PW.1 regarding the execution of Ex.A.1 by the Defendants and the payment of Rs.15,00,000/- to them remained unchallenged and consistent. The Defendants contended that they only signed the document in English and not in Telugu, but the Trial Court rejected this contention. 12. The Trial Court further observed that although the Defendants examined DWs.1 to 10, including themselves, their testimony failed to rebut the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs regarding the execution and authenticity of Ex.A.1 and Ex.A.50. However, the Trial Court pointed out that the Plaintiffs did not adduce any evidence showing they had orally requested the Defendants, expressing their readiness to pay the remaining balance of the sale consideration. However, the Trial Court pointed out that the Plaintiffs did not adduce any evidence showing they had orally requested the Defendants, expressing their readiness to pay the remaining balance of the sale consideration. The Trial Court also noted that neither the Plaintiff nor her husband deposited the balance sale consideration before the Court to demonstrate their readiness and willingness. Despite this, the Trial Court observed that it is not mandatory for the Plaintiffs to make such a deposit. 13. The Trial Court also observed that while time is not the essence of the contract, it was expected of the Plaintiffs to seek an appropriate legal remedy within a reasonable time. However, the judgment shows that the suit was filed approximately five years and four months after the execution of Ex.A.1, the sale agreement. The Trial Court did not conclude that the claim was barred by limitation, but instead dismissed the suit on the grounds that it was not filed within a reasonable time. 14. The learned counsel for the Petitioners argues that the Defendants had consistently attempted to avoid the contract by disputing the execution of the sale agreement, and the Trial Court had rejected all such contentions raised by the Defendants. Therefore, the Petitioners' counsel asserts that the Defendants cannot now argue that the Plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The Plaintiffs' counsel further contends that once the Defendants failed to prove their defence regarding the execution of the sale agreement, the additional argument about the Plaintiffs' readiness and willingness is supplementary, and equitable relief cannot be denied based on that issue alone. 15. The learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that while the Trial Court acknowledged the Petitioners' case regarding the execution of the Ex.A.1 agreement, it failed to adequately consider the recitals therein, which unambiguously reflect that the Plaintiffs were cultivating the land as lessees. Ex.A.1 itself establishes that, at the time of its execution, the Plaintiffs were in possession of the schedule property as tenants. The Defendants have not contended that the Plaintiffs were dispossessed of the land following the agreement's execution. Indeed, the Plaintiffs have remained in continuous possession of the schedule land in accordance with the terms of the Ex.A.1 agreement. 16. Ex.A.1 itself establishes that, at the time of its execution, the Plaintiffs were in possession of the schedule property as tenants. The Defendants have not contended that the Plaintiffs were dispossessed of the land following the agreement's execution. Indeed, the Plaintiffs have remained in continuous possession of the schedule land in accordance with the terms of the Ex.A.1 agreement. 16. The learned counsel for the Petitioners relied on judgments of this Court as well as the Hon’ble Apex Court, supporting the contention that the Trial Court’s observations regarding the Plaintiffs' readiness and willingness do not hold up under legal scrutiny. On the other hand, the counsel for the Respondents supports the Trial Court's judgment. 17. Learned counsel for the Petitioners/Appellants relied on the decision reported in Dudala Sarojinamma vs. Vannepenta Ramanamma , [2023 SCC OnLine AP 1140] , wherein this Court observed that: “44. In P. Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan [ (2022) 14 SCC 793 ] , the Supreme Court referred to case of Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty [ (1999) 6 SCC 337 ] , a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed that: (SCC pp. 803 to 805, 807 and 808, paras 15 to 17, 19 and 24) 15. It cannot be gainsaid that even though time is not considered as the essence of the contract in case of immovable property and that the suit could be filed within three years as provided in Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the respondent-plaintiff had to perform his part of the contract within the reasonable time having regard to the term of the agreement prescribing the time-limit. The time- limit prescribed in the agreement cannot be ignored on the ground that time was not made the essence of the agreement or that the suit could be filed within three years from the date fixed for performance or from the date when the performance is refused by the vendor. Nonetheless, as discussed above, the suit having been filed by the respondent well within the prescribed time-limit under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the respondent could not have been non-suited on the ground of the suit being barred by limitation as sought to be submitted by learned counsel for the appellant. 16. … [The ratio] in Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao [ AIR 1965 SC 1405 ], it has been observed as under: 7. 16. … [The ratio] in Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao [ AIR 1965 SC 1405 ], it has been observed as under: 7. Lakshmaiah cited a long catena of English decisions to define the scope of a court's discretion. Before referring to them, it is necessary to know the fundamental difference between the two systems — English and Indian — qua the relief of specific performance. In England the relief of specific performance pertains to the domain of equity; in India, to that of statutory law. In England there is no period of limitation for instituting a suit for the said relief and, therefore, mere delay — the time lag depending upon circumstances — may itself be sufficient to refuse the relief; but, in India mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation. If the suit is in time, delay is sanctioned by law; it is beyond time, the suit will be dismissed as barred by time; in either case, no question of equity arises. 17. The aforesaid ratio has also been followed recently by this Court in R.Lakshmikantham v. Devaraji [ (2019) 8 SCC 62 ]. We, therefore, have no hesita- tion in holding that mere delay alone in filing the suit for specific performance, without reference to the conduct of the plaintiff, could not be a ground for refusing the said relief, when the suit was filed within the statutory time-limit by the respondent-plaintiff. xxxx 48. This Court views that simply because, the plaintiff has claimed alternative relief, it cannot be held that the plaintiff is not entitled to the primary relief of specific performance. The grant of alternative relief will arise if the plaintiff's claim for specific performance is refused. When the plaintiff asks for alternative relief, there is no legal presumption or assumption that he gives up the primary relief of specific performance of the contract.” 18. Learned counsel for the Petitioners/Appellants further relied on the decision reported in Bogi Rajeswari vs. Chintala Srinivasa Kumar , [2024 SCC OnLine AP 272] , wherein this Court observed that: “41. In the present case, the appellant had neither pleaded hardship nor produced any evidence to show that it would be inequitable to order specific performance of the agreement. Learned counsel for the Petitioners/Appellants further relied on the decision reported in Bogi Rajeswari vs. Chintala Srinivasa Kumar , [2024 SCC OnLine AP 272] , wherein this Court observed that: “41. In the present case, the appellant had neither pleaded hardship nor produced any evidence to show that it would be inequitable to order specific performance of the agreement. Rather, the important plea taken by the appellant was that the agreement was fictitious and fabricated, and defendant had neither executed the same nor received the earnest money, and, as mentioned above, the trial court has found this plea to be wholly untenable. No evidence is placed before the court to show the escalation in the price of the land. However, it cannot, by itself, be a ground for denying relief of specific performance. Though defendant has raised several contentions regarding the property's value as of the date of Ext. A-1 agreement of sale, no material is placed to substantiate her contention. 42. Since the defendant's case is one of denial, the plaintiff's case that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is sufficient to infer that the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Therefore, the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff has yet to provide evidence to prove his readiness and willingness to perform the contract is not tenable. xxx 47. Moreover, it is the defendant who had always been trying to wriggle out of the contract by disputing the execution of the agreement of sale. Now, the defen- dant cannot take advantage of her wrong and then plead that a grant of decree of specific performance would be inequitable. It is not established by defendant that during the period between Ext. A-1 and the date of filing of the suit, there was a rise in prices regarding immovable properties like the plaint schedule property, which made plaintiff avail of this opportunity. Escalation of prices cannot be a ground for denying the relief of specific performance. Xxx 49. The instant case does not fall under any of these clauses. Usually, when the trial court exercises its discretion in one way or another after appreciating the entire evidence and the materials-on-record, the appellate court should only inter- fere if it is established that the discretion has been exercised perversely, arbitrarily or against judicial principles. Xxx 49. The instant case does not fall under any of these clauses. Usually, when the trial court exercises its discretion in one way or another after appreciating the entire evidence and the materials-on-record, the appellate court should only inter- fere if it is established that the discretion has been exercised perversely, arbitrarily or against judicial principles. The appellate court should also not exercise its dis- cretion against the grant of specific performance on extraneous considerations or sympathetic considerations. It is true, as contemplated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, that a party is not entitled to get a decree for a specific perfor- mance merely because it is lawful to do so. Nevertheless, once an agreement to sell is legal and validly proved and further requirements for getting such a decree are established, the court has to exercise its discretion to grant relief for a specific performance.” 19. Given that various contentions have been raised by both parties concerning the substantive issues of the Appeal, the Court refrains from making any opinion on these matters at this stage, as doing so could prejudice the parties. Both parties will have the opportunity to address these contentions during the final hearing of the appeal. 20. In order to prove the possession of the Plaintiffs over the suit property, they produced the extracts of No.3 adangals, fasilies 1416 to 1423 vide Exs.A.22 to A.27. The Trial Court observed based on Exs.A.22 to A.27 that the Plaintiffs are enjoydars, whereas the Defendants are pattadars of the said property. It is not in dispute that there is no lease or tenancy agreement in writing between the parties. The Plaintiffs have not applied for mutation of their names in the revenue records. 21. To seek relief of injunction concerning the possession of the schedule property, the Trial Court’s observation in paragraph 53 highlights that the Defendants themselves admitted that the Plaintiffs cultivated the land. However, they claimed that the Plaintiffs were cultivating it on behalf of the Defendants. The Trial Court noted that, according to the Ex.A.42 endorsement issued by the M.R.O. of Movva, the Plaintiffs were shown as "enjoydars," while the Defendants were listed as the owners of the suit property. The Trial Court further observed that the Plaintiffs failed to establish that they were in settled possession of the property, either as tenants or leaseholders. The Trial Court noted that, according to the Ex.A.42 endorsement issued by the M.R.O. of Movva, the Plaintiffs were shown as "enjoydars," while the Defendants were listed as the owners of the suit property. The Trial Court further observed that the Plaintiffs failed to establish that they were in settled possession of the property, either as tenants or leaseholders. It is contrary to the terms of Ex.A.1 agreement. 22. To prove their possession of the suit property, the Plaintiffs presented extracts of No.3 adangals, fasilies 1416 to 1423, marked as Exs.A.22 to A.28 revenue receipts. The Trial Court, based on these documents, observed that the Plaintiffs are enjoydars, while the Defendants are pattadars of the property. It is undisputed that no written lease or tenancy agreement exists between the parties, and the Plaintiffs have not applied for the mutation of their names in the revenue records. 23. The learned counsel for the Petitioners argues that, having accepted the Petitioners’ case regarding the execution of Ex.A.1 agreement, the Trial Court failed to properly consider the recitals in Ex.A.1, which clearly indicate that the Plaintiffs were cultivating the land as lessees. Ex.A.1 itself shows that at the time of its execution, the Plaintiffs were cultivating the schedule property as tenants. The Defendants have not claimed that the Plaintiffs were dispossessed from the property after the agreement was made. In fact, the Plaintiffs have continued to possess the schedule land under the terms of Ex.A.1 agreement. 24. It is well-established in law that a person in settled possession, even without title, has the right to remain in possession against the rightful owner until they are evicted through due process of law. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are entitled to seek an injunction restraining the true owner from disturbing their possession. It is a settled legal principle that no one can take the law into their own hands, and even a trespasser in settled possession cannot be dispossessed without following legal procedures. It is also not the Defendants' case that the Plaintiffs unlawfully trespassed onto the schedule property. 25. Simply because the Plaintiffs' suit has been dismissed, it does not give the Defendants the right to forcibly take possession of the property by dispossessing the Plaintiffs. The Defendants are not entitled to take possession of the schedule property by force, and they must follow the due process of law to do so. 26. 25. Simply because the Plaintiffs' suit has been dismissed, it does not give the Defendants the right to forcibly take possession of the property by dispossessing the Plaintiffs. The Defendants are not entitled to take possession of the schedule property by force, and they must follow the due process of law to do so. 26. As previously noted, the Petitioners’ case asserts that they were in possession of the property prior to the execution of Ex.A.1 agreement. The Defendants have not claimed that, after the execution of Ex.A.1, the Plaintiffs were dispossessed of the schedule property. This indicates that, at the time of the agreement and beyond, the Plaintiffs maintained their possession of the property, further strengthening their position in seeking relief. 27. According to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, while it does not outright prohibit the transfer of property during the pendency of a suit, it does stipulate that prior permission must be obtained from the Court before such a transfer can take place. This ensures that the interests of the parties involved in the litigation are protected, preventing any action that could undermine the outcome of the suit. 28. This Court views that as Appeal is considered to be continuation of the pendency of the suit proceedings within the meaning of the Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act and accordingly, lis pendens continues to have force even during the Appeal. A transferee in such circumstances, therefore, takes the consequences of the decree which the party who made the transfer to him would take as the party to the suit. The principle of lis pendens embodied in section 52 being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fides arises. This Court views that the effect of the doctrine of lis pendens is not to annul the transfer, but only to render it subservient to the rights of the parties to the litigation. 29. After carefully examining the evidence on record, the Trial Court concluded that the Defendants were the proven owners of the schedule property, while the Plaintiffs were merely assigned the role of caretakers of the land on behalf of the Defendants. The Trial Court subsequently dismissed the suit, reasoning that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were in settled possession of the schedule property. The Trial Court subsequently dismissed the suit, reasoning that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were in settled possession of the schedule property. However, the Trial Court overlooked Exs.A.28 and A.42, which should have been properly considered in their context. In contrast, the Defendants failed to produce any revenue records to substantiate their possession of the property. On the other hand, the revenue records submitted by the Plaintiffs clearly indicate that they were shown as being in possession of the land. Despite this, the Trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the Plaintiffs failed to establish their possession as tenants. 30. This Court finds that the Petitioners’ possession of the schedule property shall continue until the disposal of the Appeal. It is not the Defendants’ case that they do not dispossess the Petitioners from the property. After considering the material on record, the possibility of the Petitioners being dispossessed cannot be ruled out, in the absence of an undertaking from the Defendants that they will not interfere with the Petitioners' possession. Given that it is established from the record that the Plaintiffs have been in possession of the property (a fact acknowledged in Ex.A.1), and since the Trial Court upheld the Plaintiffs' contention that Ex.A.1 is a sale agreement executed between the parties, this Court is inclined to allow the petition, by granting temporary injunction, restraining the Defendants from interfering with the Petitioners' possession of the schedule property, except through due process of law. Additionally, the Defendants are restrained from alienating the schedule property without obtaining permission from the Court, as mandated under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 31. In the result, I.As.No.1 and 2 of 2025 in A.S.No.15 of 2025 and I.A.No.2 of 2025 in A.S.No.18 of 2025 are allowed. A temporary injunction is granted, restraining the Defendants from interfering with the possession of the Plaintiffs during the pendency of the Appeals, except through due process of law. The Defendants are further restrained by temporary injunction from alienating or creating any third-party interest in the schedule property without the permission of the Court, in accordance with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. However, in the circumstances of the case, both parties shall bear their own costs.