JUDGMENT : EASWARAN S., J. The 1 st defendant in a suit for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction non-suited concurrently, has come up with the present appeal raising a plea that the suit is barred by limitation. Pertinently, the question of limitation was neither pleaded in the written statement nor raised during the course of arguments before the trial court or before the First Appellate Court. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows:- The respondents/plaintiffs instituted the suit contending that the temple belongs to Paravanvilakom Family, Kollampuzha, Chirayinkeezhu Taluk, Attingal. On 27.11.1100(ME), a partition deed was executed including the plaint schedule property having an extent of 1.06 Acres comprised in Survey No.338A of Attingal Village and 33 cents in Survey No.337/13 of Attingal Village as temple properties and was assigned in the name of Neelan Kumaran, the then ‘Karanavar’ (the eldest member of the Paravanvilakom Family). The name of the temple is Kollampuzha Paravanvilakath Bhagavathy Temple. As per the custom under the Paravarn community, the eldest member of the family has to conduct the management, prayers and rituals of the temple. After the death of the eldest member of the family, namely, Kunju Sankaran, the next eldest member was Raghavan, who executed a deed of management in favour of his sons Chellappan and Damodaran for administration of the temple by document No.127/1991 of SRO Attingal. After the death of Damodaran and Chellappan, the 2nd plaintiff is the eldest member of the family and therefore, he is the only person having right to conduct the management. Since there were litigations pending as regards the question whether the 1 st plainti is a private trust or a public trust, and ultimately O.S No.76/1993 was instituted before the Sub Court, Attingal, which ended only after the disposal of A.S No.35/2002 before this Court, and then the 2 nd plainti asserted his right to manage the temple. However, during the life time of Chellappan, to whom the management of the temple was entrusted through the deed No.127/1991, tried to induct his children into the administration of the temple and that since litigations were pending, and on the culmination of the litigation, the 2nd plaintiff decided to assert his right for management of the affairs of the temple and thus instituted the suit. The defendants entered appearance and contested the suit by raising a plea that consequent to the abolishment of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975, the concept of management of the temple by the eldest member or the ‘Karanavar’ is no longer in force and therefore, Chellappan, the father of the defendants was entitled to nominate the 1 st defendant as the eldest member entitled to manage the affairs of the temple. It was further contended that the 2nd plaintiff is not the member of the Paravanvilakom Family. The right, if any, of the plaintiffs has since been lost by ouster. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Exts.A1 to A12 documents were produced and PW1 to PW6 were examined. On behalf of defendants, Exts.B1 to B15 documents were produced and DW1 to DW4 were examined. Exts.C1 and C1(a) are the report and rough sketch of the Advocate Commissioner. The trial court on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that the pleadings of the defendants that the concept of karanavar has since been abolished consequent to the promulgation of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition ) Act, 1975 (for short ‘the Act’), is unsustainable and that the further plea that the 2nd plaintiff does not belong to the family also stands proved to be wrong by cogent evidence adduced by him. Accordingly, the suit was decreed. Aggrieved, the defendants preferred appeal as A.S No.56/2023, which was dismissed by the Sub Court, Attingal, and hence the present appeal. 3. Heard Shri.S.Vinod Bhat, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and Shri.T.Krishnanunni, the learned Senior Counsel, for the respondents assisted by Shri.R.Rajesh (Varkala), the learned counsel appearing through caveat for the respondents. 4. Though the matter was listed for admission today, since the respondents appeared through caveat and opposed the plea of admission, especially since both courts have concurrently found in their favour as regards their entitlement to manage the 1 st plainti inasmuch as the findings rendered purely on appreciation of evidence, this Court felt that a preliminary hearing is required to decide whether any substantial question of law arises or not and hence the matter was heard. 5. 5. Prima facie, this Court finds that the plea as regards the discontinuance of the concept of ‘Karanavar’ (the eldest member of the family) consequent to the promulgation of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975, does not appear to be sound, because, as far as the management of the 1 st plaintiff-temple is concerned, the same does not fall within the concept of a Joint Hindu Family under the Act. Moreover, the then eldest member had executed Ext.B2(A2) deed. On 21.05.1991, after the coming into force of the Act and that the father of the 1 st defendant / appellant derived the right to manage the temple only because of the said deed. Moreover, as regards the intention of the settler in Ext.A1 deed, it is evidently clear that the management of the temple has to be carried out by the eldest member of the family, which necessarily presupposes identification of the eldest member, which in turn indicates that the succession is not automatic and hereditary. 6. As regards the alternate plea with regard to the entitlement of the 2 nd plainti declaratory decree, since both the courts have concurrently found, the learned Counsel, Shri.S.Vinod Bhat, though tried to raise a fervent plea regarding the perverse appreciation of facts by the courts below, this Court is not persuaded to accept the said request. 7. Apart from the above two arguments, Shri.S.Vinod Bhat, raised a seminal question regarding the maintainability of the suit, because, according to him, the suit is barred by limitation. In support of his contentions relied on Article 107 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963, which reads as under:- 8. Though the plea that the suit is barred by limitation was not raised before the courts below, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant placing reliance on the decisions of Honourable Supreme Court in V.M.Salgaocar and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and Another [ (2005) 4 SCC 613 ] and in R.Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs and Another v. Rajmani and Others [2025 SCC Online SC 762] , contended that the plea of limitation need not be specifically pleaded as defense by the defendants and going by the tenure of Section 3 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963, it is for the court to find out whether the suit is prima facie maintainable or not. By referring to paragraphs 8 and 9 of the plaint, it is the specific case raised by Shri.S.Vinod Bhat that the plaintiffs, themselves were aware that the 1 st defendant was managing the affairs of the temple and therefore the possession of the defendants has become adverse to that of the plaintiffs and therefore the plaintiffs ought to have proved that the suit is within the period of limitation. 9. Per contra, Shri.T.Krishnanunni, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents / plaintiffs countered the submissions of Shri.S.Vinod Bhat and contended that when a plea of adverse possession is raised by the defendant, it is up to him to plead and prove that the possession of the defendant had become adverse to that of the plaintiff and not vice versa. He would further point out that the plea of limitation being a mixed question of law and facts, cannot be raised for the first time in the second appeal. 10. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the Bar and perused the judgments rendered by the courts below. 11. After bestowing the anxious consideration on the rival submissions raised across the Bar, this Court is of the considered view that the plea that the suit is barred by limitation is only to be rejected. It is true that under Section 3 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963, a suit is to be rejected, if it is prima facie barred by limitation. But then, in the present case, the question is whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. The reliance placed on Article 107 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963, does not appear to be correct. Article 107 of the LIMITATION ACT applies to a case where the possession of a hereditary office is claimed and the period starts to run when the defendant takes the possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff. Indisputably in the present case, Ext.A1 deed of management provides for selection of the eldest member of the family to manage the 1 st plainti Therefore, it is explicitly clear that Article 107 of the LIMITATION ACT would not be attracted in the present case. Indisputably in the present case, Ext.A1 deed of management provides for selection of the eldest member of the family to manage the 1 st plainti Therefore, it is explicitly clear that Article 107 of the LIMITATION ACT would not be attracted in the present case. Unlike a case where the office is of hereditary nature, in the present case, since the management vests with the eldest member of the family, his office does not become hereditary, but would cease to have effect on his death, leading to a selection of the eldest member of the family. 12. It is beyond cavil that, the position of the appellant is that of a trustee qua the members of the family. A trustee cannot, by setting up his own title to the trust property, acquire by adverse possession a title to the property until he has renounced his possession and re-entered on the property claiming a hostile title. 13. In Srinivasa Moorthy v. Venkatavarada Iyengar (1911 (11) Ind. Cas. 447 (448) 34 Mad. 257 38 Ind. App. 129 (PC )), their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows: "...... No person who has accepted the position of a trustee and has acquired property in that capacity can be permitted to assert an adverse title on his own behalf until he has obtained a proper discharge from the trust with which he has clothed himself." ....... The principle above stated, namely, that a trustee cannot acquire title by adverse possession of the trust property, applies, equally to quasi or constructive trustees (5) to the managers of religious endowments (6). and in fact to all persons who stand in a fiduciary relation to others (7)." 14. In U. N. Mitra's Law of Limitation and Prescription(Tagore Law Lectures), 11th Edn., Vol. II, at page 1590, Para.66, the law is stated as follows: “ The possession of the trust properties by the trustee is really the possession of the cestui que trust of the beneficiary. Under Section 10 of the LIMITATION ACT the possession of the trustee or his legal representative does not become adverse to the cestui que trust but continues to be non -adverse so long as the trust property may be followed in his or their hands. Under Section 10 of the LIMITATION ACT the possession of the trustee or his legal representative does not become adverse to the cestui que trust but continues to be non -adverse so long as the trust property may be followed in his or their hands. Persons could not , by breach of trust continues for a period of 12 years confer a statutory title on themselves in derogation or extinction of the trust. A trustee cannot while remaining a trustee prescribe a title by adverse possession to the trust property……..” Para 71- "The possession of a trustee has its foundation in a fiduciary obligation resulting from a confidence reposed in and accepted by him. According to English Law, the possession of an express trustee is treated as possession of his cestui que trust and therefore does no run in his favour against the latter.{ See Isabella Taylor Vs Davies [1920] SAC 635-650.}. Where the origin of the possession is not only lawful, but originates in a trust delivering possession to the trust or then its representative, no person can plead that his possession, the foundation of which is an acknowledgment of a fiduciary obligation has become adverse without re delivery. So long as he does not renounce his position as such he is under obligation to protect the interests of the trust. Hence no person who has accepted the position of a trustee and has acquired property in that capacity can be permitted to assert an adverse title on his own behalf until he has obtained a proper discharge from the trust with which he has clothed himself. Trustee’s possession is in effect deemed to be beneficiaries possession.{ See Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition 1997 Col 28 para 1053 } … Even an ex trustee , till he discharges his obligation to hand over all the trust properties to the trust or to the subsequent trustees will be deemed to be in possession as and for the trust itself.” 15. In Venkatanarasimha Charyulu Peddinti v. Rayasam Gangamma Pantulu ( AIR 1954 Mad. 258 ) it was held as follows: "The principle above stated, namely, that a trustee cannot acquire title by adverse possession of the trust property, applies equally to 'quasi' or constructive trustees, the managers of religious endowments and in fact to all persons who stand in a fiduciary relation to others." 16. 258 ) it was held as follows: "The principle above stated, namely, that a trustee cannot acquire title by adverse possession of the trust property, applies equally to 'quasi' or constructive trustees, the managers of religious endowments and in fact to all persons who stand in a fiduciary relation to others." 16. In the light of the discussions above, it is concluded that the argument of the appellant based on Article 107 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963, does not hold good inasmuch as the plea of limitation is not available qua the trust property. 17. Alternatively, it is contended by Shri.S.Vinod Bhat, learned Counsel for the appellant that, at any rate if Article 107 does not apply, then Article 113 must apply and thus the suit is barred by limitation since it is filed beyond three years from the date of death of the father of the appellant. According to the learned Counsel going by Ext.A2(B2) deed dated 21.05,1991, the grandfather of the appellant was entrusted with the management of the temple and thereafter it is continued by his father and then by him. The fallacy in the above argument stems out the fact that, Ext.A2 document, is stated to be an assignment deed, [a copy which has been placed for perusal of this Court]. But a reading of the document shows that the same is nothing but a conferment of right to manage the temple because of the old age of the then eldest member of the family. On a conspectus reading of the document, this Court is persuaded to hold that, no hereditary right was vested with the grandfather of the appellant. What was conveyed to him is only the right of management, which ceased to have effect once the eldest member of the family expired. Therefore, consequently the father of the appellant lost the entire right to manage the temple. 18. In the light of indisputable fact that the father of the appellant lost the right to manage the temple on the death of late Raghavan, it remains to be seen whether the plea based on Article 113 will sustain. 19. Under Article 113 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963, for a suit for which no period is prescribed under the Act, a 3 years period is provided. Article 113 reads as under:- 20. 19. Under Article 113 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963, for a suit for which no period is prescribed under the Act, a 3 years period is provided. Article 113 reads as under:- 20. Article 113 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963, is a residual Article, which is applied, when no other period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule. The period is three years and starts from the date, when the right to sue accrues. In the present case, it is indisputable that late Raghavan, who was the eldest member conferred with the right to manage the 1 st plaintiff-temple, entrusted the management to his sons Chellappan and Damodaran and later Chellappan entrusted the same to his son / the appellant. At the time of execution of the deed, Chellappan had only a right of management, which is akin to a delegation of powers of management by the eldest member of the family. Therefore, this Court is inclined to think that, no proprietary rights over the property got assigned to Chellappan. After the death of Raghavan, it is inevitable for this Court to conclude that the power of management with Chellppan also ceased to have effect and ideally an election of the eldest member of the family to manage the 1st plaintiff-temple ought to have been conducted. The fact that neither Chellappan nor the appellant undertook such process ipso facto will not denude the right of the 2nd plaintiff to claim a declaratory relief that he is the eldest member of the family and therefore entitled to manage the 1 st plainti certainly is a continuing right and therefore the right to sue accrues on the refusal on the part of the appellant to recognise the eldest member of the family. At any rate, the question as to whether the 1 st plainti private trust or a public trust was resolved only on conclusion of the litigation before this Court as A.S No.35/2002 and therefore the right if any accrued to the 2nd plaintiff could only be after the conclusion of the litigation. Thus, the right to sue accrued at any point of time on or after 13.02.2019, that is the date of disposal of A.S No.35/2002. Thus, the right to sue accrued at any point of time on or after 13.02.2019, that is the date of disposal of A.S No.35/2002. So long as, the right of the 2 nd plaintiff is not lost due to any reasons and that the same being a continued cause of action, it is difficult to envisage a situation where the suit could be said to be barred by limitation by applying the rigour of Article 113 of the LIMITATION ACT . 21. Although the question of limitation need not be raised or pleaded and going by Section 3 of the LIMITATION ACT 1963, it is the duty of the court to see whether the suit is prima facie within the period of limitation, its application in this case is without any doubt to be answered in negative because when the management of a private trust is involved, the question of limitation does not arise at all. The result of the above discussion leads to an irresistible conclusion that the appeal must fail for want of any substantial question of law. Accordingly the same is dismissed. Costs made easy.