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2025 DIGILAW 285 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Khanabhai Shindhav

2025-03-18

S.V.PINTO

body2025
JUDGMENT : (S. V. PINTO, J.) 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant- State under Section 378 (1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rajkot (hereinafter referred to as "the learned Trial Court") in Sessions Case No. 45 of 2011 on 20.01.2012, whereby, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondents for the offence punishable under Sections 498(A) , 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ( IPC ). 1.1 The respondents are hereinafter referred to as “the accused” as they stood in the original case for the sake of convenience, clarity and brevity. 2. The brief facts that emerge from the record of the case are as under:- 2.1] The accused No. 1 is the husband and the accused Nos. 2 and 3 are the father-in-law and mother-in-law of deceased Manjuben respectively. The accused No. 1 had illicit relations with some other woman and all the three accused used to mentally and physically harass the deceased and the harassment and torture was to such an extent that on 26th December 2010, Manjuben sprinkled kerosene on herself and set herself ablaze at the house of the accused in Indiranagar. She was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment and while she was at the hospital under treatment, she filed a complaint, which was recorded by the ACP West Zone, Rajkot. She expired during treatment on 19th December 2010, and the complaint was filed under Sections 498A , 306 and 114 of the IPC , which was registered at Mahila Police Station, II-C.R.No. 261 of 2010. 2.2] The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of the connected witnesses and collected the necessary documents and after completion of investigation the police filed the chargesheet against the accused before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajkot and as the said offences against the accused were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Sessions Court, Rajkot as per the provisions of Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the case was registered Sessions Case No. 45 of 2011. 2.3] The accused were duly served with the summons and the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court, and it was verified whether the copies of all the police papers were provided to the accused as per the provisions of Section 207 of the Code and a charge at Exh. 13 was framed against the accused and the statements of the accused were recorded at Exhs. 14 and 16 respectively, wherein, the accused denied all the contents of the charge and the entire evidence of the prosecution was taken on record. 2.4] The prosecution produced sixteen oral evidences and fourteen documentary evidences to bring home the charge against the accused and after the learned Additional Public Prosecutor filed the closing pursis at Exh.57, the further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were recorded, wherein, the accused denied all the evidence of the prosecution on record. The accused refused to step into the witness box or examine witnesses on their behalf and stated that a false case has been filed against them. After the arguments of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and the learned advocate for the accused were heard, the learned trial Court by the impugned judgment and order was pleased to acquit all the accused from all the charges leveled against them. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgement and order of acquittal, the appellant - State has filed the present appeal mainly stating that the impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to law and evidence on record and the learned Trial Court has not appreciated the fact that all the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and during cross-examination, nothing adverse has been elicited in favour of the respondent. The case has been proved beyond reasonable doubts and the prosecution has successfully established the case against the respondent and the judgement and order of acquittal is unwarranted, illegal and without any basis in the eyes of law and the reasons stated while acquitting the respondent are improper, perverse and bad in law. Hence the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Heard learned APP Ms. Dhwani Tripathi, for the appellant State. Though served, the respondents have chosen not to appear either in person or through an advocate. Hence the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Heard learned APP Ms. Dhwani Tripathi, for the appellant State. Though served, the respondents have chosen not to appear either in person or through an advocate. Perused the impugned judgement and order of acquittal and have reappreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. Learned APP Ms. Dhwani Tripathi has taken this Court through the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case and submitted that the judgment and order of acquittal is contrary to law and evidence on record and the learned trial Court has not appreciated the direct and indirect evidence in the case. That the complainant has supported the case of the prosecution, which is corroborated by the deposition of the medical officer and the witnesses have identified the accused before the learned trial Court. The prosecution has fully proved the case beyond reasonable doubts but the learned trial Court has relied on minor contradictions and has given undue weightage with regard to the place of incident. That the order passed by the learned trial Court is illegal, improper and perverse and is required to be quashed and set aside and the appeal of the appellant must be allowed. 6. At the outset, before discussing the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the observations of the Apex Court in acquittal appeals in the case of Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2007 (4) SCC 415 , wherein, the Apex Court has observed as under: Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., (2006) 10 SCC 313 : AIR 2006 SC 831 , this Court stated; "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". (emphasis supplied) From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.. 7. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.. 7. The law with regard to acquittal appeals is well crystallized and in acquittal appeals, there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and it has finally culminated when a case ends in an acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and when the learned Trial Court has come to a conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubts, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets strengthened. There is no inhibition to re appreciate the evidence by the Appellate Court but if after re appre- ciation, the view taken by the learned Trial Court was a possible view, there is no reason for the Appellate Court to interfere in the same. 8. As the appeal pertains to a case under Section 306 of the IPC , it would be appropriate to reproduce the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Awase vs The State of Madhya Pradhesh Criminal Appeal No. 221/2025 (@ SLP(Cr) No. 11868/2023) passed on 17 th January, 2025 which is as under: 11. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under:- “306. Abetment of suicide. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”12. Section 107 of the IPC reads as under:- “107. Abetment of a thing.-A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First. - Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly. - Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly. - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.” As is clear from the plain language of the Sections to attract the ingredient of Section 306, the accused should have abetted the commission of a suicide. - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.” As is clear from the plain language of the Sections to attract the ingredient of Section 306, the accused should have abetted the commission of a suicide. A person abets the doing of a thing who Firstly - instigates any person to do that thing or Secondly - engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing or Thirdly - intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 13. In Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P. and Another, [1995 Supp (3) SCC 438], the appellant remarked to the deceased that 'go and die' and the deceased thereafter, committed suicide. This Court held that:- "3. ...Those words are casual nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarreling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite 'mens rea' on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events. …" 14. In Madan Mohan Singh vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (2010) 8 SCC 628 , this Court held that in order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result of that abetment is required. It was further held that the intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for attracting Section 306 . 15. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal , (2010) 1 SCC 707 , this Court held as under:- “12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC , the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. [Emphasis supplied] 16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC . 17. M. Mohan vs. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626 followed Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 , wherein it was held as under:- 41. This Court in SCC para 20 of Ramesh Kumar has examined different shades of the meaning of "instigation". Para 20 reads as under: (SCC p. 629) “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation." In the said case this Court came to the conclusion that there is no evidence and material available on record where-from an inference of the appellant accused having abetted commission of suicide by Seema (the appellant's wife therein) may necessarily be drawn.” Thereafter, this Court in Mohan (supra) held:- 45. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide.” [Emphasis supplied] 9. In light of the above settled principles of law, the evidence on record of the case is appreciated and the prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 1 Mansukhbhai Veljibhai at Exhibit 20 and Prosecution Witness No. 2 Ganeshbhai Mohanbhai Makwana at Exhibit 23 and the witnesses are the panch witnesses of the panchnama of the place of offence, which is produced at Exhibit 21. Both the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and have been declared hostile and during the lengthy cross-examination by the learned APP, nothing to support the case of the prosecution has come on record. 9.1 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 3 Amarshibhai Lavjibhai Makwana at Exhibit 24 and Prosecution Witness No. 4 Manjulaben Lakhabhai at Exhibit 27 and both the witnesses are the panch witnesses of the inquest panchnama, which is produced at Exhibit 25. Both the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and have been declared hostile. During the lengthy cross-examination by the learned APP, nothing to support the case of the prosecution has come on record. Both the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and have been declared hostile. During the lengthy cross-examination by the learned APP, nothing to support the case of the prosecution has come on record. 9.2 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 5 Subhashbhai Jerambhai Dholakiya at Exhibit 28 and Prosecution Witness No. 7 Mahesh Jesingbhai at Exhibit 33 and both the witnesses are the panch witnesses of the panchnama, by which the accused Nos. 2and 3 were arrested, but both the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and have been declared hostile. During the lengthy cross-examination by the learned APP, nothing to support the case of the prosecution has come on record. 9.3 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 6 Dhansukhbhai Nathalal Ashra at Exhibit 30 and the witness is is the Scientific Officer, who was working at Rajkot on 16-12-2010, when he received a telephone call from Gandhigram Police Station requesting him to visit the place of incident for the intimation, which was given at Janvajog Entry No.1018 of 2010 on 16-12-2010. The witness has stated that he had gone along with the government vehicle to the place of incident and examined the place which was a one room house admeasuring 12 feet X 12 feet. On the right side near the door was a white-colored plastic cane containing one litre kerosene and near the can was a wick primus stove. The tank of the primus stove was open and the cork of the tank of the primus stove was near the stove and a matchbox was lying nearby. There were burnt matchsticks and pieces of burnt synthetic cloth and the door of the room was intact. Instructions were given to the Investigating Officer to seize the necessary articles and the report was filed by the witness which is produced at Exhibit 31. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that there was no smell of kerosene in the matchsticks and matchbox and there was no evidence of any breakage in the room. The room was not closed from inside and no smell of kerosene was on the stopper of the door. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that there was no smell of kerosene in the matchsticks and matchbox and there was no evidence of any breakage in the room. The room was not closed from inside and no smell of kerosene was on the stopper of the door. There were items of cooking at that place near the “Ashok Stove” and he had noted that the vessels for cooking were also at the place of incident but in the report he has not mentioned presence of the vessels of cooking at the place of incident. 9.4 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 8 Dr. Altafbhai Osamanbhai at Exhibit 35 and the witness is is the Medical Officer who was on duty at Civil Hospital Rajkot on 16th May 2010. The witness has stated that Manjuben Dilipbhai resident of Rajkot was brought to the hospital at around 1 pm with burn injuries and as per her say, while she was cooking, the kerosene in the primus stove got over and she tried to fill kerosene in the stove and got burnt. She was conscious and had sustained burn injuries on her legs below the waist and had 1st and 2nd degree burns. Kerosene smell was emitting from her body and she was admitted in the hospital in ward No. 1 and she expired on 19th December, 2010. The witness has produced the medical papers at Exhibit 36 and he and panel doctor Dr. D.N. Shapra conducted the post- mortem on the dead body of deceased Manjuben on 20th December, 2010 at 6.10 pm. The dead body had sustained 92% burn injuries and no other injuries were found on the body except the burn injuries. The cause of death was septicemic shock due to extreme burns on the whole body. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that the deceased was burnt at many places with 1st and 2nd degree burns and had sustained 92% burn injuries and a person would be conscious and thereafter unconscious with such type of burn injuries. That, if carbon dioxide enters into the body and into the blood, there is an effect on the brain and the thinking process and on examining the injured, it could be concluded that the carbon particles have affected the thinking. That, if carbon dioxide enters into the body and into the blood, there is an effect on the brain and the thinking process and on examining the injured, it could be concluded that the carbon particles have affected the thinking. That when the patient was brought to him for treatment she was in a lot of pain and was administered Dichlor injections and Tramadol injection for the pain. The condition of the patient was poor on 16 th December, 2010 and oxygen was also being given to her. That, if carbon particles have entered into the throat, the patient would have difficulty in speaking and hearing and would not be able to understand what the person is saying and would go into a state of unconsciousness. That injury of such a nature would also affect the central nervous system and besides the burn injuries, there were no injuries on the dead body of the deceased. 9.5 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 9 Pravinkumar Vrajlal Ranchchh at Exhibit 39 and the witness is the Executive Magistrate, who has recorded the dying declaration of the deceased, which is produced at Exhibit 40. The witness has stated that he had gone to the Civil Hospital Rajkot in the Burns ward and recorded the dying declaration of Manjuben on 16 th December, at 16:10 hours and she had stated that the incident had occurred at 11:45 hours at her house and she had a fight with her husband as he had illicit relations with another lady and she told him to kill her but he told her to go and die and she sprinkled kerosene on herself and she lit one or two matchsticks and got burnt. During the cross examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that he had verified whether the patient was a tutored or in some fear but he has not made a note of the same in the dying declaration. The relatives of the patient were present before he had recorded the dying declaration and he had asked them to leave the room. That the patient was very seriously burnt and when he had seen the patient there were bandages on her face and she was in a lot of pain. The relatives of the patient were present before he had recorded the dying declaration and he had asked them to leave the room. That the patient was very seriously burnt and when he had seen the patient there were bandages on her face and she was in a lot of pain. The dying declaration does not state that it was read over and explained to her and she has affixed her thumb impression and that she had stated that she was conscious. That the doctor did not examine the patient in his presence and she had stated that she was residing with her husband and children. 9.6 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 10 Merubhai Ranabhai at Exhibit 42 and the witness is the father of the deceased, who has supported the case of the prosecution. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that his daughter used to come on festivals with the son-in-law and she would be sent happily to her matrimonial home. That, immediately after her marriage within five to six months his daughter had gone to reside separately in a rented accommodation and his daughter has two children, who are with the accused No. 1. That he does not know Dheeraj Vegda and there was an application at the Gandhigram Police Station, fifteen days prior to the incident. Fifteen days prior to the incident, his daughter had come to his house but she did not mention about any relations with Dheeraj Vegda and the cremation rites of his daughter was done at her matrimonial home. He did not state in his statement before the police that his daughter was burnt by the accused. The accused No. 2 was working in the SRP and his daughter and son-in-law were residing separately for the past four years. That immediately after the incident, his daughter had told him that the accused had poured water on her to save her and had immediately rushed her to the hospital. 9.7 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 11 Nanduben Merubhai at Exhibit 43 and the witness is the mother of the deceased, who has supported the case of the prosecution. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness stated that the accused Nos. 9.7 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 11 Nanduben Merubhai at Exhibit 43 and the witness is the mother of the deceased, who has supported the case of the prosecution. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness stated that the accused Nos. 2 and 3 are residing separately and the accused No. 1 is doing service and residing separately in a rented house. Her daughter used to reside next door and when she went to the hospital, her daughter was in a lot of pain and she could not see her daughter's pain. At the time of the incident, the accused No. 2 was on duty at Ahmedabad and she was rushed to the hospital by her husband. The accused No. 2 was residing in the SRP Quarter at Ghanteshwar and no police case was ever filed during the matrimonial life of her daughter and her daughter and the accused No. 1 used to come to their house on festivals. 9.8 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 12 Hashmukhbhai Merubhai Parmar at Exhibit 44 and the witness is the brother of the deceased, who has supported the case of the prosecution. During the cross examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that his sister and the accused No. 1 and 2 were residing separately and his sister had given an application in the Gandhigram police station about seven months prior to the incident. That his father and he reached the hospital together and he could not see his sister in pain and came out of the room and the policeman had come in the evening. That his sister was taken to the hospital by the accused No. 1 and she was residing separately from her mother-in-law and father-in- law for the past two years. When they reached the hospital, all the accused were present and the accused No. 1 did not have any illicit relations with any other person. 9.9 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 13 Rajeshbhai Merubhai Parmar at Exhibit 45 and the witness is the brother of the deceased, who has supported the case of the prosecution. When they reached the hospital, all the accused were present and the accused No. 1 did not have any illicit relations with any other person. 9.9 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 13 Rajeshbhai Merubhai Parmar at Exhibit 45 and the witness is the brother of the deceased, who has supported the case of the prosecution. During the cross examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that his sister and brother-in-law resided separately for the last two years from the in-laws and the younger brother and sister-in-law were residing with the accused Nos. 2 and 3. That the accused No. 2 on duty at Ahmedabad at the time of the incident. 9.10 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 14 Ramanbhai Sindhabhai Bhagora at Exhibit 46 and the witness was working as the ACP in West Zone, Rajkot and he has conducted the inquiry into Janvajog, which was registered at Gandhigram Police Station on 16 th June 2010. That he had recorded the complaint of Manjuben wife of the Dilipbhai and also the statements of the parents of Manjuben and the complaint was registered at Mahila Police Station. During the cross examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that the injured was brought to the hospital at around 12 in the afternoon and the complaint was recorded at 8 pm. That when he went to the hospital, the family members of the deceased were present and she had suffered burn injuries and was being given oxygen and glucose. That he did not inquire from the doctor, as to whether, the patient was conscious to record the complaint and he has not written the time when the complaint was recorded in the complaint. That he had taken the left impression of the left big toe but the same has not been identified and the deceased has stated that her mother-in-law and husband had sprinkled water on her and had immediately brought her to the hospital for treatment. That in the beginning, he had information that the patient had sustained accidental burns and he had reached the hospital at around 7 p.m. The witness has produced the complaint at exhibit 47. That in the beginning, he had information that the patient had sustained accidental burns and he had reached the hospital at around 7 p.m. The witness has produced the complaint at exhibit 47. 9.11 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 15 Gauriben Dineshbhai Rathod at Exhibit 48 and the witness is the sister of the deceased who has supported the case of the prosecution. 9.12 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 16 Daniben Dhulabhai Vaghela at Exhibit 49 and the witness is is the investigating officer who has narrated in detail the procedure that was undertaken by her during investigation. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that the Janva Jog was inquired into by PSI K.S.Jadeja and the incident had occurred at around 12 noon and the complaint was taken at 8.30 p.m. That she had recorded the statements of the neighbors, at the place of incident, but has not shown them as witnesses in the charge sheet and only the relatives are shown as witnesses in the charge sheet. That immediately an accidental case is brought to the hospital, it is recorded at the Police Chowki in the Civil Hospital, Rajkot but she has not taken the copies of the Station Diary and has not recorded the statement of the officer. It had come to her notice that the deceased had stated before the Medical Officer in the history that while she was cooking the kerosene was over in the primus stove and she tried to fill the kerosene in the stove and was burnt. That, in the panchnama of the place of offence the primus and vessels for cooking were lying and the allegations was that the accused No. 1 was having illicit relations with one Jyotsna Charan but no such person was found during investigation. The accused No. 2 was on duty at Ahmedabad at the time of the incident and the deceased and her husband and children were residing separately from the other accused. That the deceased had made a mobile phone call but no call details were seized. 10. The accused No. 2 was on duty at Ahmedabad at the time of the incident and the deceased and her husband and children were residing separately from the other accused. That the deceased had made a mobile phone call but no call details were seized. 10. On appreciation of the entire evidence of the prosecution, the incident has occurred on 16 th December, 2010 and immediately the accused No. 1 and the accused No. 3 sprinkled water on the deceased and she was brought to the hospital on 16 th December, 2010 at 1 p.m.That while she was brought to the hospital, she herself had given the history to the doctor that while she was cooking the kerosene in the primus stove got over and she tried to fill the kerosene in the stove and she had caught fire accidentally while cooking. The panchnama of the place of offence, which is produced at Exhibit 21 and the FSL report of the place of offence produced at exhibit 31, both state that at the place of incident there was a white colour plastic containing one litre of kerosene in it and the “Ashok Primus Stove” with the open tank and the cork of the tank of the stove was lying at the side with other cooking vessels and items. That the first history given by the deceased when she was immediately brought to the hospital is proved in the panchnama and the FSL report and the complaint which has been recorded at 8 p.m., almost 7 to 8 hours after the incident, has a different version. That immediately after the incident the parents, brothers and sisters of the deceased had come to the hospital and they were seated with her and during that time the dying declaration was recorded at around 16:10 hours and the complaint was recorded at 20:00 hours and the versions given were a different versions than the one given before the Medical Officer. The allegations made in the complaint are that the accused No. 1 had illicit relations with one Jyotsna Charan but the Investigating Officer has stated that no such person by the name of Jyotsna Charan was found during the investigation. The allegations made in the complaint are that the accused No. 1 had illicit relations with one Jyotsna Charan but the Investigating Officer has stated that no such person by the name of Jyotsna Charan was found during the investigation. The learned Trial Court has believed the version stated by the deceased at the first in point of time when she was brought to the hospital, that she had sustained accidental burns and all the evidence of the prosecution has been appreciated in the right perspective. 11. In view of the settled position of law in the decisions of Mahendra Awase (supra), the learned trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in proper perspective and there does not appear to be any infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court was completely justified in extending benefit of doubt and acquitting the accused of the charges leveled against him. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned trial Court and this Court is in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of extending benefit of doubt and acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same is dismissed. 12. The impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rajkot in Sessions Case No. 45 of 2011 on 20.01.2012, is hereby confirmed. 13. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.