JUDGMENT : Virender Singh, J. 1. By virtue of the present appeal, filed under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CrPC’), the State of Himachal Pradesh has assailed the judgment of acquittal dated 09.03.2010, passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No.I, Amb, District Una, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘trial Court’). 2. By way of the judgment of acquittal, dated 09.03.2010, the learned trial Court has acquitted respondent-Ashwani Kumar (hereinafter referred to as the ‘accused’), in Police Challan No.72-II-2005, from the charges, framed against him, under Sections 279 , 337 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ IPC ’). 3. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present appeal, before this Court, as per the record, may be summed up, as under. 4. The police of Police Station, Amb has filed the final report, under Section 173(2) of CrPC, against the accused, before the learned trial Court, mentioning therein that on 14.01.2005, a telephonic information was received in the Police Station, upon which, ASI Ashok Kumar, along with other police officials, had reached at the spot, from where, he came to know about the fact that two injured were rushed to CHC, Gagret for treatment. 5. Subsequently, police party reached CHC, Gagret and moved application, before the Medical Officer, for recording the statement of one injured Rajesh Kumar, upon which, the Medical Officer declared injured Rajesh Kumar unfit to make statement. 6. Thereafter, ASI Surinder Kumar had recorded the statement of one Varun Awasthi, under Section 154 of CrPC, disclosing therein that he is pursuing his Engineering degree and his father is working as ETO on Gagret Barrier. 7. According to the statement of the said Varun Awasthi, before the police, on 14.01.2005, he was on his way back to his home and de-boarded the bus at Mubarikpur. Thereafter, he boarded Maruti Van bearing registration No.HP20-B-2810 and proceeded towards Gagret. The said Maruti Van was driven by one Rajesh Kumar. When, the said Maruti Van, being driven by said Rajesh Kumar, reached about one kilometer ahead of Mubarikpur, then, one Indica car, bearing registration No.HP-19A-8000, being driven by its driver in the wrong direction, came there and hit the said Maruti Van. Rajesh Kumar had applied the brakes, but, the accident could not be avoided and vehicles collided. When, the said Maruti Van, being driven by said Rajesh Kumar, reached about one kilometer ahead of Mubarikpur, then, one Indica car, bearing registration No.HP-19A-8000, being driven by its driver in the wrong direction, came there and hit the said Maruti Van. Rajesh Kumar had applied the brakes, but, the accident could not be avoided and vehicles collided. Due to the impact of collision, the legs of the driver of the Maruti Van pressed in the Van. Number of persons gathered there, who had taken out the said injured from the vehicle. 8. In the said accident, Varun Awasthi had also sustained injuries. According to him, the accident in question had taken place because of the driver of Indica car, whose name, he has disclosed as Ashwani Kumar, as, he had driven his vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. Thereafter, the police registered the case under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC . 9. When, the Investigating Officer of the case was busy in investigation, in the meanwhile, he had received the information that injured Rajesh Kumar expired, while he was being taken to hospital at Hoshiarpur for treatment, upon which, a request for conducting the post- mortem examination of the dead body of Rajesh Kumar was made and accordingly, Section 304A of IPC was added, in this case. 10. After completion of the investigation, the police has submitted the report against the accused, under Sections 279 , 337 and 304A of IPC . 11. After complying with the provisions of Section 207 of IPC and after perusing the report, under Section 173(2) of CrPC, as well as, accompanying documents, the learned trial Court found prima facie case against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 , 337 and 304A of IPC . As such, the accused was charge-sheeted accordingly. When, the charges, so framed, were put to him, he had not admitted his guilt and claimed to be tried. 12. Since the accused had refused to admit his guilt, as such, prosecution was directed to adduce evidence, upon which, the prosecution has examined as many as 12 witnesses. 13. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the entire incriminating evidence, appearing against the accused, was put to him, in his statement, recorded under Section 313 CrPC. 12. Since the accused had refused to admit his guilt, as such, prosecution was directed to adduce evidence, upon which, the prosecution has examined as many as 12 witnesses. 13. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the entire incriminating evidence, appearing against the accused, was put to him, in his statement, recorded under Section 313 CrPC. The accused has denied the entire prosecution case and taken the simplicitor defence that the deceased was driving his vehicle in the wrong direction. However, the accused has not opted to lead any evidence in his defence. 14. Thereafter, the learned trial Court, after hearing learned Additional Public Prosecutor and learned counsel for the accused, has acquitted the accused from the charges, framed against him, in this case, vide judgment dated 09.03.2010. 15. Feeling aggrieved from the judgment of acquittal, the present Criminal Appeal has been preferred, before this Court, on the ground that the learned trial Court has not considered the evidence of PW-4 Mastan Singh, whereas, according to learned Additional Advocate General, the said witness had specifically stated about the negligence, as well as, rashness of the accused. 16. According to the appellant-State, the photographs, clicked by PW-3 and PW-11, have also not been taken into consideration by the learned trial Court and the learned trial Court has wrongly discarded the statements of eye-witnesses, namely Mastan Singh and Varun Awasthi. 17. On the basis of above facts, learned Additional Advocate General has prayed that the present appeal may be accepted and the judgment of acquittal may be set aside by convicting the accused, for the commission of offences, for which, he has been charge-sheeted, in this case. 18. Per contra, Mr. Atharv Sharma, learned counsel, appearing for the accused, has supported the impugned judgment of acquittal and has vehemently argued that the learned trial Court has rightly considered the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and right conclusion has been drawn, which does not require any interference by this Court, while exercising powers of the Appellate Court. Thus, a prayer has been made to dismiss the appeal. 19. The State of Himachal Pradesh is before this Court by way of the present Criminal Appeal, which has been preferred against the judgment of acquittal, passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, a prayer has been made to dismiss the appeal. 19. The State of Himachal Pradesh is before this Court by way of the present Criminal Appeal, which has been preferred against the judgment of acquittal, passed by the learned trial Court. The scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, has elaborately been discussed by the three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anwar Ali & Another Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166 . Relevant paragraphs 14 to 14.3 are reproduced, as under:- “14. Before considering the appeal on merits, the law on the appeal against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal is required to be considered. 14.1. In the case of Babu (supra), this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219 , Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar, (1990) 4 SCC 17 , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 761 , Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Budh Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 9 SCC 731 , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 102 , S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, (2008) 5 SCC 535 , Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 , Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P., (2010) 2 SCC 445 ) 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) “… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.” 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State, AIR 1954 SC 1 , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 ) 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368 , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) “20. … an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.” 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) “(i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.” A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 401 . 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” (emphasis supplied) 14.2 When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence” or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501 , Aruvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 ).”(emphasis supplied) It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10 , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 14.3 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh (supra), this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 . This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233) “10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.” 31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p.416) “8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p.416) “8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this noncompliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court’s judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.” 31.2. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.” 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 , in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 80910) “5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well- established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State, AIR 1952 SC 52 ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 SC 122 ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.’ 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.” (emphasis supplied) 20. With the judgment of acquittal, passed in favour of the accused, the presumption of innocence, which was available to him, at the time of initiation of the trial, becomes double and it is no longer res integra that the Appellate Court should not interfere with the judgment of acquittal, until or unless, the findings, so recorded by the learned trial Court, fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’. 21. The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arulvelu and Another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another, (2009) 10 SCC 206 . Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:- “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: "8. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: "8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re- appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 22. Similar view has again been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari vs. Union of India and Another, (2013) 6 SCC 602 . Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:- “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of Kerala).” 23. It is also no longer res integra that if two views are possible, then the view, which has been adopted by the learned trial Court, has to be adopted by the Appellate Court, while deciding the appeal against the judgment of acquittal. 24. In view of the discussions, made above, now, this Court would proceed further with the evidence, so adduced by the prosecution, in order to find out as to whether the findings, recorded by the learned trial Court, fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’ or not. 25. In this case, there are only two eye-witnesses, one is PW-4 Mastan Singh and other is PW-8 Varun Awasthi. 26. PW-4 Mastan Singh, when appeared in the witness box, has deposed that he had heard the noise of collision of the vehicle. Although, he has deposed that the accident in question had taken place due to the driver of the Indica car, but, categorically stated that he does not know the name of the driver of the said car, but, can identify him. Although, he has deposed that the driver of the Indica car was under the influence of alcohol, but, in the absence of identification of the accused as the driver of the offending Indica car, the said evidence is inconsequential. 27. Admittedly, in this case, no test identification parade was got conducted by the police, nor this witness has even bothered to identify the accused, when, he had made the statement on 23.01.2006, before the learned trial Court. In his statement, he has not even bothered to mention the registration number of the Indica car. In such situation, the learned trial Court has rightly discarded the evidence of this witness to ascertain the guilt of the accused for the commission of the crime, for which, he has been charge-sheeted by the learned trial Court. 28. In his statement, he has not even bothered to mention the registration number of the Indica car. In such situation, the learned trial Court has rightly discarded the evidence of this witness to ascertain the guilt of the accused for the commission of the crime, for which, he has been charge-sheeted by the learned trial Court. 28. So far as the evidence of another star witness i.e. PW-8 Varun Awasthi, is concerned, although, this witness sustained injuries in the accident, but, whatsoever, he has deposed, becomes inconsequential, when, he deposed that he does not identify the car driver, however, his name is stated to be Ashwani Kumar. When, the identification of the accused as driver of the Indica car could not be established even from the evidence of PW-8 Varun Awasthi, then, the accused cannot be convicted mainly on the ground that one valuable life has lost in the accident in question. 29. As stated above, there are only two eye- witnesses and the evidence of both the alleged eye- witnesses is too short to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond any shadow of doubt. 30. No other point has been urged or argued. 31. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the view that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence of the prosecution, in this case, and, thereafter, has rightly acquitted the accused from the charges, framed against him. As such, there is no occasion for this Court to interfere with the findings of the learned trial Court, as, the same do not fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’. 32. Consequently, the judgment of acquittal, passed by the learned trial Court, is upheld and the present appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged. 33. Record be sent back.