JUDGMENT : A. BADHARUDEEN, J. 1. Sri.A.P.Ramachandran, who is the 2 nd accused in C.C.No.18/2009 as well as C.C.No.19/2009 on the files of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kozhikode, is the appellant in both these appeals. The appellant assails common judgment dated 30.03.2017 in the above cases. The State of Kerala, represented by the Vigilance and Anti-corruption Bureau is the respondent herein. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the accused/appellant as well as the learned Special Public Prosecutor in detail. Perused the records of the Special Court as well as the common verdict impugned. 3. I shall refer the parties in these appeals as ‘appellant’ and ‘prosecution’ for easy reference. 4. In both these cases, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Section 13 (2) r/w Sections 13 (1)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PC Act, 1988’) and under Sections 409 , 420, 465, 468, 471 and 477A r/w. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’),by the accused. The prosecution case in C.C.No.18/2009 is that the 2 nd accused, who worked, as public servant as helper, along with 1 st accused, who was the accountant in Hotel Malabar Mansion, Kozhikode, a hotel run by Kerala Tourism Development Corporation, (KTDC), after sharing common intention to make illegal monetary gain, misappropriated a sum of Rs. 1,76,000 in between 25.06.2001 to 20.12.2001 by forging and falsifying the records. In C.C.No.19/2009, the allegation is that, in similar way, in between 15.01.2002 to 21.12.2002 an amount of Rs. 2,60,000 was misappropriated by forging and falsifying the records by the accused. 5. The Special Court framed charge and jointly tried both cases. PW1 to PW17 were examined and Exts.P1 to P64 were marked on the side of the prosecution. During cross-examination of PW3 and PW5, Ext.D1, Ext.D1(a) and Ext.D2 contradictions were marked on the side of the defence. 6. The special court addressed the evidence and found that the accused committed the above offences and accordingly, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as under: “C.C.18/2019 a) He shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the P.C. Act. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the P.C. Act. b) He shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. c) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for offence under Section 409 IPC. d) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for offence under Section 420 IPC. e) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 465 IPC. f) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for offence under Section 468 IPC. g) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 471 IPC h) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for offence under Section 477A IPC i) The substantial sentences of imprisonment shail run concurrently. j) The period of detention, if any, undergone by the accused during the investigation, inquiry or trial of this case, shall be set off against the term of substantive sentences of imprisonment. C.C. 19/2009:- a) He shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the P.C. Act. b) He shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. b) He shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. c) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months for offence under Section 409 IPC. d) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for offence under Section 420 IPC. e) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 465 IPC. f) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months for offence under Section 468 IPC. g) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 471 IPC. h) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for offence under Section 477A IPC. i) The substantial sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. j) The period of detention, if any, undergone by the accused during the investigation, inquiry or trial of this case, shall be set off against the term of substantive sentences of imprisonment.“ 7. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the evidence available is insufficient to fasten criminal culpability upon the appellant, and there is no convincing evidence to prove that the forgery in Ext.P37 series and Ext.P27 series was done by the accused either to hold that he had forged and falsified the records for the purpose of misappropriation as alleged, or he had misappropriated the amounts alleged. 8. Whereas it is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that the evidence of PW5 and PW6, identifying the handwriting and signatures of the appellant, being persons who worked along with the appellant, is sufficient to prove that Ext.P37 series and Ext.P27 series were forged and falsified by the accused by himself, as PW5 and PW6 identified the handwritings therein as that of the appellant. 9. 9. Having considered the rival submissions, points arise for consideration are: 1. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the PC Act,1988 in C.C.18/2009? 2. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988 in C.C.18/2009? 3. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 409 of IPC in C.C.18/2009? 4. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC in C.C.18/2009? 5. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 465 of IPC in C.C.18/2009? 6. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 468 of IPC in C.C.18/2009? 7. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 471 of IPC in C.C.18/2009? 8. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 477A of IPC in C.C.18/2009? 9. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the PC Act, 1988 in C.C.19/2009? 10. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988 in C.C.19/2009? 11. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 409 of IPC in C.C.19/2009? 12. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC in C.C.19/2009? 13. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 465 of IPC in C.C.19/2009? 14. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 468 of IPC in C.C.19/2009? 15. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 471 of IPC in C.C.19/2009? 16. 14. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 468 of IPC in C.C.19/2009? 15. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 471 of IPC in C.C.19/2009? 16. Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 477A of IPC in C.C.19/2009? 17. Whether the impugned verdict would require any interference by this Court. 18. Order to be passed. 10. Point Nos.1 to 18: Assimilating the arguments tendered by both sides, the prosecution case rests on misappropriation based on Ext.P37(b), Ext.P37(d), Ext.P37(f), Ext.P37(h), Ext.P37(j), Ext.P37(l), Ext.P37(n), Ext.P37(p) and Ext.P37(r) to the tune of Rs. 1,76,000 in C.C.No.18/2009 and based on Ext.P37(t), Ext.P37(v), Ext.P37(x), Ext.P27(e), Ext.P27(g), Ext.P27(i), Ext.P27(k), Ext.P27(m), Ext.P27(o) Ext.P27(q), Ext.P27(s), Ext.P27(u) and Ext.P27(w), coming to a total sum of Rs. 2,60,000. The learned Special Judge in paragraph No.44, shown the allegations in tabular form. Since the same are helpful to decide the points raised, the same are extracted as under: Schedule showing the details of misappropriation made by the accused in C.C.18/2009 11. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, insofar as Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series documents, corresponding to Ext.P23 series documents as per the tabular form, are concerned, the same were not written by the accused. According to him, going by the evidence of PW1, who worked as receptionist of the Malabar Mansion hotel of KTDC from 03.03.2003 till 2014, and also PW2, who worked as Manager in the Nothern region of KTDC, from 2002 – 2006, when amounts received by the receptionist, the receptionist would entrust the money to the accountant, in this case, the first accused, who is no more, and the accountant would prepare pay-in-slips after entering the same in the Details of Receipts of Cash and Remittance (DRCR) and then entrust the same to the helper for remitting the amount. But as per the evidence of PW5, who was the receptionist during the relevant period in the same hotel, the above entry in DRCR and preparation of pay-in-slips would be done by the receptionist and the duty of the helper is only remittance. But as per the evidence of PW5, who was the receptionist during the relevant period in the same hotel, the above entry in DRCR and preparation of pay-in-slips would be done by the receptionist and the duty of the helper is only remittance. Therefore, the prosecution case that it was the accused who worked as a helper forged and falsified the counterfoils to show a higher amount therein than the acutal amount remitted in the bank as per the pay-in-slips, marked as Exts.P50, and Ext.P50(a) to P50(u) is an impossibility since the said overt acts could not be done by the helper/appellant. According to him, even though PW5 identified the handwritings and signatures in Ext.P37 series and Ext.P27 series counterfoils of the pay-in-slips as that of the accused, during cross-examination, when he was asked as to whether he had given statement before the police to the effect that PW5 worked along with Sri.A.P.Ramachandran and he was familiar with his handwriting, signatures and initials and also he had witnessed that Sri.A.P.Ramachandran writing, signing and putting initials with suggestion that no such statement was given to the police, he replied that he had nothing to say. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, this is a contradiction. In fact, when the Investigating Officer, who recorded the statement of PW5, was examined, no attempt was made by the learned counsel for the appellant before the Special Court to prove the contradiction after suggesting the same to the Investigating Officer and in fact, legally the contradiction was not proved. It is relevant to note that in this context, the learned Special Public Prosecutor would submit that the learned counsel for the accused vigilantly did not ask this question to the Investigating Officer to prove this contention since in the previous statement of PW5, he had stated so before the police and thus, in fact, no contradiction in the evidence of PW5. 12. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, apart from the evidence of PW5 and PW6, the prosecution did not attempt to get comparison of the handwritings and signatures in Ext.P27 series as well as Ext.P37 series by getting an expert opinion to corroborate the version of PW5 and PW6. He also argued that PW5 and PW6 are not independent witnesses and they are interested witnesses. 13. He also argued that PW5 and PW6 are not independent witnesses and they are interested witnesses. 13. Thus argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that when PW1 and PW2 given evidence that initially DRCR and bank pay-in-slips of counterfoils would be prepared by the accountant or sometimes by the receptionist as stated by PW5, there is no justification to hold that it was the accused prepared Ext.P50 series pay-in-slips as well as Ext.P37 series and Ext.P27 series counterfoils. In this regard, the learned Special Public Prosecutor specifically relied on the evidence of PW5 to the effect that there was practice to deal with the reception section by different officers. In the instant case, the allegation is that the accused after suppressing the pay-in-slips prepared by the receptionist prepared pay-in-slips in his own handwriting and used to remit the amount to the bank. 14. On perusal of the evidence of PW6, he supported Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series. Apart from that, he had deposed that he was familiar with Shri.A.P. Ramachandran (appellant), his handwriting, signatures, and initials, and he had repeatedly witnessed Shri.A.P.Ramachandran writing, signing, and initialing documents. Therefore, his evidence is that the handwritings in Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series are that of Shri.A.P. Ramachandran. 15. Section 47 of the Evidence Act, 1872 provides the mode of proof to be complied with for establishing disputed handwriting, it is apposite to refer Section 47 which reads as under: “47. Opinion as to hand-writing, when relevant. –– When the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed that it was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact. –– When the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed that it was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact. Explanation- a person is said to be acquainted with the hand-writing of another person when he has seen that person write, or when he has received documents purporting to be written by that person in answer to documents written by himself or under his authority and addressed to that person, or when, in the ordinary course of business, documents purporting to be written by that person have been habitually submitted to him.” Explanation to Section 47 provides how a person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another person by explaining the three modalities for the same. The explanation to Section 47 provides that a person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another person when he had seen that person write and such a person is competent to prove the disputed handwriting of a particular person. 16. In the instant case, even though it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that PW5 and PW6 are interested witnesses, in fact, nothing was extracted to find so in the instant case and therefore, the evidence of PW5, which is in conformity with the explanation to Section 47 of the Evidence Act, is sufficient to prove that the handwritings in Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series are that of the accused. Thus the prosecution succeeded in proving that Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series are written by the accused and he was the person entrusted with the amounts collected as per Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series. 17. Here, PW12 was examined by the prosecution to prove Ext.P54 sanction issued by him to take cognizance against both accused persons and to prosecute him, and there is no challenge to the said submission. As regards the evidence of PW1, it is confined to the marking of Exts.P2 to P4 pay-in-slips maintained during the period from 19.11.2001 to 28.12.2002. 17. Here, PW12 was examined by the prosecution to prove Ext.P54 sanction issued by him to take cognizance against both accused persons and to prosecute him, and there is no challenge to the said submission. As regards the evidence of PW1, it is confined to the marking of Exts.P2 to P4 pay-in-slips maintained during the period from 19.11.2001 to 28.12.2002. It was through him that Ext.P5 and Ext.P5(a) Daily Sales Registers maintained by the respondent, as well as Exts.P6, P6(a) and P7 Daily Sales Registers maintained at the snacks bar of the Malabar Mansion Hotel, were proved. Apart from that, Ext.P8 and Ext.P8(a) to P8(o), which are the carbon copies of the reception receipt books used in the reception during the period from 10.11.2001 to 27.12.2002, were also tendered in evidence through PW1. Ext.P9, the internal audit report for the period from 01.04.2002 to 30.09.2002, and Ext.P10, the internal audit report for the half year ending on 31.03.2003, were also tendered in evidence through him, apart from proving the entries produced in the Ext.P2 series Daily Sales Register book of the beer and wine parlour. 18. Coming to the evidence of PW9, he deposed in the mode of collection and remittance of the amounts as argued by the learned counsel for the accused. Here, the prosecution relied on Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series counterfoils to show that they were forged by the accused in his own handwriting after remitting the amounts as per Ext.P50(a) to Ext.P50(u) before the bank, showing a lesser sum than the amounts actually collected, as shown in the tabular form already extracted above. 19. Here, the prosecution relied on Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series counterfoils to show that they were forged by the accused in his own handwriting after remitting the amounts as per Ext.P50(a) to Ext.P50(u) before the bank, showing a lesser sum than the amounts actually collected, as shown in the tabular form already extracted above. 19. Even though it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the accused, who worked as helper, was assigned the duty to remit the amounts as alleged by the prosecution, he had remitted the amounts as per Ext.P50(a) to (u) pay-in-slips and had entrusted the counterfoils marked as Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series to the accountant, he did not know the corrections, manipulations and falsification of forged documents carried out by somebody and therefore, he is innocent and the finding of the special court is wrong this contention could not be digested because of the simple reason, as alleged by the prosecution, all the entries in Ext.P50, Ext.P50(a) to Ext.P50(u), Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series are in the handwriting of the same person and the manipulations also were carried out at the instance of the same person and according to PW5 the handwritings in Ext.P50, Ext.P50(a) to (u), Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series are in the handwritings of the accused. When the question as whether who comitted forgery and falsification of Ext.P37 series and Ext.P27 series, the evidence of PW5 in this regard identifying the handwritings in the above documents as that of the accused is not at all shaken in cross-examination by the manner known to law. Therefore, the Special Court has rightly found that the forgery, falsification, and use of the same were carried out at the instance of the accused, and accordingly, the said amounts were misappropriated by the accused/appellant. That apart, it could be seen that once the amount is entrusted to the accused as a helper and when the amount remitted was something less than the actual amount as per the DRCR register, marked as Ext.P23(a), Ext.P23(a) (2), P23(a)(4), P23(a)(6), P23(b)(2), P23(b)(4), P23(a)(6), Ext.P23(b)(8) and Ext.P23(b)(10) responsibility falls on the accused to account for the amount he got entrusted. Here, the case is that, he had got entrustment of only the amount shown in Ext.P50(a) to Ext.P50(u) series. Here, the case is that, he had got entrustment of only the amount shown in Ext.P50(a) to Ext.P50(u) series. But when the handwritings in Ext.P37 series and Ext.P27 series compared with Ext.P25 and Ext.P55(a) to Ext.P55(u), it is already found that all these handwritings are that of the accused. 20. It is true that the prosecution did not attempt to get corroborative opinion evidence with the aid of an expert to prove the handwriting of the accused in Ext.P37 series and Ext.P27 series as well as Ext.P50 series documents. The law is well settled that in the absence of corroborative evidence also, substantive evidence alone is sufficient to find commission of offences and the law is well settled that corroborative evidence alone could not be relied on to find commission of offences without the support of the substantive evidence. 21. In this connection, it is necessary to refer the ingredients to attract offence under Section 409 of IPC. Section 409 of IPC is extracted as hereunder: “409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent: Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 22. Section 409 is pari materia to Section 316(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (`BNS’ for short) and Section 316(5) of BNS reads as under: “316(5): Criminal breach of trust: Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”” 23. Analysing the ingredients to attract offence under Section 409 of IPC, its applicability is as held by the Apex Court in Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh , (2012) 8 SCC 547 : AIR 2012 SC 3242 , as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 24. In Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh ’s case (supra), the Apex Court, while upholding the conviction held that, where the appellant, an agent entrusted with the distribution of the rice under the “Food for Work Scheme” to the workers on production of coupons, was charged with misappropriation of 67.65 quintals of rice, the evidence proves that there was entrustment of property to the accused therein. 25. In order to sustain a conviction under Section 409 of the IPC, two ingredients are to be proved; namely, (i) the accused, a public servant or a banker or agent was entrusted with the property of which he is duty bound to account for; and (ii) the accused has committed criminal breach of trust. What amounts to criminal breach of trust is provided under Section 405 IPC. The basic requirements to bring home the accusation under Section 405 IPC are to prove conjointly; (i) entrustment and (ii) whether the accused was actuated by a dishonest intention or not, misappropriated it or converted it to his own use or to the detriment of the persons who entrusted it, as held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh ’s case (supra). 26. The gravamen of the offence under Section 409 of IPC is dishonest intention on the part of the accused but to establish the dishonest intention, it is not necessary that the prosecution should establish an intention to retain permanently, the property misappropriated. An intention, wrongfully to deprive the owner of the use of the property for a time and to secure the use of that property for his own benefit for a time would be sufficient. Section 409 of IPC cannot be construed as implying that any head of an office, who is negligent in seeing that the rules about remitting money to the treasury are observed, is ipso facto, guilty of criminal breach of trust; but something more than that is required to bring home the dishonest intention. 27. Section 409 of IPC cannot be construed as implying that any head of an office, who is negligent in seeing that the rules about remitting money to the treasury are observed, is ipso facto, guilty of criminal breach of trust; but something more than that is required to bring home the dishonest intention. 27. Tracing the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 477A of IPC, Section 477A provides as under: “ Section 477A – Falsification of Accounts : “Whoever, being a clerk, officer or servant, or employed or acting in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant, willfully, and with intent to defraud, destroys, alters, mutilates or falsifies any book, electronic record, paper, writing, valuable security or account which belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, or has been received by him for or on behalf of his employer, or willfully, and with intent to defraud, makes or abets the making of any false entry in, or omits or alters or abets the omission or alteration of any material particular from or in any such book, electronic record, paper, writing, valuable security or account, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 28. Section 344 of BNS is corresponding to Section 477A of IPC. The same reads as under: “344. Falsification of accounts:- Whoever, being a clerk, officer or servant, or employed or acting in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant, wilfully, and with intent to defraud, destroys, alters, mutilates or falsifies any book, electronic record, paper, writing, valuable security or account which belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, or has been received by him for or on behalf of his employer, or wilfully, and with intent to defraud, makes or abets the making of any false entry in, or omits or alters or abets the omission or alteration of any material particular from or in, any such book, electronic record, paper, writing, valuable security or account, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 29. The three ingredients to prove the offences are: (i) That at the relevant point of time, the accused should be a clerk or officer or servant or acting in that capacity ; (ii) That he should destroy, alter, mutilate or falsify any book, electronic record, paper, writing, valuable security or account, which belongs to or was in the possession of his employer and (iii) The act should have been done willfully and with an intention to defraud. To convict a person under section 477A of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove that there was a willful act, which had been made with an intent to defraud and while proving “Intention to defraud”, the prosecution has to further prove the two elements that the act was an act of deceit and it had caused an injury. In the present case, there may be an injury, but there is no deceit. 30. For the offence under Section 477A of IPC, what has got to be proved is twofold viz., that the person who commits the offence is a clerk, officer or servant, and secondly, that there was intent to defraud. It is sufficient, to satisfy the words of the section, to prove that the person charged under this section is one who undertakes to perform and does perform the duties of a clerk or servant whether in fact he is a clerk or servant or not, and though he is under no obligation to perform such duties and receives no remuneration. The emphasis is upon the words "in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant”. 31. To attract Section 477A , the-employee concerned must destroy, alter, mutilate or falsify book or accounts etc, of the employer, inter alia, with intent to defraud. The term "intend to defraud" has already been explained in Section 25 of IPC. It contains two elements, viz., deceit and injury. A person is said to deceive another when by practising suggestio falsi or suppressio veri or both, he intentionally induces another to believe a thing to be true. "Injury" defined in Section 44 of IPC means any harm whatever illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation and property. In the decision reported in Harman Singh v. Delhi Administration , 1976 Cri. L.J. 913 (SC) : 1976 Cr. "Injury" defined in Section 44 of IPC means any harm whatever illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation and property. In the decision reported in Harman Singh v. Delhi Administration , 1976 Cri. L.J. 913 (SC) : 1976 Cr. L.R. (SC) 178 : (1976) 2 SCC 819 : AIR 1976 SC 2140 the Apex Court held that whenever the words "fraud" or "intent to defraud" or "fraudulently" occur in the definition of a crime, two elements at least are essential to the commission of the crime; namely, firstly, deceit or an intention to deceive or in some cases mere secrecy; and, secondly, either actual injury or possible injury or an intent to expose some person either to actual injury to a risk of possible injury by means of that deceit or secrecy. Where the accused prepared a false travelling allowance bill, presented it to a sub-treasury and withdrew the amount, it meant securing an advantage by deceitful act and causing corresponding loss to the State. The offence will fall under Section 477A and the fact that the accused subsequently paid over the entire amount is not a matter to be considered. 32. As per Section 13 (1)(c) and (d) of the PC Act, 1988, a public servant is said to come under the offence of `criminal misconduct’, if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or if he,— (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest. 33. Similarly, use of forged documents as genuine would attract penal consequence under Section 471 of IPC. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that no attempt was made to obtain expert opinion in this case is of no significance, since by substantive evidence, the prosecution case is proved beyond reasonable doubt with the aid of Section 47 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that no attempt was made to obtain expert opinion in this case is of no significance, since by substantive evidence, the prosecution case is proved beyond reasonable doubt with the aid of Section 47 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Even though it is argued by the learned counsel for the accused/appellant that maintenance of a passbook showing the remittance of the actual amount also was a practice, as stated by PW2 and PW7, in fact, the evidence available would show that such a practice was not followed in relation to the amounts misappropriated and that is the reason why the prosecution could not seize any passbooks. In fact, in the instant case, it has been established that the accused himself prepared Ext.P27 series and Ext.P37 series as well as Ext.P50 series documents and he had no explanation regarding what happened to the amounts actually he got custody, though he failed to remit the entire amount, as discussed herein above. Therefore, this contention of feeble nature would not serve any purpose and the same is negatived. Thus, none of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the accused to assail the common verdict found acceptable and the resultant outcome is that the conviction found to be sustainable and thus the same does not require any interference. 34. Coming to the sentence, taking note of the facts of the case involved and the plea raised by the learned counsel for the accused to reduce the sentence, I am inclined to modify the sentence. 35. In the result, these appeals are allowed in part. Conviction imposed by the special court for the offences punishable under Section 13 (2) r/w Section 13 (1)(c) and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988 as well as under Sections 409 , 420, 465, 468, 471 and 477A of IPC in both cases is confirmed. The sentence is interfered and modified as under: C.C.18/2019 a) He shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the P.C. Act. b) He shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the P.C. Act. b) He shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. c) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for offence under Section 409 IPC. d) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for offence under Section 420 IPC. e) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 465 IPC. f) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for offence under Section 468 IPC. g) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 471 IPC h) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for offence under Section 477A IPC i) The substantial sentences of imprisonment shail run concurrently. j) The period of detention, if any, undergone by the accused during the investigation, inquiry or trial of this case, shall be set off against the term of substantive sentences of imprisonment. C.C. 19/2009:- a) He shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for eight months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the P.C. Act. b) He shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for eight months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. b) He shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for eight months for offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. c) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months for offence under Section 409 IPC. d) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for offence under Section 420 IPC. e) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 465 IPC. f) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty thousand only) and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months for offence under Section 468 IPC. g) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 471 IPC. h) He shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 477A IPC. i) The substantial sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. j) The period of detention, if any, undergone by the accused during the investigation, inquiry or trial of this case, shall be set off against the term of substantive sentences of imprisonment. 36. The orders suspending sentence and granting bail to the accused stand cancelled and the bail bonds executed by the accused also stand cancelled. The accused is directed to surrender before the Special Court, forthwith, to undergo the modified sentence, failing which, the Special Court is directed to execute the sentence, without fail. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Special Court, forthwith, without fail, for information and compliance.